| Court | Nisi Prius (Court of King's Bench, on circuit) |
|---|---|
| Bench | Holt, C.J. |
| Year | 1704 |
| Cited in | Assault and Battery (Notes) |
Two people brushing past each other in a crowded lane is not a tort. The same touch, done in anger, is battery. Chief Justice Holt's one-sentence rule — the least touching of another in anger is battery — is still the opening line of every battery lecture three centuries later.
Cole and his wife — plaintiffs; claimed they had been battered by the defendant.
Turner — defendant.
Cole and his wife encountered Turner in a narrow street or passage. In the course of getting past them, Turner touched or jostled them. The precise dispute at trial was whether this contact, made while passing in a confined space, amounted to the tort of battery, or whether it was merely the kind of incidental, unavoidable contact that occurs whenever people pass each other in a crowded or narrow place.
On behalf of Cole and his wife (Plaintiffs): The plaintiffs argued that Turner had touched them without their consent while forcing his way past in the narrow passage, and that this unwanted physical contact was itself sufficient to constitute battery, regardless of how minor the contact was.
On behalf of Turner (Defendant): Turner's position was that any contact that occurred was the ordinary, incidental kind that happens whenever people pass each other in a confined space such as a narrow street, made without any hostile intent or violence, and that such everyday, non-aggressive contact should not be treated as an actionable wrong.
Holt, C.J. laid down the governing principle in a single, often-quoted sentence: the least touching of another in anger is a battery. He immediately qualified this, however, by explaining that the character and intent behind the touching is what matters, not merely its physical fact. If two or more people meet in a narrow passage, and without any violence or design of harm, one gently touches the other to pass, that is no battery — it is an ordinary, unavoidable incident of passing in a confined space. But if any of them uses violence to force a way through in a rude, inordinate manner, or if there is a struggle about the passage severe enough that it may cause hurt, that is a battery. The touching itself is not the deciding factor; what matters is whether it was done in anger, violence, or a rude and hostile manner, or was instead the gentle, non-hostile contact incidental to ordinary movement among people.
Applying this distinction, the court's ruling turned on whether the contact between Turner and the plaintiffs was gentle and incidental to passing in the narrow space, or was instead accompanied by anger, violence, or rudeness — with liability for battery following only in the latter case, consistent with Holt, C.J.'s stated principle.
The least touching of another person in anger is a battery. However, where two or more people meet in a narrow passage and, without any violence or intention to harm, one gently touches the other in the course of passing, that is not a battery. Battery requires contact that is hostile, violent, rude, or otherwise inconsistent with the ordinary, non-aggressive contact incidental to everyday life — the intent and manner behind the touching, not merely its bare physical occurrence, is what makes contact unlawful.
Cole v. Turner remains the classic statement of what counts as unlawful contact for the tort of battery, distinguishing an actionable, hostile touching from the countless incidental, non-hostile contacts that occur in ordinary social and physical proximity — jostling in a crowd, brushing past someone in a narrow space, and the like. It is regularly taught alongside Stephens v. Myers (1830) as a matched pair: this case defines what contact counts as battery, while Stephens v. Myers establishes that the mere credible threat of such contact, without it ever landing, is independently actionable as assault.
Facts, citation and Holt, C.J.'s reasoning verified against independent case-law summaries of the reported judgment.