This is the sixth post in Family Law-I (Hindu Law), Unit V — having covered who is disqualified from inheriting in the previous post, this post covers testamentary succession: the right of a Hindu to override all the intestate rules studied so far by making a valid will.
Every rule of succession studied in this unit so far — the four-class order for a male, the five-entry order for a female, the disqualifications — applies only where the deceased left no valid will. A Hindu is always free to decide, in advance, who gets what, overriding the default statutory order entirely. This post explains that right, a genuinely historic change the 1956 Act made to what could even be willed away in the first place, and the general law that actually governs how a valid Hindu will is made, proved and revoked.
Section 30 preserves the right of every Hindu — male or female — to dispose of any property capable of being disposed of by them, by will or other testamentary disposition, in accordance with the general law relating to wills. This single section is why everything studied in Posts 2 to 5 of this unit is described as applying only in the absence of a valid will — testamentary succession always takes priority over intestate succession.
Before 1956, an undivided coparcener's own interest in Mitakshara joint family property could not be bequeathed by will at all — doing so would have defeated the other coparceners' right of survivorship over that same property, so the courts simply did not permit it; a coparcener could only will away property that was genuinely his separate, self-acquired property. The Explanation to Section 30 reversed this: it deems the interest of a Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary property to be property capable of being disposed of by will, notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other law. This means a coparcener's own undivided share — the same notional share worked out on a Section 6 notional partition — can today be validly willed away, and the other coparceners' expectancy of survivorship simply yields to it.
The Hindu Succession Act itself does not say how a will is to be made, proved, interpreted or revoked — Section 30 only preserves the right to make one. The actual mechanics come from a different statute entirely: the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Section 57 of that Act, read with its Schedule III, extends Part VI (Sections 57 to 191, covering the making, attestation, revocation and construction of wills) to wills and codicils made by Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains, subject to a short list of specific exceptions listed in the Schedule. In practice, this means the "Hindu law of wills" is really the general Indian law of testamentary succession, simply applied to Hindus — it is not a separate body of personal law the way marriage, adoption or intestate succession are.
The vast majority of wills made by Hindus are unprivileged, and must fully comply with the Section 63 formalities described above. A narrow exception exists for privileged wills under Sections 65 and 66 of the Indian Succession Act — available only to a soldier employed in an expedition or engaged in actual warfare, an airman similarly employed, or a mariner at sea. Such a person may make a will orally in front of two witnesses, or in writing without the usual attestation formalities, in recognition of the practical impossibility of complying with the ordinary rules in those circumstances.
A will has no legal effect during the testator's lifetime and can be freely revoked at any time before death, in one of three ways under Section 70 of the Indian Succession Act: by executing a new will or a codicil that revokes it, expressly or by inconsistency; by a separate written declaration of an intention to revoke, executed with the same formalities as a will itself; or by burning, tearing, or otherwise physically destroying the will with the intention of revoking it. Registration of a will is entirely optional under Indian law — an unregistered will is just as legally valid as a registered one — but registration is often advisable in practice, since it provides strong contemporaneous evidence against a later claim that the will was fabricated, backdated, or improperly executed.
This is the foundational Supreme Court decision on how a will must actually be proved once its validity is disputed. The Court held that although a will has to be proved just like any other document — by satisfying the ordinary standard applicable to civil proceedings — the propounder of a will carries an additional, special burden wherever the circumstances surrounding its execution are suspicious: for instance, where the testator's signature appears shaky or unusual, where the will excludes natural heirs in favour of persons with no obvious claim, or where the very person propounding the will was actively involved in preparing it and also takes a substantial benefit under it. In every such case, the propounder must clear away the suspicion and affirmatively satisfy the conscience of the court that the will genuinely represents the true, free will of the testator, before it can be accepted — it is not enough merely to prove due execution in a formal, mechanical sense.
Suppose Kishore, a coparcener in a Mitakshara joint Hindu family along with his brother Mahesh, wishes to leave his own undivided share in the ancestral house to his daughter, Sujata, instead of letting it pass by survivorship-style computation under Section 6 read with Section 8. Before 1956, this simply could not have been done — his interest in the joint property was not his to bequeath. Today, because of the Explanation to Section 30, Kishore can validly execute a written will, signed by him and attested by two witnesses under Section 63, leaving his notional share to Sujata; on Kishore's death, that share goes to her under the will, and Mahesh's own share in the joint family property is worked out as though Kishore's interest had already been carved out for this purpose — Mahesh cannot object that the property should have devolved to him by the usual joint-family expectancy instead.