Lily Thomas v. Union of India

A Hindu husband converted to Islam and married again, while his first marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act still subsisted. The Supreme Court held that conversion does not dissolve the first marriage, so the second marriage is void and the husband can be prosecuted for bigamy. It also clarified that the earlier Sarla Mudgal judgment did not direct the enactment of a common civil code.

Quick Revision

Read the full judgment: Indian Kanoon (unofficial copy)

Parties

Lily Thomas — petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 798 of 1995, along with other petitioners.

Smt. Sushmita Ghosh — petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 509 of 1992 (with R.P.(C) No. 1310/95); wife of Shri G.C. Ghosh (also called Mohd. Karim Ghazi).

Shri G.C. Ghosh (Mohd. Karim Ghazi, Gyan Chand Ghosh) — respondent No. 3 in her petition; the husband who converted and remarried.

Miss Vanita Gupta — the woman he married on 3 September 1992, also called Vanita Ghosh and Henna Begum.

Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani — petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 1079/89.

Sunita @ Fatima — petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 347/90.

Union of India and others — respondents. An Additional Solicitor General appeared for them.

Procedural History

1. On 23 April 1990 the Court took up W.P.(C) No. 1079/89 and W.P.(C) No. 347/90 together. The Court issued notice to respondent No. 3, returnable within twelve weeks in both petitions. Counsel, after taking instructions, limited the prayers to a single relief, a declaration that a marriage after feigned conversion would be void (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
2. Sushmita Ghosh filed W.P.(C) No. 509 of 1992 in the summer vacation of 1992 (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
3. On 9 July 1992, M.N. Venkatachaliah, J., as Vacation Judge, took the petition on board and issued notice. He said that if the respondent contracted a second marriage and lacked legal capacity, the marriage would be void (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
4. On 17 July 1992 the Court ordered a counter affidavit in four weeks and placed the matter before a Bench including Pandian, J. The husband's counsel assured that his client would not marry in haste before the counter affidavit (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
5. On 30 November 1992 the petition was tagged with W.P.(C) No. 1079/89 and W.P.(C) No. 347/90 (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
6. This Court considered a review petition (R.P.(C) No. 1310/95 in W.P.(C) 509/92) and the writ petitions together (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
7. On 5 May 2000 the Court disposed of the review petition and the writ petitions finally by concurring but separate judgments. All interim orders were vacated (Saghir Ahmad, J.).

Facts

1. Sushmita Ghosh said she married G.C. Ghosh according to Hindu rites on 10 May 1984, and they lived happily in Delhi (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
2. Around 1 April 1992 he told her to agree to divorce by mutual consent, as he had taken to Islam so that he could remarry. He had fixed to marry Miss Vanita Gupta of D-152 Preet Vihar, a divorcee with two children, in the second week of July 1992 (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
3. He showed a certificate dated 17 June 1992 from the office of Maulana Qari Mohammad Idris, Shahi Qazi, that he had embraced Islam (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
4. Her father and aunt tried to talk him out of it in vain. He insisted she agree to divorce or put up with a second wife (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
5. She said he converted solely to remarry, had no real faith in Islam, did not practise Muslim rites, and had not changed his name, religion or official documents (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
6. She asserted her right under Article 15(1) not to be discriminated against on religion and sex. She said she was discriminated by the part of Muslim personal law enforced through the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1937 (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
7. She said many Hindu males who cannot get a divorce convert to Islam only to marry again, and some reconvert to keep their property, service and old name. The organisation Kalyani had filed Civil Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1989 on this, and she annexed the order of 23 April 1990 admitting it. She said such husbands resort to conversion where none of the grounds in Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act is available (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
8. She said she was 34 years old, unemployed and in great mental trauma (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
9. She prayed for declarations that polygamous marriages by Hindus and non-Hindus after conversion to Islam are illegal and void, and for directions to amend the Hindu Marriage Act. She also asked for a declaration that a marriage after feigned conversion is void, and for a direction restraining him from marrying Miss Vanita Gupta during the marriage (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
10. The second marriage was scheduled for 10 July 1992, and the petition sought to stop it. The order of 9 July 1992 recorded that the respondent had purported to embrace Islam only with a view to take another wife (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
11. The marriage with Vanita Gupta took place on 3 September 1992 (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
12. The certificate of Mufti Mohd. Tayyeb Qasmi describes the husband as Mohd. Carim Gazi, son of Biswanath Ghosh, of 7 Bank Enclave, Delhi. He signed it as G.C. Ghosh. The bride is Henna Begum. Her brother Kapil Gupta signed as witness in English (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
13. Additional documents were filed. A birth certificate of a son born on 27 May 1993 names the father as G.C. Ghosh, religion Hindu, and the mother as Vanita Ghosh, religion Hindu (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
14. In 1994 the electoral list of polling station No. 71, Assembly Constituency 44 (Shahdara) showed G.C. Ghosh and his parents at S.Nos. 182 to 184, and his wife Vanita Ghosh at S.No. 185, aged 30. The entry reads house C-41, father's or husband's name Gyan Chand Ghosh, female (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
15. In 1995 he applied for a Bangladesh visa as Gyan Chand Ghosh, professing the Hindu religion (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
16. He is facing a criminal trial (Saghir Ahmad, J.).

Issues Raised

The first question is stated in the source (from the order of 23 April 1990). The other two are drawn from the reasoning.

1. Where a non-Muslim gets converted to the Muslim faith without any real change of belief, merely to avoid an earlier marriage or to enter into a second marriage, is a marriage entered into after conversion void?
2. Does conversion dissolve a marriage solemnized under the Hindu Marriage Act, so as to avoid liability for bigamy under Section 494 IPC?
3. Did Sarla Mudgal's case issue a direction for the enactment of a common civil code under Article 44?

Arguments Contended

For the petitioner Sushmita Ghosh (Mr. Mahajan, senior counsel): the judgment records the following.

• The conversion was feigned, solely to remarry, and freedom of religion cannot be used as a garb to evade other laws (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
• The petition pleaded that the husband became a convert to Islam for the sole purpose of having a second wife, which is forbidden under Hindu law (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
• The petition also pleaded discrimination under Article 15(1) on religion and sex by the part of Muslim personal law enforced through the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1937 (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
• Mr. Mahajan asked on 17 July 1992 that the apprehended second marriage be stopped until the petition was decided (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
• Additional documents show he continued to describe himself as Hindu after the second marriage: the birth certificate, the electoral roll and the Bangladesh visa application (Saghir Ahmad, J.).
• The husband's marriage to her was legal and subsisting, and he could not take advantage of a feigned conversion to take a second wife (order of 9 July 1992, quoted) (Saghir Ahmad, J.).

For the respondents: the source text records no argument by the husband or the Union of India on the questions in these petitions. It records these statements. The husband's counsel assured the Court on 17 July 1992 that his client would not marry in haste before filing the counter affidavit. The affidavits of the Union of India filed in Sarla Mudgal's case on 30 August 1996 and 5 December 1996 said the Government would frame a uniform code only if communities desiring it approach the Government. The learned Additional Solicitor General is reported, through Sethi, J., as saying the Government did not intend to act on that judgment alone (Saghir Ahmad, J.).

Court's Reasoning

The source text contains the concurring opinion of S. Saghir Ahmad, J. and the final order. It refers to the separate judgment of R.P. Sethi, J., which is not part of the text. The judgment has no numbered paragraphs, so each step ends with the judge's name.

Saghir Ahmad, J. (concurring)

Agreement with Sethi, J. and the issue

1. Noted: Saghir Ahmad, J. respectfully agrees with Sethi, J.'s judgment disposing of the writ petitions and the review petition, and adds a few words of his own. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
2. Noted: The principal question, from the pleadings and the order of 23 April 1990, is whether a marriage after feigned conversion is void. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
3. Held: The conversion to Islam appears not to have been the result of freedom of conscience. It appears feigned, subject to what the trial court finally holds, to get rid of the first wife and marry a second. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
4. Noted: The evidence is that he continued to profess the Hindu religion after the marriage of 3 September 1992, in the birth certificate, the electoral roll and the visa application. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)

The Hindu Marriage Act and Section 494 IPC

1. Noted: Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act prescribes conditions for a valid Hindu marriage. Clause (i) says neither party may have a spouse living at the time of marriage. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
2. Noted: Section 11 makes a marriage void if it contravenes clause (i), (iv) or (v) of Section 5. Section 17 also declares such a marriage void and applies Sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
3. Held: Under Section 5(i) read with Section 11, a marriage with a person whose earlier marriage is subsisting is void ab initio. Section 17 repeats this and creates the offence of bigamy by reference. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
4. Noted: Section 494 punishes a person having a husband or wife living who marries in a case where the marriage is void because it takes place in the lifetime of the spouse. The punishment is imprisonment up to seven years and fine. The exceptions are a marriage declared void by a competent court, and a spouse absent and unheard of for seven years, with disclosure. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
5. Held: The offence needs four ingredients: the first marriage, the second marriage, the first spouse being alive at the second marriage, and the second marriage being void by reason of taking place in the lifetime of the spouse. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
6. Held: By providing in Section 17 that Sections 494 and 495 apply, the Legislature has lifted them into the Act, a well-known legislative device. The words husband or wife point to the personal law that continues while the marriage subsists. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
7. Noted: Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows cognizance of offences under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code only on a complaint by an aggrieved person. Proviso (a) lets another person complain with leave for a person under 18, an idiot, a lunatic, a sick or infirm person, or a woman who ought not to appear in public. Proviso (b) covers a husband serving in the Armed Forces. Sub-section (2) says only the husband is aggrieved by an offence under Sections 497 or 498, subject to a proviso. Under clause (c) of the proviso, a wife's complaint under Section 494 or 495 may be made by her relatives, or with leave of the court by a relation by blood, marriage or adoption. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
8. Held: If a Hindu wife complains that her husband married a second wife after converting, the offence must be investigated and tried under the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 17 makes a bigamous marriage an offence, and any marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage, despite conversion, is triable under Section 17 read with Section 494. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
9. Held: Who may complain is decided by the personal law applicable to the complainant and the accused, since mere conversion does not dissolve the marriage. They continue to be husband and wife. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
10. Noted: Section 17 corresponds to Sections 43 and 44 of the Special Marriages Act, Sections 4 and 5 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, Section 61 of the Indian Divorce Act and Section 12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act (English). (Saghir Ahmad, J.)

Earlier decisions on Sections 17 and 494

1. Noted: Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra ((1965) 2 SCR 837 = AIR 1965 SC 1564) held that a marriage between two Hindus is void under Section 17 if it is solemnized after the Act and either party had a spouse living. If not solemnized, it is not void by Section 17, and Section 494 does not apply. The marriage in issue was between the appellant and Kamlabai in February 1962. Kanwal Ram v. H.P. Administration ((1966) 1 SCR 539) followed it. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
2. Noted: The matter was again considered in Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh ((1971) 3 SCR 961 = 1971 (1) SCC 864). (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
3. Noted: Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1979 SC 713 = 1979 (2) SCC 170) held that a spouse who contracts a second marriage during the first is guilty of bigamy if the second was valid in that the necessary ceremonies were performed. Voidness under Section 17 is an essential ingredient of Section 494. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
4. Held: A second marriage in the lifetime of the wife is void under Sections 11 and 17 and is also an offence under Section 494. Section 17 speaks of two Hindus, while Section 494 names no religion. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)

Conversion does not dissolve the marriage

1. Held: Conversion or apostasy does not automatically dissolve a marriage solemnized under the Hindu Marriage Act. It only gives a ground for divorce under Section 13, on the other party ceasing to be a Hindu by conversion. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
2. Noted: Conversion is a ground for judicial separation under Section 10, after the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
3. Held: The first marriage continues to subsist. The second marriage is void against the existing marriage, and despite conversion the husband can be prosecuted for bigamy under Section 494. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
4. Held: Apostasy does not end the civil obligations or the matrimonial bond. Hindu law does not recognise bigamy, and the Act provides for monogamy. A second marriage in the lifetime of the spouse is void under Sections 11 and 17, besides being an offence. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
5. Noted: Earlier cases on the same principle are Govt. of Bombay v. Ganga (ILR (1880) 4 Bombay 330), Budansa Rowther v. Fatima Bi (AIR 1914 Madras 192), Emperor v. Mst. Ruri (AIR 1919 Lahore 389) and Jamna Devi v. Mul Raj (1907 PR No. 49). (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
6. Noted: In Ganga, the Bombay High Court held that a Hindu married woman who converted and married a Muslim committed polyandry, since conversion did not end the earlier marriage. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
7. Noted: Rakeya Bibi v. Anil Kumar Mukherji (ILR (1948) 2 Cal. 119) held that under Hindu law apostasy does not dissolve the marriage. Sayeda Khatoon v. M. Obadiah ((1944-45) 49 CWN 745) held that a marriage under one personal law cannot be dissolved under another because a party changed religion. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
8. Noted: Amar Nath v. Mrs. Amar Nath ((1947) 49 PLR 147 (FB)) held that the Vedic marriage bond keeps all its characteristics despite conversion to Christianity, unless the other party repudiates or deserts and a decree follows under the Native Converts Marriage Dissolution Act. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
9. Noted: Gul Mohammad v. Emperor (AIR 1947 Nagpur 121) held that the conversion of a Hindu wife to Islam does not dissolve her marriage. She cannot marry another in her husband's lifetime, and a man having relations with her would be guilty of adultery under Section 497 IPC. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
10. Held: "mere conversion does not bring to an end the marital ties unless a decree for divorce on that ground is obtained from the court". Till a decree is passed, the marriage subsists. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
11. Held: Any other marriage during the first marriage is an offence under Section 494 read with Section 17, and the person may be prosecuted for bigamy despite conversion. Even a marriage under another personal law cannot be performed while the first subsists. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
12. Noted: Mohammedan law differs, since a second marriage can be contracted subject to religious restrictions, as Sethi, J. explains. Saghir Ahmad, J. concurs with him on this point and calls it the vital difference between Mahommedan law and other personal laws. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
13. Held: Prosecution under Section 494 for a second marriage under Mohammedan law can be avoided only if the first marriage was also under Mohammedan law. Not so where the first marriage was under a personal law that prohibited a second marriage in the spouse's lifetime. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
14. Held: In any case, in this instance the conversion is only feigned, subject to what may be found at the trial. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)

Religion and marriage

1. Held: Religion is a matter of faith from the depth of the heart and mind. It binds man's spiritual nature to a supernatural being, and faith, devotion and religion are not easily interchangeable. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
2. Held: Feigning another religion for worldly gain would be religious bigotry. A person who mockingly adopts a religion permitting plural marriages to renounce the earlier marriage and desert his wife cannot take advantage of it, since "religion is not a commodity to be exploited". (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
3. Held: The institution of marriage under every personal law is sacred, and under Hindu law marriage is a sacrament. Both have to be preserved. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
4. Held: The Court is not concerned with the status of the second wife or the children of the second marriage. It considers only the effect of the second marriage on the first subsisting marriage. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)

The common civil code

1. Held: A direction to enforce Article 44 could not have been issued by only one of the Judges in Sarla Mudgal's case. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
2. Noted: Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India ((1997) 3 SCC 573) held that the desirability of a Uniform Civil Code did not directly arise in Sarla Mudgal's case. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
3. Noted: The order of 23 April 1990 said counsel limited the prayers to a single relief. Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of A.P. ((1996) 2 SCC 498) said a uniform law, though desirable, may be counter-productive. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
4. Noted: In Sarla Mudgal, the Union's counter affidavit of 30 August 1996 and supplementary affidavit of 5 December 1996 said the Government would make a uniform code only if communities desiring it approach it. They annexed Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's speech of 2 December 1948 in the Constituent Assembly. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
5. Noted: Dr. Ambedkar said the State claims only a power to legislate, with no obligation to abolish personal laws. No one need be apprehensive that the State will immediately enforce that power in a manner objectionable to Muslims, Christians or any other community. He also said sovereignty must reconcile itself to the sentiments of different communities. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
6. Noted: The Additional Solicitor General stated that the Government did not intend to take any action on the basis of the judgment alone. The affidavits and statement should dispel the notions of the Jamat-e-Ulema Hind and the Muslim Personal Law Board. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)
7. Held: This Court in Sarla Mudgal "had not issued any DIRECTION for the enactment of a common civil code". The review petition and writ petitions are disposed of with the clarifications. (Saghir Ahmad, J.)

Authorities

• Sarla Mudgal (President, Kalyani) v. Union of India (W.P.(C) No. 1079/89) and Sunita @ Fatima v. Union of India (W.P.(C) No. 347/90): tagged with the present petitions. Clarified as giving no direction on a common civil code.
• Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra ((1965) 2 SCR 837 = AIR 1965 SC 1564) and Kanwal Ram v. H.P. Administration ((1966) 1 SCR 539 = AIR 1966 SC 614): a marriage must be solemnized to be void under Section 17. Followed.
• Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh ((1971) 3 SCR 961 = AIR 1971 SC 1153 = 1971 (1) SCC 864): the matter was considered again. Noted.
• Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1979 SC 713 = 1979 (2) SCR 1171 = 1979 (2) SCC 170): bigamy needs a valid second marriage with the ceremonies. Followed.
• Govt. of Bombay v. Ganga (ILR (1880) 4 Bombay 330); Budansa Rowther and Anr. v. Fatima Bi and Ors. (AIR 1914 Madras 192); Emperor v. Mst. Ruri (AIR 1919 Lahore 389); Jamna Devi v. Mul Raj (1907 PR No. 49, page 198): conversion does not end the earlier marriage. Noted.
• Rakeya Bibi v. Anil Kumar Mukherji (ILR (1948) 2 Cal. 119); Sayeda Khatoon @ A.M. Obadiah v. M. Obadiah ((1944-45) 49 CWN 745); Amar Nath v. Mrs. Amar Nath ((1947) 49 PLR 147 (FB)); Gul Mohammad v. Emperor (AIR 1947 Nagpur 121): apostasy does not dissolve a marriage. Noted.
• Ahmedabad Women Action Group and Ors. v. Union of India ((1997) 3 SCC 573): the desirability of a Uniform Civil Code did not directly arise in Sarla Mudgal. Noted.
• Pannalal Bansilal Pitti and Ors. v. State of A.P. and Anr. ((1996) 2 SCC 498): a uniform law may be counter-productive. Noted.
• Other sources: Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's speech of 2 December 1948 in the Constituent Assembly.
• Names as spelt in the source text: Lily Thomas, Etc. Etc vs Union Of India & Ors (the case title); Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, "Kalyani" & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.; Sunita @ Fatima vs. Union of India & Ors.; Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande vs. State of Maharashtra; Kanwal Ram vs. H.P. Administration; Priya Bala Ghosh vs. Suresh Chandra Ghosh; Gopal Lal vs. State of Rajasthan; Govt. of Bombay vs. Ganga; Budansa Rowther & Anr. vs. Fatima Bi & Ors.; Emperor vs. Mst. Ruri; Jamna Devi vs. Mul Raj; Rakeya Bibi vs. Anil Kumar Mukherji; Sayeda Khatoon @ A.M. Obadiah vs. M. Obadiah; Amar Nath vs. Mrs. Amar Nath; Gul Mohammad vs. Emperor; Ahmedabad Women Action Group & Ors. vs. Union of India; Pannalal Bansilal Pitti & Ors. vs. State of A.P. & Anr.

Provisions mentioned

• Section 5(i) and Section 11, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: neither party may have a spouse living; a marriage contravening clause (i), (iv) or (v) is void.
• Section 10, Section 13 and Section 13(ii), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: judicial separation and divorce, including where the other party has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion.
• Section 17, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: punishment of bigamy; such a marriage is void and Sections 494 and 495 IPC apply.
• Section 494, Section 495 and Section 497, Indian Penal Code; Chapter XX, Indian Penal Code: Section 494 is marrying again in the lifetime of a spouse. Section 495 is applied by Section 17 with Section 494, but the judgment does not describe it. Section 497 is adultery. Chapter XX covers offences relating to marriage.
• Section 198, Code of Criminal Procedure: cognizance of offences against marriage only on a complaint by a person aggrieved.
• Sections 43 and 44, Special Marriages Act; Sections 4 and 5, Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act; Section 61, Indian Divorce Act; Section 12, Matrimonial Causes Act (English): corresponding provisions, named as such without description.
• Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act, 1937: the law the petitioner said discriminated against her.
• Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976; Native Converts Marriage Dissolution Act: conversion as a ground for judicial separation; dissolution after conversion.
• Article 15(1) and Article 44, Constitution: non-discrimination on grounds of religion and sex, as pleaded; Article 44 is named in the discussion of the common civil code.

Judgement

1. The review petition and the writ petitions are disposed of finally, with the clarifications and interpretation set out in the concurring but separate judgments.
2. The concurring opinion of Saghir Ahmad, J. clarifies that conversion to Islam does not dissolve a marriage solemnized under the Hindu Marriage Act. A second marriage during its subsistence is void and punishable under Section 494 IPC read with Section 17 of the Act.
3. The concurring opinion also clarifies that Sarla Mudgal's case did not issue any direction for the enactment of a common civil code.
4. All interim orders passed in these petitions stand vacated.

Legal Principle / Ratio

A marriage solemnized under the Hindu Marriage Act is not dissolved by the husband's conversion, so a second marriage during its life is void and an offence of bigamy. The Court in Sarla Mudgal gave no direction to enact a common civil code. In the concurring opinion's words, "mere conversion does not bring to an end the marital ties unless a decree for divorce on that ground is obtained from the court".

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

The source text carries only one of the two opinions. It has the concurring opinion of Saghir Ahmad, J. and the order. Sethi, J.'s judgment is referred to but is not in the text, so this page does not set out its reasoning.

The finding of feigned conversion is provisional. The Court says the conversion appears feigned, subject to what the trial court finds. The order does not decide the criminal trial.

The Court did not rule on the second wife's status. It says it considers only the effect of the second marriage on the first. It leaves the status of the second wife and the children open.

Significance

• The Court confirmed that conversion does not dissolve a Hindu marriage and that a second marriage in that case is void and punishable as bigamy.
• It clarified that Sarla Mudgal did not direct a common civil code.
• It stated that religion is not a commodity to be exploited to avoid marital obligations.

Exam-Important Points

• Facts in one line: a Hindu husband converted to Islam and remarried in his first wife's lifetime. The Court held the second marriage void.
• Rule: conversion does not dissolve a marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act. It is only a ground for divorce (Section 13) or judicial separation (Section 10).
• Rule: a second marriage in the lifetime of the spouse is void under Sections 11 and 17 and an offence under Section 494 IPC.
• Trap: Sarla Mudgal issued no direction for a common civil code. One Judge alone could not have directed enforcement of Article 44.
• Trap: the concurring opinion did not decide the status of the second wife or children.
• Order: interim orders are vacated.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. Paragraph numbers follow the official Supreme Court judgment text; law reports may number the same paragraph differently.