Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav

A Hindu man with a living wife went through Hindu marriage rites with a second woman in June 1974. She left after a week and claimed maintenance as his "wife" under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court held that her marriage was void (invalid from the start), so she was not a "wife" for Section 125.

Quick Revision

Parties

Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav — appellant. She went through Hindu marriage rites with respondent no. 1 and claimed maintenance from him.

Anantrao Shivram Adhav — respondent no. 1. He was already married to Smt. Lilabai when he married the appellant.

Another respondent — the judgment names "Another" as a respondent but does not describe the role.

Procedural History

1. In 1976, the appellant applied for maintenance. The trial Court dismissed the application (headnote).
2. She appealed to the Bombay High Court, in Crl. Appln. No. 478 of 1980. A Full Bench decided the matter against her by the judgment and order dated 21/22-4-1982.
3. She appealed to the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 475 of 1983. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 27 January 1988.

Facts

1. Anantrao Shivram Adhav had earlier married Smt. Lilabai. That marriage was subsisting in 1974, and Lilabai was alive.
2. In June 1974, the appellant was factually married to Anantrao by observance of rites under Hindu law.
3. She lived with him for a week and then left the house, alleging ill-treatment.
4. In 1976, she applied for maintenance. The application was dismissed.
5. The appellant says she was not told about the first marriage when she married. She says Anantrao treated her as his wife.
6. During the appeal, some money was paid to the appellant under an interim order made during the appeal.

Issues Raised

1. Can a Hindu woman married after the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 came into force, to a Hindu man with a living, lawfully wedded wife, claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?
2. Is her marriage void under Sections 5(1)(i) and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, or only voidable under Section 12?
3. Does "wife" in Section 125 mean only a legally wedded wife not covered by Section 11 of the Act?
4. Should "wife" be given a wider meaning to include a woman married in fact, and should the personal law of the parties be left out of account?
5. Can the principle of estoppel (a party cannot deny what it led the other to believe) help her, since she was not told of the first marriage and was treated as a wife?

Arguments Contended

For the appellant

1. A marriage should not be treated as void, because such a marriage was earlier recognised in law and custom.
2. In any event, the marriage would be voidable under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act.
3. "Wife" in Section 125 should have a wider meaning. It should cover a lawfully wedded wife and also a woman married in fact by the necessary rites or the procedure laid down by law.
4. She relied on Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, [1985] 3 SCR 844. She said the personal law of the parties should be left out of account.
5. Husband and wife cease to be so on divorce, yet a divorcee is entitled to Section 125. A woman in the appellant's position should also be brought within the section.
6. She was not told of the respondent's marriage with Lilabai, and he treated her as his wife. So her prayer for maintenance should be allowed.

For the respondent

1. "Wife" in Section 125 means only a legally wedded wife.
2. The appellant's marriage is null and void under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. So she is not entitled to any relief under the section.

Court's Reasoning

Sharma, J. (for the Court, with Ranganath Misra, J.)

The judgment is in one opinion, delivered by Sharma, J. Its text is in eight numbered blocks, so no paragraph numbers are cited below.

1. Noted: The point is whether a Hindu woman married after the 1955 Act to a Hindu man with a living, lawfully wedded wife can claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. The Court recorded the facts and the courts below.
2. Noted: Section 125(1) gives the "wife" the right to maintenance in a summary proceeding. It covers a wife, legitimate or illegitimate minor children, adult children with a disability, and parents. The Magistrate may order a monthly allowance not exceeding five hundred rupees. The proviso (an added condition) lets the Magistrate order a father to pay for a minor married daughter whose husband lacks means. Explanation (a) defines "minor" by the Indian Majority Act, 1875. Explanation (b) says "wife" includes a divorced woman who has not remarried. The respondent said "wife" means only a legally wedded wife.
3. Noted: To decide the woman's status, the Court examined the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 11 declares a marriage void if it contravenes Section 5, clauses (i), (iv) or (v). Section 5(1)(i) requires that neither party has a living spouse at the time of marriage. So a marriage in breach is null and void.
4. Held: The argument that such a marriage was earlier recognised by law and custom has no merit. Section 4 gives the Act overriding effect. No aid can be taken of the earlier Hindu law or custom that conflicts with the Act.
5. Held: Section 12 is confined to other categories of marriage. It does not apply to a marriage solemnised in breach of Section 5(1)(i). Section 12(2) puts further limits on the right to avoid such a marriage.
6. Noted: Marriages under Section 12 are not void ab initio (void from the beginning). Unless every condition is met and the aggrieved party avoids it, the marriage stays effective.
7. Held: Marriages under Section 11 are void ipso jure (void by operation of law). They are void from the very inception. They are to be ignored as not existing in law "if and when such a question arises".
8. Held: Section 11 allows a formal declaration on a petition, called a decree of nullity (a court order that the marriage is void). Getting a prior formal declaration from a court is not essential.
9. Noted: Section 16 supports this. Sub-section (1) keeps the child of a void marriage legitimate, whether or not a decree of nullity is granted. The Court said this implies that a void marriage can be held so without a prior court declaration.
10. Noted: Section 16(2) refers to a decree of nullity as an essential condition for a voidable marriage under Section 12. Section 16(3) shows the basic difference between void and voidable marriages. It also gives the child no rights in the property of anyone other than the parents. This applies where the child could not have held such rights before the Act.
11. Noted: The legislature upheld the legitimacy of a child's paternity from a void marriage. It gave no similar protection to the child's mother.
12. Held: The appellant's marriage must be treated as null and void from its very inception.
13. Noted: "Wife" is not defined in the Code, except that the Explanation shows its inclusive character to cover a divorcee.
14. Why: A woman cannot be a divorcee unless a marriage existed in the eye of law before that status. So the word takes the meaning it has in the law applicable to the parties, subject to Explanation (b), which is not relevant here.
15. Held: The argument for a wider meaning, covering a woman married in fact, is not well founded. The Court rejected the appellant's reliance on Shah Bano's case.
16. Why: A divorcee is included only because of clause (b) of the Explanation.
17. Noted: Under the old Section 488 of the Code of 1898, the position was different. A divorcee could not use the summary remedy. The wife's right depended on continuing married status.
18. Noted: Shah Bano's case pointed out that a husband could defeat that right by divorce under Muslim personal law or any other system. So the benefit was extended to a divorced woman until she remarried, by adding clause (b).
19. Noted: No similar provision was brought in for the appellant. The legislature gave the benefit to an illegitimate child by express words. It gave none for a de facto wife whose marriage is void ab initio.
20. Held: The attempt to exclude the personal law of the parties altogether must also be rejected.
21. Why: Section 125 is enacted in the interest of a wife. A woman who claims under sub-section (1)(a) must prove she is the wife of the person concerned. That issue can be decided only by reference to the law applicable to the parties.
22. Held: A maintenance application can be maintained only where the applicant establishes her status or relationship by the personal law. Once the right is established by proof of the necessary conditions, further reference to personal law cannot defeat it.
23. Held: The judgment in Shah Bano's case does not help the appellant.
24. Noted: Parliament thought it necessary to add specific provisions for a divorced woman and for an illegitimate child. It did not do so for women not lawfully married.
25. Held: There is no merit in the plea that the appellant was not told of the first marriage and was treated as a wife. She cannot use estoppel to defeat the provisions of the Act.
26. Why: The respondent's treating her as his wife is of no avail, as the issue has to be settled under the law. The intention of the legislature is relevant, "and not the attitude of the party".
27. Held: The marriage of a woman by Hindu rites with a man who has a living spouse is a complete nullity in the eye of law. She is not entitled to the benefit of Section 125 of the Code. The appeal is dismissed.
28. Directed: No order as to costs. The respondent shall not be permitted to claim a refund of the money paid under the interim order.

Authorities

• Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, [1985] 3 SCR 844 — relied on by the appellant to exclude personal law and to widen "wife". The Court distinguished it. It extended Section 125 to a divorced woman through Explanation (b). It does not help a woman in a void marriage.

Also cited in footnotes: none.

Provisions mentioned

• Section 125(1) CrPC, 1973: a Magistrate of the first class may order a person with sufficient means to pay monthly maintenance to a wife, child or parent who cannot maintain themselves, up to five hundred rupees in the whole.
• Explanation (a), Section 125: "minor" means a person who is not of age under the Indian Majority Act, 1875.
• Explanation (b), Section 125: "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried.
• Section 488, Code of 1898: the earlier provision. A divorcee could not use its summary remedy.
• Section 4, Hindu Marriage Act: gives the Act overriding effect over earlier Hindu law and custom.
• Section 5(1)(i): neither party may have a living spouse at the time of marriage.
• Section 11: a marriage in breach of Section 5 clauses (i), (iv) or (v) is null and void, and may be so declared on a petition.
• Section 12: covers voidable marriages. It does not cover a marriage in breach of Section 5(1)(i). Sub-section (2) limits the right to avoid.
• Section 16: a child of a void marriage is legitimate. A decree of nullity under Section 12 does not make the child illegitimate. The child gets no rights in property other than the parents' property, where such rights were barred before the Act.
• Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976: mentioned in Section 16(1).
• Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act: the headnote lists it. The headnote also ends with a cut-off entry, Section 1. The judgment text discusses neither.

Judgement

1. The Supreme Court held that the appellant's marriage to respondent no. 1, who had a living spouse, was a complete nullity in the eye of law.
2. She is not entitled to the benefit of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
3. The appeal was dismissed.
4. No order as to costs.
5. Some money was paid to the appellant under an interim order during the appeal. The respondent shall not be permitted to claim a refund.

Legal Principle / Ratio

A Hindu marriage solemnised after the 1955 Act with a person who has a living spouse is void from the start under Sections 5(1)(i) and 11. A woman in such a marriage is not a "wife" for Section 125 CrPC, and estoppel cannot change this. The key holding: "a complete nullity in the eye of law".

The Court also noted that Parliament gave Section 125 benefits to divorcees and illegitimate children by express words. It gave none to women not lawfully married.

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

• The Court noted that the law protects the child of a void marriage but not the mother. It treated this as the legislature's choice.
• The woman may have been unaware of the first marriage. The Court held that her good faith could not change the statutory result.
• The Court said it is "the intention of the legislature which is relevant". Any relief for such women is left to Parliament.
• The judgment does not discuss any other remedy open to such a woman.

Significance

• It confirms that a marriage in breach of Section 5(1)(i) is void, not voidable.
• It shows that a void marriage needs no prior decree of nullity.
• It fixes the meaning of "wife" in Section 125 by reference to the parties' personal law.
• It limits Shah Bano's case: the divorcee benefit rests on Explanation (b) alone.
• The judgment records no later case in this file, so no later history is stated here.

Exam-Important Points

• Rule: a marriage with a living spouse is void under Sections 5(1)(i) and 11. The woman cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. The trap: Section 12 does not apply, so the marriage is not merely voidable.
• Rule: a void marriage needs no prior court declaration. The trap: students think a decree of nullity is required first.
• Rule: personal law decides whether she is a "wife". The trap: Shah Bano's case does not exclude personal law for such a woman.
• Rule: estoppel and good faith do not defeat the Act. The trap: the husband's conduct in treating her as a wife does not help.
• Remember: no costs, and no refund of interim payments.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. Paragraph numbers follow the official Supreme Court judgment text; law reports may number the same paragraph differently.