Chikkam Ammiraju v. Chikkam Seshamma

A husband threatened to kill himself unless his wife and son signed a release deed in favour of his brothers. They signed, then sued to cancel the deed. The judges of the Madras High Court split on whether a threat of suicide is "coercion" under section 15 of the Indian Contract Act. The Letters Patent Bench held by a majority of two to one that it is.

Quick Revision

Parties

Chikkam Ammiraju and others — defendants; appellants. They are the younger brothers of the 1st plaintiff's husband and took the release deed.

Chikkam Seshamma — 1st plaintiff; respondent. She is the wife of Swami and signed the release deed after his threat.

The 2nd plaintiff — respondent; the son of Swami and Seshamma. The judgment does not give his name.

Swami — the 1st plaintiff's husband and the 2nd plaintiff's father. He is not a party to the deed. He made the threat of suicide.

Doraiyya — father of the defendants. The plaintiffs alleged that coercion or undue influence was brought to bear by the defendants and Doraiyya through Swami (para 1).

Procedural History

1. The plaintiffs sued for cancellation of the release deed (Ex. A). The lower courts found for them and decreed the suit (para 2).
2. The lower courts found that Swami did threaten suicide and that the plaintiffs signed because of that threat. They held the threat to be "coercion" even though it came from a person who was not a party to the deed (para 2).
3. The defendants filed a second appeal in the Madras High Court. It was heard by Sadasiva Aiyar J. and Moore J. (paras 1, 3, 5).
4. Sadasiva Aiyar J. would dismiss the second appeal with costs (para 4). Moore J. would allow it (para 10).
5. Because the judges differed, the decree of the Lower Appellate Court was confirmed with costs under section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure (para 11).
6. The defendants then appealed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent (para 12).
7. The Letters Patent appeal came before Wallis C.J., Oldfield J. and Seshagiri Aiyar J. because of the difference of opinion between Sadasiva Aiyar and Moore JJ. (para 15).
8. The judgment is dated 23 January 1917.

Facts

1. The 1st plaintiff's mother had sold certain lands without necessity to the vendor of the defendants' father (para 1).
2. The plaintiffs, a mother and her son, held reversionary rights in those lands (para 1).
3. The plaintiffs executed a release deed (Ex. A) in respect of those rights. The defendants are the younger brothers of the 1st plaintiff's husband (para 1).
4. Swami, the 1st plaintiff's husband, threatened to commit suicide unless the plaintiffs executed the release deed (Ex. A) (paras 1, 2, 13).
5. The lower courts found that the threat worked on the plaintiffs' minds and that they executed the deed because of it (para 2).
6. The 1st plaintiff was greatly distressed because her son had run away from home to avoid executing the document (para 6).
7. Swami also put pressure on his wife. Coupled with his threat to commit suicide, it induced her to join in the execution (para 6).
8. The Subordinate Judge noted the degrading position to which a respectable Hindu wife would be reduced if Swami carried out his threat. In its view this should have considerably contributed to inducing the plaintiff to sign Ex. A (para 6).
9. The threat was made by Swami, not by the defendants who were parties to the deed (para 2).

Issues Raised

1. Was the release deed (Ex. A) executed with the plaintiffs' free consent, or was it obtained through coercion or undue influence or both (para 1)?
2. Do the facts found constitute coercion or undue influence in law (para 3)?
3. Can persuasion by the 1st plaintiff's husband, who was not a party to Ex. A, invalidate the document (para 3)?
4. Is suicide, or a threat to commit it, an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code within section 15 of the Contract Act? Can section 15 be read by implication, or must it be read strictly (paras 16, 20)?
5. Was the threatened act to the prejudice of any person whatever, and does the threat have to be to the prejudice of the person who enters the contract (paras 3, 17, 29)?
6. Did the deed also result from undue influence under section 16 of the Contract Act (paras 3, 9, 25)?

Arguments Contended

For the appellants (the defendants):

• The facts relied on by the courts below do not in law constitute coercion or undue influence (para 3).
• Persuasion by the 1st plaintiff's husband cannot invalidate the document, because he is not a party to Ex. A (para 3).
• The prejudice to the feelings or supposed spiritual welfare of the wife and son is not the prejudice that section 15 contemplates (para 3).
• The prejudice to Swami's own life is immaterial because he was not a party to the deed (para 3).
• Mr. Patanjali Sastriar put the Taj Mahal example: A threatens to blow up the Taj Mahal unless B gives C a pronote for Rs. 10,000, and B, a man of fine artistic feelings, gives it. Is the note voidable for coercion (para 3)?
• Suicide, and so a threat to commit it, is not an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code (paras 16, 28).
• Mere sentimental prejudice is not what the law contemplates, so the threat could not have prejudiced the plaintiff (para 29).

For the respondents (the plaintiffs):

• The respondents relied on the argument that a threat to commit suicide cannot be told apart from a threat to attempt suicide, and an attempt is forbidden by section 309 of the Indian Penal Code (para 22).
• The Penal Code impliedly forbids suicide because it expressly forbids abetment of it and attempt to commit it (paras 23, 24).
• The Penal Code punishes abetment (sections 305 and 306) and attempt (section 309). Counsel Mr. Venkatramiah argued that any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code is wider than punishable by it (para 28). The judgment does not say which side he appeared for.
• Respondents also relied on section 16 of the Contract Act (para 25). Their other contentions were not heard (para 26).
• The record does not set out any further argument for either side.

Court's Reasoning

Judgment of Sadasiva Aiyar J. (second appeal, paras 1-4)

1. Noted: The only question is whether the release deed was executed with free consent, or was obtained by coercion or undue influence through Swami's threat. (para 1)
2. Noted: Section 15 defines coercion. It covers committing or threatening any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code. It also covers unlawfully detaining property. The act must be to the prejudice of any person whatever and meant to cause an agreement. (para 3)
3. Held: The words any person whatever were chosen to show that the act need not be to the prejudice of the person entering the contract. (para 3)
4. Held: The words "to the prejudice of any person whatever" relate both to the forbidden act and to the unlawful detention of property. (para 3)
5. Held: It makes no difference whether a man killing himself is called suicide or a successful attempt at suicide. An attempt to commit suicide is punishable under the Penal Code. So both are acts forbidden by the Penal Code, though a dead man cannot be punished. (para 3)
6. Held: If the threat of the forbidden act has the intended effect of bringing about consent, it does not matter who made the threat or to whose prejudice it was made. (para 3)
7. Noted: It was unnecessary to decide whether prejudice to sentiments, feelings or supposed spiritual welfare is also covered. He refers to sections 298, 499 and 508 of the Indian Penal Code, which punish some sentimental injuries. (para 3)
8. Held: Prejudice to Swami's own life is enough to bring his threat within the definition of coercion, provided he intended the threat to bring about the agreement. (para 3)
9. Held: On the Taj Mahal example the answer is yes. The threat would be an act of mischief or vandalism prohibited by the Penal Code, to the prejudice of Government. The note would be voidable if the court concludes that the threat was intended to bring about the pronote and did have that effect. (para 3)
10. Noted: A mere threat does not make the agreement voidable. The agreement must have been caused by it. See section 19 of the Contract Act and its explanation. (para 3)
11. Held: A threat need not come from a party to the agreement. Askari Mirza v. Jai Kishori held this, relying on Shephard and Pollock on the Contract Act. (para 3)
12. Noted: It was unnecessary to consider in detail whether the deed was caused by undue influence. The line between coercion (section 15) and undue influence (section 16) is sometimes thin. Some cases may fall under both. (para 3)
13. Noted: In Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti a widow executed an adoption deed because her relations obstructed the removal of her husband's corpse. Collins C.J. and Muthuswami Aiyar J. held that this was covered by section 15 or section 16. (para 3)
14. Held: A man who threatens suicide to his wife and son affects their mental capacity. The word capacity includes volitional freedom and strength. They are persons whose capacity is temporarily affected by reason of mental distress under section 16(2)(b). (para 3)
15. Held: He would dismiss the second appeal with costs. (para 4)

Judgment of Moore J. (second appeal, paras 5-11)

1. Noted: He regrets that he differs from his learned brother. (para 5)
2. Noted: The courts below found that, under Swami's threat of suicide, his wife and son executed the release deed. The 1st plaintiff was distressed because her son had run away to avoid executing it. (para 6)
3. Noted: He found considerable difficulty in deciding whether the threat is coercion under section 15. The difficulty lies in the words to the prejudice of any person, which must be read with both branches of the section. (para 6)
4. Noted: The lower courts had not dealt with the question satisfactorily. The Subordinate Judge relied on the degrading position of a Hindu wife. The District Judge said a threat of suicide is coercion and the section is very wide. He said the coercion need not come from a party, be directed at the person coerced, affect his property, or be specifically to his prejudice. (para 6)
5. Noted: The words act forbidden by the Penal Code mean the court must decide whether the alleged coercive act amounts to an offence. (para 7)
6. Noted: Suicide is, he takes it, an act forbidden by the Penal Code, because abetment of suicide is punishable. He cites section 304. (para 8)
7. Held: He cannot accept that prejudice to Swami's own life brings the threat within coercion, even if Swami intended to induce the release deed. (para 9)
8. Noted: In Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti a Hindu widow aged 13 was held not bound by an adoption, because relations obstructed the removal of her husband's corpse until she consented. The Court seems to have applied section 15, presumably through section 297 of the Penal Code. (para 9)
9. Noted: In that case it would have been easy to find undue influence under section 16. (para 9)
10. Held: As to undue influence in this case, Swami may have dominated his wife's will. But he was not a party to the contract, so section 16(2)(b) does not apply. (para 9)
11. Noted: The Subordinate Judge found the deed was executed under coercion though not under undue influence in the strict legal sense. (para 10)
12. Held: With considerable hesitation, the facts relied on by the lower courts do not in law constitute coercion or undue influence. He would allow the appeal. (para 10)
13. Noted: Because the judges differed, the decree of the Lower Appellate Court was confirmed with costs under section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (para 11)
14. Noted: An appeal was filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. (para 12)

Judgment of Wallis C.J. (Letters Patent appeal, paras 13-18)

1. Noted: The courts found the deed was obtained by coercion. Coercion consisted of the fifth witness for the plaintiffs threatening his wife and son that he would commit suicide if they did not execute the document. (para 13)
2. Noted: "It is easy to set up such a defence and the evidence in support of it should therefore be very closely scrutinized". Here it was found as a fact and the Court is not at liberty to interfere on second appeal. (para 14)
3. Noted: The case came on a Letters Patent appeal because Sadasiva Aiyar and Moore JJ. differed on whether the facts amount to coercion under section 15. (para 15)
4. Held: Suicide is an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code. The argument that it is not forbidden cannot be accepted. (para 16)
5. Why: At common law suicide was a form of homicide. Hawkins says homicide is either against a man's own life or that of another. On finding that the suicide was felo de re (as printed), his chattels were forfeited to the Crown. (para 16)
6. Why: Section 299 of the Penal Code defines culpable homicide widely enough to cover deliberate suicide. Sections 302 onwards apply only to living offenders. (para 16)
7. Why: Sections 305 and 306 punish abetment of suicide. Sections 307 and 308 deal with attempts to murder and to commit culpable homicide. Section 309 punishes attempts to commit suicide. (para 16)
8. Held: It is impossible to hold that an act which it is made punishable to abet or attempt is not forbidden by the Indian Penal Code. There is no section punishing the act itself only because the suicide is beyond the Court's jurisdiction. It is also no longer thought desirable to punish those who come after him by forfeiting his goods to the Crown. (para 16)
9. Held: The act threatened must be to the prejudice of any person whatever. This would cover threats to a wife to murder her husband, or to a son to murder his father. (para 17)
10. Held: Here the husband and father threatened to kill himself. That is an act to his own prejudice, which is sufficient for the section. (para 17)
11. Noted: The threatened act would also be directly to the prejudice of the wife, who would be deprived of her husband and incur all the disabilities of a Hindu widow. The same holds for the son. (para 17)
12. Held: He would dismiss the appeal with costs. (para 17)
13. Held: Under section 36 of the Letters Patent, the appeal is dismissed with costs. (para 18)

Judgment of Oldfield J. (dissenting; Letters Patent appeal, paras 19-26)

1. Noted: He regrets that he differs from the Chief Justice and so deals with the case at length. (para 19)
2. Noted: The question is whether a threat to commit suicide is a threat to commit an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code under section 15. It is conceded that suicide is not forbidden directly or by a penalty. (para 20)
3. Noted: It can be forbidden only by implication. So the question is whether section 15 can be read by implication or should be read strictly. (para 20)
4. Noted: Section 15 has given rise to few decisions, and none define its policy. No general policy is in question, because the test depends on a statute that does not list all Indian crimes. (para 21)
5. Noted: The test may be definite but is arbitrary. It does not promote a general policy that could support liberal construction. So he scrutinises the respondents' arguments closely. (para 21)
6. Held: The first argument fails. The two threats are distinguishable unless attempt is used in its ordinary sense of endeavour and, in its second place, in the legal sense of sections 305 and 511. A threat to commit suicide is different from a threat to attempt it. Used in its legal sense, a threat to attempt suicide is a contradiction in terms. (para 22)
7. Why: An attempt in the legal sense is recognised only after the criminal's intention is frustrated, not when it is expressed. (para 22)
8. Held: The second argument fails. The Code does not forbid suicide by implication merely because it forbids abetment and attempt in sections 306 and 309. (para 23)
9. Why: The argument works only if it matches a general principle. Apart from abetment of children and lunatics under section 108, Explanation 3, innocent acts are not forbidden. The principle cannot be tested on any case except suicide. (para 23)
10. Held: A prohibition cannot be inferred from the prohibition of attempts. He has decided in favour of strict construction of section 15. (para 24)
11. Noted: The only form of prohibition in the Code, a penalty, would be useless for suicide. But it does not follow that the omission was an oversight. (para 24)
12. Why: The omission may be deliberate. Such cases would be rare and hard to prove. The person coerced usually has easier means of preventing the threat than by entering into the agreement. (para 24)
13. Held: On section 16, the threat of suicide is irrelevant, because Swami was not a party to the contract. There is no finding of undue influence by the appellants who were parties. This plea fails. (para 25)
14. Noted: As the majority would dismiss the appeal on section 15, the respondents' other contentions were not heard. On his view it would be necessary to consider them before the appeal could be disposed of. (para 26)

Judgment of Seshagiri Aiyar J. (Letters Patent appeal, paras 27-30)

1. Noted: He agrees with the Chief Justice. (para 27)
2. Held: The evidence is not sufficient to support a finding on undue influence. (para 28)
3. Held: On coercion he had some doubts at first. He concludes that the facts bring the case within section 15. (para 28)
4. Why: A man who commits suicide goes unpunished because the law cannot reach him, not because the act is not forbidden. The Code punishes abetment and attempt. The legislature's intention is to forbid the act. (para 28)
5. Held: The term any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code is wider than punishable by the Code. A lunatic or minor may escape punishment, but the acts are still forbidden. (para 28)
6. Held: Where abetment and attempt are both punishable, suicide itself is an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code. (para 28)
7. Held: He agrees with the defendants that "mere sentimental prejudice is not what the law contemplates". Some legal injury must flow. (para 29)
8. Noted: He relies on The Queen v. The Metropolitan Board of Works and Clark v. London General Omnibus Co. for the test of prejudice. (para 29)
9. Held: On that test, the wife to whom the husband threatened suicide is prejudicially affected. The possibility of him dying and leaving the wife and child uncared for is sufficient legal prejudice. (para 29)
10. Held: Exhibit A was brought about by coercion and should be set aside. The appeal should be dismissed with costs. (paras 29, 30)

Authorities

• Askari Mirza v. Jai Kishori ((1992) 16 I.C. 344, as printed in the judgment) — cited by Sadasiva Aiyar J. for the view that the threat need not proceed from a party to the agreement. It relies on Shephard and Pollock on the Contract Act (para 3).
• Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti ((1889) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 214) — a widow's adoption deed obtained by obstructing her husband's corpse. Sadasiva Aiyar J. said it was within section 15 or 16. Moore J. said it could have been decided on undue influence (paras 3, 9).
• The Queen v. The Metropolitan Board of Works ((1863) 3 Best and Smith 710) — cited by Seshagiri Aiyar J. for the point that some legal injury must flow before a man is said to be prejudiced (para 29).
• Clark v. London General Omnibus Co. Ltd. ((1906) 2 K.B. 648) — cited with the above case on the meaning of prejudice (para 29).
• Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, Book I, Chapter 9 — quoted by Wallis C.J. for the common-law view that homicide may be against one's own life (para 16).
• Shephard and Pollock on the Contract Act — relied on in Askari Mirza v. Jai Kishori (para 3).
• Nelson's Indian Penal Code — cited by Wallis C.J. for treating suicide as a species of unlawful homicide (para 16).

Statutes and provisions mentioned:

• Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act — defines coercion (paras 3, 6, 15, 20).
• Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act (undue influence), including clause (2)(b), covering a person whose mental capacity is temporarily affected by mental distress (paras 3, 9, 25).
• Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act and its explanation — an agreement is voidable only if consent was caused by the coercion (para 3).
• Section 297 of the Indian Penal Code — Moore J. presumes it is the section applied in Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti, where relations obstructed the removal of a corpse (para 9).
• Sections 298, 499 and 508 of the Indian Penal Code — Sadasiva Aiyar J. cites them as showing that the criminal law also punishes some acts causing sentimental injury (para 3).
• Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code — defines culpable homicide in terms wide enough to cover deliberate suicide, according to Wallis C.J. (para 16).
• Section 302 and the following sections of the Indian Penal Code — prescribe punishment for homicide and apply only to living offenders (para 16).
• Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code — Moore J. cites it for the point that abetment of suicide is punishable (para 8).
• Sections 305 and 306 of the Indian Penal Code — make abetment of suicide punishable (paras 16, 23).
• Sections 307 and 308 of the Indian Penal Code — deal with attempts to commit murder and culpable homicide (para 16).
• Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code — provides for attempts to commit suicide (paras 16, 22, 23).
• Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code — the word attempt is used in its legal sense in this section and in section 305 (para 22).
• Section 108, Explanation 3 of the Indian Penal Code — abetment can include acts done innocently without guilty knowledge or intention (para 23).
• Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure — decree of the Lower Appellate Court confirmed where the judges differed (para 11).
• Section 36 of the Letters Patent — the appeal was dismissed with costs under it (para 18).
• Clause 15 of the Letters Patent — gave the right of appeal to the Bench (para 12).

Judgement

1. In the second appeal the judges differed. Under section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decree of the Lower Appellate Court was confirmed with costs (para 11).
2. In the Letters Patent appeal, the majority (Wallis C.J. and Seshagiri Aiyar J.) held that the release deed was obtained by coercion (paras 17, 28, 29).
3. Under section 36 of the Letters Patent, the appeal is dismissed with costs (para 18).
4. Oldfield J. dissented. He held that section 15 did not apply and that the plea under section 16 failed. He said the respondents' other contentions would have to be considered before the appeal could be disposed of (paras 24-26).

Legal Principle / Ratio

A threat to commit suicide is a threat to commit an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code under section 15 of the Contract Act. Sadasiva Aiyar J. added that the threat need not come from a party to the contract, if it was intended to cause the agreement and did cause it (para 3). The Letters Patent majority did not discuss that point.

Key holding (Wallis C.J.): he found it impossible to hold that "an act which it is made punishable to abet or attempt is not forbidden by the Indian Penal Code" (para 16).

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

• The majority give different routes to prejudice. Wallis C.J. relies on the threatener's own prejudice and the wife's loss. Seshagiri Aiyar J. relies on legal injury to the wife and child (paras 17, 29).
• Oldfield J. gives a strict-construction reason: section 15 has no general policy and the Code lists no explicit prohibition of suicide (paras 20, 21, 24).
• The judgment itself says the line between coercion and undue influence is thin (para 3). Seshagiri Aiyar J. found the evidence insufficient on undue influence (para 28). Wallis C.J. did not address it.
• Wallis C.J. warns that such a defence is easy to set up and the evidence must be closely scrutinised (para 14).
• Moore J. in the second appeal decided the opposite on the same facts (para 10).

Significance

• The case treats a threat of suicide as coercion under section 15.
• Sadasiva Aiyar J. held that the coercive threat may come from a stranger to the contract (para 3).
• Wallis C.J. held that the prejudice can fall on the person making the threat (para 17).
• It reads forbidden by the Indian Penal Code more widely than punishable by the Code.

Exam-Important Points

• Rule: a threat of suicide is coercion under section 15, because suicide is an act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code. Trap: suicide itself cannot be punished.
• Rule: the threat need not come from a party to the contract. Trap: Swami was not a party to Ex. A.
• Rule: the threat must cause the agreement (section 19). A mere threat is not enough.
• Rule: forbidden is wider than punishable (Seshagiri Aiyar J., para 28).
• Trap: the majority was two to one. Oldfield J. dissented and Moore J. had also differed in the second appeal.
• Result: appeal dismissed with costs; the release deed stands set aside.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. Paragraph numbers follow the judgment text as supplied; law reports may number the same paragraph differently.