Unit I traced how a proposal becomes an agreement — communication, acceptance, revocation, consideration. But an agreement is only as strong as the people who made it. Before the law asks what was agreed, it asks a sharper question first: was this person even allowed to agree to anything at all? Unit II opens with that question.
A shopkeeper sells a bicycle on credit to a 15-year-old, who signs the receipt himself. A woman recovering from a breakdown signs away her only house during a lucid week, then relapses a month later. Both transactions look ordinary on paper — an offer, an acceptance, money changing hands. Yet Indian contract law treats them very differently from each other, and treats a third case — an undischarged insolvent signing a fresh loan agreement — differently again. Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 is the provision that draws these lines. It doesn't ask whether the parties agreed to something; Unit I already covered that ground. It asks whether they were legally allowed to agree at all.
Section 11 lays down the complete test in a single sentence: "Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject, and who is of sound mind, and is not disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject." Strip out the legal phrasing and three separate conditions remain — a person must clear all three before the law treats them as capable of binding themselves.
Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 supplies the actual rule Section 11 refers to. The general position is straightforward: a person domiciled in India attains majority on completing 18 years, and not before. The same section carves out one exception — where a court has appointed a guardian of the minor's person or property, or where a Court of Wards has taken charge of the minor's property, before the age of 18, majority is pushed to 21 years instead. The reasoning is protective: a minor already under active court supervision is treated as needing that supervision for three years longer than an ordinary minor would.
Section 12 defines what "sound mind" means for contract law, and it's a narrower, more functional test than it first sounds: "A person is said to be of sound mind for the purpose of making a contract if, at the time when he makes it, he is capable of understanding it and of forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon his interests." Two things follow directly from that wording. First, soundness of mind is judged at the exact moment of contracting — not as a fixed, permanent label attached to a person. Second, the test asks about that specific contract, not about general intelligence.
Section 12 spells out both directions this cuts. A person who is usually of unsound mind, but has occasional lucid intervals, may validly contract during one of those intervals. Equally, a person who is usually of sound mind, but temporarily loses it — through illness, intoxication, or a similar cause — cannot validly contract during that temporary period, even though they are perfectly capable the rest of the time.
Section 11's third ground is a residual category: anyone the law specifically disqualifies from contracting, even though they are an adult of sound mind. This includes alien enemies (during wartime), foreign sovereigns and accredited diplomats (without the Central Government's consent), persons declared insolvent until their discharge, and convicts during their sentence. Each category has its own rules and its own reasoning, and rather than compress them into a paragraph here, the next post in this unit covers persons of unsound mind and this disqualified-persons category together, with the case law each one actually turns on.
Capacity to Contract has appeared as a direct 15-mark essay question in Osmania's own Semester-1 papers twice in the last five available years — "Parties to a contract must be competent to contract. Explain" (March/April 2017) and "State briefly the law relating to competence of parties to a contract" (March/April 2018). Treat this as a core, frequently-tested topic rather than background reading before Minor's Agreements.
The three grounds of incompetence don't all produce the same legal consequence, which is exactly why the next two posts treat them separately instead of lumping every incompetent party's agreement together as simply "void." An agreement made by a minor is void from the very beginning — not voidable, not enforceable against the minor under any circumstance, as the Privy Council held in the foundational case of Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose (1903), covered in full in the next post. An agreement made by a person of unsound mind is generally void as well, but Section 68 carves out a real exception for necessaries supplied to them. A person disqualified by law faces restrictions that depend entirely on which category they fall into — an undischarged insolvent's contracting power is not restricted in the same way an alien enemy's is. Both of these threads are picked up properly in the post that follows this one.
Ramu, aged 17, buys a smartphone worth ₹40,000 on an EMI plan from an electronics dealer, signing a credit agreement for 12 monthly instalments. He pays the first three instalments and then stops. The dealer sues Ramu for the remaining balance as a contract debt. Applying Section 11, Ramu was a minor on the date he signed the agreement, so he lacked the capacity to contract at all — the agreement is void from its inception, not merely voidable at his option. The dealer cannot recover the outstanding balance as a contract debt from Ramu, whatever they might separately be able to do to recover the phone itself. This is precisely the situation the next post, on Minor's Agreements, works through in detail.