Freedom of Conscience and Free Profession, Practice and Propagation of Religion — Article 25

This is the 3rd post in Constitutional Law-I, Unit 4 — the previous two posts covered the Rights against Exploitation under Articles 23 and 24. This post begins the Right to Freedom of Religion with Article 25 — the freedom of conscience, and the right to freely profess, practise, and propagate religion.

The Problem This Topic Solves

India is home to an extraordinary diversity of religious belief and practice, and the framers of the Constitution had to solve a genuinely difficult problem: how does a State guarantee every individual the freedom to hold and live out their own religious (or non-religious) convictions, while also retaining the power to regulate genuinely secular activities that happen to be wrapped up in religious practice — running temple finances, reforming discriminatory social customs, or maintaining public order when religious practices clash? A right to religious freedom that is either too narrow (letting the State interfere with core belief and worship) or too broad (letting religious practice override every other law, however harmful) would fail. Article 25 solves this by drawing a careful line: it protects conscience and religious practice as a Fundamental Right, but subjects it to public order, morality, health, other Fundamental Rights, and the State's power to regulate secular aspects and reform religious institutions.

What Article 25 Guarantees

Article 25(1) provides: "Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion." This clause does three things at once: it grants the right to every person (not just citizens); it identifies four distinct protected freedoms — conscience, profession, practice, and propagation of religion; and it immediately subjects all of them to public order, morality, health, and the other Fundamental Rights in Part III.

Word	What It Protects
Freedom of Conscience	The inner freedom to hold, or not hold, any religious belief at all — a purely internal freedom that exists even before any outward act of worship.
Profess	The right to declare one's religious belief and faith openly and freely.
Practise	The right to perform religious rites, rituals, ceremonies, and observances that the religion prescribes.
Propagate	The right to transmit or spread one's religious beliefs to others, for the edification of others — but not the right to convert another person (see Rev. Stainislaus below).

Freedom of Conscience — An Inner, Personal Freedom

"Freedom of conscience" is the most personal of the four freedoms in Article 25(1) — it protects a person's inner freedom to believe, or disbelieve, in any religion, deity, or doctrine, according to the dictates of their own mind. Because it is a freedom of belief rather than of external conduct, it can also justify a person's refusal to participate in an act that conflicts with their sincerely held religious conviction, even where that act (such as singing a patriotic song) would ordinarily seem entirely uncontroversial to everyone else.

Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986)

(1986) 3 SCC 615, decided by a Bench of Justices O. Chinnappa Reddy and M.M. Dutt.

Facts: Three schoolchildren in Kerala belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses faith stood respectfully during the singing of the National Anthem in their school's morning assembly but did not themselves sing it, because their faith did not permit them to participate in what they believed to be a form of worship directed at any authority other than God. The Head Mistress expelled them from school on the Deputy Inspector of Schools' instructions. A departmental inquiry itself found that the children were law-abiding and had shown no disrespect towards the National Anthem. The Kerala High Court nonetheless upheld the expulsion.

Holding: The Supreme Court reversed the High Court and ordered the children's immediate readmission. The Court held that standing respectfully without joining in the singing did not amount to disrespect to the National Anthem under the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971, and that compelling the children to sing against their genuine religious conviction violated both their freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) (which includes the freedom not to speak or utter a particular message) and their freedom of conscience under Article 25(1). The judgment recognised that freedom of conscience protects a negative liberty as well — the right to abstain from an act that one's genuine religious belief forbids, provided doing so does not itself show disrespect or breach any other law.

The Right to Propagate Does Not Include the Right to Convert

"Propagate" allows a person to transmit, teach, and spread their religious beliefs so that others may understand and, if they freely choose, adopt them. It does not, however, extend to a right to convert another person to one's own religion by force, fraud, or allurement — because a forced or induced conversion would violate the very freedom of conscience of the person being converted, which Article 25 protects equally for everyone.

Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977)

(1977) 1 SCC 677, decided by a Constitution Bench of Chief Justice A.N. Ray and Justices M. Hameedullah Beg, Ranjit Singh Sarkaria, P.N. Shingal, and Jaswant Singh.

Facts: Reverend Stainislaus, a Roman Catholic priest in Madhya Pradesh, was prosecuted under the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantrya Adhiniyam, 1968, a State law that prohibited religious conversion effected by force, fraud, or allurement. A similar Orissa law (the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act, 1967) was challenged in a connected matter. Both statutes were challenged as violating the right to propagate religion under Article 25(1) and as being outside the State Legislature's competence.

Holding: The Supreme Court upheld both statutes. It held that the word "propagate" in Article 25(1) means the right to transmit or spread one's religion by an exposition of its tenets, and does not confer a right to convert another person, since conversion by force, fraud, or allurement impairs the "freedom of conscience" of the very person being converted — a right Article 25 guarantees equally to all persons. The Court also held that legislation of this kind falls within the State Legislature's competence to legislate on "public order" under the State List, since forced or fraudulent conversions have the potential to disturb public order in a religiously diverse society.

The Essential Religious Practices Test — Article 25(2)(a)

Article 25(2)(a) allows the State to make laws regulating or restricting any "economic, financial, political or other secular activity" that may be associated with religious practice. This is what enables the State to regulate, for instance, the financial administration of a temple's trust, or the appointment of a manager for a religious institution's properties, without this being treated as interference with religion itself — because such matters are secular, not religious, in character, even though they arise in a religious context.

Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954)

AIR 1954 SC 282, decided by a seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court.

Facts: The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, empowered the Hindu Religious Endowments Board to take over the administration of a religious institution's properties, and to appoint an "Executive Officer" to manage the Shirur Mutt (a Hindu monastic institution), on the ground that it was heavily in debt and mismanaged. The Mathadhipati (head) of the Mutt challenged this as an unconstitutional interference with the institution's religious affairs under Articles 25 and 26.

Holding: The Supreme Court held that the State's power under Article 25(2)(a) extends only to secular activities associated with a religious practice (such as financial administration and management of property), and does not permit the State to interfere with practices that are genuinely essential and integral to the religion itself. The Court laid down what became known as the "Essential Religious Practices" test: whether a particular practice is essential to a religion must be determined primarily by reference to the doctrines of that religion itself, not by the State's or the Court's own view of what is or is not "essential" in a general sense. Certain provisions of the Act that went beyond secular regulation and encroached on essential religious matters were struck down as unconstitutional, while the provisions dealing purely with financial/secular administration were upheld.

Article 25(2)(b) allows the State to make laws providing for social welfare and reform, and for throwing open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. This clause was specifically inserted to enable the State to legislate against practices such as untouchability-based exclusion from temples, ensuring that reformist social legislation could not be struck down merely because it touched upon a religious institution's traditional practices.

Restrictions on Article 25 — Public Order, Morality, and Health

Article 25(1) itself begins with the words "Subject to public order, morality and health" — meaning the right to freedom of conscience and religion is not absolute even at the level of belief-driven conduct. A religious practice that genuinely threatens public order, offends generally accepted standards of morality, or endangers public health can be restricted, even if the person asserting it sincerely believes it to be a core part of their religion. The right is also expressly made subject to "the other provisions of this Part" — meaning a religious practice cannot override another person's Fundamental Right, such as their right to equality or right to life.

Must Know

Article 25(1) protects four things: freedom of conscience, and the right to profess, practise, and propagate religion — available to "all persons", not just citizens, subject to public order, morality, health, and the other Fundamental Rights
The right to "propagate" religion allows spreading one's own beliefs, but does not include a right to convert another person by force, fraud, or allurement (Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977)
The Essential Religious Practices test (from Shirur Mutt, 1954) determines what religious practice is constitutionally protected by looking at the religion's own doctrines, not the State's or Court's independent view — the State may regulate only the secular, economic, financial, or political aspects associated with a religious practice under Article 25(2)(a)
Article 25(2)(b) allows social-welfare/reform legislation and laws throwing open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus
Freedom of conscience protects "negative liberty" too — the right to abstain from an act one's genuine religious belief forbids, without that abstention itself being disrespectful or unlawful (Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, 1986)

Should Know

Anti-conversion laws similar to the Madhya Pradesh and Orissa statutes upheld in Rev. Stainislaus continue to exist in several States today, and are consistently justified under the "public order" head of restriction on Article 25
The Essential Religious Practices test has been applied (and debated) in many later cases well beyond the syllabus for this unit — it remains one of the most litigated doctrines in Indian constitutional law, precisely because deciding what is "essential" to a religion is inherently difficult for a secular court to do
Article 25's explanation clauses also clarify that wearing and carrying kirpans is deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion, and that references to "Hindus" in Article 25(2)(b) include Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists for this specific purpose

Looking Ahead — Article 26

Article 25 protects the individual's freedom of religion. The next post covers Article 26, which protects a different but related freedom — the right of religious denominations themselves (not individuals) to manage their own religious affairs, establish and maintain institutions, and own and administer property.

A Practical Example

Suppose a State government passes a law requiring every temple trust above a certain income to file its accounts with a government auditor and mandating open, non-discriminatory entry for worshippers of every caste. A temple management challenges the law as violating Article 25. Applying the principles above: the accounts-filing requirement is a purely secular, financial matter, valid under Article 25(2)(a) (as in Shirur Mutt); the open-entry requirement is a social-reform measure specifically permitted under Article 25(2)(b), aimed at ending caste-based exclusion from a public religious institution. Neither provision touches an essential religious practice (such as the manner of performing a particular ritual), so the challenge would fail on both counts.

Quick Revision Points

Article 25(1): freedom of conscience, and the right to profess, practise, and propagate religion — available to all persons, subject to public order, morality, health, and other Fundamental Rights
"Propagate" ≠ right to convert others by force, fraud, or allurement (Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977)
Essential Religious Practices test: a religion's own doctrines decide what is essential, not the State (Shirur Mutt, 1954); State can regulate only the secular/economic/financial/political aspects of religious practice
Article 25(2)(b): allows social-welfare/reform laws and laws opening Hindu religious institutions to all classes and sections of Hindus
Freedom of conscience includes a negative liberty to abstain from an act one's faith forbids, without that being disrespect (Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, 1986)

3. Freedom of Conscience and Free Profession, Practice and Propagation of Religion — Article 25