This is the 9th post in Law of Torts, Unit 4 — Business and Reputation Related Torts and Remedies. This post covers injunctions as a judicial remedy in tort — their meaning, the different kinds of injunctions recognised by the courts, and the modern test applied when a court decides whether to grant an interim injunction.
Damages compensate a plaintiff for harm that has already occurred, but money is not always an adequate remedy — a plaintiff whose land is repeatedly trespassed upon, whose business reputation is being damaged by an ongoing course of wrongful conduct, or who faces an imminent but not-yet-completed wrong, often needs the wrongful conduct itself to be stopped or prevented, not merely compensated for after the fact. An injunction is the judicial remedy designed for exactly this situation. Because an injunction can restrain a person's future conduct — sometimes even before any wrong has actually occurred — courts have developed careful rules governing when this powerful remedy should be granted, particularly at the interim stage before the full merits of a case have been tried.
An injunction is a judicial order by which a person is required to do, or is restrained from doing, a particular act. It is an equitable remedy, meaning it is granted at the discretion of the court based on principles of fairness and justice, rather than as a right that automatically follows once a wrong is proved — the court weighs a range of factors before deciding whether to grant it, and may refuse an injunction even where a legal wrong is established, if damages would be an adequate remedy or if granting the injunction would cause disproportionate hardship to the defendant. An injunction is typically sought to prevent an ongoing or apprehended tort, such as a continuing trespass, nuisance, or infringement of an intellectual property right, where the plaintiff's real interest lies in stopping the wrongful conduct rather than merely being compensated for it.
Injunctions are classified along two main lines, based on what the order requires the defendant to do, and based on the stage of the proceedings at which the order is made. By the nature of the order, an injunction may be prohibitory (or restrictive), which restrains the defendant from doing or continuing a particular wrongful act — this is the more common form, and is the natural remedy for torts such as trespass and nuisance, where the plaintiff simply wants the wrongful conduct stopped. An injunction may instead be mandatory, which positively compels the defendant to undo the effects of a wrongful act already done — for instance, ordering the defendant to demolish a wall built in violation of the plaintiff's rights, or to remove an obstruction unlawfully placed on the plaintiff's land; because a mandatory injunction requires active compliance rather than mere restraint, courts are generally more cautious in granting it, and require clearer proof of the wrong and of the necessity of the order.
By the stage and duration of the order, an injunction may be perpetual (or permanent), which is granted only after a full trial on the merits and finally disposes of the plaintiff's right to restrain the defendant's conduct for good; or temporary (also called interim or interlocutory), which is granted at an early stage of the litigation, before the full trial, to preserve the position between the parties and prevent irreparable harm to the plaintiff while the case is being decided, and which remains in force only until the specified time or until further order of the court. A further specialised category is the quia timet injunction, which is granted to prevent an apprehended future wrong before any actual damage has yet occurred — for example, where a plaintiff has clear evidence that the defendant is about to construct a building that will obstruct the plaintiff's ancient right to light, the plaintiff need not wait for the building to be completed and the light actually obstructed before seeking relief, but may apply for a quia timet injunction to prevent the threatened wrong altogether, provided the plaintiff can show a strong probability that the apprehended injury will in fact occur and that it will be substantial.
Because an interim injunction is granted before the full merits of the case have been tried, and may seriously restrict a defendant's conduct on the basis of an incomplete picture of the facts, courts have developed a structured test to decide whether one should be granted, balancing the plaintiff's need for urgent protection against the risk of wrongly restraining a defendant who may ultimately be found to have done nothing wrong.
American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (1975) — House of Lords.
Facts: The plaintiff, American Cyanamid, held a patent for a particular type of absorbable surgical suture. The defendant, Ethicon, began marketing a competing absorbable suture that the plaintiff alleged infringed its patent. Pending the full trial of the patent infringement claim, the plaintiff applied to the court for an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from marketing its product until the dispute could be finally resolved at trial.
Holding: The House of Lords, in the judgment of Lord Diplock, reformulated the test for granting interim injunctions. Rather than requiring the plaintiff to first establish a strong prima facie case on the merits — the older, stricter approach — the House of Lords held that the plaintiff need only show that there is a serious question to be tried, meaning the claim is not frivolous or vexatious and raises a real issue to be decided at trial. Once that threshold is crossed, the court does not attempt to resolve the disputed facts or the merits of the case at the interim stage; instead, it moves on to consider the "balance of convenience" — weighing which party would suffer the greater harm or injustice if the injunction were wrongly granted or wrongly refused, taking into account factors such as whether damages would be an adequate remedy for either party if they ultimately succeed at trial, the relative financial position of the parties, and the preservation of the status quo pending trial. This reformulation lowered the threshold for a plaintiff to obtain interim relief while shifting the focus of the interim hearing away from a preliminary assessment of who is likely to win, to a practical assessment of where the balance of harm lies until the matter can be tried properly. A full standalone Case-Law post on this decision is available in this unit's Case-Law list.
The American Cyanamid approach remains the starting point for interim injunction applications in most common law jurisdictions today, including in Indian practice, subject to some refinements and exceptions developed in later cases — for instance, courts continue to give particular weight to the strength of the plaintiff's case in situations where the balance of convenience is itself evenly poised, or where there will be no full trial on the merits at all because the interim decision will effectively dispose of the entire dispute.
| Basis of Classification | Kind | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Nature of order | Prohibitory / restrictive | Restrains the defendant from doing or continuing a wrongful act |
| Nature of order | Mandatory | Compels the defendant to undo the effects of a wrongful act already done |
| Stage/duration | Perpetual / permanent | Granted after full trial; finally disposes of the plaintiff's right to restrain the defendant |
| Stage/duration | Temporary / interim / interlocutory | Granted before full trial, to preserve the position and prevent irreparable harm pending decision |
| Special category | Quia timet | Granted to prevent an apprehended future wrong before actual damage occurs |
A factory owned by X begins releasing untreated effluent into a stream that flows past Y's agricultural land, damaging Y's crops. Y wants the discharge stopped immediately, not merely to be paid for the crops already damaged, so Y applies to the court for an interim injunction restraining X from discharging the effluent pending the full trial of Y's nuisance claim. Applying American Cyanamid, the court first asks whether Y's claim raises a serious question to be tried — clearly it does, since the discharge and resulting crop damage are not frivolous allegations — and then considers the balance of convenience: continuing the discharge causes ongoing, potentially irreparable harm to Y's land and livelihood, whereas restraining X temporarily, if X is later found not to have wrongfully damaged Y's land, causes X only the cost of treating the effluent or the temporary loss of production, which is comparatively easier to quantify and compensate. The balance of convenience therefore favours granting the interim injunction. If, instead, Y had approached the court before X's factory was even built, on clear evidence that the planned discharge method would inevitably harm Y's land, Y could seek a quia timet injunction to prevent the harm before it begins, rather than waiting for actual damage to occur.