Nervous Shock
Liability for recognised psychiatric injury caused by what a person sees or hears
In one minute
Nervous shock is a recognised psychiatric or nervous injury caused by what a person sees or hears, without a physical blow. Mere grief or fear is not enough. The injury must be a medically recognisable illness.
It can be caused intentionally (Wilkinson v. Downton) or by negligence. In exams, this topic is asked as "explain liability for nervous shock", and as a problem on a bystander who sees an accident.
Exam focus
- Frequency: Rarely asked
- Usually asked as: Short answer (4 to 6 marks)
Legal provision
- No Indian statute defines nervous shock. The rules come from English common law and are applied in India as justice, equity and good conscience.
- Article 21, Constitution of India: the right to life is read widely. Courts can order the State to pay public law compensation for violations, as in Nilabati Behera.
Meaning and definition
Nervous shock means a recognised psychiatric illness or nervous injury produced by the shock of seeing or hearing an event. It is a name for the damage, not a separate act. The same damage can follow an intentional act or a careless one, and the rules differ.
Detailed explanation
Step 1: Early law
- In Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas (1888), the Privy Council refused to allow recovery for shock without impact. It feared a flood of claims and difficulty of proof.
- In Dulieu v. White (1901), the court allowed a claim by a pregnant woman who feared for her own safety when a horse van crashed into a public house. Shock caused by fear of immediate personal injury was actionable.
- In Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers (1925), a mother suffered shock from fear for her children, when a runaway lorry went down a hill. The court allowed her claim.
Step 2: Intentional infliction
- In Wilkinson v. Downton, the defendant falsely told a woman as a joke that her husband had broken both legs. She suffered a violent shock and fell seriously ill. The court held that a wilful act calculated to cause physical harm, which does cause it, is a good cause of action if no justification is alleged.
- Intention is imputed from the act. The harm need not have been meant. A larger harm than expected is no answer.
- In Rhodes v. OPO (2015), the UK Supreme Court restated the rule. The conduct must be directed at the claimant. It must be intended to cause severe distress. It must in fact cause a recognised psychiatric illness.
Step 3: Negligent infliction: primary victims
- A primary victim is a person in the zone of danger, put in reasonable fear for his own safety.
- The defendant owes a duty of care to a person who is foreseeably at risk of physical harm. If psychiatric injury follows, the claim is allowed.
Step 4: Negligent infliction: secondary victims
- A secondary victim is a bystander who suffers shock from the injury or danger to someone else.
- In Bourhill v. Young (1943), a pregnant woman heard a motorcycle crash, and later saw blood on the road. She was not within the range of foreseeable harm. The House of Lords refused her claim.
- In Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1992), claimants who suffered shock from the Hillsborough stadium disaster had to meet control tests. They had to have a close tie of love and affection with the victim. They had to be close to the event in time and space. They had to perceive it with their own senses, and not by hearsay.
- In McLoughlin v. O'Brian (1983), a mother who saw her injured family at the hospital soon after the crash was allowed to recover.
Step 5: Other requirements
- The shock must be a recognised illness, such as post-traumatic stress disorder or severe depression. Grief and distress are not enough.
- The injury must be caused by a sudden shock, not by a long course of events such as nursing a sick relative.
- The defendant takes the claimant as he finds him. A claimant of unusual weakness can recover for the full injury if some psychiatric injury was foreseeable in a person of ordinary strength.
Step 6: Defences and remedies
- Defences: no duty of care, no foreseeability, no recognised illness, and the general defences of consent and contributory negligence.
- Remedy: damages for the illness, treatment costs and loss of earnings.
- Recognised psychiatric injury
- Intentional
- Wilkinson v. Downton: wilful act calculated to cause harm
- Negligent
- Primary victim: fear for own safety
- Secondary victim: Alcock control tests
- Intentional
Don't confuse: intentional and negligent nervous shock
| Point | Intentional (Wilkinson) | Negligent |
|---|---|---|
| Fault | Wilful act calculated to cause harm | Breach of a duty of care |
| Test | Act, intention imputed, harm caused | Duty, foreseeability, proximity |
| Who can claim | The person at whom the act was directed | Primary victims, and secondary victims who meet Alcock tests |
| Illness required | Recognised illness or physical harm | Recognised psychiatric illness |
Intentional. A man in Rajahmundry falsely tells a woman that her son has died in an accident, only to frighten her. She collapses and is diagnosed with a serious illness. This is the Wilkinson rule.
Negligent. A passer-by in Vizag, 200 metres away, hears about a bus crash from a friend an hour later and becomes depressed. She did not perceive the event with her own senses, so she fails the Alcock tests.
Common mistakes
- Treating grief or fear as nervous shock. A recognised illness is needed.
- Forgetting that intention is imputed in Wilkinson. The harm need not have been meant.
- Allowing any bystander to claim. Secondary victims must meet the control tests.
- Ignoring foreseeability, as in Bourhill v. Young.
- Saying that nervous shock needs physical impact. It does not.
Apply it
Problem
A speeding lorry hits a child on a street in Nizamabad while the child's mother stands ten metres away. She sees it happen and is later diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder. A neighbour who hears of it by phone also becomes depressed.
Question. Who can claim from the lorry driver?
Rule. A secondary victim must have a close tie with the victim, be close in time and space, and perceive the event with her own senses. The injury must be a recognised illness.
Application. The mother has a close tie, was close, saw the event, and has a recognised illness. The neighbour heard by phone and has no close tie.
Conclusion. The mother can claim. The neighbour cannot.
Leading case laws
- Wilkinson v. Downton (1897)
Facts. The defendant falsely told the claimant as a joke that her husband had broken both legs. She suffered a violent shock and fell seriously ill.
Principle. A wilful act calculated to cause physical harm, which does cause it, is actionable if no justification is alleged.
Significance. The leading case on intentional nervous shock.
- Bourhill v. Young (1943)
Facts. A pregnant woman heard a motorcycle crash and later saw blood on the road.
Principle. She was outside the range of foreseeable harm, so no duty was owed.
Significance. Foreseeability limits claims by bystanders.
- Alcock v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police (1992)
Facts. Relatives of the Hillsborough disaster victims sued for shock.
Principle. A secondary victim needs a close tie, proximity in time and space, and direct perception.
Significance. The control tests for secondary victims.
- Dulieu v. White (1901)
Facts. A pregnant woman suffered shock when a horse van crashed into the public house where she worked.
Principle. Shock from fear of immediate personal injury is actionable.
Significance. Recognised negligent nervous shock.
How to write this answer in the exam
5-mark answer
- Define nervous shock.
- Explain the two routes: intentional and negligent.
- Cite Wilkinson v. Downton.
- State the Alcock tests.
10-mark answer
- Meaning and early law.
- Intentional infliction.
- Primary victims.
- Secondary victims: Bourhill and Alcock.
- Recognised illness requirement.
- Defences and remedies.
- Conclusion.
Key points to remember
- Nervous shock is a recognised psychiatric illness, not mere grief or fear.
- No physical impact is needed.
- Intentional: Wilkinson v. Downton. Negligent: duty, foreseeability, proximity.
- Secondary victims must meet the Alcock tests.
- Damage must be proved.
Quick self-test
1. What did Wilkinson v. Downton decide?
A wilful act calculated to cause physical harm to another, which does cause it, is actionable if no justification is alleged.
2. What are the Alcock tests?
A close tie of love and affection, closeness in time and space, and direct perception of the event.
3. Is grief nervous shock?
No. A recognised psychiatric illness is needed.