Read the full set here, or use the practice card above to test yourself one question at a time.
Article 14 guarantees equality before law and the equal protection of laws to:
Explanation. Unlike Articles 15, 16 and 19, which say 'citizen', Article 14 says 'any person'. A foreigner can claim equality before the law.
'Equality before law', the first limb of Article 14, is:
Explanation. The first limb is a negative idea: no person is above the ordinary law. The second limb, equal protection of the laws, is a positive idea: like persons must get like treatment.
Under the doctrine of reasonable classification, a classification made by law is valid only if it satisfies the twin test of:
Explanation. The classification must rest on an intelligible differentia distinguishing grouped persons from others, and that differentia must have a rational nexus with the object the law seeks to achieve — laid down in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) and refined in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (1958).
In Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar (1958), the Supreme Court held that a law may validly base a classification on:
Explanation. In Ram Krishna Dalmia the Union appointed a Commission of Inquiry into the companies promoted by Dalmia. The Court held that one person or one named group can be a class by itself if there is sufficient reason, and it stated the twin test.
In Devarajiah v. B. Padmanna, the Mysore High Court read the word 'untouchability' in Article 17 in:
Explanation. The word 'untouchability' in Article 17 is not defined in the Constitution. The Mysore High Court read it in its historical sense, not its literal sense.
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) is significant because it introduced which additional test for Article 14?
Explanation. Bhagwati J. held in Royappa that equality is a dynamic concept and is antithetic to arbitrariness — state action that is arbitrary violates Article 14 even without a formal classification to test, moving beyond the older reasonable-classification test alone.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) built on the arbitrariness doctrine by holding that a procedure affecting a person's rights must be:
Explanation. Maneka Gandhi held that 'procedure established by law' under Article 21 must itself be fair, just and reasonable, linking Article 21 to Article 14's non-arbitrariness requirement and effectively fusing the two doctrines.
Which statement about Article 14 and permissible classification is correct?
Explanation. Article 14 does not forbid classification altogether — it forbids 'class legislation,' i.e., discriminatory, arbitrary classification, while permitting reasonable classification that satisfies the intelligible-differentia and rational-nexus test.
In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), instant triple talaq was held by two judges to violate Article 14 because it was:
Explanation. Nariman and Lalit, JJ. held the practice manifestly arbitrary. The Bench ruled 3:2 against it, with different reasons.
Article 15(1) prohibits the State from discriminating against any citizen on grounds only of:
Explanation. Article 15(1) lists exactly five prohibited grounds — religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth — and applies only to citizens, unlike Article 14.
In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951), the Supreme Court struck down a communal G.O. reserving college seats by caste/community because:
Explanation. Seven Judges unanimously struck down the Madras order, which reserved college seats by caste and religion. It breached Articles 15(1) and 29(2), and the State could not justify it by a Directive Principle. Parliament answered with the First Amendment, which added clause (4).
Article 15(4), inserted by the First Amendment (1951) in response to Champakam Dorairajan, empowers the State to make special provision for:
Explanation. Article 15(4) is an enabling provision allowing special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes and for SCs/STs.
Article 15(3) permits the State to make special provision for:
Explanation. Article 15(3) is a specific enabling exception allowing the State to make protective special provisions for women and children, recognising their distinct social position.
Article 15(5), inserted by the 93rd Amendment (2005), extends reservation-enabling special provisions to admissions in:
Explanation. Article 15(5) allows the State to make special provisions for backward classes/SCs/STs regarding admission to educational institutions, including private ones, whether aided or unaided, but expressly excludes minority educational institutions protected under Article 30(1).
Article 15(6), inserted by the 103rd Amendment (2019), permits reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) up to what additional limit, without touching existing SC/ST/OBC reservation?
Explanation. Article 15(6) permits up to a further 10% reservation for EWS citizens not already covered by the existing SC/ST/OBC reservation schemes, in both education and (via a corresponding Article 16(6)) public employment.
In Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2008), the Supreme Court struck down a law barring women from working in premises serving liquor because it:
Explanation. The Court struck down section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, which barred women from places that serve liquor. A protective rule that restricts women's choice of work is not saved by Article 15(3).
Which statement correctly distinguishes Article 15 from Article 14?
Explanation. Article 14 is a broad guarantee of equality to 'any person'; Article 15 is narrower in one sense (citizens only) but more specific in another (an exhaustive list of five prohibited grounds), and carries its own set of enabling exceptions (15(3)-(6)).
Article 16(1) guarantees equality of opportunity to all citizens in matters relating to:
Explanation. Article 16(1) guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.
In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) (Mandal Commission case), the Supreme Court capped total reservation in public employment at:
Explanation. Indra Sawhney held that total reservations ordinarily cannot exceed 50%, barring extraordinary situations, and also introduced the 'creamy layer' exclusion and held reservation could not extend to promotions under Article 16(4) as it then stood.
The 'creamy layer' principle from Indra Sawhney requires that:
Explanation. The creamy layer principle excludes the socially and economically more advanced members within an Other Backward Class from availing reservation benefits meant for the class's genuinely disadvantaged members.
Article 16(4A), inserted by the 77th Amendment (1995) after Indra Sawhney, enables the State to provide for:
Explanation. Article 16(4A) was inserted specifically to reverse Indra Sawhney's holding against promotion-reservation, enabling reservation in promotion for SC/ST employees inadequately represented in State services.
In M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006), the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Articles 16(4A) and 16(4B) but subjected their use to which conditions?
Explanation. Nagaraj upheld the amendments as not violating the basic structure, but required the State to collect quantifiable data justifying backwardness and inadequate representation, and to ensure the '50% ceiling' and 'efficiency of administration' (Article 335) limits are respected before applying them.
Article 16(4B), inserted by the 81st Amendment (2000), enables the State to:
Explanation. Clause (4B) lets the State consider unfilled vacancies of a year that are reserved under clause (4) or (4A) as a separate class of vacancies, to be filled in a later year. It was inserted by the 81st Amendment (9 June 2000).
Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination in public employment on grounds including:
Explanation. Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination in respect of any employment/office under the State on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence, or any of them.
Which of the following is a correct statement about Article 16(4)?
Explanation. Article 16(4) is enabling, not mandatory — it empowers, but does not compel, the State to make reservation for backward classes it considers inadequately represented in State services; no individual has a fundamental right to claim reservation as such.
Article 17 abolishes 'untouchability' and forbids its practice in any form, and its enforcement:
Explanation. Articles 15(2) and 17 reach private persons as well as the State. Article 17 binds private persons because the evil was practised in daily social life.
The word 'untouchability' in Article 17 is:
Explanation. The Constitution does not itself define 'untouchability,' leaving it to be understood in its historical, social sense as the disability traditionally attached to persons regarded as belonging to certain castes.
Parliament gave statutory teeth to Article 17 by enacting the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, later renamed and strengthened as the:
Explanation. The Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 was substantially amended and renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, expanding penalties and the scope of prohibited practices.
In State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale (decided 1 December 1992), the Supreme Court:
Explanation. The Supreme Court restored convictions under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955. The accused had stopped a Scheduled Caste group from drawing water from a new borewell.
Which of the following Articles reach private persons as well as the State?
Explanation. Article 15(2) binds private persons because shops, hotels and wells were shut to people by private conduct. Article 17 also binds private persons.
Enforcing 'untouchability' against another person, in any form, is treated under Indian law as:
Explanation. Practising untouchability in any form is made a punishable criminal offence under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, giving Article 17's constitutional prohibition concrete penal effect.
Unlike Articles 14 to 16, which ask whether a difference is justified, Article 17 allows:
Explanation. Articles 14 to 16 ask whether a difference is justified. Article 17 allows no test and no exception.
Which of these is an example that could fall within Article 17's prohibition?
Explanation. Denying access to public places, wells, temples, or social amenities purely on caste-based untouchability grounds is a classic, historically-recognised example of the practice Article 17 was specifically designed to abolish.
Article 18(1) prohibits the State from conferring any title on any person, except:
Explanation. Article 18(1) bars the State from conferring titles generally, but expressly carves out military and academic distinctions (such as ranks or degrees) as permitted exceptions.
Article 18(2) prohibits an Indian citizen from:
Explanation. Article 18(2) prohibits any citizen of India from accepting a title from a foreign State, aimed at preventing foreign influence over citizens through honours.
Article 18(4) requires that a person holding any office of profit or trust under the State must obtain the President's consent before:
Explanation. Article 18(4) requires Presidential consent before a person holding an office of profit or trust under the State accepts any present, emolument, or office from or under any foreign State — a further safeguard against foreign influence.
In Balaji Raghavan v. Union of India (decided 15 December 1995), five Judges held that National Awards like the Bharat Ratna and Padma awards are:
Explanation. Five Judges unanimously held that the Bharat Ratna and Padma awards are not 'titles' under Article 18. Recipients must not use them as a prefix or suffix to their names.
The underlying constitutional purpose of Article 18 is to:
Explanation. Article 18 reflects a deliberate post-colonial rejection of hereditary titles/nobility (a legacy of British-era honours like 'Rai Bahadur') and safeguards against foreign titles compromising a citizen's loyalty or the principle of equality among citizens.
Which of these would most likely violate Article 18(1) if done by the State?
Explanation. Academic degrees and military ranks are expressly excepted under Article 18(1); a hereditary title of nobility carrying continuing legal privilege is exactly the kind of conferment Article 18 was designed to prohibit.
Article 18 appears in Part III of the Constitution under which broader head?
Explanation. Article 18 is placed within the 'Right to Equality' group (Articles 14-18), since prohibiting titles of nobility is fundamentally about preventing a legally privileged, unequal class of citizens.
If a foreign government confers an honorary title on a private Indian citizen holding no office of profit or trust under the State, Article 18:
Explanation. Article 18(2)'s bar on accepting a title from a foreign State applies to any citizen, not only those holding an office of profit or trust — the Presidential-consent requirement in 18(4) is the separate, narrower provision that specifically concerns office-holders' acceptance of foreign presents/emoluments/offices.