Attorney-General v. P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd.

A quarry near Pontardawe in Glamorgan threw stones, dust and vibration onto neighbouring houses. The Attorney-General sued for a public nuisance (a nuisance affecting a class of the public), at the request of two local councils, and won an injunction. The Court of Appeal upheld the injunction for dust and vibration and explained what makes a nuisance "public".

Quick Revision

Read the full judgment: BAILII

Parties

Her Majesty's Attorney-General, on the relation of the Glamorgan County Council and the Pontardawe Rural District Council — plaintiffs (respondents in the appeal). The Attorney-General sued at the request of the two councils, which are the relators.

P.Y.A. Quarries Limited — defendant (appellant in the appeal). A company incorporated in 1929 that ran a quarry at Penyralltwen near Pontardawe in the County of Glamorgan.

Directors and manager of the company (not parties) — Mr Bryndley Thomas (director from 1949), Mr Wyndham Thomas, Mr Jim Morris and Mr Illtyd Williams (also the manager). Mr Bryndley Thomas and Mr Wyndham Thomas took over management from 1951. Mr Illtyd Williams left in the same year.

Procedural History

1. The action was a relator action (a suit by the Attorney-General at the request of another body). It was brought on the relation of the two councils, founded on a public nuisance under three headings: stones and splinters, vibration and dust. The Statement of Claim alleged the nuisances had existed since about 1947.
2. The Statement of Claim was later amended. Allegations that the nuisances damaged the occupiers, made the houses dirty and endangered them were struck out, as thought irrelevant to a public nuisance action. They substantially reappeared in detailed particulars given later.
3. The writ was issued on 4 July 1952.
4. The action was heard by Mr Justice Oliver, starting on 11 April 1956. The trial took nine or ten days. The judge also spent a day viewing the premises, where blasting was carried out in his presence.
5. Mr Justice Oliver granted an injunction by an order dated 25 April 1956. It restrained the defendants from quarrying so as to project stones or splinters from the quarry. It also restrained them from causing a nuisance to Her Majesty's subjects by dust or vibrations.
6. The injunction is unqualified for stones and splinters. For dust and vibration it is limited to occasioning a nuisance to Her Majesty's subjects.
7. The defendants appealed. They challenged only the injunction about dust and vibration.
8. Romer, L.J., gave the first judgment. Denning, L.J., and Parker, L.J., agreed. The appeal was dismissed. Counsel for the respondents asked for costs, and Denning, L.J., said yes.

Facts

1. The company was incorporated in 1929. It worked on a modest scale for some years.
2. In 1947 the Pontardawe Rural District Council gave planning permission under the Town and Country Planning Acts for further working of the existing quarry. One condition was that the Council must be satisfied that the utmost precautions would be taken to prevent nuisance from dust.
3. In 1949 Mr Bryndley Thomas became a director. There were then three other directors. From 1951 he and Mr Wyndham Thomas managed the business.
4. The quarry adjoins the Alltwen-Brynllewellyn highway, which runs roughly east and west. A footpath runs north from the highway just east of the quarry.
5. East of the footpath are eight houses on the north side of the highway. The nearest is about 50 yards from the quarry. West of the quarry are about 20 houses on the north side. The nearest is 35 yards away and the furthest about 260 yards.
6. About 250 yards south of the quarry is Alltwenganol Farm, surrounded by fields. To the north-west is Dyffryn Road, which is used for residential purposes and comes within about 360 yards of the quarry.
7. The trial judge described the houses as a small colony built for people who wanted a pleasant place to live. Their occupiers included steelworkers, a justice of the peace, schoolmasters and a bachelor of science. The quarry itself was about 25 or 26 years old as an open quarry.
8. Before 1949 the quarrying activity increased considerably, and some householders began complaining to the local authorities.
9. In June 1949 thirty residents petitioned the Pontardawe Rural District Council. They said damage by flying stones had been done to houses. A kitchen window pane had recently been blown in by blast, littering a breakfast table with glass while the wife narrowly escaped injury.
10. The petition protested against three things.
11. First, blasting done regardless of the risk to homes.
12. Second, flying rock landing some distance away, which endangered people in and outside homes and on the highway.
13. Third, dust from stone crushing that penetrated houses and made the main road unpleasant and unhealthy.
14. The Council's Public Health Committee held several meetings. On 13 December 1949 the Committee met the defendants and a residents' deputation. A sub-committee then visited the quarry and reported that the dust was negligible and no splinters fell outside the perimeter during blasting.
15. Further complaints led to more trials. A vibration test was done at the quarry on 27 April 1950. The Committee still thought no action could be taken.
16. On 8 July 1950 the Clerk of the Glamorgan County Council wrote to the defendants. He said stones and splinters were falling on or being blasted across the adjoining highway and asked for assurance that adequate steps would be taken. The letter was unanswered.
17. The Clerk wrote again on 20 July 1950. On 26 July 1950 the defendants replied that they were taking extraordinary precautions during blasting.
18. After a meeting between the Council and the defendants, the Clerk to the Council wrote on 15 March 1951. He said the nuisance had not been abated and was unlikely to be abated for a substantial period, if at all. The Council had decided to take proceedings.
19. The writ was not issued until 4 July 1952. From early summer 1950, complaint letters had reached the relator councils in a steady stream. Most were about flying stones, but some concerned vibration and dust.
20. Up to 1950 the defendants drilled 12 ft holes of 1 1/8 ins diameter, four to six in number, 3 ft to 4 ft back from the face. About 6 lb of explosive was used in each hole. The charges were fired together and brought down 80 to 100 tons of stone.
21. The stone was lifted by crane into skips and taken to an open crusher. The crusher could take stones only of about 10 ins by 6 ins.
22. Larger stones were drilled part-way, stemmed with 1-oz or 2-oz cartridges and detonated. This was called popping. Twelve to fifteen stones were exploded together. There were four or five main explosions a week, and popping took place up to three times a day.
23. In 1950 the defendants obtained planning permission to install vibratory screens and a new crusher, to reduce dust. They also began building a new road to the quarry base. The road came into use towards the end of 1951 and was completed in 1952. Building it involved much blasting near the highway.
24. The new crusher was obtained in April 1951 and could take stones up to 20 ins by 10 ins. At the end of 1952 they bought a skull breaker that could take stones of 4 ft by 16 ins thick, to reduce popping. Popping fell to about three times a month, and Mr Bryndley Thomas said they sometimes went four or five weeks without it.
25. Major blasting continued in the same manner until 1953. Then the defendants obtained drills reaching 24 ft, with holes 4 ft to 6 ft back from the face and 12 lb of powder in each. Four to six charges fired together brought down 300 to 400 tons per explosion.
26. In June 1952 the defendants consulted Mr F.C. Rosling, a consultant in quarry blasting. He advised a wagon drill, which he thought would remove all cause for complaint. The defendants bought one somewhat belatedly and installed it towards the end of 1953.
27. The wagon drill drills to 40 ft with a 2½ ins diameter. Up to 12 holes are drilled 12 ft to 14 ft back from the face, each with 30 to 35 lb of explosive. The charges are fired by delayed detonators, so each charge explodes separately although a bystander notices one explosion.
28. The wagon drill was meant to prevent stones leaving the quarry and to reduce vibration. Each explosion now brings down 3,000 to 4,000 tons, and is needed only once every five or six weeks.
29. On 26 August 1952 Mr D. Stenhouse, a B.Sc. in Mining, carried out a second vibration test and reported to the defendants.

Evidence of the residents and the sanitary inspector

1. Mr Percy Howell Davies, a schoolmaster at 57 Penyralltwen, wrote many complaints from July 1950. He complained of excessive vibration on 1 January 1952, of very intensive blasting on 21 February 1952, and of an explosion on 31 March 1952 followed by a small cloud of dust. In a letter of 30 January 1953 he called the vibration from an explosion two days earlier excessive.
2. In evidence he described the vibration on 21 February 1952 as terrific and said articles had fallen from a shelf in his pantry. This was not on a great number of occasions, but the vibration was invariably terrific. He said dust in his home had not decreased since 1947 and came from explosions and the crusher.
3. Mrs Apperley, an elderly lady at 59 Penyralltwen, wrote many letters in 1951 and later. She said the ground trembled under her feet and the dust was dreadful. In a letter of 15 January 1952 she wrote that on Saturday 12th blasting had shaken her bed and frightened her. She confirmed both complaints in evidence.
4. Mr David Brynmor Williams of 62 Penyralltwen wrote in 1950 and 1951. He linked a leaking trough to vibration and found it half full of fine dust. On 29 December 1951 his house shook as if in an earthquake. On 5 July 1952 he wrote that dust in dry weather was beyond all reason. He confirmed this in evidence.
5. Mrs Catherine Mary Davies, a justice of the peace who lived with her husband at No. 57, wrote on 3 May 1950 that dust, escaping stones and the shock of explosions made living conditions almost impossible. In a letter of 18 April 1951 she described a living-room window nearly shaken in. She wrote of very dense dust on 4 June 1951.
6. In evidence she described heavy blasting that shook the house on 13 April 1951. She described terrific vibration on 10 January 1952 and 7 July 1952. She described terrific blasting with dense dust on 31 July 1952. On 12 September 1952 a living-room window was cracked. Her evidence was helped by a diary she kept.
7. Mr William John Hopkin of Alltwenganol Farm wrote on 31 July 1950 that excessive vibration was a serious matter for his animals.
8. Mr Arther Jenkins, formerly of No. 69, wrote on 4 October 1951 that an explosion on 21 September 1951 shook the foundations of the house. He confirmed this in evidence.
9. Miss Elisabeth Hannah Williams of No. 61 wrote on 21 April 1951 that the loud reports and vibrations were very distressing and affected her mother's health. On 17 May 1954 she wrote that in dry weather dust got through the house and onto food. She had been unable to use the garden's soft fruit for several years. She confirmed this in evidence.
10. Mrs Emily Mary Smith of No. 63 wrote in July 1950 that the explosions shook her and the bed and were frightening. On 23 April 1951 she wrote that dust was all over the house, clothes and food. She confirmed her complaints were true.
11. Mr Ieuan Lewis, senior sanitary inspector of the Pontardawe Rural District Council, visited the quarry between 1950 and 1956 to check dust control. His first report was dated 4 July 1952 and noted dust blown by the wind through an open door at the bottom of the plant. Fine dust covered the floor and the surroundings (the depth is garbled in the source text). It improved greatly when the door was closed. Mr Wyndham Thomas refused to remove the dust, saying rain would do the job.
12. The door is a double door at the bottom of the secondary crusher, used to remove accumulated dust and reach the machinery. It caused constant trouble down to the trial. It jammed open from stones coming from the internal plant.
13. Mr Lewis's reports for July and August 1952 were moderate. On 1 September 1952 he described the dust as appreciable and found deposits on bushes and blackberries.
14. Mr Lewis said the defendants had not taken the steps they could have taken. The dust exceeded what was normal for the area. He gave three causes: crushing stone to chippings in the crushers; disturbance of rock and earth during blasting; and accumulation on the site from the first two sources.
15. He urged the defendants constantly to keep the crusher doors closed and to make them impossible to open by accident. Very little improvement followed. Every time he called, a cloud of dust came from the accumulation because of the through draught.
16. Asked why he had not done a Petri test for dust, he gave one answer. The film of dust on furniture, roofs and windows in the houses was sufficient evidence, equal to that test.

Evidence of the defendants' experts

1. Mr Rosling gave evidence for the defendants on vibration. He was consulted in June 1952. On his advice the defendants installed the wagon drill at the end of the following year.
2. He said there should have been no reason for considerable vibration from blasting since 1953. In 1952 he had told the defendants he would send details of a better, more progressive method of operating the quarry. He gave no evidence on vibration in 1952.
3. Mr David Stenhouse, of I.C.I., carried out a vibregraph test on 26 August 1952, arranged by Mr Rosling. The reason was a complaint of possible damage to nearby property from blast vibrations.
4. His report said the maximum ground movement was well below that which could damage the houses. It also noted that a much lower amplitude is perceptible to the human body.
5. At the trial he said that people being conscious of vibration is no guide to whether property is damaged. The explosions registered at the test could not have damaged the houses. He also said the delayed-detonation method used since the end of 1953 causes considerably less vibration than simultaneous detonation.

Findings of the trial judge

1. On flying stones the judge said there was really no defence. The case was proved absolutely when the writ was issued. Despite the wagon drill, the nuisance had not been wholly abated, so he granted an injunction.
2. On vibration he found that on occasion there is vibration that frightens people, shakes their houses and makes them thoroughly uncomfortable. That is a nuisance and must cease.
3. On dust he said it would not be right to base an injunction on the explosions, given their rarity since the end of 1953. But excessive dust came from the secondary crusher when its door was left open, as it often was.
4. He had no doubt there was a dust nuisance, only in dry weather, and that the defendants had done nothing to cope with it. He ordered them to do so by injunction.

Issues Raised

1. What is the nature of a public nuisance as distinct from a private nuisance, and how widely must it be felt?
2. Did the trial judge wrongly treat the case as one of private nuisance, applying tests that do not decide a public nuisance?
3. Did the judge give too little weight to the expert evidence?
4. Did the judge wrongly rest his decision on events between the writ and the trial, instead of the position at the date of the writ?
5. Was a public nuisance from vibration proved at the date of the writ?
6. Was a public nuisance from dust proved at the date of the writ?
7. Was the evidence of individual residents' experiences properly received in a public nuisance action?
8. Given the defendants' remedial measures since 1952, was the Attorney-General still entitled to an injunction, or should only limited relief such as liberty to apply be given?
9. Should the dust injunction be limited to dust from the crushing plant?

Arguments Contended

For the appellants (defendants), Mr Beney, Q.C.:

• The judge approached the case as though it was a private nuisance. He applied tests and lines of inquiry apt for private nuisance but irrelevant or indecisive for a public nuisance.
• The judge paid insufficient attention to the expert evidence.
• The judge did not consider the position at the date of the writ. He founded the injunctions mainly on incidents between the writ and the trial.
• Even if one or more individuals could have sued for private nuisance in 1952, too few people were affected by vibration for it to be a public nuisance.
• Vibration differs from noise or air pollution. For those, the Court may infer injury to the whole class from some members' evidence. For vibration, which depends on individual susceptibility, no such inference is fair.
• The Statement of Claim was rightly amended. In a public nuisance action, evidence of individual experiences should not be received, though it would be relevant in private nuisance.
• The dust that residents complained of at trial arose from the crusher doors being left open. This started only after the proceedings began.
• The defendants' measures had been so effective that the proper order was liberty to apply for injunctions, and the judge's injunctions should be discharged.
• Freak explosions may occur without warning. An unavoidable incident might lead to contempt applications, so the injunctions should not stand.
• The dust injunction should at least be confined to dust from the crushing plant.

For the respondents (plaintiffs), Mr Edmund Davies, Q.C.:

• The judgment records no separate argument for the respondents. Counsel asked only that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

Court's Reasoning

Judgment of Romer, L.J. (with whom Denning, L.J. and Parker, L.J. agreed)

1. Noted: The appeal is against the order of Mr Justice Oliver dated 25 April 1956. The defendants challenge only the injunction on dust and vibration.
2. Noted: Romer, L.J., sets out the facts, the planning permission, the petition, the correspondence, the changes in plant and the trial judge's findings. He records three criticisms of the judgment by Mr Beney (see Arguments).
3. Noted: Before dealing with them, he considers the nature of a public nuisance. He sets out the authorities, listed below in the Authorities subsection.
4. Noted: Archbold's Criminal Pleading gives a form of indictment for an offensive trade. Its notes say the smoke or smell must be injurious to health or so offensive as to detract sensibly from enjoyment of life and property. It need not be injurious to health if it offends the senses. It must be in a populous neighbourhood or near a highway. That depends on the number of houses and the concourse of people, which is a fact for the jury.
5. Noted: Stephen's Digest defines a common nuisance as an act not warranted by law, or an omission to discharge a legal duty. It must obstruct or cause inconvenience or damage to the public in exercising rights common to all subjects.
6. Noted: Blackstone defines nuisance as anything that works hurt, inconvenience or damage. He divides nuisances into public ones, which affect all subjects and are public wrongs or crimes, and private ones, which hurt the lands or tenements of another. Pearce and Meston say this definition is too broad because it includes things that are damna sine injuria (harm without legal injury).
7. Noted: Chitty's form of indictment for a public nuisance by smells alleges that the air was corrupted. The damage was to all subjects living there or passing through the streets and highways.
8. Held: It is hard to tell from these sources how widely a nuisance must spread to be public. It is not required that all subjects be affected. Otherwise no public nuisance could ever be established.
9. Noted: In Soltau v. De Held, the Vice-Chancellor said a public nuisance must be an injury to all persons within its sphere of operation, though greater for some than others.
10. Noted: In Rex v. White, Lord Mansfield rejected an objection that the indictment named only the parish. He said the existence of the nuisance depends on the number of houses and concourse of people, a fact for the jury.
11. Noted: In Rex v. Lloyd, a noise affected only three houses in Clifford's Inn. Lord Ellenborough held the indictment could not be sustained. It was at most a private nuisance, confined to three inhabitants and avoidable by shutting windows.
12. Noted: In Attorney-General v. Sheffield Gas Consumers Co., Turner, L.J., said the Chancery jurisdiction rests on injury to property. The only distinction is that private nuisance injures individual property, and public nuisance injures the property of mankind.
13. Noted: In Reg. v. Price, Stephen, J., told the jury to find a true bill if burning a body was done in a way offensive to any considerable number of persons.
14. Noted: In Attorney-General v. Keymer Brick and Tile Co., Joyce, J., said a public nuisance need not injure health. It is enough that there is a material interference with the comfort and convenience of life of people within the sphere of influence. The injunction there restrained noxious odours to the annoyance of persons in the neighbourhood.
15. Noted: The neighbourhood has also been treated as defining the area in Attorney-General v. Stone, Attorney-General v. Cole and Attorney-General v. Corke.
16. Noted: Romer, L.J., does not attempt a more precise definition. Any nuisance is public if it materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty's subjects. The sphere may be described as the neighbourhood. Whether the community within it is large enough to be a class of the public is a question of fact in every case.
17. Held: It is not necessary to prove that every member of the class was injuriously affected. It is enough to show a representative cross-section of the class was affected for an injunction to issue.
18. Noted: The appeal turns on the evidence, related to these principles.
19. Noted: He reviews the evidence of the residents, the sanitary inspector, Mr Rosling and Mr Stenhouse as summarised in the Facts section. Mr Stenhouse's test showed no damage to houses, though people perceive lower vibration than damages property.
20. Noted: The question is whether the plaintiffs proved a public nuisance from vibration and dust at the date of the writ. If so, the further question is whether the defendants' remedial measures since July 1952 should stop the Court interfering.
21. Held: On vibration, he agrees with Mr Beney that vibration differs from noise and smell. One person's reasonable discomfort does not prove his neighbour's. But a nuisance from vibration existed in 1952 and was widespread enough to be a common or public nuisance.
22. Held: This is a question of fact that the judge decided against the defendants. He cannot say the judge was wrong, given the 1949 petition, the letters and the oral evidence.
23. Noted: Complaints of vibration and dust were fewer and less emphatic than those of flying stones. But they came from a number of persons east and south of the quarry, and the judge saw the witnesses and accepted they were genuine.
24. Held: The complaint that the judge gave insufficient attention to the vibration tests and to Mr Stenhouse is ill-founded. The judge had them in mind when he found no structural damage.
25. Held: The judge's principal ground was sound. In his words: "if reasonable people on reasonable grounds do believe that their houses are being shaken to pieces". Such people are harassed and distressed as much as if the damage were real. There was also evidence of personal discomfort apart from fear of damage.
26. Held: Three incidents impressed the judge (1 July 1955, 30 August 1955 and 3 January 1956, as Romer, L.J., records them; the judge's own words in the next step give 20 August 1955) and all came long after the writ. But he was mindful of past history. He asked whether he accepted that the vibration had existed for so long and was recently intensified though less frequent.
27. Noted: The trial's main interest was whether the nuisances still existed despite the defendants' efforts. So the evidence and judgment emphasised recent events.
28. Held: The judge intended to find, and did find, a public nuisance before action brought for vibration as well as flying stones. There is no ground for disturbing that decision.
29. Held: The same applies to dust. Mr Beney's argument on vibration's local effect does not apply to dust, which pollutes air like smoke or smells. If one householder is affected, his neighbour is likely affected too, subject to the direction of the wind.
30. Noted: Dust is seasonal, existing generally only in summer. That does not stop it being actionable, and it was not suggested that it did.
31. Held: The suggestion that dust arose only from open crusher doors after proceedings began is wrong. Mr Lewis's 1952 reports, the 1949 petition and the residents' complaints show a dust nuisance existed in 1952. Enough people were affected to be a class of Her Majesty's subjects.
32. Noted: The judge did not say in so many words that the nuisance existed in 1952. But he was fully alive to the position at the date of the writ, though he directed his judgment more to later events.
33. Noted: The original Statement of Claim alleged damage to occupiers, danger to houses and dust making them dirty. These allegations were struck out as thought irrelevant to a public nuisance. Counsel for the appellants supported that and argued that evidence of individual experiences should not be received in such an action.
34. Held: The argument that individual experiences should not be received in a public nuisance action is rejected. Some public nuisances, such as river pollution, can be proved without individual witnesses. But generally a public nuisance is proved by its cumulative effect on people in its sphere. In his words: "a normal and legitimate way of proving a public nuisance is to prove a sufficiently large collection of private nuisances".
35. Held: There was nothing improper in the Statement of Claim as first delivered or in receiving the residents' evidence.
36. Noted: The defendants say their measures were so effective that the injunctions should be discharged and liberty to apply given instead.
37. Held: Prima facie (on first view), a plaintiff is entitled to an injunction (a court order to do or stop doing something) if a nuisance, public or private, existed when the writ was issued. If the nuisance was abated between writ and trial, the Court usually holds back and gives leave to apply if trouble recurs.
38. Held: It is impossible to say the nuisance from vibration or dust was wholly abated at trial. With the wagon drill, blasting was far less frequent, but its effects were far more violent.
39. Noted: The judge found three main dates of tremendous vibration: 1 July 1955, 20 August 1955 and 3 January 1956. Each led to a petition signed by many neighbours to the local authority. Explosions were fewer but at times far more violent.
40. Held: There is still ground for serious complaint of vibration. The judge was right to grant the injunction.
41. Held: On dust, the judge relied partly on his visit, when he saw a cloud pour from the secondary crusher door when open. Apart from that, ample evidence from residents shows they were still troubled by dust at trial. Named witnesses included Mr and Mrs Percy Davies, Mr John Thomas, Mrs Apperley, Mr D.B. Williams (who saw layers of white dust on the shed), and Miss Williams and Mrs Smith (dust on soft fruit).
42. Held: There is no ground for the Court to interfere with the dust injunction.
43. Noted: Two further considerations support the injunctions. First, expert evidence shows the nuisances are not inevitable. Mr Rosling said that if the defendants were ordered not to vibrate houses they would have no difficulty. Mr Lewis said that if the crusher doors were kept permanently shut he thought nothing would be left to complain of from the crusher.
44. Held: Second, the defendants' past conduct is not irrelevant. Indifference to complaints shows irresponsibility. This gives no ground for a penal order, but it bears on granting an injunction.
45. Noted: The judge said the defendants paid scant attention to residents' complaints and the local authorities. They were slow to adopt Mr Rosling's suggestion. They never really tried to keep the door shut or to use water to stop the escape of dust. Romer, L.J., says that view was amply justified.
46. Held: The injunctions were rightly granted, and the appeal fails.
47. Noted: Mr Beney feared that an unavoidable freak explosion could lead to contempt applications such as sequestration or attachment. Mr Wyndham Thomas said a freak blast at a tight corner might not happen for another ten years. Such a blast occurred on 3 January 1956.
48. Held: No resident could make such an application. Only the Attorney-General could, and he would presumably not do so unless the circumstances warranted it. He might not act on an isolated incident if satisfied that no reasonable care could have avoided it. The defendants will doubtless take expert advice with more energy than in the past.
49. Held: The submission that the dust injunction be confined to the crushing plant is rejected. The plant is probably the main source now. But a limit might be read as implied permission to spread dust from other sources as before.
50. Noted: He would dismiss the appeal.

Judgment of Denning, L.J.

1. Held: He agrees entirely with Romer, L.J., and adds a few points.
2. Noted: Mr Beney rightly raised the difference between public and private nuisance. It matters because the order restrains a public nuisance, not a private one.
3. Noted: The classic statement is that a public nuisance affects Her Majesty's subjects generally, while a private nuisance affects only particular individuals. That does not help much. Asking when individuals become subjects generally is like asking when a group becomes a crowd.
4. Held: He declines to say how many people make up subjects generally. He prefers the reason of the thing. He says: "a public nuisance is a nuisance which is so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate in its effect". Then it would not be reasonable to expect one person to sue alone. The community at large should take responsibility.
5. Noted: Examples are blocking or failing to repair a public highway, which affects everyone indiscriminately even if only one or two householders use the footpath. Another is a landowner who collects pestilential rubbish near a village, or lets gypsies with filthy habits camp beside a residential area. The nearest householders suffer most, but everyone nearby suffers.
6. Noted: In such cases the Attorney-General may sue for an injunction. He acts to defend the public right, not any sectional interest (Attorney-General v. Bastow).
7. Noted: Sometimes only two or three property owners are affected, like the three attorneys in Clifford's Inn. They should sue in their own names and not expect the community to do it (Rex v. Lloyd, and Chitty's Criminal Law).
8. Held: Applying this test, the nuisance by stones, vibration and dust was a public nuisance at the date of the writ. It was so widespread in range and so indiscriminate in effect.
9. Noted: The defendants have since taken such good measures that objectionable incidents are rare and accidental. The stones injunction is absolute. The dust and vibration injunction depends on there being a nuisance to Her Majesty's subjects, that is a public nuisance.
10. Noted: The question is whether every rare incident is a public nuisance. He supposes six months without excessive vibration, and then a violent explosion by mischance that terrifies many people.
11. Held: He would think that it might be a public nuisance, and could lead to contempt proceedings. But the punishment would be measured by the degree of the defendants' fault.
12. Noted: A private nuisance always involves some repetition or continuance. An isolated act done once and for all may give rise to negligence (a breach of a duty of care) or an action under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, but not nuisance. A factory explosion breaking windows for miles gives an action under Rylands v. Fletcher, but no other if there was no negligence (Read v. J. Lyons).
13. Held: But "an isolated act may amount to a public nuisance" if done in circumstances where the public right to condemn it should be vindicated. He referred to authorities in Southport Corporation v. Esso.
14. Held: There is a long history of stones, vibration and dust. So the defendants must ensure that nothing of the kind happens again to injure the neighbourhood at large, even on an isolated occasion.
15. Noted: He would also dismiss the appeal.

Judgment of Parker, L.J.

1. Held: He entirely agrees with both judgments and has nothing to add.

Provisions discussed

• Town and Country Planning Acts: the Pontardawe Rural District Council used them in 1947 to grant planning permission for further working of the quarry. One condition was that the Council be satisfied that the utmost precautions were taken to prevent dust. The judgment does not name a section.
• The injunction: restrains stones and splinters absolutely, and dust and vibration only to the extent they are a nuisance to Her Majesty's subjects.
• Sequestration and attachment (remedies for contempt of court (disobeying a court order), used on breach of an injunction): raised by Mr Beney as a risk. Romer, L.J., says only the Attorney-General could apply.

Authorities

• Archbold's Criminal Pleading, 33rd edition, p. 1392: a form of indictment for an offensive trade and its notes. Romer, L.J., used it to see how a public nuisance is defined. A textbook, not a case.
• Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law, 8th edition, p. 184: definition of a common nuisance. Romer, L.J.
• Blackstone's Commentaries, III, chapter 13, p. 216: definition of nuisance and the public and private division. Romer, L.J.
• Pearce and Meston, Law of Nuisances, p. 1: says Blackstone's definition is too broad. Romer, L.J.
• Chitty on Criminal Law, 2nd edition, vol. III, pp. 652-654 and (per Denning, L.J.) pp. 664-5 of the 1826 edition: forms of indictment for public nuisance. Romer, L.J. and Denning, L.J.
• Soltau v. De Held, 2 Sim. (N.S.) 133, at 142: a public nuisance injures all persons within its sphere, though some more than others. Romer, L.J.
• Rex v. White, 1 Burr. 333: existence of a nuisance depends on the number of houses and concourse of people, a jury question. Romer, L.J.
• Rex v. Lloyd, 4 Esp. 200 (1800): noise affecting three houses in Clifford's Inn was at most private. Romer, L.J. and Denning, L.J.
• Attorney-General v. Sheffield Gas Consumers Co., 3 De G. M. & G. 316: jurisdiction rests on injury to property, private or the property of mankind. Romer, L.J.
• Reg. v. Price, 12 Q.B.D. 247, at 256: offensive to a considerable number of persons. Romer, L.J.
• Attorney-General v. Keymer Brick and Tile Co. Ltd., (1903) 67 J.P. 434: no need for injury to health; material interference with comfort suffices. Romer, L.J.
• Attorney-General v. Stone, 12 T.L.R. 76; Attorney-General v. Cole, [1901] 1 Ch. 205; Attorney-General v. Corke, [1933] Ch. 86: the neighbourhood as the area affected. Romer, L.J.
• Attorney-General v. Bastow, [1957] 2 W.L.R. 340: the Attorney-General acts to defend the public right. Denning, L.J.
• Read v. J. Lyons, [1947] A.C. 156: an isolated factory explosion gives a Rylands v. Fletcher action, not nuisance. Denning, L.J.
• Rylands v. Fletcher (the rule): an isolated act that is over and done with may give rise to that action, not nuisance. Denning, L.J.
• Southport Corporation v. Esso, [1954] 2 Q.B. 182, at 197: authorities on an isolated act as a public nuisance. Denning, L.J.
• Also cited in footnotes: none; the judgment has no footnotes.

Judgement

1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The injunction granted by Mr Justice Oliver on 25 April 1956 stands. It restrains the defendants from quarrying at Penyralltwen so as to project stones or splinters from the quarry. It also restrains them from causing a nuisance to Her Majesty's subjects by dust or vibrations.
3. The dust injunction is not limited to the crushing plant.
4. Counsel for the respondents asked for costs of the appeal. Denning, L.J., answered yes. The judgment states no amount.
5. Denning, L.J., and Parker, L.J., agreed with Romer, L.J.

Legal Principle / Ratio

A nuisance is public if it materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of life of a class of the public within its sphere, usually the neighbourhood. It is not necessary to prove that every member of the class was affected. On Denning, L.J.'s approach, it is public if it is so widespread or indiscriminate that one person cannot fairly be expected to sue alone.

Key holding: "it is sufficient to show that a representative cross-section of the class has been so affected for an injunction to issue".

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

• Romer, L.J., and Denning, L.J., state the test differently. Romer looks at a class of subjects and a representative cross-section. Denning looks at whether it is reasonable to expect one person to sue. The judgment does not say the two tests conflict.
• Both judges refuse to fix a number of persons. The line between a public nuisance and a private one stays a question of fact.
• The judgment treats the amendment of the Statement of Claim as mistaken. It does not say what evidence would have been needed had the Court accepted that individual evidence was irrelevant.
• Denning, L.J., says he should have thought an isolated violent explosion might be a public nuisance, and describes it in hypothetical terms. The Court did not need to decide it.
• The judgment records the trial judge's own findings on the 1955 and 1956 incidents but does not state their dates against a specific 1952 fact. The Court relies on inference that the judge meant to find a nuisance before action brought.
• The judgment records no separate argument for the respondents, so the Court's account of their case is limited.

Significance

• The case gives two working tests for public nuisance: effect on a class of the public, and the unreasonableness of expecting one person to sue.
• It confirms that evidence of many private nuisances can prove a public nuisance.
• It shows that an injunction is normally available where a nuisance existed at the writ date and has not been wholly abated by trial.
• It shows that expert evidence of no structural damage does not defeat a nuisance claim based on reasonable fear and discomfort.
• It suggests that a defendant's indifference to complaints can bear on whether an injunction is granted.

Exam-Important Points

• Rule: a nuisance is public if it materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of life of a class of the public. Trap: not every member need be affected.
• Rule (Denning, L.J.): public if so widespread or indiscriminate that the community, not one person, should act. Trap: the judge refused to give a headcount.
• Rule: a public nuisance can be proved by a sufficiently large collection of private nuisances. Trap: evidence of individual experience is not irrelevant.
• Rule: the Attorney-General sues on the relation of local authorities. Trap: no resident could apply for contempt.
• Rule: an injunction follows if the nuisance existed at the writ date. Where it is abated before trial, the Court usually gives liberty to apply. Trap: here it was not wholly abated.
• Rule: reasonable belief that houses are being shaken to pieces is enough for harassment. Trap: Mr Stenhouse's test showed no damage, but that did not decide the case.
• Rule: private nuisance involves repetition or continuance. Trap: Denning, L.J., says an isolated act may still be a public nuisance.
• Result: appeal dismissed; injunction upheld; costs asked for by the respondents.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. The judgment text has no numbered paragraphs, so no paragraph numbers are cited. [1957] 2 QB 169 is the law-report citation, not stated in the judgment text.