| Court | Court of Appeal (England and Wales) |
|---|---|
| Bench | Bowen, L.J. (delivering the leading judgment), with Fry, L.J. also sitting |
| Year | 1892 (decided 28 May 1892) |
| Cited in | Injurious Falsehood and Negligent Misstatement (Notes) |
A newspaper falsely announced that a family engineering business had shut down. The owner couldn't point to a single named customer he'd lost — only a general fall-off in trade. The Court of Appeal held that was enough: some falsehoods are so obviously going to cost you money that the law presumes the damage rather than demanding you itemise it.
Ratcliffe — plaintiff; ran an engineering and boilermaking business under the name Ratcliffe and Sons, which he took over from his father.
Evans — defendant; published a false article in a local newspaper.
Ratcliffe and his father had carried on business together as engineers and boilermakers under the name Ratcliffe and Sons. After his father's death, Ratcliffe continued to run the family business himself, still trading under the same established name.
Evans published an article in a local newspaper falsely stating that the business, Ratcliffe and Sons, had ceased to exist. Ratcliffe sued for the loss this false statement caused him, arguing that it had damaged his business by wrongly telling the public — including his existing and potential customers — that his firm was no longer operating.
At trial, Ratcliffe was unable to identify any specific, named customer who had stopped dealing with him because of the false statement. The evidence he offered instead was general: a broad downturn in the trade and custom of his business following publication of the article, without pinning that downturn to any particular lost transaction or client by name.
On behalf of Ratcliffe (Plaintiff): Ratcliffe argued that a false statement telling the public his established business had ceased to exist was inherently, obviously calculated to damage his trade in a general way — driving away potential customers who would simply assume, reasonably, that there was no longer a business to deal with. Requiring him to identify specific, named individuals who would otherwise have done business with him, but did not because they believed the false statement, set an impossible and unrealistic standard of proof for exactly the kind of diffuse, general harm this sort of falsehood was calculated to cause; general evidence of a trade downturn following the publication should be enough.
On behalf of Evans (Defendant): Evans' position, in substance, was that damage in an action of this kind had to be proved with some specificity — that a plaintiff could not simply point to a general decline in business and assume it was caused by the defendant's statement, without evidence connecting particular lost custom to the false statement in question, since a general downturn could equally have other causes.
The Court of Appeal held that it is not necessary for a plaintiff, in an action for this kind of malicious or injurious falsehood, to prove the loss of specific, individually named customers in order to recover damages. Where a false statement is of a character calculated, in the ordinary course of things, to produce a general loss of trade — as a false announcement that an established business has ceased to exist obviously is — the resulting general damage may be alleged and proved generally, through evidence of an overall downturn in custom following the publication, rather than requiring the near-impossible task of identifying, by name, every individual customer who was deterred by the falsehood.
The Court reasoned that this kind of general damage flows directly and naturally from the nature of the false statement itself, and that the law should not impose an artificially rigid, itemised standard of proof that would, in practice, make this species of wrong impossible to remedy — a business's trade with the general public is, by its nature, conducted with a shifting body of customers whose individual decisions are rarely capable of being traced and proven one by one.
The Court of Appeal upheld the jury's award of £120 in damages to Ratcliffe, holding that his general evidence of a downturn in trade following Evans' false publication was sufficient proof of damage, without requiring proof of the loss of specific, named customers.
Where a false statement is not actionable per se and not necessarily defamatory, but is published maliciously, is of a kind calculated in the ordinary course of things to cause actual damage, and does in fact cause such damage, an action lies for that injurious falsehood. General damage — such as an overall loss of custom flowing directly and in the ordinary course from the falsehood — may be alleged and proved generally, through evidence of an overall downturn in trade, without the plaintiff needing to identify specific, individually named customers lost as a result.
Ratcliffe v. Evans remains a foundational case in the law of injurious (or malicious) falsehood, establishing that general damage to trade can be proved generally rather than requiring an unrealistic, itemised account of every individual customer lost. It is regularly cited, alongside cases like Sim v. Stretch (1936) on the boundaries of defamation, in the broader law governing false statements that damage reputation or business interests, and its "general damage, general proof" principle continues to be applied wherever a plaintiff's loss from a falsehood is genuinely diffuse across an entire customer base rather than traceable to one or two specific transactions.
Facts, bench and citation verified against independent case-law summaries of the reported judgment.