When the world stopped in March 2020, litigants scrambled to argue that Covid-19 excused them from contracts, delayed construction, or justified holding back payments. Courts had to quickly decide how much weight a pandemic actually carries against a specific-performance claim or an injunction application — and the early answers were not uniform.
A pandemic and a nationwide lockdown are genuinely disruptive, unforeseen events — but the law had to draw a careful line between real, causally-connected impossibility and a convenient excuse dressed up as force majeure. Two contrasting cases decided within weeks of each other in 2020 show exactly how Indian courts approached this line, and both remain important teaching examples for how Covid-19 interacted with specific relief and bank-guarantee enforcement.
Standard Retail Pvt. Ltd. v. G.S. Global Corp. & Ors., Bombay High Court, decided 8 April 2020 — Steel importers sought to restrain Korean steel exporters and their bank from encashing letters of credit, citing the Covid-19 lockdown as force majeure preventing them from taking delivery and paying. The Bombay High Court held that letters of credit are an independent transaction with the issuing bank, separate from the underlying sale contract, and the bank is not concerned with disputes between buyer and seller. The Court further found that the lockdown notifications had actually classified steel distribution and related port/logistics activities as essential services, allowing continued shipment. On these facts, the lockdown could not rescue the petitioners from their contractual obligations, and the Court refused to restrain encashment of the letters of credit.
This was among the earliest Indian rulings on Covid-19 and force majeure, and it set an important early tone: courts would scrutinise whether the pandemic actually prevented performance on the specific facts, not accept it as an automatic, blanket excuse.
Halliburton Offshore Services Inc. v. Vedanta Limited & Anr., Delhi High Court — Halliburton, engaged on a large oil-field services contract, invoked force majeure over delays caused by the nationwide lockdown from 24 March 2020, and sought to restrain Vedanta from invoking eight bank guarantees after terminating the contract. In an interim order (April 2020), the Court, per Justice C. Hari Shankar, granted an ad-interim injunction, treating the lockdown as prima facie force majeure creating "special equities" justifying a temporary restraint on encashment. However, in a final judgment dated 29 May 2020, delivered by a differently constituted bench, the Court vacated the ad-interim injunction, allowing Vedanta to encash the bank guarantees. The final ruling reaffirmed the settled principle that bank guarantees are independent of the underlying contract and must be honoured on their own terms unless fraud or a similarly narrow exception is shown — a general force majeure argument over the underlying contract does not, by itself, justify restraining an unconditional bank guarantee.
Read together, Halliburton shows a court initially sympathetic to Covid-19 disruption at the interim stage, but ultimately returning to the well-established, stricter principle on bank guarantees once the matter was fully argued.
Both cases converge on the same underlying doctrine, one that predates Covid-19 but was tested hard by it: a bank guarantee or letter of credit is a separate contract between the beneficiary and the bank, and its invocation is not automatically suspended just because the underlying commercial contract is disrupted by an external event. An injunction against encashment remains an exceptional remedy, generally reserved for fraud of an egregious nature or genuine irretrievable injustice — a pandemic-driven delay in the underlying contract, without more, was not treated as sufficient by the courts once the initial shock of the 2020 lockdown had passed.
For a specific-performance suit itself (as opposed to bank-guarantee litigation), the same underlying discipline applies: a defendant resisting performance on Covid-19 grounds would need to show the pandemic genuinely rendered performance impossible or fundamentally altered its nature — echoing the doctrine of frustration under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (Unit III) — rather than simply pointing to the pandemic as a general backdrop of difficulty. Courts remained willing to enforce specific performance, and to enforce bank guarantees, where the connection between Covid-19 and actual non-performance was not genuinely established.
A construction company contracted to complete a private residential project by June 2020 fails to do so, citing the nationwide lockdown. The homeowner sues for specific performance/possession. The construction company had, however, continued sourcing some materials through the lockdown period via essential-services exemptions, and resumed full work within weeks of restrictions easing, yet still delayed handover by over a year for reasons unrelated to Covid-19 (labour disputes, cost overruns).
Following the reasoning of Standard Retail and the final view in Halliburton, a court would likely scrutinise this claim closely: the lockdown period genuinely affected performance for a limited window, but the company must show the pandemic itself — not other, unrelated causes — is responsible for the full extent of the delay it seeks to excuse. A blanket invocation of "Covid-19" for a year-long delay, without this causal proof, would not automatically defeat the homeowner's specific-performance claim.