So far Unit II has asked whether the parties were even allowed to contract. This post asks a different question about the same agreement: assuming both parties could contract, did they actually agree freely — or was one party's "yes" produced by pressure or manipulation rather than genuine choice?
Section 13 defines consent itself: two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense — consensus ad idem. But agreeing isn't enough on its own. Section 14 adds a second layer: consent is free only when it is not caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake. This post covers the first two of those five vitiating factors; the next post covers fraud, misrepresentation, and mistake together.
Coercion is committing, or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (or the old Indian Penal Code), or unlawfully detaining, or threatening to detain, any property — done with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement.
Chikham Amiraju v. Chikham Seshamma, (1912) 16 IC 344 (Mad) — A man threatened to commit suicide unless his wife and son executed a release deed in favour of his brother. The Madras High Court held that a threat of suicide amounted to coercion, since it was an act forbidden by the (then) Indian Penal Code — the release deed was therefore voidable.
Undue influence is different in kind from coercion — there's no unlawful act or threat, only the misuse of a position of trust or dominance. Section 16(1) defines it: a contract is induced by undue influence where the relations between the parties are such that one is in a position to dominate the will of the other, and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage. Section 16(2) lists when a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate another's will — where they hold real or apparent authority over the other (an employer over an employee, a doctor over a patient), where a fiduciary relationship exists (a solicitor and client, a trustee and beneficiary), or where they are contracting with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by age, illness, or mental or bodily distress.
Raghunath Prasad v. Sarju Prasad, AIR 1924 PC 60 — In a moneylending dispute involving an exceptionally high rate of compound interest, the Privy Council laid down the settled three-step approach for undue influence: first, was one party in a position to dominate the will of the other; second, did they use that position to obtain an unfair advantage; third, once the relationship of dominance and an unconscionable bargain are shown, the burden shifts to the dominant party to prove the transaction was not induced by undue influence.
| Aspect | Coercion (Sec. 15) | Undue Influence (Sec. 16) |
|---|---|---|
| Nature | An unlawful act or threat | Misuse of a position of trust/dominance |
| Relationship needed | None — can come from a stranger | Yes — dominance over the other's will |
| Involves criminal law? | Yes — a forbidden act under criminal law | No — the act itself is lawful |
| Effect | Voidable (Sec. 19) | Voidable (Sec. 19A) |
An elderly, seriously ill patient is entirely dependent on his attending doctor for care. During treatment, the doctor persuades the patient to gift him a valuable property, at a moment when the patient is weak and anxious about his prognosis. This falls squarely within Section 16(2)(c) — the doctor holds a position of dominance because of the patient's mental and bodily distress. If the gift is shown to be an unfair advantage, the burden shifts to the doctor to prove he did not use his position to induce it — and absent that proof, the patient (or his estate) can have the transaction set aside.