| Court | House of Lords |
|---|---|
| Bench | Lord Atkin (delivering the leading opinion), Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Macmillan |
| Year | 1936 |
| Cited in | Defamation (Notes) |
A single-line telegram announcing that a maid had gone back to work for her old employer became the case that gave English law its enduring test for what actually counts as defamatory — not whether words expose someone to hatred or ridicule, but whether they would lower them in the eyes of right-thinking people generally.
Sim — plaintiff; a newspaper proprietor.
Stretch — defendant; a former employer of a maid who had previously worked for Sim.
A maid had previously worked for Sim before leaving to work for Stretch. When she left Stretch's service and returned to Sim, Stretch sent Sim a telegram referring to the maid resuming her service and asking for her belongings, her wages, and a sum of money that the telegram described as having been "borrowed" by Sim from her.
Sim sued Stretch for defamation, contending that the reference to money he had "borrowed" from his own maid implied that he had been in such financial difficulty that he had needed to borrow from a domestic servant, and that this implication damaged his reputation.
On behalf of Sim (Plaintiff): Sim argued that the telegram's reference to money "you borrowed" from the maid implied that he had been in genuine financial need, reduced to borrowing from a domestic servant — an implication that would tend to lower him in the estimation of people who read or heard of the telegram, and was therefore defamatory.
On behalf of Stretch (Defendant): Stretch's position was that the telegram, read fairly and in its ordinary sense, was a mundane, practical communication about returning the maid's belongings, wages, and a specific sum of money, and did not carry any meaning that could reasonably be understood as damaging to Sim's reputation or character.
Lord Atkin, delivering the leading opinion, observed that the older, narrower formulations of the test for defamatory meaning — asking only whether words exposed the claimant to "hatred, ridicule, or contempt" — were too restrictive and did not capture the full range of statements that could genuinely damage a person's reputation without necessarily provoking those specific, strong reactions. He proposed a broader and now-classic test: whether the words complained of would tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally.
Applying this test to the facts, the House of Lords considered the telegram's actual wording and its likely natural meaning to an ordinary reader. The reference to money "borrowed" by Sim from his former maid, viewed in its full context as part of a routine, practical message about returning belongings and settling wages, was not reasonably capable of conveying anything that would lower Sim's reputation in the eyes of right-thinking members of society — at most, it was an unremarkable, everyday domestic financial arrangement, not a matter reflecting badly on Sim's character or standing.
The House of Lords held that the telegram was not reasonably capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, and dismissed Sim's claim. Since the words were not capable in law of being defamatory, the question never needed to go before a jury to decide whether they were in fact defamatory on the specific facts.
The test for whether a statement is defamatory is whether it would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally — a broader formulation than the older test confined to exposing the claimant to hatred, ridicule, or contempt. Whether words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning at all is a question of law for the court; only if they are so capable does it become a question of fact, for a jury, whether they were in fact defamatory on the particular occasion.
Sim v. Stretch remains the classic, most frequently cited statement of the test for defamatory meaning in English and Commonwealth law, including in India. Lord Atkin's "right-thinking members of society" formulation displaced the older, narrower "hatred, ridicule or contempt" test as the standard starting point for analysing whether a statement is capable of being defamatory, and it continues to be quoted and applied as the foundational test in defamation cases today.
Facts, bench and citation verified against independent case-law summaries of the reported judgment.