This is the 4th post in Constitutional Law-I, Unit 4 — the previous post covered Article 25's protection of an individual's freedom of conscience and right to profess, practise, and propagate religion. This post covers Article 26, which protects a different right-holder altogether — religious denominations themselves — and their right to manage their own religious affairs, establish institutions, and own and administer property.
Article 25 protects what an individual believes and how an individual practises religion. But religion in India is rarely practised in isolation — it is organised through denominations, sects, monastic orders, and communities, each with its own internal doctrines, hierarchy, institutions, and property. If the Constitution protected only individual belief and left these collective religious bodies with no independent right to run their own internal affairs, the State could still control religion indirectly — by dictating who a denomination could excommunicate, how its temples or churches should be governed, or how its trusts should be administered — even while formally respecting each member's personal Article 25 rights. Article 26 closes this gap by giving religious denominations, as collective entities, their own distinct set of rights.
Article 26 provides: "Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right — (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d) to administer such property in accordance with law." Note the crucial difference from Article 25: this right belongs to a "religious denomination or any section thereof" — not to individual citizens — and, unlike Article 25, it is not expressly subjected to "the other provisions of this Part" (though it is still subject to public order, morality, and health).
Since Article 26's rights belong specifically to a "religious denomination", courts have had to define what qualifies as one. The test, first articulated in the Shirur Mutt case and consistently applied since, requires three elements: (i) a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being; (ii) a common organisation; and (iii) a designation by a distinctive name. A body that merely shares a broad cultural or philosophical outlook, without these three elements — especially without genuinely being organised around a religious system of belief — will not qualify as a religious denomination, however spiritually or ethically oriented its activities may be.
(1983) 1 SCC 51, decided by a Constitution Bench of Justices R.B. Misra, Y.V. Chandrachud, P.N. Bhagwati, O. Chinnappa Reddy, and V. Balakrishna Eradi.
Facts: Following internal disputes over the control of the Sri Aurobindo Society and the Auroville township in Puducherry, Parliament enacted the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980, which took over the management of Auroville from the Society for a temporary period. The petitioners, associated with the Society, challenged the Act, contending that the Society and Auroville together constituted a "religious denomination" following the teachings of Sri Aurobindo, and that the Act violated their rights under Articles 25 and 26 to manage their own religious institution.
Holding: The majority held that neither the Sri Aurobindo Society nor Auroville qualified as a "religious denomination" — the Society itself had described its own objectives as educational, cultural, and scientific rather than religious; membership was open to persons of any faith or none; and Sri Aurobindo and "the Mother" (the Society's founders) had themselves publicly stated they were not founding a new religion. Since the body in question failed the three-part test (a distinct religious system of belief, common organisation, and distinctive name used specifically for a religious purpose), Article 26 protection was not available, and the Act was upheld as a valid temporary administrative measure. Justice Chinnappa Reddy dissented, taking the view that the followers of Sri Aurobindo's teachings could genuinely be regarded as a religious denomination.
Once a body qualifies as a religious denomination, Article 26(a) guarantees it the right to establish and maintain its own institutions for religious and charitable purposes — temples, mutts, churches, dargahs, gurdwaras, schools run for religious/charitable ends, and similar bodies. This is a right to set up and run such institutions free of undue State interference in their core religious character, though (as seen in Post 3's discussion of Article 25(2)(a)) the secular, administrative aspects of running such institutions can still be regulated by the State.
Article 26(b) is often the most litigated part of this Article: it guarantees a religious denomination the right to manage its own affairs "in matters of religion" — meaning genuinely religious matters, such as its rituals, ceremonies, modes of worship, and internal religious discipline, cannot be dictated by the State. This includes, in appropriate cases, the denomination's power to discipline its own members on religious grounds, including through excommunication, where that power is itself recognised as a matter of religion within that community's own belief system.
AIR 1962 SC 853, decided by a Bench of Chief Justice B.P. Sinha and Justices A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, and J.R. Mudholkar.
Facts: The appellant, the Dai-ul-Mutlaq (spiritual head) of the Dawoodi Bohra community, had excommunicated a member of the community on religious grounds in 1934. The Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949, later made every act of excommunication by a religious head void and unenforceable, regardless of the religious grounds on which it was based, and treated an excommunicated person as continuing to enjoy all rights within the community. The Dai-ul-Mutlaq challenged the Act as an unconstitutional interference with the Dawoodi Bohra community's right under Article 26(b) to manage its own religious affairs.
Holding: By a 4:1 majority (Sarkar, Das Gupta, Ayyangar, and Mudholkar, JJ., with Sinha, C.J., dissenting), the Supreme Court struck down the Act as unconstitutional. The Court held that, within the Dawoodi Bohra community's own religious framework, excommunication was not a mere disciplinary or social sanction but a matter intimately connected with the tenets of the religion itself — it affected a person's status in relation to the community's religious life, worship, and religious observances. Since exercising this power of excommunication on religious grounds formed part of "managing its own affairs in matters of religion" under Article 26(b), a State law that nullified excommunication altogether, without any exception for excommunication genuinely made on religious grounds, impermissibly took away the denomination's core Article 26(b) right, and was accordingly void.
Article 26(c) guarantees a religious denomination the right to own and acquire movable and immovable property, and Article 26(d) guarantees it the right to administer such property — but Article 26(d) is expressly made subject to "law", meaning the State retains the power to regulate how such property is administered (accounts, audits, trustee appointments, and similar secular administrative matters), exactly as discussed for Article 25(2)(a) in the previous post. The denomination's ownership of property is protected as a matter of right; the manner of administering it can be regulated by ordinary law. In Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay (1954), the Supreme Court confirmed this same line: the State can regulate the secular administration of religious trust property, but cannot interfere in matters that are genuinely religious.
| Point | Article 25 | Article 26 |
|---|---|---|
| Who holds the right | Every individual person | Religious denominations (or sections thereof) as collective bodies |
| What is protected | Freedom of conscience; profess, practise, propagate religion | Establish institutions; manage own religious affairs; own, acquire, and administer property |
| Subject to other Fundamental Rights? | Yes — expressly subject to "the other provisions of this Part" | Not expressly so subjected, though still subject to public order, morality, and health |
| Illustrative case | Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986) | Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay (1962) |
Having covered the individual's right to religion (Article 25) and the denomination's right to manage its own religious affairs (Article 26), the next post turns to a narrower, specific protection: Article 27, which prevents a person from being compelled to pay taxes for the promotion of any particular religion.
Suppose a State enacts a law requiring every religious trust, regardless of denomination, to have its accounts audited annually by a government-appointed auditor, and separately requires that any decision by a religious head to expel or excommunicate a member must first be approved by a government tribunal before it takes legal effect. Applying Articles 26(c) and (d), the audit requirement is a valid regulation of property administration. But following Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb, the second requirement — subjecting a genuinely religious disciplinary decision to prior government approval — would likely be struck down as an unconstitutional interference with the denomination's Article 26(b) right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, since it does not merely regulate secular administration but inserts the State directly into a religious decision.