This is the topic Osmania University tests most in this unit. Before 2018, whether a court would order specific performance was a matter of judicial discretion — a judge could refuse it even in a perfectly good case, simply because he thought damages were an adequate answer. That is no longer the law.
A student's first instinct is to think specific performance is granted "whenever it seems fair." That was roughly true before 2018, and it made outcomes unpredictable — two similar cases could go opposite ways depending on which judge heard them. Parliament's 2018 amendment converted this into a rule-based system: certain named exceptions (Sections 11(2), 14, 16) bar the remedy; outside those exceptions, the court has no discretion left to refuse it. This post covers exactly which contracts qualify and which do not.
Section 9 — "Except as otherwise provided herein where any relief is claimed under this Chapter in respect of a contract, the person against whom the relief is claimed may plead by way of defence any ground which is available to him under any law relating to contracts."
Section 9 is a bridge back to the Indian Contract Act, 1872. A defendant sued for specific performance can raise ordinary contract defences — that there was no free consent (Unit II), that the agreement was void or unlawful (Unit II), that it stood discharged (Unit III). The Specific Relief Act does not create a fresh contract; it only gives a different remedy once a valid, subsisting contract is shown.
Section 10 (as substituted by Act 18 of 2018) — "The specific performance of a contract shall be enforced by the court subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section 11, section 14 and section 16."
Read this section as a formula: specific performance = mandatory, MINUS the three named carve-outs. There is no fourth carve-out and no residual judicial discretion to refuse performance just because the court personally thinks damages would do.
Section 11(1) allows specific performance where the act agreed to be done is in performance, wholly or partly, of a trust. Section 11(2) is one of the three named exceptions in Section 10: a contract made by a trustee in excess of his powers, or in breach of trust, cannot be specifically enforced — because enforcing it would let the trustee's wrongdoing bind the trust property.
Ordinarily a court will not force a party to perform only part of a bargain (Section 12(1)). Three situations soften this:
Section 14 is the second named exception in Section 10, and the one examiners return to again and again. As rewritten in 2018, exactly four categories of contract are excluded:
Clause (c) is the one to remember with an example: a contract to paint a portrait, sing at a concert, or provide unique professional services cannot be specifically enforced — the court cannot compel good-faith personal skill, and a coerced performance would likely be worthless or worse. Clause (d) covers something like a partnership at will, which either partner may dissolve at any time — enforcing it specifically would be pointless since it could be undone immediately after.
Introduced in 2018, Section 14A lets the court engage one or more experts on any specific technical issue in a suit under this Act, and examine them in open court. This provision anticipates the more technical infrastructure-project litigation the same amendment was designed to speed up (covered later in this unit).
Section 13 protects a purchaser or lessee who contracts with someone whose title turns out to be defective. If the vendor later acquires a good interest, the purchaser can compel him to make good the contract out of that interest (13(1)(a)); if a mortgage is discovered, the purchaser can compel the vendor to redeem it (13(1)(c)); and if the vendor's own suit for specific performance is dismissed for want of title, the defendant purchaser gets his deposit back with interest and costs, secured by a lien on the vendor's interest in the property (13(1)(d)).
Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 355 — The Supreme Court held in 2022 that the 2018 amendment to the Specific Relief Act applies prospectively — it governs only transactions entered into on or after 1 October 2018, not agreements made before that date, even if the suit is decided afterward. On review in November 2024, the Supreme Court recalled its own 2022 judgment for errors apparent on the record and restored the High Court's decree of specific performance on the facts of that case — but the review order pointedly avoided taking a fresh position on the prospective-vs-retrospective question, leaving it formally unresolved rather than reaffirmed. Treat the 2022 prospective-application reasoning as the most-cited position on this point, but note it in an exam answer as unsettled by the 2024 review, not as settled law.
The practical lesson: always check the date the contract was made, not the date of the suit or judgment, before deciding whether old Section 20's discretion or new Section 10's rule applies.
Deepika contracts with a well-known classical singer to perform at her daughter's wedding for a fixed fee. Two days before the event, the singer backs out, citing a scheduling conflict.
Deepika cannot get a decree of specific performance compelling the singer to sing — this falls squarely within Section 14(c): a contract dependent on the personal skill of a party, which the court cannot supervise or force in good faith. Her remedy is damages for breach under the Indian Contract Act, not specific performance. Contrast this with a contract to sell a specific house: there, none of the four Section 14 exclusions apply, and after 2018 the court must enforce it.