Rylands v. Fletcher

Mill owners built a reservoir over old, forgotten coal workings. The water broke through and flooded a neighbour's mine. The owners had taken no part in the work and knew nothing of the danger. The House of Lords still held them liable, and adopted a rule that a person who keeps something dangerous on his land must keep it in at his own risk.

Quick Revision

Parties

John Rylands and Jehu Horrocks — called Plaintiffs in error in the report heading (the side that brought the case to the House of Lords). Lord Cairns calls the mill owners the Defendants, using the description of the parties in the action. They were the owners of a mill and built the reservoir.

Thomas Fletcher — called Defendant in error in the report heading. Lord Cairns calls him the Plaintiff, using the description of the parties in the action. He was the occupier of a mine and works under a close of land (a piece of land) near the mill.

Procedural History

1. The facts were stated in a special case (an agreed statement of facts put to the court). The Court of Exchequer heard it and decided that the Plaintiff had established no cause of action (Lord Cairns).
2. The Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Exchequer Chamber. The Judges there decided unanimously that there was a cause of action and that the Plaintiff was entitled to damages (Lord Cairns).
3. Mr. Justice Blackburn stated the opinion of the Exchequer Chamber. Both Lords in the House of Lords adopted his statement of the law (Lord Cairns; Lord Cranworth).
4. The case reached the House of Lords on error from the Exchequer Chamber. The report is headed 1868 July 6, 7, 17. It ends with an entry from the Lord's Journals of 17th July, 1868.
5. The House of Lords affirmed the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber and dismissed the appeal with costs (Lord Cairns; Lord Cranworth).

Facts

1. The Plaintiff was the occupier of a mine and works under a close of land.
2. The Defendants were the owners of a mill in his neighbourhood.
3. They proposed to make a reservoir to keep and store water for use about their mill, on another close of land.
4. For this case that close is taken as adjoining the Plaintiff's close, although some land lay between the two.
5. Under the Defendants' close there were certain old and disused mining passages and works.
6. There were five vertical shafts and some horizontal shafts communicating with them.
7. The vertical shafts had been filled up with soil and rubbish.
8. It does not appear that anyone knew of the vertical shafts or of the horizontal works.
9. In working his mine, the Plaintiff had gradually worked through the seams of coal underneath the close and come into contact with the old works under the Defendants' close.
10. Lord Cranworth adds that the Plaintiff had a right to work his coal through the lands of Mr. Whitehead, up to the old workings.
11. The Defendants built the reservoir through the agency and inspection of an engineer and a contractor.
12. Personally, the Defendants appear to have taken no part in the works. They were not aware of any want of security connected with them.
13. The case must be taken to say that the engineer and the contractor did not use reasonable care and caution. They had appeared to take notice of the vertical shafts filled in as described.
14. When the reservoir was constructed and filled, or partly filled, with water, the weight of the water broke through the disused and imperfectly filled-up vertical shafts.
15. The water passed down those shafts into the horizontal workings under the Defendants' close.
16. From there it passed on into the workings under the Plaintiff's close and flooded his mine.
17. The flooding caused considerable damage, for which the action was brought. The amount of damages is not stated in the judgment.

Issues Raised

The reported judgment does not list issues. These questions follow from the way the Lords decided the case.

1. Is an owner liable when water stored on his land for his own purposes escapes and damages his neighbour's mine?
2. Does liability depend on a distinction between the natural use of land and a non-natural use of land?
3. Does it matter that the Defendants took no personal part in the work, and that the engineer and contractor were the ones who failed to use reasonable care?
4. Was Mr. Justice Blackburn's statement of the law in the Exchequer Chamber correct, so that its judgment should be affirmed?

Arguments Contended

The reported judgment does not set out the arguments of counsel for either side.

For the Plaintiffs in error (Rylands and Horrocks)

• No argument of this side is recorded.
• Lord Cranworth says nothing in the authorities cited (side not stated) conflicted with the principle he applied.

For the Defendant in error (Fletcher)

• No argument of this side is recorded.
• Lord Cairns records that Smith v. Kenrick and Baird v. Williamson were cited in the argument before the House at the Bar. The report does not say which side cited them.

Court's Reasoning

The judgment has no numbered paragraphs, so each step is cited to the opinion of the Lord who gave it.

Lord Cairns, L.C.

1. Noted: the principles for deciding the case are extremely simple. The Defendants, as owners or occupiers of the close, might lawfully use it for any purpose of the ordinary enjoyment of land (Lord Cairns).
2. Noted: suppose water had collected on the surface or underground through the natural user of the land. Suppose it then passed into the Plaintiff's close by the laws of nature. The Plaintiff could not have complained (Lord Cairns).
3. Noted: if he wanted protection, it was for him to leave or place some barrier between his close and the Defendants' close (Lord Cairns).
4. Noted: Smith v. Kenrick illustrates this first principle (Lord Cairns).
5. Held: suppose the Defendants went beyond natural use. If they used the land for a "non-natural use", to bring onto it what was not naturally there, they act at their own peril. Here that means water above or below ground in quantities and in a manner not the result of any work on or under the land (Lord Cairns).
6. Held: if the water escapes into the Plaintiff's close and injures him, the Defendants are liable. This applies also where the escape results from any imperfection in the way they did the work (Lord Cairns).
7. Noted: Baird v. Williamson illustrates this second principle (Lord Cairns).
8. Held: these two simple principles, if well founded, dispose of the case (Lord Cairns).
9. Held: the same result follows from the principles stated by Mr. Justice Blackburn in the Exchequer Chamber. Lord Cairns says he entirely concurs with them (Lord Cairns).
10. Noted, Blackburn, J.'s rule: the person who brings on his land and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes "must keep it in at his peril". If he does not, he is answerable for the natural consequence of its escape unless he has an excuse (Lord Cairns, quoting Blackburn, J.).
11. Noted: he can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the Plaintiff's default. Perhaps he can also do so if the escape was the consequence of vis major (superior force) or the act of God (an event of nature beyond human control). As nothing of this sort existed here, the Exchequer Chamber found it unnecessary to inquire what excuse would be enough (Lord Cairns, quoting Blackburn, J.).
12. Noted, Blackburn, J.'s reasons: a neighbour's grass or corn may be eaten by escaping cattle. A mine may be flooded by water from a reservoir. A cellar may be invaded by filth from a privy. A home may be made unhealthy by fumes from alkali works. In each case the person harmed suffers without any fault of his own (Lord Cairns, quoting Blackburn, J.).
13. Noted: it is reasonable and just that the neighbour who brought onto his property something not naturally there should make good the damage. The thing is harmless while confined to his property. He knows it will be mischievous if it gets onto his neighbour's land (Lord Cairns, quoting Blackburn, J.).
14. Noted: but for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued. So it is just that he keeps it there at his peril, or answers for the natural and anticipated consequence (Lord Cairns, quoting Blackburn, J.).
15. Noted: the Exchequer Chamber said authority establishes this as law, whether the things brought are beasts, water, filth or stenches (Lord Cairns, quoting Blackburn, J.).
16. Held: the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber should be affirmed and the appeal dismissed with costs (Lord Cairns).

Lord Cranworth

1. Held: Lord Cranworth concurs that Mr. Justice Blackburn correctly stated the rule of law in delivering the opinion of the Exchequer Chamber (Lord Cranworth).
2. Held: if a person brings or accumulates on his land anything that may damage his neighbour if it escapes, he does so at his peril. If it escapes and causes damage, he is responsible "however careful he may have been". This is so whatever precautions he took (Lord Cranworth).
3. Noted: the general question in such a case is not whether the Defendant acted with due care and caution. It is whether his acts have occasioned the damage. Lambert v. Bessey explains this well (Lord Cranworth).
4. Why: the doctrine rests on good sense. When one person, managing his own affairs, causes damage to another, however innocently, it is just that he should be the one to suffer (Lord Cranworth).
5. Noted: he is bound by the maxim sic uti suo ut non lædat alienum (use your own property so as not to harm another's). Lord Cranworth finds nothing in the cited authorities that conflicts with the principle (Lord Cranworth).
6. Noted: two modern Common Pleas cases illustrate the doctrine. They are Smith v. Kenrick and Baird v. Williamson (Lord Cranworth).
7. Noted, Smith v. Kenrick: the owner of a coal mine on the higher level worked out the whole of his coal. He left no barrier between his mine and the mine on the lower level (Lord Cranworth).
8. Noted: water seeping through the upper mine flowed into the lower mine and obstructed the owner in getting his coal. It was held that the owner of the lower mine had no ground of complaint (Lord Cranworth).
9. Noted: the upper owner had a right to remove all his coal. The damage came from the natural flow or percolation of water from the upper strata (Lord Cranworth).
10. Noted: he was under no obligation to protect the lower owner. It was the lower owner's business to erect or leave a sufficient barrier, or to conduct the water away so that it did not impede his workings. The water was only left to flow in its natural course (Lord Cranworth).
11. Noted, Baird v. Williamson: the upper owner did not merely let the water flow through his mine without a barrier. To work his own mine profitably he pumped up quantities of water. It passed into the Plaintiff's mine in addition to what would naturally have reached it (Lord Cranworth).
12. Noted: this was done without negligence (a failure to take reasonable care) and in the due working of his own mine. Yet he was held responsible for the damage. It was his act, whether skilful or unskilful, that damaged the Plaintiff (Lord Cranworth).
13. Noted: the damage in the first case may be treated as arising from the act of God. In the second it arose from the act of the Defendant (Lord Cranworth).
14. Held: applying these decisions, Lord Cranworth concludes without hesitation that the Exchequer Chamber judgment was right (Lord Cranworth).
15. Noted: the Plaintiff had a right to work his coal through the lands of Mr. Whitehead, up to the old workings. Suppose water rising naturally in the Defendants' land had percolated down through the old workings. That would have given him no ground of complaint (Lord Cranworth).
16. Noted: even if the Plaintiff had made all the old workings himself, he would have done only what he was entitled to do. Under Smith v. Kenrick, the person working the mine under the reservoir close could win all the coal without leaving a wall or barrier against Whitehead's land (Lord Cranworth).
17. Held: but that is not the real state of the case. The Defendants brought a large accumulated mass of water onto their land, to serve their own object, and stored it in a reservoir (Lord Cranworth).
18. Held: the consequence was damage to the Plaintiff. For that damage, "however skilfully and carefully the accumulation was made", the Defendants were certainly responsible (Lord Cranworth).
19. Held: Lord Cranworth concurs that the judgment below must be affirmed and there must be judgment for the Defendant in error (Lord Cranworth).

Authorities

• Smith v. Kenrick (Court of Common Pleas; cited as 7 CB 515 by Lord Cairns and 7 CB 564 by Lord Cranworth): illustrates the first principle. Natural flow of water from an upper mine gives the lower owner no claim (Lord Cairns; Lord Cranworth).
• Baird v. Williamson (Court of Common Pleas; cited as 15 CB(NS) 317 by Lord Cairns and 15 CB (NS) 376 by Lord Cranworth): illustrates the second principle. The owner who pumped water into the lower mine was held responsible even without negligence (Lord Cairns; Lord Cranworth).
• Lambert v. Bessey (reported by Sir Thomas Raymond, Sir T Raym 421): the question is whether the Defendant's acts occasioned the damage, not whether he was careful (Lord Cranworth).
• Judgment of Blackburn, J. in the Court of Exchequer Chamber: the rule and reasons quoted and adopted by both Lords (Lord Cairns; Lord Cranworth).

Provisions mentioned

• No statute, section or article is mentioned in the judgment.
• The only maxim cited is sic uti suo ut non lædat alienum (Lord Cranworth).

Judgement

1. The judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber is affirmed.
2. The appeal is dismissed with costs (Lord Cairns).
3. There is judgment for the Defendant in error, Thomas Fletcher (Lord Cranworth).
4. The report closes by recording that the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber is affirmed. The amount of damages is not stated.

Legal Principle / Ratio

A person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it in at his peril. If it escapes, he is answerable for the natural consequence, and it does not matter how careful he was. Lord Cairns also drew a line between natural use of land (no liability for natural flow) and non-natural use (liability for the escape).

The key holding, in Lord Cairns' adoption of Blackburn, J.: the person "must keep it in at his peril".

• Ratio: liability follows from bringing and keeping a mischievous thing on land and its escape, and not from proof of fault.
• Obiter: whether vis major or the act of God would excuse the owner is left open ("perhaps"). The Exchequer Chamber found it unnecessary to decide (Lord Cairns).

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

• The judgment contrasts natural use with non-natural use only through examples (Smith v. Kenrick and Baird v. Williamson). It gives no general test for a "non-natural use".
• The excuses are left open. Blackburn, J. names the Plaintiff's default and, "perhaps", vis major or the act of God. No later excuse is decided here.
• Lord Cairns treats the engineer's and contractor's lack of reasonable care as part of the facts. Lord Cranworth says liability does not depend on care at all. The report does not separately discuss whether the owners answer for their contractors.
• The two opinions state the rule in different words. Lord Cairns stresses non-natural use, while Lord Cranworth stresses bringing or accumulating something on land.

Significance

• Both Lords adopt Blackburn, J.'s rule, so the House of Lords confirmed it as the law.
• The rule holds an owner answerable for the escape of a dangerous accumulation without any proof of negligence on his part.
• It ties the liability to the maxim that a person must use his own property so as not to harm another's.

Exam-Important Points

• Rule first: a person who brings and keeps mischievous things on his land for his own purposes must keep them in at his peril. He is strictly liable for their natural consequences if they escape.
• Non-natural use: Lord Cairns contrasts natural use of land (no liability, as in Smith v. Kenrick) with non-natural use (liability, as in Baird v. Williamson).
• Liability is prima facie (on first view, unless an excuse is shown), with the Plaintiff's default as a named excuse.
• Act of God or vis major is only a possible excuse ("perhaps"), and was not decided.
• Trap: the engineer and contractor lacked reasonable care, and the Defendants personally did nothing wrong. They were still liable.
• Trap: the appeal was from the Exchequer Chamber. The Court of Exchequer had ruled for the Defendants; the Exchequer Chamber reversed unanimously.
• Authorities to remember: Smith v. Kenrick, Baird v. Williamson, Lambert v. Bessey.
• Bench: Lord Cairns, L.C. and Lord Cranworth. Result: affirmed, appeal dismissed with costs.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. The judgment has no numbered paragraphs, so steps are cited to the opinion of each Lord. The citation as printed in the judgment heading is 3 LR HL 330; the other form is a standard rewriting of it.