| Court | Court of Common Pleas (Nisi Prius) |
|---|---|
| Bench | Tindal, C.J. |
| Year | 1830 (decided 17 July 1830) |
| Cited in | Assault and Battery (Notes) |
He never laid a finger on the chairman — churchwardens grabbed him first. That was exactly the point: assault doesn't need contact, only a credible start on violence that's about to land.
Stephens — plaintiff; the chairman of a parish council meeting.
Myers — defendant; a member of the meeting who was voted to be ejected.
Stephens was chairing a turbulent parish council meeting. Myers, seated some distance away, became vociferous and disruptive, interrupting the proceedings. The meeting voted, by majority, to have him ejected.
Myers refused to leave. Instead, with his fist clenched, he advanced towards Stephens in the chairman's seat, declaring that he would rather pull Stephens out of the chair than be thrown out himself. Before Myers could reach him, the churchwardens intervened and stopped his advance, so he never actually struck or touched Stephens.
Stephens sued Myers for assault, even though no contact had ever occurred.
On behalf of Stephens (Plaintiff): Stephens argued that Myers had, by advancing towards him with a clenched fist and an explicit declared intention to pull him from his chair, put him in immediate and reasonable fear of violence. The fact that Myers was stopped by the churchwardens before he could actually strike did not undo the wrong — the moment Myers began advancing with the apparent means and intention to carry out an immediate attack, the assault was already complete, regardless of how the encounter was ultimately interrupted.
On behalf of Myers (Defendant): Myers' position was that since he never touched Stephens, and was in fact stopped well before he could have reached him, there was no completed threat of imminent violence — merely a disturbance and some angry words and gestures that fell short of an actionable assault, since he was prevented from ever coming close enough to constitute a genuine, immediate threat.
Tindal, C.J. held that not every threat unaccompanied by actual violence amounts to an assault — there must be a real, apparent ability and intention to carry the threat into immediate effect. But where a defendant advances towards the claimant with a clenched fist and an evident intention to strike or seize him, in circumstances where, had he not been stopped, he would have reached the claimant within a second or two, that advance is itself sufficient to constitute an assault in law. The wrong lies in the reasonable apprehension of imminent violence created by the defendant's own conduct, not in whether the violence was in fact ultimately delivered. It made no difference that it was the churchwardens' intervention, rather than Myers' own choice, that stopped him — the assault was complete the moment he began his advance with the apparent means and intent to strike.
The jury returned a verdict for Stephens, finding Myers liable for assault, and awarded nominal damages of one shilling — reflecting that the wrong (the apprehension of imminent violence) was established, even though no actual contact or serious injury had occurred.
Assault does not require actual physical contact. Where a defendant advances towards the claimant with the apparent means and intention of carrying out an immediate act of violence, such that the claimant would have been struck within moments had the defendant not been stopped or otherwise prevented, that advance is itself sufficient to constitute an actionable assault — the tort is complete once the reasonable apprehension of imminent violence is created, regardless of whether the threatened contact is ultimately delivered.
Stephens v. Myers remains the classic illustration of the principle that assault is committed by creating a reasonable apprehension of imminent physical contact, distinct from battery, which requires the contact itself to actually occur. It is regularly paired with Cole v. Turner (1704) to teach the assault/battery distinction as a matched set: Cole v. Turner establishes what counts as unlawful contact for battery, while Stephens v. Myers establishes that the mere credible threat of such contact, without it ever landing, is independently actionable as assault.
Facts, bench and citation verified against BAILII's report of the judgment and independent case-law summaries.