This is the 2nd post in Constitutional Law-I, Unit 4 — the previous post covered Article 23's prohibition on traffic in human beings and forced labour, the first Right against Exploitation. This post covers Article 24, the second Right against Exploitation, which protects children specifically by prohibiting their employment in factories, mines, and other hazardous work.
A general prohibition on forced labour under Article 23 is not, by itself, enough to protect children. Children can be — and historically were — put to work in factories, mines, and other dangerous occupations with the "consent" of their parents or guardians, often out of sheer poverty, without any element of physical force at all. Because such employment is technically "voluntary" on the part of the parent, it would not automatically fall within Article 23's prohibition on forced labour. Yet a child working in a match factory, a fireworks unit, or a mine faces real risks to life, health, and physical and mental development, and loses the years that should be spent in school. Article 24 closes this gap: it does not require proof of force or coercion at all — it prohibits the employment of children below fourteen years in certain kinds of work outright, regardless of parental consent or economic necessity.
Article 24 provides: "No child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment." This is a short but absolute provision — it fixes a clear age threshold (below fourteen years) and identifies three categories of prohibited work: employment in a factory, employment in a mine, and engagement in "any other hazardous employment", a residual category that Parliament and the courts have filled in over time through legislation and judicial interpretation.
Parliament gave detailed effect to Article 24 through the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 (renamed and substantially amended in 2016 as the Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act). The 1986 Act, as amended, prohibits the employment of children below fourteen years in any occupation or process whatsoever (not merely a list of "hazardous" occupations, as under the original Act), subject to a narrow exception allowing a child to help in family enterprises or as an artist, outside school hours, provided the work does not endanger the child's safety, health, or education. The Act also regulates the employment of "adolescents" (aged 14 to 18) by prohibiting their employment in a specified list of hazardous occupations and processes, and imposes stringent obligations on employers regarding working hours, safety, and record-keeping wherever employment of adolescents is permitted.
"Hazardous employment" is not limited to obviously dangerous industrial settings; it covers any occupation or process that exposes a child to a real risk of injury, disease, or impairment to physical or mental development — historically, this has included match and fireworks manufacturing, glass and bangle-making units involving furnaces, mining, and construction work. Courts have consistently read this category broadly and purposively, in keeping with Article 24's protective object, rather than narrowly restricting it to whatever a statute's schedule happens to list at a given time.
(1996) 6 SCC 756, decided by a Bench of Justices Kuldip Singh, B.L. Hansaria, and S.B. Majmudar.
Facts: The petitioner, environmental and public interest lawyer M.C. Mehta, filed a writ petition under Article 32 highlighting the large-scale employment of children in the match and fireworks manufacturing units in Sivakasi, Tamil Nadu. The petition placed on record that, as of the relevant survey, Sivakasi's 221 registered match factories alone employed over 27,000 workers, of whom nearly 3,000 were children — many working directly in the hazardous chemical-handling and manufacturing processes involved in making matches and fireworks.
Holding: The Supreme Court held that employing children directly in the manufacturing process of a hazardous industry like match and fireworks-making is unconstitutional under Article 24, and directed that children could, at most, be engaged only in the packing process, and that too in a location physically separated from the manufacturing area, to keep them away from the risk of fire and chemical exposure. The Court laid down comprehensive directions for employers found violating the child labour laws: every employer must pay Rs. 20,000 as compensation for each child unlawfully employed, to be deposited in a welfare fund for the rehabilitation of child labour; the State Government must, wherever possible, provide employment to an adult member of the affected child's family in lieu of the child, or, failing that, must itself contribute Rs. 5,000 per child to the welfare fund; and the children withdrawn from hazardous work must be ensured proper schooling. The judgment treated Article 24 as inseparably linked to the child's right to education and healthy development under Article 39(e) and (f) and (at the time) Article 45 of the Directive Principles.
| Point | Article 23 | Article 24 |
|---|---|---|
| Who is protected | Every person (adults and children) | Only children below fourteen years |
| What is prohibited | Traffic in human beings; begar and similar forced labour | Employment in a factory, mine, or other hazardous employment |
| Is "force" required to be shown | Yes — the essence of the violation is compulsion (including economic compulsion) | No — employment itself is prohibited regardless of consent, once the child is below the age limit and the work falls in a prohibited category |
| Enforceable against private individuals | Yes, directly | Yes, directly |
| Key legislation | Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976; Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 | Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 (as amended in 2016) |
Article 24's protection is closely tied to the child's Right to Education under Article 21A (inserted by the 86th Constitutional Amendment, 2002), which guarantees free and compulsory education to every child between six and fourteen years of age. The two provisions reinforce each other: a child who is kept out of hazardous work under Article 24 is also, in the same age band, constitutionally entitled to be in school under Article 21A, rather than doing any other kind of unregulated child labour instead. This link was already anticipated in M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, which ordered rehabilitated children to be given proper schooling well before Article 21A was formally inserted into the Constitution.
Having covered both Rights against Exploitation (Articles 23 and 24), this unit now moves to the Right to Freedom of Religion. The next post covers Article 25 — the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise, and propagate religion.
Suppose a thirteen-year-old boy from a poor family is sent by his parents to work at a small unlicensed firecracker unit in exchange for a modest daily wage, doing tasks that involve direct handling of explosive chemical compounds. The parents may have genuinely consented, and the boy himself may be willing to work to support his family — there is no physical force involved at all, so Article 23 would not directly apply here. Article 24, however, applies regardless: the boy is below fourteen years, and firecracker manufacturing is hazardous employment, so his employment is constitutionally prohibited outright. Following M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, the employer would be liable to pay compensation into the child-labour welfare fund, and the State would be obligated to try to secure alternative employment for an adult in the family and ensure the boy is enrolled in school.