M.P. State Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari

A cyclist was electrocuted by a live wire lying on a road. The Electricity Board said a stranger had stolen electricity from its line and the wire had fallen. The Supreme Court held the Board liable under the rule of strict liability, and held that the act of a stranger was not a defence for the Board.

Quick Revision

Read the full judgment: Indian Kanoon (unofficial copy)

Parties

Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (the Board) — appellant; the statutory supplier of electricity in the locality.

Shail Kumari and others — respondents, as the case title shows; the claimants who sued were the widow and the minor son of Jogendra Singh (para 4). The judgment text does not name them.

Hari Gaikwad — third respondent (para 4); the alleged pilferer, who denied taking the line (para 5).

Jogendra Singh — the victim; a workman in a factory, aged 37.

Procedural History

1. The widow and minor son sued the Board for compensation of Rs 6.9 lacs (para 6).
2. The trial court assessed the compensation at Rs 4.34 lacs, but denied it because the claimants "failed to prove who was liable for the above compensation" (para 6).
3. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed the claimants' appeal and directed the Board to pay Rs 4.34 lacs (para 6).
4. The Board appealed to this Court. Leave was granted, and notice to the respondents was dispensed with (paras 1-2).
5. The Court dismissed the appeal on 11 January 2002 without issuing notice to the respondents (para 16).

Facts

1. Jogendra Singh, a factory workman aged 37, was cycling home on the night of 23 August 1997 (para 3).
2. A live electric wire lay on the road, which was partially under water after rain. He did not notice it and rode over it. The wire twitched and snatched him, and he was instantly electrocuted and died within minutes (para 3).
3. Nobody disputed that he died at the stated time and place, or that a live wire on the road electrocuted him (para 4).
4. The Board said Hari Gaikwad had taken a wire from the main supply line to siphon energy for his own use. It said this was done clandestinely without the Board's notice, and the line got unfastened from the hook and fell on the road (para 4).
5. Hari Gaikwad denied liability, denied the pilferage and disowned having taken the line (para 5).
6. The claim was Rs 6.9 lacs, and the trial court assessed Rs 4.34 lacs (para 6).
7. The High Court noted that in paragraph 5 of Ex. P/6 the Board said it kept staff to prevent pilferage and had no knowledge of the pilferage by Hari Gaikwad. It reasoned that the line was a live wire, whether or not put there by Hari Gaikwad, and the Board's defences were without basis and an attempt to conceal the real position (para 6).

Issues Raised

1. Is the supplier of electricity liable to compensate for a death from a live wire on a public road, even if a stranger pilfered current (paras 2, 7)?
2. Does the rule of strict liability apply, and can the exception of the act of a stranger help the Board (paras 8-14)?

Arguments Contended

For the appellant Board:

• The electrocution was due to clandestine pilferage by a stranger unauthorisedly siphoning electric energy from the supply line, so the wrongdoer alone should pay damages (para 2).
• Hari Gaikwad had taken a wire from the main supply line, without the Board's notice, and the line got unfastened from the hook and fell on the road (para 4).
• The Board relied on the exception of the act of a stranger to the rule of strict liability (para 13).

For the respondents: the Court did not seek the respondents' help and dispensed with notice (para 2). The judgment records only Hari Gaikwad's denial of liability and pilferage (para 5).

Court's Reasoning

The judgment is by K.T. Thomas, J. for the Bench of K.T. Thomas and S.N. Phukan, JJ. Paragraph numbers are those of the judgment.

K.T. Thomas, J. (for the Bench)

1. Noted: The Board strives to squirm out of its liability to the dependents of the sole victim of a snap electrocution. The trial court agreed with the Board, and the High Court disagreed. (para 2)
2. Noted: After hearing counsel for the Board, the Court does not see the need for the help of the respondents, so notice to them is dispensed with. (para 2)
3. Noted: The facts of the death, the Board's plea of pilferage by Hari Gaikwad and his denial are set out. (paras 3-5)
4. Noted: The trial court assessed Rs 4.34 lacs but refused it on the ground that the claimants failed to prove who was liable. The High Court directed the Board to pay. (para 6)
5. Noted: It is admitted that the statute gave the Board the responsibility to supply electric energy in the locality. If the energy causes injury or death to a person who is unknowingly trapped, the primary liability to compensate is that of the supplier. (para 7)
6. Held: As long as the voltage is potentially dangerous, the managers of supply have the added duty to take all safety measures. They must prevent the escape of energy and ensure that a snapped wire does not remain live on the road. (para 7)
7. Held: "It is no defence on the part of the management of the Board that somebody committed mischief by siphoning such energy". It is for the managers to prevent pilferage by installing necessary devices. (para 7)
8. Held: If a live wire snaps and falls on a public road, the current should automatically be disrupted. Authorities managing such a dangerous commodity have an extra duty to plan measures to prevent such mishaps. (para 7)
9. Held: Even assuming all such measures were adopted, a person who undertakes a hazardous or risky activity is liable under the law of torts to compensate for injury to others, whatever his care. The basis is the foreseeable risk inherent in the nature of the activity. (para 8)
10. Noted: This liability is called strict liability. It differs from liability for negligence. In negligence the defendant is not liable if he did all that could avoid the harm. In strict liability the defendant is liable whether or not he could have avoided the harm by precautions. (para 8)
11. Noted: The doctrine of strict liability began in English common law in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868 Law Reports (3) HL 330). Blackburn, J. said a person who brings on his land and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril. He is prima facie answerable for all the damage that is the natural consequence of its escape. In Blackburn, J.'s words he must keep it at his peril. (para 9)
12. Noted: Seven exceptions were formulated by case law. The Court mentions one, the act of a stranger: if the escape was caused by the unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply. It cites Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn., page 535. (para 10)
13. Noted: The rule of strict liability has been approved and followed in England. The Court cites Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather Plc. (House of Lords). (para 11)
14. Noted: The principle gained approval in India. A Constitution Bench in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India and a Division Bench in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation (printed as Rod Transport in the source) v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai followed Rylands v. Fletcher. Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. ({2001 (2) SCC 9}) repeated it. (para 11)
15. Noted: In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, this Court went beyond strict liability. An enterprise in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate those who are affected by the accident. That liability is not subject to the exceptions in Rylands v. Fletcher. (para 12)
16. Held: The Board's attempt to rely on the exception of the act of a stranger fails. The act of the third respondent should reasonably have been anticipated, or its consequences should have been prevented by the Board. (para 13)
17. Noted: In Northwestern Utilities Ltd. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co. Ltd. ({1936 Appeal Cases 108}), a hotel was destroyed in a fire from natural gas escaping from a fractured welded joint in a pressure main. A third party's underground construction had caused the fracture. The defendant was a public utility company. The Privy Council repelled the defence of a stranger's act. It said the risk was so great that a high degree of care was expected, since the defendant ought to have appreciated the possibility of such a leakage. (para 13)
18. Noted: In Quebec Railway, Light Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry and Ors. ({1920 Law Reports Appeal Cases 662}), the Privy Council said a company supplying electricity is liable without proof of negligence. It rejected the defence that a violent wind disrupted the cables, and high tension current found its way through the low tension cable. (para 14)
19. Held: Merely because an illegal act could be attributed to a stranger does not absolve the Board of liability for the live wire on the road. (para 14)
20. Noted: In W.B. State Electricity Board v. Sachin Banerjee, the Board's defence was that lines were illegally hooked for pilferage. This Court said the Board could not be held negligent on those facts. The question of strict liability was not taken up. (para 15)
21. Held: The Board has no reasonable prospect of succeeding. The appeal is dismissed even without issuing notice to the respondents. (para 16)

Authorities

• Rylands v. Fletcher (1868 Law Reports (3) HL 330): the origin of strict liability. Applied (paras 9, 12-13).
• Winfield on Tort, 15th Edn. (page 535): the act of stranger exception. Cited (para 10).
• Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather Plc. ({1994(1) All England Law Reports (HL) 53}): recent recognition of the doctrine by the House of Lords. Noted (para 11).
• Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India (Constitution Bench) and Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai (Division Bench): followed Rylands v. Fletcher. Noted (para 11).
• Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. ({2001 (2) SCC 9}): reiterated the principle. Noted (para 11).
• M.C. Mehta v. Union of India: the rule of absolute liability, without the Rylands exceptions. Noted (para 12).
• Northwestern Utilities Limited v. London Guarantee and Accident Company, Limited ({1936 Appeal Cases 108}): the stranger exception was rejected. Cited in support (para 13).
• Quebec Railway, Light Heat and Power Company Limited v. Vandry and Ors. ({1920 Law Reports Appeal Cases 662}): an electricity supplier is liable without proof of negligence. Cited in support (para 14).
• W.B. State Electricity Board v. Sachin Banerjee: Board not negligent on pilferage; strict liability not considered. Noted; strict liability was not taken up there (para 15).
• Names as spelt in the source text: Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board vs Shail Kumari And Ors. (case title); Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather Plc.

Provisions mentioned

• No statutory section or article is cited in the judgment. The Court refers to the statutory responsibility of the Board to supply electricity (para 7) and to the law of torts on strict liability (paras 8-12).

Judgement

1. The appeal of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board is dismissed, without issuing notice to the respondents (para 16).
2. As a consequence of the dismissal, the High Court's direction to pay Rs 4.34 lacs to the claimants stands. The judgment does not restate it as an order (paras 6, 16).

Legal Principle / Ratio

The supplier of electricity has the primary liability to compensate a person killed by its live wire, and a stranger's pilferage is no defence. A person undertaking a hazardous activity is liable for injury "irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings". The act of stranger exception to strict liability did not apply, since the Board should have anticipated the act or prevented its consequences.

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

The Court decided without hearing the respondents. It dismissed the appeal without notice to the respondents, after hearing the Board only. The judgment does not say what the respondents' case was.

The Court did not decide whether the pilferage occurred. It held that even if Hari Gaikwad pilfered current, the Board is liable. It did not make a finding on his role.

The judgment relies on strict liability and mentions absolute liability. It cites M.C. Mehta as going beyond strict liability but applies the strict liability doctrine and rejects the stranger exception. It does not say which rule would govern if the exception had applied.

Significance

• The Court held that an electricity supplier is primarily liable when its live wire kills a person, whatever a stranger did.
• It applied strict liability and held the act of stranger exception unavailable, since the act should have been anticipated or prevented.
• It said the managers must install devices, and a snapped wire should automatically lose current.

Exam-Important Points

• Facts in one line: a cyclist was electrocuted by a live wire on a road. The Board blamed a stranger's pilferage and lost.
• Rule: strict liability applies to a hazardous activity, irrespective of negligence, and rests on the foreseeable risk of the activity.
• Rule: the act of stranger exception does not apply where the act should reasonably have been anticipated or prevented.
• Trap: strict liability differs from negligence. The defendant cannot rely on having taken precautions.
• Trap: the appeal was dismissed without notice to the respondents.
• Award: Rs 4.34 lacs, as directed by the High Court.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. Paragraph numbers follow the official Supreme Court judgment text; law reports may number the same paragraph differently.