Rectification fixes a document that says the wrong thing. Rescission and cancellation go further — they undo a contract or a written instrument altogether, restoring the parties as closely as possible to where they stood before it existed.
A person who signed a voidable contract, or one who is threatened by a document that could be misused against him, needs more than damages — he needs the contract or the paper itself gone. Chapter IV (rescission) deals with undoing a contract; Chapter V (cancellation) deals with undoing a written instrument, whether or not it embodies a contract at all (a deed, a promissory note, a will-substitute document). Together they are the Act's "undo" buttons.
Section 27(1) — a person interested in a contract may sue to have it rescinded, and rescission may be adjudged (a) where the contract is voidable or terminable by the plaintiff; or (b) where the contract is unlawful for causes not apparent on its face and the defendant is more to blame than the plaintiff.
Rescission is available to a party whose contract is voidable — think back to Unit II: agreements caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud, or misrepresentation are voidable at the option of the injured party (Section 19, Indian Contract Act, 1872), and Section 27 is the procedural route to actually have that contract set aside by a court.
Section 27(2) then lists four situations where the court will refuse rescission even though one of the grounds above exists:
Notice the underlying theme across (b), (c) and (d): rescission is refused wherever undoing the contract would now be impossible to do cleanly, or would unfairly hurt an innocent outsider.
Section 28 handles a specific practical situation: a court has already decreed specific performance of a contract for sale or lease of immovable property, but the purchaser or lessee then fails to pay the purchase money within the time the decree allows. The vendor or lessor may apply, in the same suit, to have the contract rescinded. If rescinded, the court can direct the purchaser to restore possession (if he had obtained it) and can order payment of rents/profits accrued, and refund of earnest money if justice requires. Section 28(4) bars a separate fresh suit for this relief — it must be sought in the original proceeding.
A plaintiff suing for specific performance may, in the same plaint, pray in the alternative that if the contract cannot be specifically enforced, it should instead be rescinded and delivered up to be cancelled. If the court refuses specific performance, it may then grant this alternative relief without the plaintiff having to start over with a fresh suit.
When a court adjudges rescission, it may require the party granted that relief to restore, so far as possible, any benefit he received from the other party, and to make any compensation justice requires. Rescission is not a one-way escape — a party who took an advance, or received goods, or enjoyed possession under the rescinded contract, must generally give it back or account for it.
Section 31(1) — any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that the instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
This section protects against a real, practical danger: a document that looks valid on its face — a promissory note, a sale deed, a bond — can be misused, transferred, or enforced against a person even though it is actually void or voidable, simply because it exists and looks genuine. Cancellation removes that danger by having the court formally declare it void/voidable and order it destroyed or marked cancelled. Section 31(2) adds a registration safeguard: if the instrument was registered, the court sends a copy of its decree to the registering officer, who notes the cancellation on the record.
Where an instrument records different rights or different obligations, the court may cancel it in part and let it stand for the rest. This mirrors Section 12's approach to part-performance — the law prefers a surgical fix over an all-or-nothing outcome wherever the document can genuinely be separated.
Section 33(1) mirrors Section 30: on adjudging cancellation, the court may require the party granted relief to restore any benefit received and make compensation. Section 33(2) extends this idea further and is worth remembering separately: even where a defendant successfully resists a suit brought against him (he is not the one asking for cancellation, he is defending), on the ground that the instrument is voidable, or that it is void because he was not competent to contract (Section 11, Indian Contract Act, 1872), the court may still require him to restore any benefit he received under it, to the extent his estate has actually benefited.
Suresh, a minor, is persuaded to execute a promissory note in favour of a moneylender for a loan that was never actually advanced to him. Years later, now a major, Suresh learns the moneylender still holds the note and could present it for payment or transfer it to a third party who might claim to be a holder in due course.
Suresh does not need to wait for the moneylender to sue him. He can proactively sue under Section 31 to have the promissory note declared void (an agreement with a minor is void ab initio under Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as covered in Unit II) and ordered to be delivered up and cancelled — removing the standing risk that the document could later be misused against him.