V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy

Court	Supreme Court of India
Bench	P.N. Bhagwati, A.C. Gupta and Syed Murtaza Fazal Ali, JJ.
Year	1977 (decided 17 March 1977)
Principle / Topic	Enlargement of women's estate
Cited in	Enlargement of limited estate of women into their absolute estate (Notes)

A Hindu widow got properties under a 1949 compromise in place of her maintenance. The compromise gave her only a life interest and barred any sale. After the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 she leased and sold some of them. The Supreme Court decided on 17 March 1977 whether Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) governed her interest.

Quick Revision

Facts: A widow won a maintenance decree against her husband's step-brother. In execution, a compromise certified on 30 July 1949 gave her properties for life, with no power to sell. She sold and leased some in 1960 and 1961.
Issue: Did Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 apply to property given in lieu of maintenance under an instrument that restricts her interest?
Holding: Section 14(1) applied. The widow held the properties as full owner. The restricted estate in the compromise was ignored because it only recognised a pre-existing right to maintenance.
Key sections and articles: Section 14(1), the Explanation and Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937; Order XXI rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Biggest exam trap: Do not write that restrictive words in a document always bring in Section 14(2). Section 14(2) covers only a grant that creates a new title for the first time.
Present position: In Tej Bhan v. Ram Kishan (9 December 2024), a two-Judge bench said the Tulasamma principles substantially hold the field. It referred Section 14 to a larger bench.

Parties

V. Tulasamma and others — appellants; appellant No. 1 is Vaddeboyina Tulasamma, the widow. She was the defendant in the suit and held the properties under the compromise. The judgment does not name the other appellants.
V. Sesha Reddi (Dead) by L.Rs. — respondent; the step-brother of Tulasamma's husband. He was the plaintiff in the suit and sued to have her alienations declared not binding on him.
Defendants 2 and 3 — lessees of some of the properties under the first registered deed of 12 April 1960.
Defendant 4 — purchaser of some of the properties under the second registered deed of 26 May 1961.

Procedural History

11 October 1944: Tulasamma filed a petition for maintenance in forma pauperis (as a poor person) in the Court of the District Munsif, Nellore.
13 January 1945: the application was set ex parte (in the respondent's absence). The petition was later registered as a suit.
29 June 1946: the District Munsif passed an ex parte decree for maintenance against Sesha Reddy.
1 October 1946: Sesha Reddy applied to record a compromise said to have been made out of Court on 9 April 1945. Tulasamma opposed it. The application was dismissed on 16 October 1946, and his appeal to the District Judge, Nellore, was also dismissed.
Tulasamma put the decree in execution. A settlement made out of Court was certified by the Executing Court on 30 July 1949 under Order XXI rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
31 July 1961: Sesha Reddy sued in the Court of the District Munsiff, Nellore. The Munsiff decreed the suit. He held that Tulasamma got only a limited interest for her lifetime and that the alienations did not bind the reversioner.
Tulasamma appealed to the District Judge, Nellore. The District Judge reversed the decree and dismissed the suit. He held that she acquired an absolute interest under the 1956 Act. He also held that Section 14(2) did not apply because the compromise was an instrument in recognition of a pre-existing right.
Sesha Reddy filed a second appeal (Second Appeal No. 804 of 1964) in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. By judgment of 22 November 1967 the High Court held that the case was covered by Section 14(2). It held that the compromise gave her title for the first time. It reasoned that she had no pre-existing right because her husband died before the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937.
Tulasamma appealed to this Court by special leave (Civil Appeal No. 1360 of 1968).

Facts

Venkatasubba Reddy, husband of Vaddeboyina Tulasamma, died in 1931. He died in a state of jointness (as members of a joint Hindu family) with his step-brother V. Sesha Reddy. He left Tulasamma as his widow.
On 11 October 1944 Tulasamma filed a petition for maintenance in forma pauperis against Sesha Reddy before the District Munsif, Nellore.
The application was set ex parte on 13 January 1945. The petition was then registered as a suit. An ex parte decree was passed against Sesha Reddy on 29 June 1946.
On 1 October 1946 Sesha Reddy filed an application to record a compromise said to have been made out of Court on 9 April 1945. Tulasamma opposed it. It was dismissed on 16 October 1946, and his appeal to the District Judge, Nellore, was dismissed.
Tulasamma put the decree in execution. At that stage the parties settled the matter out of Court. The Executing Court certified the settlement on 30 July 1949 under Order XXI rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Under the compromise, Tulasamma was allotted the Schedule properties. She was to enjoy only a limited interest in them, with no power of alienation at all. The properties were to revert to the plaintiff after her death.
Tulasamma stayed in possession of the properties after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force.
By a registered deed of 12 April 1960 she leased some of the properties to defendants 2 and 3. By a registered deed of 26 May 1961 she sold some of the properties to defendant 4.
On 31 July 1961 Sesha Reddy sued for a declaration that the alienations were not binding on him and could remain valid only during the widow's lifetime. He said she had a restricted estate under the compromise. He said Section 14(2) stopped the 1956 Act from enlarging it.
Tulasamma denied the allegations. She said that she had become full owner with an absolute right of alienation under the 1956 Act. She also said that Sesha Reddy had no locus standi (right to bring the suit).
Fazal Ali J. records that the facts were not disputed. It was common ground that the properties were allotted under a compromise in lieu of maintenance. It was admitted that she was in possession when the 1956 Act came into force. It was also admitted that the compromise purported to give only a limited interest and completely restricted her power of alienation.
Two other appeals (Nos. 135 of 1973 and 126 of 1972) raised similar points. All three were heard together. Counsel confined their arguments to questions of law and did not dispute the findings of fact.

Issues Raised

Fazal Ali J. framed two points for determination.

Does the instrument of compromise, under which the properties were given to Tulasamma before the 1956 Act in lieu of maintenance, fall within Section 14(1) or within Section 14(2) of the Act?
Does a Hindu widow have a right to property in lieu of her maintenance? If such a right is conferred on her later by way of maintenance, is it a mere recognition of a pre-existing right, or a conferment of new title that falls squarely within Section 14(2)?

Bhagwati J. framed the question in two forms.

Where property is given to a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance under an instrument that restricts the interest given to her, does sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 14 apply?
Were the properties acquired by the appellant under the compromise in virtue of a pre-existing right? Or were they acquired for the first time as a grant owing its origin to the compromise alone?

Arguments Contended

Bhagwati J.'s opinion does not set out the arguments of counsel. The arguments below are recorded in the opinion of Fazal Ali J.

For the appellant (Tulasamma)

Counsel, Mr. Krishna Murthy Iyer, argued that a Hindu woman's right of maintenance is a pre-existing right.
Any instrument or transaction that allots property to her for maintenance does not create a new title. It only recognises that pre-existing right.
The appellant relied on the decision of the Bombay High Court in B.B. Patil v. Gangabai as the correct view.

For the respondent (Sesha Reddy)

Counsel, Mr. Natesan, argued that the object of the proviso (Section 14(2); an exception to the main rule) is to validate past transactions that placed restrictions on a Hindu female. It is not meant to disturb them.
The language of the proviso is very wide. There is no warrant for refusing to apply it where pre-existing rights are involved.
In the alternative, he argued that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is not a legal right unless an actual charge (a burden on specific property) is created on property. Without a charge it is not enforceable at law.
So a bare claim to maintenance cannot be called a pre-existing right, because the indicia of a legal right are wanting.
The respondent relied on the Madras decisions in Gurunadham v. Sundrarajulu and Santhanam v. Subramania. He also relied strongly on Smt. Naraini Devi v. Smt. Ramo Devi of this Court.

Court's Reasoning

Opinion of Bhagwati J. (for himself and A.C. Gupta J.)

Noted: Bhagwati J. had read the judgment of Fazal Ali J. and agreed with its conclusion. He gave his own reasons. He did not repeat the facts, which Fazal Ali J. had set out.
Noted: the short question is whether sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies. The case is one where property is given to a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance under an instrument that expressly restricts her interest.
Noted: if sub-section (1) applies, the limits on her interest are wiped out and she becomes full owner. If sub-section (2) applies, she keeps the restricted estate prescribed by the instrument.
Noted: the question is complex. It has produced wide diversity of opinion among the High Courts, and within some of them.
Noted (observation): the confusion was evident from 1967. The legislature did not step in and did not amend the law. Bhagwati J. called Section 14 "a classic instance of a statutory provision which, by reason of its inapt draftsmanship, has created endless confusion for litigants".
Noted (observation): he said it proved a paradise for lawyers. He said an authority or body should keep in touch with courts and the legal profession and recommend amendments quickly. This would save time and money and give the law clarity, certainty and simplicity.
Noted: he set out Section 14(1), the Explanation and Section 14(2) in full.
Noted: before Section 14, Hindu law restricted the interest of a Hindu female in property she acquired. Even the nature of that restricted interest differed between schools.
Noted: in S.S. Munna Lal v. S.S. Rajkumar this Court said sub-section (1) intends to convert the interest of a Hindu female into an absolute estate, however restricted it was under Sastric Hindu law. The Act is a codifying enactment. It sweeps away traditional limits on her powers of disposition.
Noted: sub-section (1) is wide. The words any property cover every kind of property. The Explanation widens the section further. It covers property acquired by inheritance, devise, partition (a division of joint family property), in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, gift, her own skill or exertion, purchase, prescription, or in any other manner. It also covers stridhana held immediately before the Act began.
Held: whatever the kind of property and whatever the mode of acquisition, sub-section (1) covers it. The object is to wipe out the disabilities of a Hindu female. It is to abridge the strict rules against her proprietary rights, which showed her lifelong control. It is to recognise her as an independent and absolute owner.
Noted: this Court has given sub-section (1) a very wide reading to advance its social purpose. It has read possessed of in its widest sense.
Noted: in Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva the Court held that possessed of means the state of owning or having in one's hand or power. It need not be actual or physical possession. It may be possession in law, actual or constructive.
Noted: in Mangal Singh v. Rattno the Court added that the section covers property a Hindu female owns even if she is not in actual, physical or constructive possession. This holds provided she has not parted with her rights and can obtain possession.
Held: sub-section (1) therefore covers every kind of acquisition by a Hindu female, including acquisition in lieu of maintenance. If she possessed the property at the date of commencement, or acquired and possessed it later, she becomes full owner.
Noted: sub-section (2) says nothing in sub-section (1) applies to property acquired by gift, will (a document disposing of property after death), any other instrument, a decree or order of a civil court, or an award. The exception applies where the terms of the document prescribe a restricted estate.
Noted: this Court treated sub-section (2) as a proviso or exception to sub-section (1) in Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi.
Held: sub-section (2) is an exception to a provision meant to improve women's social and economic position. It must be construed strictly so that it affects the broad sweep of sub-section (1) as little as possible. It cannot rob sub-section (1) of its efficacy or deprive a Hindu female of its protection.
Why: the words of sub-section (2) are wide enough, on their face, to cover property given at a partition or in lieu of maintenance under an instrument that prescribes a limited interest. That reading would virtually gut sub-section (1).
Why: before the Act, most instruments allotting property to a Hindu female carried a limited interest, in line with the old Sastric law. After the Act, the dominant male could simply write in a restricted interest and make a mockery of sub-section (1).
Why: the Explanation, which includes property acquired at a partition or in lieu of maintenance, would also become meaningless. The social purpose of the law would be frustrated. That could never have been the intention of the Legislature.
Held: no provision of a statute should be read in isolation. Sub-section (2) must be read in the context of sub-section (1) to leave sub-section (1) as large a scope as possible.
Held: so read, sub-section (2) is confined to cases where a Hindu female acquires property for the first time, as a grant without any pre-existing right. The grant may be under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award that prescribes a restricted estate.
Noted: this approach is supported by Badri Prasad's case. There the Court said sub-section (2) can operate only if the acquisition is made for the first time, with no pre-existing right in the Hindu female who is in possession.
Noted (legislative history): the Hindu Succession Bill, 1954 was referred to a Joint Committee of the Rajya Sabha. Clause 15(2) of the draft Bill, which matches the present sub-section (2), referred only to gift or will. The other modes were added later.
Held: this shows that sub-section (2) was meant only for acquisitions made for the first time without a pre-existing right, akin to a gift or will. Property acquired at a partition or in lieu of a right of maintenance comes from a pre-existing right. It is outside sub-section (2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate.
Noted: this approach is borne out by the decisions of this Court. In Badri Pershad, Gajju Mal died in 1947, leaving five sons and a widow. An arbitrator, Tulsi Ram Seth, was appointed on 5 August 1950. His award of 31 December 1950 gave the widow certain properties and expressly said she would have a widow's estate.
Held (as reported in Badri Pershad): although the award gave a restricted estate, sub-section (1) applied and not sub-section (2). The properties were given on the basis of a pre-existing right, as heir of her husband under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937. They were not a new grant made for the first time.
Noted: in Nirmal Chand v. Vidya Wanti (dead) there was a partition deed of 3 December 1945 between Amin Chand, a coparcener (a member of the joint family with a birthright in its property), and Subhrai Bai, widow of a deceased coparcener. It allotted her property and said she was entitled only to its user. She had no right to alienate it and held a life interest.
Noted: Subhrai Bai died in 1957, after the Act. She had made a will leaving the property to her daughter Vidyawati. The will was challenged on the ground that her case fell under sub-section (2).
Held (as reported in Nirmal Chand): the contention was rejected. The partition deed gave only a limited interest. That was in recognition of the legal position then prevailing. So it did not bring her case within sub-section (2). This Court said the recital was "merely recording the true legal position".
Noted: Bhagwati J. explained that the property was given to Subhrai Bai in virtue of a pre-existing right. The provision for a limited interest only repeated what the law of the time already said.
Held: sub-section (2) comes into play only when a Hindu female acquires property as a new grant for the first time. The instrument, decree, order or award must prescribe the terms on which she holds it, namely as a restricted owner.
Noted: in Badri Persad's case the Court quoted with approval Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal (Madras High Court). The object of sub-section (2) is only to remove the disability of women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decree etc. by virtue of which a woman's right was restricted.
Held: where a Hindu female acquires property under an instrument in virtue of a pre-existing right, the position is different. Examples are a right to property on partition or a right to maintenance. Under pre-Act law she would have had only a limited interest. A provision giving her a limited interest then only records the true legal position.
Held: that restriction is a disability imposed by law. It is wiped out, and her limited interest is enlarged under sub-section (1). But where she acquires property under an instrument for the first time, with no pre-existing right, she holds it on the terms given. A restricted estate is then not enlarged by sub-section (2).
Noted: the controversy therefore narrows to one question. Were the properties acquired under the compromise in virtue of a pre-existing right? Or were they a grant for the first time, owing its origin to the compromise alone?
Noted: Tulasamma claimed maintenance out of the joint family properties in the hands of her deceased husband's brother. The claim was decreed. In execution of the decree the compromise was reached. It allotted the properties to her for maintenance and gave her a limited interest.
Noted: so the nature of a Hindu widow's right to maintenance out of joint family estate has to be considered. A widow is entitled to maintenance out of her deceased husband's estate. This is so whether the estate is with his male issue or with his coparceners. The joint family estate in which he had a share is liable for her maintenance.
Noted: in Rani Bai v. Shri Yadunandan Ram this Court said that her claim is not a charge on joint family property until her maintenance is determined and made a specific charge, by agreement or by a decree or order of a court. Even so, her right is not liable to be defeated except by transfer to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Even a transfer with notice of her claim defeats it only if the transfer was made with the intention of defeating her right.
Noted: the widow can follow the joint family property into the hands of anyone who takes it as a volunteer (one who gives no value) or with notice of her claim. Where she is in possession of specific property for maintenance, a purchaser with notice cannot take possession without first securing proper maintenance for her. The Court cited Rachawa v. Shivayanappa, approved in Rani Bai.
Held: under Sastric Hindu law, a widow has a right to be maintained out of joint family property. The right ripens into a charge if she takes steps to have her maintenance ascertained and specifically charged. Even without a specific charge it can be enforced against a volunteer or a purchaser with notice.
Held: her right is not jus in rem, because it gives no interest in the joint family property. It is jus ad rem, a right against the joint family property.
Held: so when specific property is allotted to a widow in lieu of maintenance, the allotment satisfies her jus ad rem. It is not a grant for the first time without a pre-existing right. The instrument is merely a document effectuating such pre-existing right. It does not grant the property without any antecedent right or title.
Held (additional consideration): even if the instrument were silent, she would have only a limited interest under pre-Act Hindu law. A provision prescribing a limited interest is therefore merely recording the true legal position. That does not attract sub-section (2), and sub-section (1) governs.
Held: the conclusion is inescapable. Where property is allotted to a widow under an instrument, decree, order or award that prescribes a restricted estate for her, sub-section (2) of Section 14 has no application in such a case.
Noted: several High Courts have taken the same view. Bhagwati J. named B.B. Patil v. Gangabai, Sumeshwar Misra v. Swami Nath Tiwari, Reddayya v. Varapula Venkataraju, Lakshmi Devi v. Shankar Jha, N. Venkanegouda v. Hanemangouda, Smt. Sharbati Devi v. Pt. Hiralal, Sesadhar Chandra Dev v. Smt. Tara Sundari Dasi, Saraswathi Ammal v. Anantha Shenoi and Kunji Thomman v. Meenakshi. He did not discuss them, because he had decided the question on principle.
Held: the judgment of Palekar J. in B.B. Patil v. Gangabai is a well reasoned judgment and has the Court's full approval.
Held: the contrary view in Gurunadham v. Sundarajulu, Santhanam v. Subramania, S. Kachapalava Gurukkal v. V. Subramania Gurukkal, Shiva Pujan Rai v. Jamuna Missir, Gopisetti Kondaiah v. Gunda Subbarayudu, Ram Jag Misir v. The Director of Consolidation, U.P. and Ajab Singh v. Ram Singh is not the correct law. These cases were wrongly decided.
Held (conclusion): the properties were acquired under the compromise in lieu or satisfaction of her right of maintenance. So sub-section (1) applies and not sub-section (2). The appellant became full owner despite the compromise prescribing a limited interest.

Opinion of Fazal Ali J.

Fazal Ali J. gave a separate opinion. Bhagwati J. and Gupta J. agreed with its conclusion.

Noted: this is a defendant's appeal by special leave against the Andhra Pradesh High Court judgment of 22 November 1967. He narrated the facts that appear above under Facts and Procedural History.
Noted: the appeal was argued only on the substantial questions of law on the interpretation of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14. It was common ground that the properties were allotted under a compromise in lieu of maintenance. The widow was in possession when the 1956 Act came into force, and the compromise gave only a limited interest with no power of alienation.
Noted: two points fall for determination, as set out under Issues Raised.
Noted: there is serious divergence of judicial opinion. The Bombay, Punjab, Calcutta and Patna High Courts hold that a widow's right of maintenance is a pre-existing right. For them, an allotment in lieu of maintenance only recognises it and confers no new title. Such property falls within Section 14(1), and the limited interest is enlarged into an absolute interest.
Noted: the Orissa, Allahabad, Madras and Andhra Pradesh High Courts take the contrary view. For them, the right to maintenance is not a right to property. Property allotted in lieu gives a right or title for the first time, which Section 14(2) protects. This Court has no decision directly in point, though some support the Bombay view.
Noted: before resolving the dispute, the legal nature of a Hindu widow's right to maintenance must be considered. Under Shastric Hindu law, marriage is a sacrament and not a contract. The wife is transplanted into her husband's household and becomes part and parcel of his body. Colebrooke (Digest of Hindu Law, Vol. II, p. 158) describes a wife as half the body of her husband.
Noted: the law therefore imposes a corresponding duty on the husband to maintain her. Under Hindu law he has a personal obligation to maintain his wife. If he has property, she is entitled as of right to be maintained out of it.
Noted: the claim is not a matter of concession, grace or generosity. It is a valuable spiritual and moral right that flows from the spiritual and temporal relationship of husband and wife. The wife is a co-owner of her husband's property in a subordinate sense.
Noted: the right does not by itself create a legal charge on the husband's property. But the wife can enforce it by moving the Court for a decree creating a charge. The right lasts only so long as she remains chaste. It may become a legal charge if created by agreement or by decree.
Noted: many authorities say that a transferee who takes the property with notice of the widow's right takes on the obligation to maintain her. She can follow the property into the purchaser's hands for that limited purpose. Fazal Ali J. dealt with these later.
Noted: Colebrooke (Vol. II, p. 121) quotes the Mahabharata: where females are honoured, the deities are pleased. This shows the high position given to Hindu women by Shastric law.
Noted: Colebrooke (Vol. II, p. 123) quotes Manu. A man with business abroad must assure a fit maintenance to his wife before he leaves. This shows a legal obligation on the husband to make arrangements for her maintenance.
Noted: Colebrooke (Vol. II, p. 243) quotes Yajnawalkya. On an equal partition among sons, wives who have received no wealth from their lord or his father must have equal shares. This reinforces the importance of the wife's right.
Noted: Gopalchandra Sarkar Sastri (Hindu Law, p. 533) says the husband is personally liable for his wife's maintenance. It is also a legal charge on his property, as an incident of her marital co-ownership. After his death her right is limited to his estate, which passes to the heir with the same charge.
Noted: Sastri adds that courts have held it to be only an equitable charge, so that the husband's debts have priority unless a decree makes it a charge. He suggests that the courts held so because proper materials were not placed before them. In his view the original Hindu law clearly made the right a charge, and the obligation runs with the property.
Noted: Sastri cites Manu (in Srikrishna's commentary on the Dayabhaga and in the Mitakshara). The group to be maintained includes the father, the mother, the Guru, a wife, offspring, poor dependants, a guest and a mendicant. Hell is the portion of a man if they suffer.
Noted: Manu also says that the aged mother and father, the chaste wife and an infant child must be maintained even by doing a hundred misdeeds. Fazal Ali J. said this shows the imperative nature of the duty.
Noted: Sastri (p. 523) quotes Yajnavalkya: property other than what is needed for the maintenance of the family may be given away. He says ancestral immovable property is the hereditary source of maintenance and is charged with the liability. It cannot be sold or given away except for family support, though a small portion may be alienated if consistent with that support. Heirs must maintain those whom the last holder was bound to maintain.
Noted: under the Mitakshara law, the daughter-in-law acquires a right to the ancestral property from her marriage, as her husband's co-owner in a subordinate sense. The principal incident is her right to maintenance, which a gift or devise by the holder cannot defeat.
Noted: Sastri (pp. 528-529) says that under both schools a lawfully wedded wife acquires from marriage a right in her husband's present and later property. Her right is subordinate because of her status of lifelong tutelage or dependence. The right is not lost if he renounces Hinduism.
Noted: the right survives his death whether his interest passes by survivorship or by succession, to male issue or others. It does not depend on the widow lacking other means of support.
Noted: summing up Sastri, the widow's right to maintenance is a very important right. It amounts to a charge on her husband's property and continues to the successor. She is a sort of co-owner of his property in a subordinate sense, without dominion over it.
Noted: Mayne (Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage, 11th ed., pp. 684, 813, 816, 822) traces the right to the theory of an undivided family. The head of the family must maintain its members, their wives and their children.
Noted: Mayne (pp. 816 and 818) says a wife's maintenance is a personal obligation from the existence of the relationship, independent of property. It attaches from the moment of marriage. He repeats the text of Manu on maintaining the chaste wife.
Noted: Mayne (p. 821) says that after the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937, the widow of a deceased coparcener is still entitled to maintenance. The Act gave her a share in the non-agricultural part of the family estate. He also cites Narada: a virtuous widow is entitled to food and raiment.
Noted: Mayne (p. 822) says the widow's right to be maintained passes to heirs who take by inheritance or survivorship. The obligation falls even on the King who takes the estate by escheat or forfeiture.
Noted: Mulla (Hindu Law, p. 597) says a wife is entitled to maintenance from her husband whether or not he has property. It is a personal obligation arising from the relationship.
Noted: the right to maintenance was statutorily recognised and codified by the Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946. It came into force on 23 April 1946. The various schools of Hindu law are unanimous on the incidents of the right. It is not an indefeasible right to property, but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right.
Noted: in Narayan Rao Ramchandra Pant v. Ramabai the Judicial Committee said the widow's right to maintenance arises from the common law, which developed over time.
Noted: West J. discussed the law at length in Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai. He said the authorities strongly support the view that a widow's maintenance, especially against sons, is a charge on the estate. It is a right in re adhering to the property, into whatever hands it may pass. Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan repeated this.
Noted: the Judicial Committee approved West J.'s observations in Mst. Dan Kuer v. Mst. Sarla Devi. It quoted Phear J. in Srimati Bhagabati v. Kanailal Mitter. The widow may have a proper sum for her maintenance ascertained and charged on the property in the heir's hands.
Noted: she may also follow the property into the hands of anyone who takes it as a volunteer or with notice of her claim. A bona fide purchaser without notice cannot be affected by anything short of an already existing proprietary right or a specific charge.
Noted: the Privy Council stated the true rule. A joint Hindu family has two obligations: to pay the binding debts, and the moral obligation to maintain its widows. The second becomes a legal obligation when a charge is created by agreement or decree. Until either takes the form of a charge, the debts take precedence over maintenance. If either becomes a charge, it takes precedence over the other.
Noted: in Pratapmull Agarwalla v. Dhanabati Bibi the Judicial Committee said a mother may not own her share before partition and has no pre-existing right to the share. But she has a pre-existing right to maintenance.
Noted: in Rani Bai v. Shri Yadunandan Ram this Court dealt with a widow who claimed maintenance but would not hand over possession until she secured it. The Court said she was presumably in possession of the properties in lieu of her right of maintenance. She could not be deprived of them even by Jugli Bai without securing proper maintenance out of them.
Noted: Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree (Calcutta High Court) stressed that a widow who is not owner of a share still has a pre-existing right of maintenance. Srinath Das v. Probodh Chunder Das (Calcutta High Court) said the right is identified with the husband's property right, though of a subordinate nature.
Noted: in Hemangini Dasi v. Kedarnath Kundu Chowdhury the Privy Council held that if the estate remained joint, the mother's maintenance remained a charge on the whole estate. Any share the widow took, equal to a son's, was really in lieu of maintenance for which the estate was liable.
Noted: K.V. Thangavelu v. The Court of Wards, Madras (Madras High Court) traced the whole history. A cogent ground for preferring the widow's claim is her qualified or subordinate co-ownership in the husband's property, declared by the Mitakshara. The Court cited verse 52 of the Vyavaharadhaya (chapter II), referring to Apastamba's Dharmasutra: from marriage arises jointness in holding property.
Noted: in Sarojinidevi v. Subrahmanyam (Madras High Court) the right to maintenance survived the 1937 Act, which did not apply to agricultural lands. Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma (Madras High Court) held that a wife's maintenance is a personal obligation independent of the husband's property. Fazal Ali J. fully agreed.
Noted: in Yellawa v. Bhimangavda (Bombay High Court) an heir of the husband could not recover possession from the widow without first making proper arrangements for her maintenance. This Court approved the case in Rani Bai.
Held: on a careful analysis of these authorities and Shastric Hindu law, six propositions emerge on a Hindu woman's right to maintenance.
1. It is a personal obligation of the husband, who must maintain her even if he has no property. If he has property, her right becomes an equitable charge on it. Anyone who succeeds to the property carries the legal obligation to maintain the widow.
2. It is not a right to property, but it is a pre-existing right in property. It is jus ad rem and not jus in rem. The widow can get a charge created on the property, by agreement or by a civil court decree.
3. The right is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold, a purchaser with notice of her right is legally bound to provide for her maintenance.
4. It is a pre-existing right that existed in Hindu law long before the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946.
5. It flows from the social and temporal relationship of husband and wife, which makes the wife a sort of co-owner of his property in a subordinate way.
6. A widow in possession of her husband's property may retain it in lieu of maintenance. This holds unless the person who succeeds to the property or buys it can make due arrangements for her maintenance.
Noted: Fazal Ali J. traced the historical growth of legislation. The origin of Hindu law is lost in antiquity, so the reason for the woman's subordinate position cannot be fixed. Hindu law made no provision for divorce. Perhaps the old jurists thought property or expenses for maintenance were a good substitute for an inheritance share. They were very particular about safeguarding maintenance, by the husband or his heirs.
Noted: the Legislature stepped in from time to time to soften personal law. The idea of conferring an absolute interest on the Hindu female had engaged it since 1941. It took tangible shape in 1954, when the Hindu Succession Bill was introduced. It was passed in 1956. A Hindu Code Committee headed by Mr. B.N. Rau had made the recommendations that formed its basis.
Noted: after independence, the need to free womanhood from feudal bondage became imperative. Society needed to give women a place of honour and equality, and to end the invidious distinction between male and female in inheritance. Divorce also needed an express provision on specified grounds.
Noted: even in British times, laws changed Hindu law. The Hindu Law of Inheritance Act added a few heirs, including some females. The Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 gave a widow the same share as sons on partition. It kept her right to claim maintenance, and she could sue for maintenance without a partition.
Noted: after independence Parliament passed the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The last provided for intestate succession. It was a piece of social legislation that met a long felt need, as the debates showed.
Noted: he set out Section 14, with the Explanation and sub-section (2), in full.
Noted: this Court has said the object of Section 14 was to make revolutionary changes in the structure of Hindu society. Possessed is used very widely. It includes owning or having property in one's power. A Hindu woman need not be in actual or physical possession. It is enough that she has a right to the property and it is in her power or domain.
Noted: in S.S. Munnalal v. S.S. Rajkumar, a share declared for the widow under a preliminary decree fell within Section 14(1). She was deemed in possession in law before the final decree (the decree that finally allots the share). The High Court had held that the declaration gave only an inchoate interest, so that the property remained joint family property. This Court reversed that.
Noted: this Court said the words possessed by show that the Legislature envisaged this situation. It repeated that the Act is a codifying enactment, and it sweeps away traditional limits on women's powers of disposition. A right declared in favour of a Hindu male under a preliminary decree counts as property. The right declared for a Hindu female must be treated the same.
Noted: in the same case the Court said Section 14(1) manifestly intends to convert the interest of a Hindu female into an absolute estate, however restricted it was under Sastric Hindu law.
Noted: in Eramma v. Verrupanna this Court held that, before a widow can get an absolute interest under Section 14(1), she must have some vestige of title. Her possession must be under some title or right and not that of a rank trespasser. The section does not validate illegal possession or confer title on a trespasser.
Noted: in Mangal Singh v. Smt. Ratno a widow came into possession of her husband's property in 1917. In 1954 a collateral of her husband dispossessed her under orders of the Revenue authorities. She sued to recover possession, and the 1956 Act came into force during the suit. This Court held the dispossession illegal. She was deemed in the eye of law to continue in possession and acquired an absolute interest. She had not parted with her right.
Noted: the Legislature began Section 14(1) with possessed by and not in possession of. The Court said this was meant to enlarge the meaning. A property is said to be possessed by a person if he is its owner, even if he is out of actual or constructive possession.
Noted: the Court clarified, referring to Eramma, that possessed by does not apply to mere possession without title. The Legislature intended the provision for cases where the Hindu female has the right of ownership. The section will not apply if she has parted with her rights so that she could no longer exercise ownership.
Noted: in Sukhram v. Gauri Shanker, the brothers Hukam Singh and Sukh Ram, and Sukh Ram's son Chidda, formed a joint Hindu family under the Benares School of Mitakshara. Hukam Singh died in 1952 leaving his widow Krishna Devi. On 15 December 1956 she sold half the family house. The others challenged the sale, saying she had only a life interest. They argued that a male coparcener under the Benares school could not alienate his undivided interest without the others' consent.
Noted: this Court held that, on the express words of Section 14, a female Hindu possessed of property before or after the Act holds it as full owner. Restrictions of Shastric law were wiped out. The interest she took under Section 3(2) of the 1937 Act was her property. As full owner she acquired a right unlimited in point of user and duration and uninhibited in point of disposition.
Held: Fazal Ali J. said this case indirectly supports the appellant. If the Legislature meant to confer an absolute interest, no limit from old Shastric law or elsewhere can defeat it. Under the Act the female had higher powers than a male coparcener of the Benares school, because the statute had no limit.
Held: on the same reasoning, once property is given to a widow in lieu of maintenance and she enters possession, no restriction in the document can stop her from acquiring an absolute interest. A contractual restriction cannot be higher than the old Shastric law or the express words of the 1956 Act.
Noted: in Badri Prashad v. Smt. Kansa Devi the propositus died in 1947 leaving five sons and a widow. The matter went to an arbitrator in 1950. His award gave the widow only a widow's estate. This Court held that the award only narrated the law as it stood when it was made.
Noted: because the widow inherited under the 1937 Act, her interest became absolute with the 1956 Act and fell within Section 14(1). The fact that the partition was made by an award did not bring it within Section 14(2), because the interest was given on a pre-existing right and not as a new grant.
Noted: the Court said the word acquired in sub-section (1) must have the widest meaning. If a female has a share in joint properties at the commencement of the Act and later gets properties allotted to her by metes and bounds, she is possessed of them at the Act and acquired them before it. The Court relied on Munnalal and Sukhram. Fazal Ali J. said this case is nearest to the point in this appeal, though it does not cover it directly.
Noted: in the unreported Nirmal Chand v. Vidya Wanti (dead) (Civil Appeal No. 609 of 1965, decided 21 January 1969), Amin Chand and Lakhmi Chand owned agricultural and non-agricultural properties and partitioned them in 1944. Lakhmi Chand died leaving the appellant, his second wife Subhrai Bai, and his daughter by her.
Noted: a registered partition document dated 3 December 1945 between Amin Chand and Subhrai Bai gave her a portion of the property for user only. She had no right to alienate it. She had only a life interest. In 1957 she bequeathed the property to her daughter Vidya Wanti, whose name was mutated after the 1956 Act.
Noted: the High Court point was that Subhrai Bai had only a limited interest, so her case fell under Section 14(2). This Court said the Act had not yet come into force at the allotment. Under the law then she was entitled only to a limited interest. The restriction was not a restriction as such but a statement of the law then prevailing.
Noted: so it did not bring her under Section 14(2). She acquired an absolute interest after the 1956 Act and could make the will. The Court said the recital was merely recording the true legal position. Four principles are clear from this line of cases, as the next step records.
Held: the four principles are these.
1. Section 14 must be liberally construed to advance the Act's object of enlarging the limited interest of a Hindu widow.
2. Sub-section (2) does not refer to any transfer that merely recognises a pre-existing right without conferring a new title. This was clearly held in Badri Pershad.
3. The 1956 Act made revolutionary and far-reaching changes. Every attempt should be made to carry out its spirit, and to end the distinction between Hindu male and female in intestate succession.
4. Sub-section (2) is a proviso to sub-section (1). It must be read as a proviso and not so as to destroy the main provision.
Held: there is no real inconsistency between Section 14(1), the Explanation and sub-section (2). Section 14(1) does not limit the enlargement to any particular interest. The Explanation gives an exhaustive category of cases where a Hindu female gets an absolute interest.
Noted: the arguments of the appellant and the respondent are recorded under Arguments Contended.
Held: after considering the matter, Fazal Ali J. agreed with the appellant's counsel. First, the appellant's contention is more in line with the spirit and object of the statute.
Held: second, "the claim of a Hindu female for maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right". Courts in India, the Judicial Committee and this Court have held so. The right to maintenance is really a substitute for a share she would have got in her husband's property.
Why: a Hindu female who gets a share acquires an absolute interest under Section 14(1). The Legislature could not have intended that a female with only a right of maintenance should not. Otherwise the appellant would suffer because her husband died before the 1937 Act. Had he died after 1937, she would have got an absolute interest, as she would have had a share under that Act.
Held: third, the language of the Explanation and sub-section (2) points the same way. The Explanation expressly mentions property acquired at a partition or in lieu of maintenance. Sub-section (2) does not refer to that mode of acquisition. This shows Parliament meant to keep sub-section (2) away from such cases.
Why: the Explanation is an inclusive definition. If Parliament had meant everything in it to be covered by sub-section (2), it should have said so there.
Held: fourth, the language of sub-section (2) shows it applies only to transactions that are absolutely independent in nature. It does not apply to transactions in recognition of, or in lieu of, pre-existing rights.
Noted (Parliamentary Debates): when the Hindu Succession Bill, 1954 was referred to a Joint Committee of the Rajya Sabha, Section 14(2), then clause 16(2) of the draft Bill, mentioned only gift or will. Later a member proposed adding instrument, decree, order or award, and the Government accepted it.
Held: Parliament's first intention was to confine sub-section (2) to gift or will, which would not include property received in lieu of maintenance or at a partition. The various terms in sub-section (2) must be read ejusdem generis (of the same kind). They refer to transactions where a right is created for the first time in favour of the female.
Held: the later additions meant only that a new or independent title under any listed mode, prescribing a restricted estate, would not be disturbed. A Hindu male who got property by those modes would also get only a restricted interest. So Parliament saw no reason to distinguish between male and female.
Held: fifth, sub-section (2) is clearly a proviso to Section 14(1), as this Court held in Badri Prasad. A proviso carves out an exception. It cannot be interpreted to destroy the main provision or make it useless.
Held: accepting the respondent's argument would set a substantial part of the Explanation at naught. Sub-section (2) must be interpreted so as not to erode Section 14(1) or the Explanation substantially.
Held: three conditions must exist before the proviso applies. (i) The property must be acquired by gift, will, instrument, decree, order of the Court or award. (ii) The document in favour of the Hindu female must prescribe a restricted estate. (iii) The instrument must create or confer a new right, title or interest on her. It must not merely recognise or give effect to a pre-existing right.
Noted: where no restricted estate is prescribed, sub-section (2) has no application. The report adds that where the instruments do not confer a new title for the first time, Section 14(1) would have no application.
Noted: Fazal Ali J. called Section 14(2) a useful provision, added for historical reasons to keep the link between Shastric Hindu law and the new law. Where a female became possessed of property not in virtue of a pre-existing right, and the grantor imposed conditions, the legislature did not want to undo those conditions.
Noted: counsel argued about limited owner in Section 14(1) and restricted estate in Section 14(2). Not much turns on it. Parliament used restricted estate advisedly. A limited interest means only a life estate, but a restricted estate is much wider.
Noted (example): suppose a donor gives property to a Hindu female on the condition that she pays Rs. 200 to the donor or one of his relatives until a certain time. This is not a limited interest, but it is a restricted estate. That explains the difference in the wording.
Noted: Fazal Ali J. then dealt with the authorities, which are not consistent. The appellant's main authority was B.B. Patil v. Gangabai (Bombay). The respondent's main authorities were Gurunadham v. Sundrarajulu and Santhanam v. Subramania (Madras). The Division Bench affirmed the latter in S. Kachapalaya Gurukkal v. V. Subramania Gurukkal, the subject of Civil Appeal No. 135 of 1973. That appeal was to be decided by a separate judgment. Later the opinion calls the same appeal Civil Appeal No. 126 of 1972.
Noted: in B.B. Patil v. Gangabai, the self-acquired properties belonged to Devgonda, who died in 1902. His daughter-in-law Hira Bai, widow of his son Appa, came into possession. Disputes arose with Devgonda's nephew Nemgonda. An arbitrator gave an award on 16 October 1903, and a decree followed on 24 October 1903.
Noted: Hira Bai got 65 acres and one house. Thirty acres were earmarked for the maintenance and marriage of three daughters. She kept the rest for life with restrictions, and it was to revert to Nemgonda after her death. The dispute concerned 35 acres and the house. She stayed in possession until 25 February 1967.
Noted: after her death, two of her three daughters sued for possession. They said Hira Bai held as limited owner when the 1956 Act began, so her estate enlarged into an absolute estate. Nemgonda's sons (defendants 2 to 6) said Section 14(2) applied, so the property reverted.
Held (in B.B. Patil): Section 14(2) did not apply. Hira Bai was put in possession in lieu of her maintenance. The award merely recognised her pre-existing rights and conferred no fresh source of title. She got an absolute interest after the 1956 Act.
Noted: Palekar J. said the Explanation covers all properties traditionally acquired by a Hindu female on which she had limited ownership. By the Act her rights are enlarged. He said sub-section (2) covers only grants where the interest is created by the grant itself.
Noted: where the instrument is merely declaratory of a right she already enjoyed, sub-section (2) does not apply. It does not matter if the instrument says she has a limited estate (a restricted interest, not full ownership) or that the property reverts on her death. Those terms only repeat the incidents of Hindu law on the limited estate.
Noted: Palekar J. described the incidents of a widow's right to maintenance. He said that right is different in quality from her right to a share in family property. The Explanation treats a female allottee in lieu of maintenance as much a limited owner as a widow who acquires by inheritance or at a partition.
Noted: if sub-section (2) is conceded not to apply to the latter two on the ground of an antecedent right, there is no rational justification to exclude a widow with an equally sufficient claim for maintenance.
Held: from B.B. Patil three propositions emerge. First, the widow's claim to maintenance is a tangible right, though not an absolute right to property that becomes a fresh source of title. It can be charged on joint family properties, and sold properties stay burdened with the claim.
Held: second, by the 1937 Act the widow's claim crystallised into a full right. Property allotted to her in lieu of maintenance becomes property in which she has a limited interest, enlarged into an absolute title by the 1956 Act.
Held: third, Section 14(2) applies only where the grant is not in lieu of maintenance or in recognition of pre-existing rights. It applies where a grant confers a fresh right or title for the first time, with restrictions. Where a grant only recognises or implements a pre-existing right to maintenance, the case falls within the Explanation to Section 14(1). The Bombay High Court dissented from the Orissa and Madras courts on this.
Held: the facts of B.B. Patil are on all fours with this appeal. Fazal Ali J. agreed with Palekar J.'s view and reasons. Once the right of maintenance is a pre-existing tangible right, it makes no difference whether the widow's husband died before or after the 1937 Act.
Held: Gadam Reddayya v. Varapula Venkataraju (Andhra Pradesh High Court) correctly stated the law. The family settlement there only recognised the widow's pre-existing right to maintenance, so Section 14(2) did not apply.
Held: Sumeshwar Mishra v. Swami Nath Tiwari (Patna High Court) took the same view, very correctly. It differed from Thatha Gurunadhan Chetti v. Smt. Thatha Navaneethamma (Madras High Court), rightly. The Madras view was not legally correct. A later Patna decision in Lakshmi Devi v. Shankar Jha took the same view.
Held: in H. Venkanagouda v. Hanamangouda the Mysore High Court adopted the Bombay view and dissented from the Madras and Orissa courts. It interpreted Section 14(2) correctly. The Madras and Orissa view is legally erroneous and must be overruled.
Held: in Smt. Sharbati Devi v. Pt. Hira Lal the Punjab High Court clearly held that Section 14(2) is limited to cases where a Hindu female acquires title for the first time. Property acquired in lieu of maintenance, though giving a limited estate, falls within the Explanation to Section 14(1). The widow there got the property after the 1937 Act, but that makes no difference. This view has full approval.
Held: the Court endorsed the Calcutta High Court in Sasadhar Chandra Dev v. Smt. Tara Sundari Desi.
Held: in Saraswathi Ammal v. Anantha Shenoi the Kerala High Court said maintenance is no concession. Under Sastri's Hindu law it is an obligation on the heirs who inherit the husband's property. Property a widow gets in lieu of maintenance is a right she acquires in it. Fazal Ali J. fully agreed.
Noted: in Kunji Thomman v. Meenakshi the Kerala High Court reiterated its earlier view. On the facts of that case, it found that the widow got no right to maintenance under the family settlement but a new right not based on a pre-existing right. So she would not get an absolute interest under the Explanation.
Held: in Chellammal v. Nallammal a single Judge of the Madras High Court had facts almost like these. He held that the Explanation to Section 14(1) covered the case. The property given to the widow became her absolute property, and Section 14(2) did not apply. The Division Bench later seems to have overruled it in S. Kachapalaya Gurukkal, the subject of Civil Appeal No. 126 of 1972. Fazal Ali J. agreed with the single Judge and overruled the Division Bench decision.
Held: all these decisions proceed on the right premises. They correctly understood the nature and incidents of the right to maintenance and the scope of Section 14(2).
Held: in Narayan Patra v. Tara Patrani (Orissa High Court), following G. Kondiah v. G. Subbarayya (Andhra Pradesh), the widows got only a restricted estate. The court held they fell within Section 14(2). It also relied on Thatha Gurunadharn Chetty v. Thatha Navaneethamma (Madras). Fazal Ali J. said these conclusions are not warranted by the principles of Hindu Sastric law.
Why: a widow's claim for maintenance does not ripen into a full right to property. But it is a right that can amount to a right to property where it is charged. One cannot say that property given in lieu of maintenance is given for the first time and not in lieu of a pre-existing right.
Why: the claim to maintenance, and the right to claim property to maintain herself, is an inherent right conferred by Hindu law. Property given in lieu merely recognises it. Once the instrument merely recognises a pre-existing right, the widow acquires an absolute interest.
Why: the Explanation lists property given in lieu of maintenance as one mode of acquisition. Sub-section (2) is a proviso and cannot destroy the concept of the right conferred by sub-section (1).
Why: sub-section (2) is limited to cases where a grant or disposition confers a right on the widow for the first time and restricts it. The effect of sub-section (2) is to equate male and female for grants that confer a restricted estate. The Court did not agree with the Orissa High Court.
Noted: the other High Courts taking the contrary view are mainly Andhra Pradesh, Allahabad and Madras. An earlier Patna decision, Shiva Pujan Rai v. Jamuna Missir, seems to side with the Madras view. The earlier Andhra Pradesh decision in Gadam Reddayya followed the Bombay view.
Noted: in Gopisetti Kondaiah v. Gunda Subbarayudu, another Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court took a contrary view. Jaganmohan Reddy C.J. said that a Hindu woman's right to maintenance is merely a right to receive maintenance, with no right, title or interest in the property. It is not definite until it is charged on specific properties. If an instrument gives a restricted estate, even in lieu of maintenance, sub-section (2) gives her only that estate.
Held: Fazal Ali J. agreed with the first part of those observations. A Hindu woman has a right to be maintained by her husband or from his property or the joint family property. He respectfully disagreed with the conclusion that the right confers no right, title or interest in the property. The claim is not an enforceable right without a charge, but it is a pre-existing right.
Held: he also disagreed that property given in lieu of maintenance gives her only a restricted estate. The Andhra Pradesh High Court proceeded on wrong premises. It presumed that the claim for maintenance was not a tangible right at all, so no pre-existing right arose. This goes against the consistent view of many courts over a long time.
Held: that case also did not notice the earlier Division Bench decision in Gadam Reddayya, which took the contrary view. This weakens its authority. Any transaction that recognises or declares the pre-existing right falls outside Section 14(2). The case does not lay down the correct law, and it is overruled.
Noted: the position in the Madras High Court is almost the same. A single Judge took the Bombay view and held Section 14(2) did not apply. A Division Bench in an appeal from another single Judge took the contrary view.
Held: S. Kachupalaya Gurukal v. Subramania Gurukkal drew an artificial distinction between a bare claim for maintenance and a pre-existing right. The High Court said a bare claim was not a right at all, but a share under the 1937 Act was a pre-existing right. It misconceived the scope of a Hindu woman's right to maintenance. It also read the proviso so as to destroy the main provision, Section 14(1) and the Explanation. There is no warrant in law for that.
Held: Natesan J.'s decision in Gurunadham v. Sundrarajulu Chetty, which the Division Bench affirmed, fell into the same error. His view that, on the Bombay reading, Section 14 overrides lawful terms in contracts, bargains, bequests or gifts is not correct. The scope of sub-section (2) is separate and defined. It applies only to transactions that confer a new right, title or interest on Hindu females. Titles created under it are left intact.
Held: the two Madras decisions have four legal infirmities. First, the Madras High Court did not properly appreciate the nature and extent of the widow's right to maintenance.
Held: second, the distinction drawn for the share given under the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 rests on artificial grounds. The 1937 Act legislated nothing new. It gave statutory recognition to the old Shastric law on the widow's right of succession. It neither took away nor conferred the right to maintenance.
Held: third, the Court gave an extended meaning to Section 14(2) that sets at naught the express words of the Explanation. The Explanation places property given to a widow in lieu of maintenance or at a partition in a class where she has a limited interest. That interest is enlarged by force of Section 14(1) if she is in possession on the date of the Act.
Held: fourth, the Court failed to notice that sub-section (2) applies only where a new right is created for the first time, in which she had no prior interest. For example, take a daughter given a limited interest in the presence of the widow. Before the 1956 Act she was not an heir in the widow's presence and had no right or share. A fresh right is created for her, and that is covered by Section 14(2).
Held: Ram Jag Misir v. The Director of Consolidation, U.P. (Allahabad) took the Madras view. It did not discuss these aspects. It assumed that because the widow got a restricted estate under the compromise, Section 14(2) applied at once. It did not consider this Court's decisions that a mere description of a limited interest is not a restriction but may be a statement of the law as it stood. It also did not consider the incidents of the widow's right to maintenance.
Held: Shiv Pujan Rai v. Yamuna Missir (Patna High Court) held that property given to a widow under a compromise in lieu of maintenance was covered by sub-section (2). That decision rested on peculiar findings of fact. There was nothing to show she had any interest independent of the compromise. A fresh title may have been given, which would fall under Section 14(2).
Held: if it is treated as authority that any property allotted under a compromise in lieu of maintenance falls under Section 14(2), the Court dissents. It prefers the later Patna decision in Sumeshwar Mishra v. Swami Nath Tiwari.
Held: the Full Bench of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Ajab Singh v. Ram Singh did not consider these aspects. It gave an extended meaning to sub-section (2), which there was sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Noted: Fazal Ali J. himself gave the leading judgment in that case. But the question was not presented to him in all its aspects, and counsel for the respondents there did not seriously argue that sub-section (2) was inapplicable. The Court cannot approve it, and it is overruled.
Held: the view of the Bombay, Andhra Pradesh, Patna, Mysore, Punjab, Calcutta and Kerala High Courts rests on three premises.
1. A widow's claim to maintenance is a right against property, though not a right to property. It matures into a full right if charged on the property by agreement or decree. Even otherwise, the husband's heirs are burdened with the obligation to maintain her, so the claim is a pre-existing right.
2. Section 14(2) is a proviso to Section 14(1). It cannot be read to defeat the purpose of Section 14(1) in giving an absolute interest to Hindu women and ending the Hindu woman's estate. It applies only to cases outside the Explanation.
3. The proviso does not apply to a grant or transfer that merely recognises or declares a pre-existing right. It applies where a new right, which the female did not possess at all, is conferred on her under limits. In that case a conditional grant to a male would equally bind him. The proviso wipes out the distinction between male and female.
Held: the contrary view of the Madras, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Allahabad and Jammu and Kashmir High Courts rests on two grounds. First, a widow's claim to maintenance is only an inchoate or incomplete right. It cannot be legally enforced unless property is allotted in lieu or a charge is created. So an allotment confers a new right for the first time.
Held: the first ground rests partly on the 1937 Act, under which the widow has a right to a share. These courts treat the share as a pre-existing right recognised by law, but not a bare claim to maintenance. Fazal Ali J. said this view suffers from a serious fallacy. It misunderstands the widow's claim.
Held: under pure Sastric Hindu law the widow is almost a co-owner with her husband. Even before the 1937 Act, some schools gave her the share of a son on her husband's death after partition. The 1937 Act introduced no new right. It gave statutory recognition to the old law. The 1956 Act is very different. It made a revolutionary change and changed the entire concept of the Hindu woman's estate. It is futile to say a right that existed before 1937 flows from the 1937 Act.
Held: the second fallacy is the failure to see that maintenance is an important right under Sastric Hindu law. The husband must maintain his wife even if he has no property. Whoever inherits his property takes it subject to the burden of maintaining the widow. Even where property is transferred to pay family debts, a transferee with notice must discharge the burden from the property sold. So the right is undoubtedly pre-existing. It is wrong to say it comes into existence only when property is allotted in lieu.
Held: the second ground is that Section 14(2), being a proviso, takes every grant with conditions out of Section 14(1). That rests on a wrong reading of the scope of sub-section (2).
Held: lastly, the contrary view directly conflicts with this Court's observations in the cases cited above. In them, a grant in lieu of maintenance was treated as recognition of a pre-existing right, which takes it out of sub-section (2).
Held: Fazal Ali J. chose the view of Palekar J. in B.B. Patil v. Gangabai, which is more in line with the object and spirit of the 1956 Act. He affirmed and approved the decisions of the Bombay High Court in B.B. Patil v. Gangabai, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gadam Reddayya v. Varapula Venkataraju, the Mysore High Court in H. Venkanagouda v. Hanamanagouda, the Patna High Court in Sumeshwar Mishra v. Swami Nath Tiwari, the Punjab High Court in Smt. Sharbati Devi v. Pt. Hira Lal and the Calcutta High Court in Sasadhar Chandra Dev v. Smt. Tara Sundari Dasi.
Held: he disapproved the decisions of the Orissa High Court in Narayan Patra v. Tara Patrani; the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gopisetty Kondaiah v. Gunda Subbarayudu; the Madras High Court in S. Kachapalaya Gurukkal v. V. Subramania Gurukkal and Gurunadham v. Sundararaulu; the Allahabad High Court in Ram Jag Missir v. Director of Consolidation, U.P.; and the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Ajab Singh v. Ram Singh.
Noted: Mr. Natesan strongly relied on Smt. Naraini Devi v. Smt. Ramo Devi ((1976) 1 SCC 574), to which Fazal Ali J. was a party. It is directly in point. There, under an award the widow could rent out the property for her lifetime, and this Court held that was a restricted estate under Section 14(2).
Held: the various aspects were not brought to the Court's notice or argued in Naraini Devi. These include the nature of a Hindu woman's right to maintenance, the limited scope of the proviso and the effect of the Explanation. The ground on which that case distinguished Badri Parshad does not appear sound.
Why: Naraini Devi distinguished Badri Parshad because the widow there had a share or interest in her husband's house under the Hindu law then in force, which was a pre-existing right. The Court's attention was not drawn to the Explanation, which puts property given at a partition or in lieu of maintenance in the same category.
Held: the Division Bench decision in Naraini Devi was not correctly decided and is overruled.
Noted (observation): accepting the contrary view would defeat the legislative process on a part of Hindu law of intestate succession. It would curb the social urges and aspirations of Hindu women, particularly in the International Year of Women. It would revive a detestable legacy that Parliament sought to bury.
Held: Fazal Ali J. summarised seven conclusions on the interpretation of Section 14(1) and (2).
1. A Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim conceded as grace. It is a tangible right against property, which flows from the spiritual relationship of husband and wife. Pure Shastric law recognises it, and the earlier jurists from Yajnavalkya to Manu stressed it. It may not be a right to property, but it is a right against property. If a charge is created, it becomes legally enforceable. Even without a charge, it is a pre-existing right. A transfer that declares or recognises it confers no new title and only endorses or confirms the pre-existing right.
2. Section 14(1) and the Explanation use the widest possible terms. They must be liberally construed in favour of females to advance the object of the 1956 Act.
3. Section 14(2) is a proviso with a field of its own. It must not be construed to destroy the main provision or the protection of Section 14(1), or to become inconsistent with it.
4. Section 14(2) applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts and the like that create independent and new titles for the first time. It has no application where the instrument only confirms, endorses, declares or recognises pre-existing rights. A restricted estate is then legally permissible. Where an instrument only declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance, partition or a share, the limited interest is automatically enlarged into an absolute one under Section 14(1). The restrictions in the document must be ignored. Property allotted in lieu of maintenance or as a share at partition is governed by Section 14(1) despite restrictions on the transferee.
5. The express terms in the Explanation, such as property acquired at a partition, in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, make sub-section (2) inapplicable to those categories.
6. The words possessed by in Section 14(1) have the widest amplitude. They include owning property without actual or physical possession. A widow who gets a share under a preliminary decree is deemed to possess it, though no final decree has given her possession. Her possession must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title. Section 14 does not contemplate possession by a rank trespasser without any right or title.
7. The words restricted estate in Section 14(2) are wider than limited interest in Section 14(1). They include not only a limited interest but any other kind of limit placed on the transferee.
Held (application to the facts): the Court found four things. (i) The properties in suit were allotted to Tulasamma on 30 July 1949 under a compromise certified by the Court. (ii) She took only a life interest, and a clear restriction barred her from alienating. (iii) Despite these restrictions she stayed in possession till 1956, when the Act came into force. (iv) The alienations in 1960 and 1961 were made after she acquired an absolute interest.
Held: the compromise allotting the properties in lieu of maintenance only recognised her right to maintenance, which was a pre-existing right. So her case is taken out of Section 14(2) and falls squarely within Section 14(1) read with the Explanation. She acquired an absolute interest, as she was in possession when the 1956 Act came into force. In the Court's words, "any restrictions placed under the compromise would have to be completely ignored".
Held: the High Court erred in holding that she had only a limited interest and in setting aside the alienations. It decreed the suit on an erroneous view of the law.

Authorities

The list below shows each case, its citation as printed in the judgment, how the Court used it, and the opinion.

This Court

S.S. Munna Lal v. S.S. Rajkumar, [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 418 — followed; Section 14(1) converts a restricted interest into an absolute estate and a share under a preliminary decree is possessed property (both opinions).
Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva, [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 968 — followed; possessed of means owning or having in one's hand or power (Bhagwati J.).
Mangal Singh v. Rattno, AIR 1967 SC 1786 / [1967] 3 SCR 454 — followed; possessed by includes owned property outside actual possession (both opinions).
Badri Pershad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, [1970] 2 SCR 95 — followed; Section 14(2) is a proviso and applies only to acquisition for the first time (both opinions).
Nirmal Chand v. Vidya Wanti (dead), Civil Appeal No. 609 of 1965, decided 21 January 1969 — followed; a restriction that only records the law is no bar to Section 14(1) (both opinions).
Rani Bai v. Shri Yadunandan Ram, [1969] 3 SCR 789 — followed; a widow's maintenance right is not defeated by a transfer with notice (both opinions).
Eramma v. Verrupanna, [1966] 2 SCR 626 — referred to; a widow must have some vestige of title (Fazal Ali J.).
Sukhram v. Gauri Shanker, [1968] 1 SCR 476 — referred to; Section 14 removes Shastric limits (Fazal Ali J.).
Smt. Naraini Devi v. Smt. Ramo Devi, [1976] 1 SCC 574 — overruled (Fazal Ali J.).

Privy Council and Indian High Courts

Narayan Rao Ramchandra Pant v. Ramabai, LR 6 IA 114 (Privy Council) — the right to maintenance arises from the common law (Fazal Ali J.).
Mst. Dan Kuer v. Mst. Sarla Devi, LR 73 IA 208 (Privy Council) — approved West J.; the two obligations of the joint family (Fazal Ali J.).
Pratapmull Agarwalla v. Dhanabati Bibi, LR 63 IA 33 (Privy Council) — a mother has a pre-existing right to maintenance (Fazal Ali J.).
Hemangini Dasi v. Kedarnath Kundu Chowdhry, ILR 16 Cal 758 (Privy Council) — maintenance charged on the joint estate (Fazal Ali J.).
Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai, ILR 2 Bom 494 — maintenance is a charge on the estate (Fazal Ali J.).
Narbadabai v. Mahadeo Narayan, ILR 5 Bom 99 — repeated the same view (Fazal Ali J.).
Srimati Bhagabati v. Kanailal Mitter, (1872) 8 Ben LR 225 — quoted by the Privy Council (Fazal Ali J.).
Sheo Dyal Tewaree v. Judoonath Tewaree, (1868) 9 WR 61 — a widow has a pre-existing right of maintenance (Fazal Ali J.).
Srinath Das v. Probodh Chunder Das, 11 CLJ 580 — the right is identified with the husband's property right (Fazal Ali J.).
K.V. Thangavelu v. The Court of Wards, Madras, [1946] 2 MLJ 143 — the widow's subordinate co-ownership (Fazal Ali J.).
Sarojinidevi v. Subrahmanyam, ILR 1945 Mad 61 — the right survives the 1937 Act (Fazal Ali J.).
Jayanti Subbiah v. Alamelu Mangamma, ILR 27 Mad 45 — maintenance is a personal obligation (Fazal Ali J.).
Yellawa v. Bhimangavda, ILR 18 Bom 452 — an heir cannot recover possession without arranging maintenance (Fazal Ali J.).
Rachawa v. Shivayanappa, ILR 18 Bom 679 — a purchaser with notice cannot take possession without securing maintenance (Bhagwati J.).
Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal, AIR 1964 Mad 387 — quoted by this Court on the object of Section 14(2) (Bhagwati J.).

Cases approved

B.B. Patil v. Gangabai, AIR 1972 Bom 16 — approved; Palekar J.'s judgment is well reasoned (both opinions).
Sumeshwar Misra v. Swami Nath Tiwari, AIR 1970 Pat 348 — approved (both opinions).
Reddayya v. Varapula Venkataraju, AIR 1965 AP 66 — approved (both opinions).
Lakshmi Devi v. Shankar Jha, AIR 1967 Mad 429 — approved; the report also prints a Patna citation for the later Patna decision (both opinions).
N. Venkanegouda v. Hanemangouda, AIR 1972 Mys 286 — approved (both opinions).
Smt. Sharbati Devi v. Pt. Hiralal, AIR 1964 Pb 114 — approved (both opinions).
Sesadhar Chandra Dev v. Smt. Tara Sundari Dasi, AIR 1962 Cal 438 — approved (both opinions).
Saraswathi Ammal v. Anantha Shenoi, AIR 1966 Ker 66 — approved (both opinions).
Kunji Thomman v. Meenakshi, ILR [1970] 2 Ker 45 — approved by Bhagwati J.; Fazal Ali J. reports that the widow there got a new right, so no absolute interest
Chellammal v. Nallammal, [1971] MLJ 439 — a single Judge's view agreed with (Fazal Ali J.).

Cases disapproved or overruled

Gurunadham v. Sundarajulu, ILR [1968] 1 Mad 467 (also cited as ILR [1968] 1 Mad 567) — wrongly decided (both opinions).
Santhanam v. Subramania, ILR [1967] 1 Mad 68 — wrongly decided (both opinions).
S. Kachapalaya Gurukkal v. V. Subramania Gurukkal, AIR 1972 Mad 279 (also printed as AIR 1976 Mad 279) — overruled (both opinions).
Shiva Pujan Rai v. Jamuna Missir, ILR 47 Pat 1118 — wrongly decided; explained on its facts (both opinions).
Gopisetti Kondaiah v. Gunda Subbarayudu, ILR [1968] AP 621 — overruled (both opinions).
Ram Jag Misir v. The Director of Consolidation, U.P., AIR 1975 All 151 — wrongly decided (both opinions).
Ajab Singh v. Ram Singh, AIR 1959 J&K 92 — overruled (both opinions).
Narayan Patra v. Tara Patrani, [1970] 35 Cuttack LT 667 / AIR 1970 Orissa 131 — disapproved (Fazal Ali J.).
G. Kondiah v. G. Subbarayya, [1968] 2 Andh WR 455 — followed by the Orissa case; disapproved with it (Fazal Ali J.).
Thatha Gurunadhan Chetti v. Smt. Thatha Navaneethamma — the Madras view is not legally correct (Fazal Ali J.).

Other forms of the same case names, as printed in the report: Mst. Dan Kaur v. Mst. Sarla Devi; Mangal Singh v. Smt. Rattno; Shiva Pulan Rai & Ors. v. Jamuna Missir & Ors., ILR 47 Pat 1118; Shiva Pujan Rat and Others v. Jamuna Missir and Others; Ajab Singh & Ors. v. Ram Singh & Ors.; Rachawa & Ors. v. Shivayanappa; Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi and Anr. v. Satyabhamabai; Sukhram and Anr. v. Gauri Shanker; Thatha Gurunadharn Chetty v. Thatha Navaneethamma; Kachupalaya Gurukal v. Subramania Gurukkal; Ram Jag Missir v. Director of Consolidation.

Also cited in footnotes: none, apart from the report citations given above.

Judgement

The appeal is allowed.
The judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside.
The judgment of the District Judge, Nellore, is restored.
The plaintiffs' suit is dismissed.
Costs: there is no order as to costs in this Court. Fazal Ali J. gave the reason: the peculiar circumstances of the case and the serious divergence of judicial opinion in the courts of India.

Legal Principle / Ratio

Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies only where an instrument creates a new title for a Hindu female for the first time. Where property is given to her in recognition of a pre-existing right such as maintenance, Section 14(1) applies and her limited interest becomes full ownership. In Fazal Ali J.'s words, "any restrictions placed under the compromise would have to be completely ignored".

Subsequent Treatment

This section is based on one later judgment, supplied in full. Only what it says about this case is stated.

Tej Bhan v. Ram Kishan

Tej Bhan (D) through LR. v. Ram Kishan (D) through LRs., 2024 INSC 945, Civil Appeal No. 6557 of 2022, order of 9 December 2024. Bench: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta JJ.

Para 1: the order quotes Bhagwati J. on the inapt draftsmanship of Section 14 and its endless confusion.
Para 2: the principles formulated in Tulasamma substantially hold the field. But at least 18 judgments of two-Judge and three-Judge benches are varying and sometimes inconsistent with the view taken in Tulsamma’s case. They explain, distinguish, negotiate or ignore its principles. Some depart from it sub silentio (without notice).
Para 2: there are now two streams of thought. One applies Tulasamma as an inviolable principle. The other evolves case by case, depending on how the female came by the property, the instrument used, and the time of possession.
Para 3: a two-Judge bench could not reconcile the cases. Its judgment would be subject to many three-Judge benches.
Para 24: the bench heard the appeal in detail and took a view. Finding many inconsistent decisions, it said there must be clarity and certainty in the reading of Section 14.
Para 4 and para 25: the Registry was directed to place the order before the Chief Justice of India to constitute a larger bench. The larger bench is to reconcile the principles and restate the law on how sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 interact.
Paras 10 and 11: the order sets out Section 14. It then notes that Mangal Singh explained "any property possessed by a female Hindu" and that Seth Badri Prasad, a three-Judge bench, called sub-section (2) a proviso or exception. That exception applies only to an acquisition made for the first time, with no pre-existing right.
Paras 5 to 9: the appeal concerned a sale by a widow holding under her husband's will of 3 March 1965. The will gave her a life estate. The High Court preferred Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike. The appellant argued that Sadhu Singh is contrary to Tulasamma. The respondents relied on Karmi v. Amru (a three-Judge bench).
Para 12: the order lists how Tulasamma treated earlier cases as referred to, followed, approved or overruled. It restates the seven principles of Tulasamma.
Para 13: Tulasamma was followed in Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh, and that was affirmed by a three-Judge bench in Jaswant Kaur v. Major Harpal Singh.
Para 14: in Thota Sesharathamma v. Thota Manikyamma a two-Judge bench followed Tulasamma. It noted that Tulasamma had not noticed Karmi v. Amru.
Paras 16 and 17: C. Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil (a three-Judge bench, 1996) followed Tulasamma. Many other cases also followed it, among them Munni Devi v. Rajendra and Kallakuri Pattabhiramswamy v. Kallakuri Kamaraju.
Paras 18 to 22: the other stream began with Karmi v. Amru and continued in Bhura v. Kashi Ram, Gumpha v. Jaibai and Sadhu Singh. The order extracts Sadhu Singh, which said the Tulasamma ratio applies only when a Hindu female is possessed of the property on the date of the Act under a semblance of a right.
Para 23: decisions following Tulasamma made only passing remarks on the discordant note in Karmi, Bhura and Gumpha. Those cases were not clearly and categorically overruled.

Other later cases (not summarized): these cases are named in the Tej Bhan order, and their texts were not fetched.

Jupudy Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna, (2016) 2 SCC 56 (fetch failed).
Karmi v. Amru, (1972) 4 SCC 86; Bhura v. Kashi Ram, (1994) 2 SCC 111; Gumpha v. Jaibai, (1994) 2 SCC 511; Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike, (2006) 8 SCC 75; Sharad Subramanyan v. Soumi Mazumdar, (2006) 8 SCC 91.
Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh, (1987) 3 SCC 674; Jaswant Kaur v. Major Harpal Singh, (1989) 3 SCC 572; Thota Sesharathamma v. Thota Manikyamma, (1991) 4 SCC 312; Balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh, (2000) 6 SCC 310; Shakuntala Devi v. Kamla, (2005) 5 SCC 390; V. Kalyanaswamy v. L. Bakthavatsalam, (2021) 16 SCC 543.
C. Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil, (1996) 8 SCC 525; Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy v. Bhoospalli Pedda Verrappa, (1997) 10 SCC 673; Nazar Singh v. Jagjit Kaur, (1996) 1 SCC 35; Santosh v. Saraswathibai, (2008) 1 SCC 465; Munni Devi v. Rajendra, (2022) 17 SCC 434; Kallakuri Pattabhiramswamy v. Kallakuri Kamaraju, 2021 INSC 883; Raghubar Singh v. Gulab Singh, (1998) 6 SCC 314; Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi, (1995) 6 SCC 88.
Gaddam Ramakrishnareddy, (2010) 9 SCC 602; Jagan Singh v. Dhanwanti, (2012) 2 SCC 628; Shivdev Kaur v. R.S. Grewal, (2013) 4 SCC 636; Ranvir Dewan v. Rashmi Khanna, (2018) 12 SCC 1; Jogi Ram v. Suresh Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 274.

Comparative Analysis

The Tej Bhan order puts Tulasamma beside a later stream of cases. Tulasamma reads Section 14(2) narrowly, as a proviso that applies only to a grant creating a new title.
The other stream starts with Karmi v. Amru. In Gumpha v. Jaibai and Sadhu Singh, as summarised in the order, Section 14(2) is read with Section 30 so that a will's limits on a widow's estate stand.
Para 15: the order says Karmi did not analyse the Act or the earlier precedents, yet later cases followed its principle.
Para 20: Sadhu Singh said that if a female takes as an heir she takes absolutely, but if under a devise the restriction applies. Tulasamma instead asks whether she had a pre-existing right, such as maintenance.

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

The judgment has no numbered paragraphs, and the two opinions differ in structure. Bhagwati J. reasons from the structure of Section 14. Fazal Ali J. adds a long account of Shastric law and a review of High Court cases.
The conclusions are the same, but Fazal Ali J. also overruled Naraini Devi, a decision he had joined. Bhagwati J. did not mention that case.
Fazal Ali J.'s three conditions for Section 14(2) say that where an instrument confers no new title, Section 14(1) would have no application. Read with the rest of the opinion, this appears to be meant for Section 14(2). The text does not explain it.
Likewise, Fazal Ali J.'s third infirmity says the Explanation expressly exclude such property from sub-section (1). This also reads oddly against his own conclusion.
The report cites Kachapalaya Gurukkal as Civil Appeal No. 135 of 1973 in one place and No. 126 of 1972 in another. The judgment does not say which is right.
The Tulasamma text does not discuss wills. The later Tej Bhan order says, at its paragraphs 2 and 18, that later cases differ on how the female came by the property, the instrument used and the time of possession.

Significance

The Court held that property allotted to a widow in lieu of maintenance falls under Section 14(1), whatever restrictions the document carries.
It settled the conflict among High Courts on this point, which Bhagwati J. said might well be described as chaotic.
It overruled Naraini Devi, an earlier decision of this Court.
It treated the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as social legislation meant to give Hindu women equality.
Later law: the Tej Bhan order of 2024 says Tulasamma's principles substantially hold the field. It also shows that conflicting decisions on Section 14 led to a reference to a larger bench.

Exam-Important Points

Rule: Section 14(2) covers only a grant that creates a new title for the first time. Property given in recognition of a pre-existing right, such as maintenance, falls under Section 14(1).
Key phrase: a widow's right to maintenance is jus ad rem, a right against property, and undoubtedly a pre-existing right.
Trap: restrictive words in the document, such as life interest or no alienation, do not by themselves bring in Section 14(2).
Trap: restricted estate in Section 14(2) is wider than limited owner in Section 14(1). It covers any limit on the transferee.
Method: Section 14(2) is a proviso. It is read narrowly so it does not destroy Section 14(1) and the Explanation.
Possession: possessed by covers owning property without physical possession. But the widow must have some vestige of title, and a rank trespasser is not covered.
Overruled: Naraini Devi, Gopisetti Kondaiah, Kachapalaya Gurukkal and Ajab Singh. B.B. Patil v. Gangabai was approved.
Opinions: Bhagwati J. wrote for himself and Gupta J. Fazal Ali J. gave a concurring opinion.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. Paragraph numbers follow the official Supreme Court judgment text; law reports may number the same paragraph differently.