This is the 6th post in Law of Torts, Unit 3 — Specific Torts and Torts Affecting Property (the previous post covered trespass to land, the tort of direct physical intrusion onto another's property). This post covers nuisance, the tort that protects a person's use and enjoyment of land from indirect interference, and explains the crucial distinction between private nuisance and public nuisance.
Not every interference with land takes the form of a physical entry. Smoke drifting from a neighbouring factory, fumes from smelting works, or a foul smell from a nearby drain do not involve anyone setting foot on the plaintiff's land at all, yet they can make that land unusable or unpleasant to live on. The law needs a separate tort to address this kind of indirect interference, and it also needs to distinguish between interference that affects one individual's land specifically and interference that affects an entire community — because the two situations call for different rules about who may sue and what must be proved. Nuisance performs both functions: it is the general tort of unlawful interference with the use or enjoyment of land, and it splits into private nuisance and public nuisance depending on who is affected.
Nuisance, in its general sense, is an unlawful interference with a person's use or enjoyment of land, or of some right connected with it. Unlike trespass, which requires a direct physical intrusion, nuisance arises from an indirect interference — the offending activity typically originates outside the plaintiff's land and merely produces consequences, such as noise, smell, smoke, vibration, or excessive light, that cross onto it. Because the interference is indirect and consequential rather than direct, nuisance is not actionable per se in the way trespass is — the plaintiff must generally show actual damage, or at least a substantial and unreasonable interference with comfort, before a claim will succeed.
Private nuisance is an unlawful interference with a particular individual's use or enjoyment of their own land, and it is actionable by that individual alone. The essentials of private nuisance are: first, there must be a substantial interference — trivial or fanciful interferences that a reasonable person would simply tolerate as part of ordinary life are not actionable. Second, the interference must be unreasonable in the circumstances, taking into account factors such as the duration and frequency of the interference, its intensity, and the manner in which it is carried out. Third, the plaintiff must generally show damage — either actual physical damage to property, or, in cases of mere personal discomfort, a substantial and unreasonable interference with the ordinary comfort of living, judged by the standards of an average person and not by the plaintiff's own unusually sensitive standards.
A closely related principle is the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas" — use your own property so as not to injure that of another — tempered by what is often called the "give and take, live and let live" principle: a certain amount of mutual toleration of ordinary, everyday interference between neighbours is necessary for community life, and only interference going beyond this reasonable degree of mutual toleration amounts to an actionable nuisance.
St Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping (1865) — 11 HL Cas 642, decided by the House of Lords (Lord Westbury LC).
Facts: Fumes from the defendant's copper-smelting works, located in an industrial part of South Lancashire, damaged trees, shrubs, and crops on the plaintiff's neighbouring estate. The defendant argued that since the locality was already heavily industrial in character, the plaintiff could not complain of fumes that were simply typical of the area.
Holding: The House of Lords held the defendant liable, drawing the now-classic distinction between two categories of nuisance: where the nuisance causes material, sensible injury to property, the character of the neighbourhood is immaterial and does not excuse the defendant; but where the complaint is of mere personal discomfort or inconvenience without physical damage, the nature of the locality is a relevant factor in deciding whether the interference is actionable. Since actual physical damage to the plaintiff's trees and crops was proved here, the industrial character of the area gave the defendant no defence. A full standalone Case-Law post on this decision is available in this unit's Case-Law list.
Public nuisance is an act or omission that materially affects the reasonable comfort, convenience, health, or safety of the public at large, or of a class of the public who come within the sphere or neighbourhood of its operation. Examples include obstructing a public highway, polluting a public source of water, or running a dangerous or offensive trade in a manner that affects the surrounding community rather than a single neighbour. Because public nuisance is regarded as an offence against the public at large rather than a wrong to a specific individual, the general rule is that it can only be remedied through action by the Attorney-General or the appropriate state authority, typically by way of a relator action, and not by a private civil suit brought by an ordinary member of the public.
There is, however, an important exception: a private individual may sue in respect of a public nuisance if they can show "special" or "particular" damage — that is, damage over and above what is suffered by the general public, peculiar to that individual and substantially greater in degree than the inconvenience suffered by the rest of the community. For example, if an obstruction on a public road causes general inconvenience to all users, no individual member of the public can ordinarily sue; but if the same obstruction causes a particular trader's shop to become inaccessible, resulting in a specific and substantial loss of business to that trader beyond the general inconvenience suffered by others, the trader may maintain a private action.
Attorney-General v. PYA Quarries Ltd. (1957) — 2 QB 169, decided by the Court of Appeal (Lord Denning).
Facts: The defendant's quarry operations caused dust, vibration, and flying stones affecting a substantial number of local residents. The Attorney-General, acting at the relation of the local authority, sought an injunction to restrain the defendant's operations as a public nuisance.
Holding: The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of public nuisance and laid down the modern test for it: a public nuisance is one that materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of life of a class of the public, and it is not necessary to show that every single member of that class was affected — it is sufficient that a representative cross-section of the class was affected, so as to make it unreasonable to expect one person to take proceedings on their own responsibility to put a stop to it, rather than leaving it to the community as a whole through the Attorney-General. A full standalone Case-Law post on this decision is available in this unit's Case-Law list.
Although both public and private nuisance involve an unlawful interference falling short of trespass, they differ sharply in who is affected, who may sue, and what must be shown, as set out below.
| Point of Distinction | Public Nuisance | Private Nuisance |
|---|---|---|
| Persons affected | The public at large, or a class of the public | A specific individual's use or enjoyment of their own land |
| Who may sue | Ordinarily only the Attorney-General or State, by relator action | The individual whose land or enjoyment is affected |
| Exception | A private individual may sue on proof of special/particular damage | Not applicable — the affected individual always has standing |
| Basis in law | Treated substantially as a crime against the community, remediable civilly in special circumstances | A civil wrong to an individual's proprietary or possessory interest |
| Typical remedy | Injunction, sought by the State | Damages and/or injunction, sought by the affected individual |
Prescription is a recognised defence to private nuisance: if the defendant has carried on the activity constituting the nuisance openly, continuously, and without interruption for twenty years, and the plaintiff (or their predecessor) has taken no legal action to stop it during that period, the defendant may acquire a legal right to continue it, provided the activity was actionable as a nuisance for the entire prescriptive period. Statutory authority is also a defence — where a statute expressly or by necessary implication authorises an activity, and the resulting nuisance is the inevitable consequence of carrying out that activity with due care, no action lies, though this defence is strictly construed and any negligence in carrying out the authorised activity remains actionable. On the other hand, several pleas are specifically not defences: that the defendant exercised reasonable care and skill in carrying out the activity is no defence, since nuisance looks at the result and not merely at the care taken; that the nuisance results from the combined acts of several persons, none of whom individually would have caused actionable harm, is also no defence to each contributor; and that the plaintiff "came to the nuisance" by moving into the area after the activity had already begun is generally no defence either, though it may be relevant to the remedy granted.
The primary remedies for nuisance are damages, compensating the plaintiff for the loss suffered, whether physical damage to property or the diminished comfort of using it, and injunction, restraining the defendant from continuing the offending activity, which is especially important where the interference is ongoing or recurring. In cases of urgent necessity, the law also recognises the remedy of abatement, which permits the affected person to take reasonable steps to remove the nuisance themselves — such as cutting overhanging branches back to the boundary line — provided notice is given where practicable and no more force or damage is caused than is reasonably necessary.
A runs a factory that emits thick smoke and chemical fumes, which drift onto B's adjoining land and kill several of B's fruit trees. B has a claim for private nuisance against A, since the interference caused material, sensible damage to B's property, and the industrial character of the area (even if the area is a recognised industrial zone) is no defence once actual physical damage is shown. If, instead, the same fumes spread over the entire neighbourhood, causing general discomfort to dozens of residents without any one of them suffering damage beyond the others, this would be a public nuisance, actionable only by the State through the Attorney-General — unless one particular resident, such as a shopkeeper whose goods were specifically spoiled by the fumes in a way the rest of the neighbourhood did not suffer, could show special damage entitling them to sue individually.