This is the first post in Family Law-I (Hindu Law), Unit V — this unit covers succession and inheritance under Hindu law, and this opening post lays the foundation with an overview of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and its 2005 Amendment before the following posts work through the actual rules of succession in detail.
Before 1956, succession among Hindus was governed by uncodified rules drawn from the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools studied in Unit I, supplemented by a patchwork of regional customs and earlier reform statutes such as the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 and the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937. These rules differed sharply from region to region, and more seriously, a woman generally received only a limited estate in inherited property rather than full ownership — she held it for her lifetime, and it passed on her death not to her own heirs but back to her husband's family. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was enacted to bring one uniform code of intestate succession for all Hindus, and — as far as the 1956 Parliament was willing to go — to remove this disability female heirs suffered under the old law.
Section 2 extends the Act to the same broad definition of "Hindu" already studied under Application of Hindu Law in Unit I — any person who is a Hindu, Buddhist, Jain or Sikh by religion, and any person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew and who is not shown to be governed by any other law. Two matters originally fell outside its reach: property saved by any earlier special or local law, and — until the 2005 Amendment removed this exclusion — agricultural land governed by State tenancy legislation.
Where a Hindu male dies intestate, his property devolves according to a four-class order of heirs — Class I heirs, Class II heirs, agnates and cognates — set out fully in the next post of this unit. This post only establishes that this is a separate, self-contained scheme, distinct from the one that applies when a Hindu female dies.
Where a Hindu female dies intestate, an entirely different and more compact order of heirs applies under Section 15, with Section 16 laying down the order in which they take. The third post of this unit works through this scheme in detail, including why the source of the property (inherited from her father's side, her husband's side, or self-acquired) can change who inherits it.
Sections 18 to 29 lay down rules that cut across both schemes above — for example, that a full-blood relative is preferred over a half-blood relative of the same class, that certain heirs are disqualified (the subject of the fifth post in this unit), and that property escheats to the government if no heir can be traced at all. Section 30, separately, preserves every Hindu's right to dispose of property by a valid will. This is an important point of sequence: the whole intestate scheme discussed above and in the next several posts applies only where the deceased left no valid will — testamentary succession, covered in its own post later in this unit, always takes priority over it.
The 2005 Amendment is the most significant change made to the Act since 1956, and it did four distinct things.
| Provision | Position before 2005 | Position after 2005 |
|---|---|---|
| Section 6 | Only sons were coparceners by birth in Mitakshara joint family property; daughters had no birthright share. | A daughter becomes a coparcener by birth in exactly the same manner as a son, with the same rights and liabilities. |
| Section 4(2) | Agricultural land was excluded from the Act and governed instead by State-level tenancy and land-reform laws. | Section 4(2) was omitted; agricultural land now devolves under this Act like any other property. |
| Section 23 | A daughter's right to seek partition of a dwelling house wholly occupied by the family could be postponed until the male heirs chose to divide it. | Section 23 was omitted; a daughter may seek partition of the dwelling house on the same footing as a son. |
| Section 24 | Certain widows — such as a predeceased son's widow — lost their right to succeed if they remarried before succession opened. | Section 24 was omitted; remarriage is no longer, by itself, a ground of disqualification. |
Of these four changes, the new Section 6 has generated the most litigation, because Parliament gave the daughter's coparcenary right only "on and from the commencement of" the 2005 Amendment, without stating clearly whether a daughter born before 2005 — or one whose father had already died before 2005 — could claim it.
A three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court finally settled a decade of conflicting High Court and Supreme Court rulings on this point. It held that Section 6, as amended in 2005, confers coparcenary status on a daughter **by birth**, exactly like a son — and that this right does not depend on her father being alive on 9 September 2005, the date the Amendment came into force. Two earlier two-judge Bench decisions had gone the other way: **Prakash v. Phulavati (2015)** had held that the father-coparcener must be alive on the date of the Amendment for the daughter to claim a share, while **Danamma @ Suman Surpur v. Amar (2018)** had allowed a daughter's claim despite her father's earlier death, without directly overruling Phulavati. Vineeta Sharma resolved the conflict in the daughter's favour: since the right arises by birth, it is not conditional on the father surviving into 2005, and it applies retroactively — though not to a partition already given effect before 20 December 2004, or to one effected by a registered instrument or a court decree passed before this judgment.
Suppose Ramesh's father, Krishnamurthy, died in 1990, leaving behind Mitakshara coparcenary property that was never partitioned. Krishnamurthy is survived by Ramesh (a son) and Lalitha (a daughter, then unmarried). Under the pre-2005 position, only Ramesh would have had a birthright share in that property; Lalitha would have had none as a coparcener. After the 2005 Amendment and Vineeta Sharma, Lalitha's coparcenary right is treated as arising by birth, so she is entitled to the same share Ramesh would take on a notional partition — even though her father died fifteen years before the Amendment — provided the property was never actually partitioned by a registered deed or a final court decree before the 2020 judgment.