"Damages" is not one number — it's a family of different measures, each answering a different question about loss. This post sorts out the six kinds an examiner expects you to be able to name and distinguish, and the two Sections (73 and 74) that govern them.
Once a breach is established, the next question is always: how much? Not every loss flowing from a breach is recoverable, and not every claimed sum is treated the same way by a court. Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, together with a foundational English case the Act itself is built on, supply the rules for working this out.
Section 73 provides that the party who suffers by a breach is entitled to compensation for any loss or damage caused to him which naturally arose in the usual course of things from the breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from it. Compensation is not given for remote or indirect loss. Notably, Section 73 also directs that the means available to remedy the inconvenience caused by non-performance must be taken into account when estimating loss — the seed of the "duty to mitigate" rule covered as its own topic later in this unit.
Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341 — a mill's crankshaft broke, and the mill owners hired a carrier to deliver the broken shaft to an engineering firm to serve as a pattern for a replacement. The carrier delayed delivery unreasonably, and the mill was idle for longer than it should have been. The mill owners sued for the profits lost during the extra delay. The court denied this claim, holding that damages recoverable for a breach fall into two categories only: (1) loss arising naturally, in the usual course of things, from the breach itself, and (2) loss which was reasonably in the contemplation of both parties, as a probable result of the breach, at the time the contract was made. Since the carrier was never told the mill would be completely stopped for want of the shaft, the lost profits were not within either party's contemplation, and so were not recoverable.
This two-limb test is exactly what Section 73 codifies: the first limb becomes "general damages," the second becomes "special damages."
General damages compensate for loss that flows naturally and directly from the breach, in the usual course of things — the kind of loss any reasonable person would expect, without needing any special knowledge communicated at the time of contracting. This is the default, most commonly awarded category.
Special damages compensate for loss that is unusual to this particular transaction, and is recoverable only if the special circumstances making that loss likely were actually communicated to, and within the contemplation of, both parties when the contract was made. Without that communication — exactly as in Hadley v. Baxendale itself — the loss remains too remote to recover.
Contract law's purpose is compensation, not punishment — so exemplary or punitive damages, meant to punish the defendant rather than compensate the claimant, are ordinarily not awarded for breach of contract at all. Indian courts have long recognised only a small number of exceptions to this rule, most notably breach of a promise to marry, and the wrongful dishonour of a cheque by a bank where the customer is a trader — since a trader's dishonoured cheque causes reputational harm to their credit and business standing that goes beyond the face value of the cheque itself.
Where a breach is proved but the claimant has suffered no real, quantifiable loss, courts award nominal damages — a small, token sum that formally vindicates the claimant's legal right without pretending any actual harm occurred.
Section 74 provides that when a contract names a sum to be paid in case of breach, or contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the aggrieved party is entitled to reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named — whether or not actual damage is proved. Unliquidated damages, by contrast, are not fixed in the contract at all; the court assesses them after the fact, based on the actual proven loss.
Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405 — the Supreme Court held that Section 74 abolishes the English-law distinction between a genuine pre-estimate of loss ("liquidated damages," enforceable as fixed) and a penalty clause ("in terrorem," reduced to actual proven loss). Under Indian law, whatever the contract calls the named sum, the court's role is the same: it may award reasonable compensation up to that named amount, but no more — the named figure is simply a cap, never an automatic entitlement.
| Basis | English Law Approach | Indian Law — Section 74 (Fateh Chand) |
|---|---|---|
| Genuine pre-estimate ("liquidated damages") | Enforced as the fixed sum, generally without further proof | Treated the same as a penalty — court awards reasonable compensation, capped at that sum |
| Penalty clause | Struck down; court assesses actual loss instead | Same treatment as a genuine pre-estimate — no separate category |
| Proof of actual loss | Required for a penalty, not for genuine liquidated damages | Court still fixes "reasonable compensation," so evidence of actual loss remains relevant |
A caterer breaches a contract to supply food for a wedding reception at the last moment. The couple has to arrange a replacement caterer at a higher price — the price difference is general damages, recoverable as loss naturally arising from the breach. If the couple had specifically told the original caterer, at the time of booking, that a famous food critic would be attending and reviewing the event, and the caterer's failure caused a damaging public review, that additional reputational loss could be claimed as special damages — but only because it was communicated and contemplated at the time of contracting, not because it happened to occur.