Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav

A man already married went through Hindu rites with a second woman while his first wife was still alive. When that second marriage soured within a week and she sought maintenance as his "wife" under criminal procedure law, the Supreme Court had to decide whether a union void from the moment it was solemnised could still give her that status — or whether the law simply refuses to see it as a marriage at all.

Parties

Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav — appellant; had gone through Hindu marriage rites with the respondent while his earlier marriage was still subsisting, and sought maintenance from him as his wife under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Anantrao Shivram Adhav — respondent; already validly married to Smt. Lilabai at the time he went through a second ceremony with the appellant, and resisted her maintenance claim on the ground that the second marriage was void.

Facts

Anantrao Shivram Adhav was already validly married to Smt. Lilabai, and that marriage was subsisting, when in June 1974 he went through Hindu marriage rites with Yamunabai. Yamunabai lived with him for about a week after this ceremony before leaving, alleging ill-treatment. She subsequently filed a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking maintenance from Anantrao as his "wife." Anantrao resisted the claim, contending that since he already had a living, legally wedded wife at the time of the second ceremony, that second marriage was void under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and Yamunabai could not therefore claim the status of a "wife" entitled to maintenance under Section 125.

Issues Raised

1. Is a marriage solemnised by a Hindu man during the subsistence of a valid earlier marriage void under Sections 5(i) and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?
2. Can a woman who has gone through such a void marriage ceremony claim the status of a legally wedded "wife," entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?
3. Does the broader, welfare-oriented purpose of Section 125 CrPC — protecting women and children from destitution — permit a wider or more liberal reading of "wife" than the strict definition under the Hindu Marriage Act would allow?

Arguments Contended

On behalf of Yamunabai (Appellant): It was argued that Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a beneficial, welfare-oriented provision intended to prevent vagrancy and destitution, and should be construed liberally in favour of a woman who had genuinely gone through marriage rites and lived as a wife, even if that marriage later turned out to be void under the Hindu Marriage Act; a purposive reading of "wife" in this specific, summary maintenance context should not import the full technical bar of Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, especially where doing so would leave the woman with no remedy at all.

On behalf of Anantrao (Respondent): It was argued that Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 makes monogamy a mandatory condition for a valid Hindu marriage, and Section 11 expressly declares any marriage in contravention of that condition void from its very inception, as if it had never taken place at all; since Yamunabai's marriage to Anantrao was void ab initio, she could never have acquired the status of a legally wedded wife, and the word "wife" in Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure — which itself does not independently define marriage — must be understood by reference to substantive personal law, under which no valid marriage had ever come into existence between them.

Court's Reasoning

The Supreme Court held that a marriage solemnised by a Hindu man in contravention of the monogamy condition in Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, while a previous valid marriage subsists, is void under Section 11 of the Act — such a marriage is void from its inception and must be treated, in the eyes of law, as if it never took place at all, not merely as an imperfect or voidable union capable of producing some lesser legal effects. The Court reasoned that the term "wife" as used in Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, though the provision itself serves a beneficial, welfare purpose, is not defined independently by that Code; it necessarily draws its meaning from the substantive personal law governing the parties' marriage, since only that law can determine whether the relationship of husband and wife has actually come into legal existence between them.

Applying this, the Court held that since Yamunabai's marriage to Anantrao was void under the Hindu Marriage Act from the moment it was solemnised, she could not be regarded, even for the specific and beneficial purposes of Section 125 CrPC, as his legally wedded "wife"; the welfare purpose of Section 125 could not be stretched so far as to override the clear, express statutory consequence Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act attaches to a bigamous marriage. The Court acknowledged the resulting hardship to women in Yamunabai's position but held that any remedy for this gap lay with the legislature, not with a strained judicial interpretation of "wife" contrary to the plain effect of personal law.

Judgement

The Supreme Court held that Yamunabai's marriage to Anantrao, contracted during the subsistence of his earlier valid marriage, was void under Sections 5(i) and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and that she could not accordingly claim the status of a legally wedded wife entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; her appeal was dismissed.

Legal Principle / Ratio

A marriage solemnised by a Hindu man or woman during the subsistence of a valid earlier marriage is void under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for contravening the monogamy condition in Section 5(i) — it is void from its inception and is to be treated as if it never took place. The term "wife" in Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not independently defined by that Code and must be understood by reference to the parties' substantive personal law; a party to a marriage void under that law cannot claim the status of "wife" for maintenance purposes under Section 125, notwithstanding the beneficial, welfare-oriented purpose of that provision.

Significance

Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav is the leading Indian authority on the consequence of a bigamous marriage under Section 5(i) and Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, confirming that such a marriage is void, not merely voidable, and cannot found even a beneficial maintenance claim under Section 125 CrPC. It is regularly read alongside Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra (1965), which addresses the closely related question of what must actually be proved to establish that a "second marriage" — and hence bigamy — occurred at all; together the two cases give the complete picture of how Indian courts treat a purported second Hindu marriage, both as to its formation and its legal consequences.

Exam-Important Points

• Facts in one line: a woman who went through Hindu marriage rites with an already-married man sought maintenance as his "wife" under Section 125 CrPC; the Supreme Court held the marriage void and denied her that status.
• Holding: a marriage during the subsistence of an earlier valid marriage is void under Sections 5(i) and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act — and a party to such a marriage cannot claim "wife" status under Section 125 CrPC.
• Key principle: "wife" in Section 125 CrPC is not independently defined by the Code — it must be determined by reference to the parties' substantive personal law.
• Classic exam trap: students sometimes think Section 125's welfare purpose alone entitles any woman who went through a ceremony to maintenance — this case shows a void marriage under personal law defeats even that beneficial claim.
• Always read together with Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra (1965) — what must be proved to establish a second marriage occurred at all, versus this case's consequence once it is void.

Facts, bench and citation verified against IndianKanoon's report of the Supreme Court judgment and independent case-law summaries (CaseMine, Legal Authority, Lawyers Club India) — the citation 1988 AIR 644; 1988 SCR (2) 809, the bench (L.M. Sharma and Ranganath Misra, JJ.), and the 27 January 1988 decision date are confirmed across sources.