State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar

West Bengal let its government send any case to a Special Court with a faster and harsher procedure. The Act gave no rule on which cases to pick. Seven judges of the Supreme Court heard the challenge under Article 14. Six judges gave separate opinions and dismissed the State's appeals. The Chief Justice dissented.

Quick Revision

Parties

State of West Bengal — appellant. It defended the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 and the notification sending the case to a Special Court.

Anwar Ali Sarkar — respondent in Appeal No. 297 of 1951. He was one of 50 accused in the Dum Dum Factory Raid case and was convicted by the Special Court.

Gajen Mali — respondent in the connected Appeal No. 298 of 1951. He was being tried with five others for murder and conspiracy to murder before another Special Judge.

Procedural History

1. On 17 August 1949, the Governor of West Bengal promulgated the West Bengal Special Courts Ordinance under section 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (Mukherjea, J., para 42).
2. On 15 March 1950, the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 (West Bengal Act X of 1950) replaced the Ordinance. Its provisions were almost identical (Mukherjea, J., para 42; Fazl Ali, J., para 25).
3. On 28 October 1949, the State appointed Shri S. N. Guha Roy, Sessions Judge of Alipore, as a Special Judge (Mukherjea, J., para 43).
4. On 25 January 1950, the State directed that the case of Anwar Ali and his 49 co-accused be tried by Mr. Guha Roy under the Ordinance. Sastri, C.J. records the notification as dated 26 January 1950 (Mukherjea, J., para 43; Sastri, C.J., para 2).
5. On 2 April 1950, a formal complaint against the 50 accused was lodged before the Special Judge (Mukherjea, J., para 43).
6. On 31 March 1951, the Special Judge convicted the accused. Some got transportation for life and others got terms of imprisonment. The State sought enhancement and the High Court issued a rule on whether some should be sentenced to death (Mukherjea, J., para 43).
7. On 1 May 1951, Anwar Ali applied to the Calcutta High Court under Article 226 for a writ of certiorari (a writ to quash a lower court's order). Gajen Mali made a similar application on 21 May 1951 (Sastri, C.J., para 2; Mukherjea, J., para 43).
8. Bose, J. of the High Court referred both applications to a larger bench. The State conceded that the Constitution applied to Anwar Ali's case even though his notification was issued a day before it began (Mukherjea, J., para 43).
9. A Special Bench of five judges decided on 28 August 1951. It held Section 5(1) void to the extent that it lets the State direct any case to the Special Court. It also held the notifications invalid and quashed the conviction (Sastri, C.J., paras 2, 5; Mukherjea, J., paras 42-43).
10. Harries, C.J. wrote the leading High Court judgment. Das and Banerjee JJ. concurred (Sastri, C.J., para 5).
11. Chakravartti and Das Gupta JJ. wrote separate judgments. Das Gupta, J. held Section 5(1) invalid in its entirety (Sastri, C.J., para 6).
12. The State appealed to the Supreme Court (Sastri, C.J., paras 1-2).

Facts

1. The Act is titled An Act to provide for the speedier trial of certain offences. Its preamble says the same (Sastri, C.J., para 3).
2. Section 3 lets the State Government create Special Courts by notification. Section 4 provides for Special Judges (Sastri, C.J., para 3; Mukherjea, J., para 42).
3. Section 5(1) says a Special Court shall try the offences, classes of offences, cases or classes of cases that the State Government directs by general or special order in writing (Sastri, C.J., para 3).
4. Section 5(2) bars a direction for an offence already being tried in court when the Act began. Otherwise a direction may cover offences committed before or after the Act (Sastri, C.J., para 3).
5. Sections 6 to 15 set the special procedure. It dropped committal proceedings and jury or assessors. It restricted adjournments, gave special powers over refractory accused, and removed the de novo trial (a fresh trial) on transfer between Special Courts (Sastri, C.J., para 4).
6. The Special Court also followed the warrant-case procedure. It could convict for an offence not charged. Revision to the High Court was taken away (Mukherjea, J., para 42).
7. On 26 February 1949, an armed gang raided the Jessop and Company factory at Dum Dum. Crimes of great brutality were committed (Mukherjea, J., para 43).
8. Anwar Ali and 49 others were charged with offences in the raid. The offences fell under the Indian Penal Code, the Indian Arms Act and the High Explosives Act (Sastri, C.J., para 2; para 21 quoting Chakravartti, J.).
9. The notification covered Anwar Ali's case and five more cases. All related to the raid and the incidents that followed it (Sastri, C.J., para 21).
10. The State conceded that the Constitution applied to Anwar Ali's case (Mukherjea, J., para 43).
11. The notifications named specific cases by their police-station record numbers. They did not name any class of offences (Das, J., para 69).
12. Gajen Mali raised the same questions in Appeal No. 298 of 1951 (Sastri, C.J., para 23; Mukherjea, J., para 42).

Issues Raised

1. Is Section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 void under Article 13(2) because it denies equal protection under Article 14? (Sastri, C.J., paras 2, 7-8; Mukherjea, J., para 42)
2. Can the preamble's aim of speedier trial cut down the wide words of Section 5(1) or supply a reasonable classification? (Sastri, C.J., para 7; Mukherjea, J., paras 52-53; Das, J., paras 65-66)
3. Does Article 14 apply to a procedural law such as the Special Courts Act? (Mukherjea, J., para 47; Das, J., para 61; Aiyar, J., para 74)
4. Must a person show a hostile or intentional design before Article 14 applies? Is the test the Attorney-General's general interest of administration? (Mukherjea, J., para 48; Das, J., para 59; Aiyar, J., para 75)
5. Does the mere grant of unguided discretion to the executive offend Article 14, or only its abuse? (Sastri, C.J., paras 17-19; Fazl Ali, J., paras 31-33; Aiyar, J., paras 81-85)
6. Does the invalidity cover the whole of Section 5 or only the power to direct cases? (Mukherjea, J., para 55; Das, J., paras 64-69; Aiyar, J., para 88)
7. Is the whole Act invalid? (Bose, J., para 106)

Arguments Contended

For the appellant (State of West Bengal)

1. The State controls court procedure. A law that only changes the mode of trial is not discriminatory or hostile legislation (Mukherjea, J., para 46).
2. The differences in procedure are minor and not substantial (Mukherjea, J., para 46).
3. The preamble supplies the classification. Cases that, in the State's view, need speedier trial may go to the Special Court. The tests of unguided discretion do not apply (Mukherjea, J., paras 46, 52-53; Das, J., para 65).
4. Even if unguided power was given, the Act itself does not break the equality clause. Only improper delegation or mala fide use could then arise (Mukherjea, J., paras 46, 54).
5. Article 14 is not breached by a statute that gives unregulated discretion to officers (Mukherjea, J., para 54).
6. Alternative test: if inequality is not meant to prejudice anyone and is made in the general interest of administration, Article 14 is not infringed (Das, J., para 59; Aiyar, J., para 75).
7. Inequalities of minor importance do not invalidate a law. The Attorney-General relied on Cooley and on Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg (Das, J., para 60).
8. Article 14 protects only against unequal substantive law and not procedural law. This was not pressed strongly (Das, J., para 61).
9. Some of the American decisions relied on were Hayes v. Missouri and Brown v. The State of New Jersey (Mukherjea, J., para 47).
10. If the objective is laudable, inequality as a by-product does not offend Article 14 (Aiyar, J., para 75).
11. A classification exists because the Act speaks of speedier trial of certain offences. Some offences need more expeditious trial (Aiyar, J., para 80).

For the respondents (Anwar Ali Sarkar and Gajen Mali)

1. Section 5(1) is clear and has no ambiguity. The preamble cannot cut down or widen its plain words (Das, J., para 65; Mukherjea, J., para 53).
2. If the preamble cannot be the basis, the power is uncontrolled and unguided. The State could use it capriciously with an evil eye and an unequal hand (Das, J., para 67).
3. Theft in a dwelling house by a stranger (section 380 of the Penal Code) could be sent to the Special Court. Theft by a servant (section 381) could be left to the ordinary court (Das, J., para 67).
4. It was argued that the possibility of arbitrary use makes the Act unconstitutional. The High Court judges rested on Romesh Thapar v. The State of Madras and Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (Sastri, C.J., para 18).
5. They relied on Truax v. Corrigan and Yick Wo v. Hopkins (Sastri, C.J., para 12).
6. An application for bail cannot be made to the High Court after the Special Court refuses bail (Mukherjea, J., para 50).
7. It was suggested that the Act is open to the charge of excessive delegation of legislative power (Fazl Ali, J., para 32).
8. The Act is general and applies to all, so any discrimination lies only in the executive act (Fazl Ali, J., para 31).
9. Unless discrimination is purposeful or intentional, the equality clause is not infringed (Fazl Ali, J., para 33).
10. Only the rights in Articles 20 to 22 need safeguarding. Procedural change leaves substantive law unchanged (Aiyar, J., para 74).
11. Unguided power is not itself a violation, only its arbitrary exercise. The Willis passage and Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania were cited for this (Aiyar, J., paras 83-84).
12. If executive notifications are open to challenge, administration may be paralysed (Aiyar, J., para 86).
13. Cases needing speedier trial form a class by themselves (Mahajan, J., para 37).

Court's Reasoning

Seven judges wrote seven separate opinions. Paragraph numbers run continuously from 1 to 107 and are cited below for each judge's opinion.

Sastri, C.J. (dissenting)

1. Noted: this is the State's appeal against a Calcutta High Court Full Bench judgment. The judgment quashed the conviction by the Special Court set up under the Ordinance of 1949, later replaced by the Act. (para 1)
2. Noted: the respondent and 49 others were charged over an armed raid on the Jessop Factory at Dum Dum. The Governor's notification of 26 January 1950 sent the case under Section 5(1). The respondent applied under Article 226 for certiorari. The High Court quashed the conviction and ordered trial according to law. (para 2)
3. Noted: the Act has the stated aim of speedier trial. Section 3 lets the State create Special Courts. Section 4 provides Special Judges. Section 5 is the section under challenge. (para 3)
4. Held: the special procedure in sections 6 to 15 is not on its face calculated to prejudice a fair trial. It departs from the Code of Criminal Procedure to shorten the trial. (para 4)
5. Noted: Harries, C.J. refused to read cases as cases requiring speedier trial. He found it impossible to cut down the plain meaning of the word. He said an Act that gives power capable of offending the Constitution is ultra vires (beyond the legislature's power) even if it could be administered without offending. He relied on the Crossroads case, [1950] SCR 594, 603 (Romesh Thapar). (para 5)
6. Noted: Harries, C.J. applied reasonable classification. He held the need for speedier trial can be a basis for classification. He held Section 5(1) discriminatory only where it vests absolute power to refer any cases, including an individual case. (para 5)
7. Noted: Chakravartti and Das Gupta JJ. agreed with Harries, C.J. on the result. Das Gupta, J. held that the speedier-trial classification is too indefinite and Section 5(1) is void as a whole. (para 6)
8. Held: Section 5(1) defines the jurisdiction of the Special Court. It does not define the power of the State to refer cases. The State should refer only cases that need speedier trial. (para 7)
9. Why: a literal reading would impute to the legislature an intention to confer arbitrary power. That would clash with the declared object and with Article 14, which the legislature knew of when it re-enacted the Ordinance. (para 7)
10. Why: the title, the preamble and the specific provisions show the object was speedier trial of certain offences. Wide enacting words must be limited to that object. He relied on Halton v. Cove and Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co. (para 7)
11. Held: the State's discretion may not be subject to judicial review. That does not make it arbitrary. Its exercise must involve bona fide consideration of special features that call for prompt disposal. Section 5(1) empowers the State to direct trial of cases that, in its judgment, require speedier trial. (para 7)
12. Noted: the first part of Article 14 comes from the Irish Constitution. The second part rests on the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution. Article 14 secures persons against arbitrary laws and arbitrary application of laws. (para 8)
13. Noted: Article 13 defines law to include an order or notification. So executive orders must also respect Article 14. This trilogy of articles bars discrimination in legislative and administrative action. (para 8)
14. Noted: classification necessarily means discrimination between those inside and outside the class. The State must have large powers to classify. He quoted Brewer J. in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R. Co. v. Matthews and McKenna J. in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. (para 8)
15. Held: a court must ask two things. First, does the law treat equally all persons on whom it operates? Second, if it is special law for a class, is the classification reasonable? (para 9)
16. Noted: reasonable classification arises only for special legislation affecting a class. It does not arise for laws like the Land Acquisition Act. It does not arise for executive orders against individuals. (para 9)
17. Noted: recent American decisions lean towards sustaining State action. He discussed Tigner v. Texas, Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe R. Co. v. Ellis, Atchison v. Matthews and Kotch v. Pilot Commissioners. (para 10)
18. Noted: these cases show growing respect for State regulatory power. They show the futility of wordy tests. (para 11)
19. Held: Truax v. Corrigan was a case of arbitrary classification of a class and helps little. (para 12)
20. Held: Yick Wo v. Hopkins turned on systematic discriminatory administration of an ordinance against Chinese owners. The Court looked beyond the letter of the ordinance. (para 12)
21. Held: Yick Wo is a colourable legislative expedient case in the sense of Morgan Proprietary Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. It does not condemn a statute merely because discretion could be abused. (para 13)
22. Noted: American cases support a plenary but not arbitrary discretion for administrators. He cited Engel v. O'Malley, where the licensing statute was upheld. (para 14)
23. Noted: in New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, discretionary licensing power was upheld. There is no presumption that the power will be arbitrarily exercised. (para 15)
24. Noted: Holmes J. added that the statute need not show that the Board's action was open to judicial revision on reasonableness. (para 16)
25. Held: it is difficult to hold that Section 5(1) is discriminatory in whole or in part. It does not discriminate between persons or classes in terms. It is the State's notification that attracts the special procedure. (para 17)
26. Held: the procedure is not calculated to impair a fair trial. The State is expected to exercise the discretion honestly and reasonably. (para 17)
27. Held: abuse of the discretion can be challenged as discriminatory administrative action. It cannot affect the validity of the law. He relied on Kania C.J. in Dr. Khare's case: validity does not depend on an apprehension of abuse. (para 17)
28. Held: Romesh Thapar and Chintaman Rao do not apply. In Romesh Thapar the pre-Constitution Act covered restrictions outside Article 19(2) and was not severable. (para 18)
29. Held: the Act in Romesh Thapar was condemned because its contemplated use fell outside the Constitution. It was not condemned because it might be abused. (para 19)
30. Held: even on reasonable classification, the Act is valid. He could not agree with Das Gupta, J. that speedier trial is too vague and indefinite. (para 20)
31. Noted: courts should not insist on delusive exactness. The test is whether the law is "palpably discriminatory". Great weight attaches to the view of a majority of elected representatives. (para 20)
32. Noted: to sustain the Act is not to leave the affected party without a remedy. State action on the administrative side can still be challenged. (para 20)
33. Noted: Snowden v. Hughes requires an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination for unequal application of a fair statute. A discriminatory purpose is not presumed. (para 21)
34. Held: no attempt was made to prove a discriminatory motive. The record seems to justify the reference. He quoted Chakravartti, J. on the exceptional character of the raid cases. (para 21)
35. Held: the State acted neither arbitrarily nor with discriminatory intention. The cases had special features needing speedier disposal. The charge of discrimination fails. (para 22)
36. Held: he would allow Appeal No. 297 of 1951 and Appeal No. 298 of 1951 (State of West Bengal v. Gajen Mali). (para 23)

Fazl Ali, J.

1. Held: the appeals should be dismissed. He added brief points to the full judgments of his colleagues. (para 24)
2. Noted: the Ordinance was valid when promulgated on 17 August 1949. The Act of 15 March 1950 copies it word for word. The question is whether the Act breaks Article 14. (para 25)
3. Noted: the framers copied a pre-Constitution Ordinance made when no Article 14 existed. (para 25)
4. Noted: American law on the equal protection clause has produced a huge volume of cases. Article 14 is as widely worded as the American clause. It may disturb some pre-Constitution laws. (para 25)
5. Noted: Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara explain Article 14. Article 14 protects persons in similar circumstances against legislative discrimination. (para 25)
6. Noted: there is nothing sacred about the test of reasonable classification. It has proved a useful basis for meeting attacks on laws. One of the ways to save the Act is to show that it rests on a reasonable classification. (para 25)
7. Noted: the aim of this opinion is to examine the more important aspects of the case. (para 26)
8. Noted: the framers of the Code made four sets of provisions for summary, summons, warrant and sessions trials. They graded them roughly by the gravity of the offence. No one calls that classification unreasonable. (para 27)
9. Held: the Act ignores the classification in the Code. Section 5 baldly lets the State direct offences or cases. To read the preamble as the basis of classification is to read into the Act what it does not contain. (para 28)
10. Noted: the Act copies a pre-Constitution Ordinance. Article 14 could not have been in the minds of its framers. (para 28)
11. Noted: two procedures now run side by side. A grave offence may be tried under the Act while a less grave offence is tried under the Code. (para 29)
12. Noted: two accused charged with the same offence may be tried under different procedures. Offences of one group may be split between the Act and the Code. (para 29)
13. Noted: the Code procedure gives the accused greater facilities for defence. A person sent to the Special Court may rightly ask why he is singled out. (para 30)
14. Held: the answer that the Act is general and any discrimination lies only in the executive act is not sufficient. It would let discrimination go unchallenged. (para 31)
15. Why: the discrimination is incorporated in the Act itself, which lays down a less advantageous procedure. That is the root cause of any discrimination in its use. (para 31)
16. Noted: two criticisms were made. One was excessive delegation of legislative power. The other was infringement of Article 14. (para 32)
17. Noted: the first criticism may be met by the decision in Special Reference No. 1 of 1951 (In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912). (para 32)
18. Held: the second criticism cannot be so easily met. An Act that gives uncontrolled authority to discriminate is hit by Article 14. The generality of the language cannot save it. (para 32)
19. Held: it would be unsafe to hold that unless discrimination is purposeful or intentional, the equality clause is not infringed. Article 14 refers to equality of treatment and not intention. (para 33)
20. Held: as a general rule, if the Act is fair, the public authority administering it is protected. The exception is mala fides in applying the Act. The basic question is whether the Act itself is fair and good. (para 33)
21. Held: it would be dangerous to introduce a subjective test when Article 14 lays down an objective one. (para 33)
22. Noted: the best argument for the Act was that it keeps notice of charge, the right to be heard, legal aid and an impartial trial. He found it incomplete. (para 34)
23. Why: it brings in the American idea of due process, which the Constitution has not adopted. The Act does not say public interest will be the occasion for its use. The discrimination is too evident. (para 34)
24. Noted: the Constitution treats equality in the Preamble and in Articles 14 to 18. Article 14 should not be whittled down. (para 35)
25. Held: Section 5, or at least the part in issue, offends Article 14 and is void. The Act is modelled on a pre-Constitution pattern and must be redrafted. (para 35)

Mahajan, J.

1. Noted: he read Mukherjea, J.'s judgment and agrees with it. (para 36)
2. Held: Section 5 is hit by Article 14 because it gives no basis for the different treatment of persons tried under the Act. (para 37)
3. Noted: the Attorney-General argued that cases needing speedier trial form a class by themselves. (para 37)
4. Noted: Article 14 prevents any person or class being singled out for discriminatory and hostile legislation. It assures the same rules of evidence and modes of procedure to everyone in similar circumstances. (para 38)
5. Noted: Article 14 does not mean every law must have universal application. (para 38)
6. Noted: the State may classify. A classification must rest on a real and substantial distinction with a just and reasonable relation to the object. It cannot be arbitrary. (para 39)
7. Noted: the legislature may fix an age of competence to contract. It could not make competence depend on stature or hair colour. He cited Gulf Colorado and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. W. H. Ellis. (para 39)
8. Held: speedier trial may be the reason for the legislation. It is not a classification of offences or of cases. It is too vague and uncertain a criterion, as Chakravartti and Das Gupta JJ. said. (para 39)
9. Held: the Act gives no yardstick for grouping persons, cases or offences. It leaves the matter to the unregulated discretion of the provincial government. (para 39)
10. Noted: the State could send a simple hurt case to the Special Court and leave a dacoity with murder to the ordinary court. It could treat killings of Europeans differently from killings of Indians. (para 39)
11. Noted: the only answer the Act gives is that the State thinks a case needs it. That is the choice of the prosecutor. It is neither sound nor rational. (para 39)
12. Held: the Special Act short-circuits the Code. It removes committal procedure, jury or assessors and the de novo trial on transfer. It allows conviction for offences not charged. (para 40)
13. Noted: the right to call defence witnesses is curtailed, and remedies in higher courts are cut down. The statute may be non-discriminatory on its face but is discriminatory in effect. (para 40)
14. Held: the presumption of good faith and knowledge in the legislature cannot be taken so far as to presume an undisclosed reason for discrimination. That would make Article 14 a mere rope of sand. (para 41)
15. Held: no just cause for discrimination was shown. The appeals fail and are dismissed. (para 41)

Mukherjea, J.

1. Noted: the two appeals challenge the Calcutta High Court Special Bench judgment of 28 August 1951. They arise from petitions under Article 226 for certiorari quashing two criminal proceedings. (para 42)
2. Noted: the issue is whether Section 5(1) and the notifications under it conflict with Article 14. The Ordinance of 17 August 1949 was replaced by the Act of 15 March 1950. (para 42)
3. Noted: sections 3 and 4 create Special Courts and Special Judges. Sections 6 to 15 set the procedure. Trial is without jury or assessors and follows the warrant procedure. (para 42)
4. Noted: committal is omitted and adjournments are restricted. Section 13 lets the court convict of an offence not charged. Revision to the High Court is taken away, but appeals lie on fact and law. (para 42)
5. Noted: the Special Judge was appointed on 28 October 1949. The raid occurred on 26 February 1949. The State directed the trial on 25 January 1950. The complaint was lodged on 2 April 1950. (para 43)
6. Noted: convictions followed on 31 March 1951. Anwar Ali applied on 1 May 1951 and Gajen Mali on 21 May 1951. Bose, J. referred the rules to a larger bench. (para 43)
7. Noted: the State conceded that the Constitution applied even though the notification preceded it by a day. The Special Bench made the rules absolute on 28 August 1951. (para 43)
8. Noted: Article 14 is modelled on the American equal protection clause with the English rule of equality before the law. American decisions give useful guidance but need not be followed rigidly. (para 44)
9. Held: Article 14 does not mean the same rules or remedies apply to all. It means all persons similarly circumstanced must be treated alike in privileges and liabilities. He cited Chiranjit Lal and Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers. (para 45)
10. Held: the legislature may classify. It need not provide abstract symmetry. It may recognise degrees of evil, citing Skinner v. Oklahoma. (para 45)
11. Held: the classification must never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It must rest on a real and substantial distinction with a reasonable relation to the subject, citing Southern Railway Co. v. Greene. (para 45)
12. Noted: the presumption is in favour of constitutionality, and the burden lies on the person attacking the law. This was not disputed. (para 45)
13. Noted: the Attorney-General argued in two ways. First, there was no infringement of Article 14 even apart from classification. Second, there was a justifiable classification. (para 46)
14. Held: the first argument fails. A legislature may alter criminal procedure. But law in Article 21 must be valid and must not infringe Part III. A rule of procedure is as much within Article 14 as substantive law. He cited A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras. (para 47)
15. Held: Hayes v. Missouri and Brown v. The State of New Jersey do not help the State. In Hayes, the same peremptory challenges applied to all in a territory. In Brown, every party could apply for a struck jury, and a court decided each application. (para 47)
16. Held: a person need not prove a hostile intention. A discriminatory law that denies privileges to some and gives them to others is hostile in effect. (para 48)
17. Held: intention matters only where officials are accused of mala fide acts, as in Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield. No question of intention arises when discrimination follows from the express terms of the law. (para 48)
18. Held: minor differences may not amount to discrimination. The differences made by the Act are not minor and do prejudice the accused. (para 49)
19. Noted: elimination of committal removes the interval that lets an accused prepare. Warrant procedure keeps the same Magistrate throughout. (para 50)
20. Held: trial by jury is not guaranteed by the Constitution. Section 269 of the Code lets the State end jury trial in a district. It cannot end it for a particular case while other cases of the same offence keep it. (para 50)
21. Noted: the Act also lets the Special Court convict of an offence not charged under section 13. It removes the section 350 right to re-hearing witnesses on transfer (section 7). It removes revision to the High Court. (para 50)
22. Noted: bail cannot be sought from the High Court after the Special Court refuses it. These curtailments are substantial. The first line of argument fails. (para 50)
23. Noted: the Attorney-General said the preamble shows the classification. Section 5 would then reach cases that, in the State's opinion, need speedier trial. (paras 51-52)
24. Held: the preamble cannot cut down or extend a clear and unambiguous section. Section 5(1) vests an unrestricted discretion in the State. It does not say discretion applies only when speedier trial is needed. (para 53)
25. Held: assuming the preamble can be used, the need for speedier trial is too vague, uncertain and elusive a criterion for a rational basis. (para 53)
26. Why: speedier is a comparative term with degrees. The selection is not made by the nature of the offences, the area or the offenders. It is left to the unfettered discretion of the executive. (para 53)
27. Held: the Act does not make a reasonable classification. It makes an arbitrary selection. He cited Gulf Colorado v. Ellis. The presumption of understanding by the legislature, from Middleton v. Texas Power and Light Co., cannot be stretched to presume an undisclosed reason. (para 53)
28. Held: the proposition that unregulated discretion never raises Article 14 is wrong. He examined Yick Wo v. Hopkins, where an ordinance divided owners by arbitrary line. It put the right to carry on a lawful trade in a public officer's unrestrained will. (para 54)
29. Noted: Crowley v. Christensen restated the view. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield held the clause can be used against an officer, but good faith is a defence. (para 54)
30. Held: when the statute itself discriminates without a reasonable basis, the statute is invalid. How it works in practice may not matter. Here discrimination arises from the terms of the Act. (para 54)
31. Noted: the High Court held Section 5 void only so far as it allows the State to direct any case. Harries, C.J. thought direction of specified offences throughout the State could not be impeached. (para 55)
32. Held: this is not strictly correct. It may be that the authorities would exclude cognate offences from the list. He cited Skinner v. Oklahoma, where sterilisation applied to larceny but not embezzlement. (para 55)
33. Noted: where no standard is laid down, officers must classify consistently with the Constitution. The notification is law under Article 13 and can be challenged apart from the Act. (para 55)
34. Held: it is unnecessary to go further. The appeals fail even on the limited ground the High Court adopted. (para 55)

Das, J.

1. Held: he concurs in dismissing the appeals. He is not persuaded that the whole of Section 5 is invalid. He broadly agrees with the High Court majority and Harries, C.J. (para 56)
2. Noted: Section 5 must be judged under the Constitution in force from 26 January 1950. If the section is invalid even in part, the Special Court had no jurisdiction and the appeals fail. (para 57)
3. Noted: Article 14 corresponds to the last part of the Fourteenth Amendment. It adds the English equality before the law. No one argued that the added words matter in practice. (para 58)
4. Noted: Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury and State of Bombay v. F. N. Balsara explain the principles. He and Sastri J. differed in Chiranjit Lal on the result and not on the principles. (para 58)
5. Held: Article 14 does not demand abstract symmetry. It guards against discrimination among equals only. It does not take away the State's power to classify. (para 58)
6. Held: the test has two conditions. The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia that separates the group from others. The differentia must have a rational relation to the object of the Act. (para 58)
7. Held: the differentia and the object are distinct. A nexus between them is needed. The doctrine gives courts flexibility. (para 58)
8. Held: he rejected the Attorney-General's alternative test. A test that depends on the state of mind of the authority would add the words except in good faith and in the general interest of administration to Article 14. (para 59)
9. Why: it would let flagrantly discriminatory action stand on a plea of good faith. It would make the clause "a mere rope of sand". No judicial decision supports it. (para 59)
10. Held: Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg upheld a classification by number of workmen on the ground of intelligible distinction. It did not rest on minor inequality. (para 60)
11. Held: a trivial, unsubstantial difference may mean no discrimination. If a statute brings about real inequality, its validity should not depend on the degree of inequality. (para 60)
12. Held: he rejected the argument that Article 14 protects only against unequal substantive law. A procedural law may inflict great hardship, as this Act has done. (para 61)
13. Held: the Act's procedure is materially different from the Code. He listed elimination of committal and jury (section 6), loss of de novo trial (section 7), and discretion on defence witnesses (section 8). He added conviction of a higher offence (section 13) and exclusion of revision, transfer and section 491 (section 16). (para 62)
14. Held: the Act goes much beyond the Code. It is not an innocuous substitute. Committal gives a fresh independent mind and early notice of the evidence. (para 62)
15. Held: section 269 of the Code does not clearly permit ending jury trial only in particular cases, which is what the Act allows. The Act creates a substantial inequality of treatment. (para 62)
16. Noted: the question is whether Section 5 can be saved by rational classification. (para 62)
17. Noted: Section 5 reads A Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government may... direct. (para 63)
18. Noted: Section 5(1) names four categories. They are offences, classes of offences, cases and classes of cases. (para 64)
19. Held: prima facie, offences, classes of offences and classes of cases imply a process of classification. They do not point at any individual accused. (para 64)
20. Noted: the Attorney-General said offences fall into two classes, those needing speedier trial and those that do not. He pointed to the title and preamble. (para 65)
21. Noted: the respondents said the language is unambiguous and the preamble cannot cut it down. (para 65)
22. Held: the preamble cannot override plain operative words. It may still help to find a section's meaning. It is a key to the understanding of the Act. (para 65)
23. Held: the aim of the Act cannot by itself be the basis of classification. Speedier trial is desirable for all offences. A differentia with a reasonable relation to that aim is needed. (para 66)
24. Noted: the respondents gave the example of theft in a dwelling house by a stranger (section 380) and theft by a servant (section 381). They said the State could pick one for the Special Court. (para 67)
25. Held: this argument is not sound. The power is a power to make a proper classification. An arbitrary picking lacks a nexus with the object. It would fall to the Skinner v. Oklahoma principle. (para 67)
26. Noted: some offences can call for speedier trial by their frequency or circumstances. Examples are large-scale crimes in communal riots, political murders and crimes against a class such as women. (para 68)
27. Held: such circumstances give a cogent basis of classification related to the aim of the Act. All offenders in the specified area and circumstances are treated alike. (para 68)
28. Held: the power to direct offences, classes of offences and classes of cases is controlled. A proper classification guided by the preamble is needed. That part of Section 5(1) is valid. (para 68)
29. Held: if the State classifies arbitrarily, that is an abuse or an excess of power. The Court will strike down the abuse and not the good law. (para 68)
30. Noted: the State did not proceed under that part of Section 5(1). It directed specific cases identified by police-station record numbers. There is no attempt at classification. (para 69)
31. Held: the preamble speaks of speedier trial of certain offences and not of a case or cases. It cannot control the part of Section 5(1) about cases. (para 69)
32. Held: it is hard to see an individual case as a class by itself. One murder case does not need speedier trial more than another. (para 69)
33. Held: the power to direct cases is a purely arbitrary selection on the whim of the State. The unconstitutionality is "writ large on the face of the statute". (para 69)
34. Held: Section 5(1), so far as it empowers the State to direct cases, offends Article 14. The Special Court had no jurisdiction. The High Court was right and the appeals should be dismissed. (para 69)

Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J.

1. Noted: the question is whether the whole or any part of the Act is invalid under Article 14. He agrees the appeals should be dismissed. (para 70)
2. Noted: the Preamble speaks of equality of status and opportunity. Article 14 says the State shall not deny equality before the law or equal protection of the laws. (para 71)
3. Noted: Articles 15 and 16 deal with discrimination and public employment. Articles 20, 21 and 22 deal with prosecutions and detention. Article 21 is the key to this group. (para 72)
4. Held: the Act departs in many important ways from the Code, to the accused's disadvantage. He listed loss of preliminary inquiry, jury or assessors and the de novo trial on transfer. (para 73)
5. Held: section 13 lets a person be convicted of a more serious offence not charged. The points of prejudice, listed by Harries, C.J., cannot be brushed aside as minor. (para 73)
6. Held: the argument that procedural changes do not deny equality is unsound. The right in Article 14 is as fundamental as any right in Part III. Procedural law confers valuable rights. (para 74)
7. Held: a laudable public purpose does not save the Act if discrimination results as a by-product. Accepting that would neutralise Article 14. (para 75)
8. Held: whether a law is discriminatory is judged not so much by its purpose or objects but by its effects. (para 75)
9. Noted: equality does not mean identity or abstract symmetry. He cited Holmes J. in Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson that government needs a little play in its joints. (para 76)
10. Noted: he relied on Willis, on Balsara, and on the seven principles Fazl Ali J. drew from Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury. (para 76)
11. Noted: Willis says the guaranty forbids class legislation but permits classification on reasonable grounds. The challenger carries the burden of showing there is no reasonable basis. (para 77)
12. Noted: principle 1 is the presumption of constitutionality. Principle 2 says the presumption can be rebutted where the law has no classification and still hits only a particular individual or class. (para 78)
13. Noted: principle 3 says equality does not require every law to apply universally. Principle 4 keeps the State's power to classify. Principle 5 says every classification causes some inequality and mere inequality is not enough. (para 78)
14. Noted: principle 6 says a law dealing equally with a well-defined class is not open to challenge. Principle 7 requires a real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable relation to the object. (para 78)
15. Noted: it is unnecessary to discuss the many American decisions. The Court should not stray far. Whether a classification is reasonable turns on common sense and not refined distinctions. (para 79)
16. Held: speedy justice is a mark of every civilised government. Saying a class needs speedy trial adds little. (para 80)
17. Held: where the legislature wants certain offences tried faster, it should indicate the basis of classification. A mere statement of the general object is of no avail. The policy should at least be adumbrated. (para 80)
18. Held: apart from missing classification, the State is given a carte blanche to send any offences or cases to the Special Court. (para 81)
19. Held: the preamble may be used where the meaning is doubtful. Where the operative words are clear, it cannot control them. The State could send any case, grave or simple. (para 82)
20. Held: the Act makes no reasonable classification and gives the executive uncontrolled and unguided power of discrimination. (para 82)
21. Noted: American courts have answered differently whether unguided power is proper classification. Willis suggests that mere conferment of unguided power is not a violation, only its arbitrary exercise. (para 83)
22. Held: Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania is no authority for that view. The statute there laid down a general rule, and an administrative body fixed the width of a coal pillar. (para 84)
23. Held: delegation to an administrative body is subject to the condition that the statute itself is valid. (para 84)
24. Held: if unguided power is conferred without standards, the statute itself may be challenged and not just the administrative act. Weaver supports this, citing Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, Rogers v. Alabama and Concordia Fire Insurance Co. v. Illinois. (para 85)
25. Noted: under Articles 12 and 13, a local authority's notification may also be challenged. Administration might be paralysed, but the difficulty can be overcome. (para 86)
26. Held: if the statute classifies reasonably, a person alleging discrimination in its exercise must show mala fides. If the Act itself is invalid, the notification falls with it. (para 86)
27. Noted: individual acts of officials may be challenged separately. He cited Willoughby and Tarrance v. Florida: actual discrimination is as potent as discrimination by law. (para 87)
28. Noted: he could not see the difference Harries, C.J. drew between cases and classes of cases. An Act without a reasonable classification is void whichever word is used. (para 88)
29. Held: if the Act sets no principle for selecting offences or cases and leaves the State to select at will, the Act is void. He invited special attention to Das Gupta, J.'s passage that the whole Act is ultra vires and deleting cases would not save it. (para 88)
30. Noted: different considerations might arise if specified offences in a particular area or from a particular incident were tried by a Special Court. That was not the case here. (para 88)

Bose, J.

1. Noted: plain words in a statute or Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning. The words equality before the law and equal protection of the law are not plain. (para 89)
2. Noted: equality is guaranteed only before the law, and the law itself draws distinctions. Personal laws, trusts, places of worship and marriage laws all differ between communities. Literal equality is impossible. (para 90)
3. Noted: people differ in wealth and status. Abstract equality cannot apply where inequality exists from the start. (para 91)
4. Held: constitutional provisions are not mathematical formulae. They must not be put into watertight compartments of generalisations such as classification. Such tests are a rough guide and are not the true tests. (para 91)
5. Noted: classification is a systematic arrangement, but the scheme can be anything. It can be broken down until one unit is cut off. Qualifiers like reasonable and rational raise the question whose standard applies. (para 92)
6. Noted: to say the law shall not be discriminatory carries us nowhere. The word also suggests favouritism, which imports motive and a subjective test. (para 93)
7. Noted: he is slow to impute bad faith. Without material to look into the legislature's mind, the presumption of good motive is overwhelming. (para 94)
8. Held: a scientific and rational classification made in good faith can still offend Article 14. His example was trying accused with low skull measurements summarily. (para 95)
9. Noted: judges would decide such a case by their own judgment of what is fair. That is inevitable in giving shape to a vague general rule like Article 14. He cited Dicey. (para 95)
10. Held: judges do not decide what is for the people's good. The legislature must have the widest latitude within its powers. The question is only whether the Constitution forbids the law. (para 96)
11. Noted: the rules of liberty under the Constitution will take shape decision by decision, as the common law and Hindu law did. They cannot be stated as hidebound rules. (para 97)
12. Held: the Constitution's words must be read with their history. They are living flames. The Constitution must be elastic enough to meet changing conditions. Judges should look at the heart of things. (para 98)
13. Noted: the Constituent Assembly remembered trials by hastily made tribunals under Ordinances. Many acquitted on a retrial in ordinary courts had been condemned earlier. Article 14 reflects that mood. (para 99)
14. Held: the test is whether the collective conscience of a sovereign democratic republic can regard the impugned law as substantially equal treatment compared to the ordinary law. (para 100)
15. Held: law in Article 14 means the general body of doctrine and tradition, as Dean Pound said. It does not mean only precepts applied in tribunals. (para 100)
16. Noted: the same things may be viewed differently at different times. This is flexibility of interpretation and not a change in law. (para 101)
17. Noted: this is like blasphemy and sedition in England. He cited Bowman's case, Niharendu Dutt Majumder's case and Bhagwati Charan Shukla's case. (para 102)
18. Held: he does not say the departures from the Code are bad in themselves. The differentiation is what matters. Singling out cases or offences for serious treatment offends the social conscience of the republic. (para 103)
19. Held: the new procedure might even do justice better. But it would not satisfy the ordinary reasonable man. "Justice must also be seen to be done". Ramchandra and Sakharam, similarly placed, cannot face radically different procedures. (para 104)
20. Noted: the Constitution is for the common man too. It must be read in a sense the common man understands, so that he keeps faith in it. (para 105)
21. Held: the whole of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 offends Article 14 and is bad. Good faith, convenience of government and lofty motive do not matter. (para 106)
22. Why: men accused of heinous crimes, answering for their lives and liberty, are picked out and denied valuable defence privileges others have. Fair-minded men would not call it equal treatment. (para 106)

Order of the Court

1. Held: appeals dismissed. (para 107)

Authorities

• Halton v. Cove, (1830) 1 B & Ad 538, 558. Sastri, C.J. used it for reading an enacting part in light of the preamble (para 7).
• Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U.S. 401. Sastri, C.J. used it for restricting general language to the particular end (para 7).
• Ward v. Flood, 17 Am. Rep. 405. Sastri, C.J. cited it for equality as the basic principle of republicanism (para 8).
• Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356. Sastri, C.J. explained it as a case of systematic discriminatory administration (paras 8, 12, 13). Mukherjea, J. used it for the rule that unrestrained will over a lawful trade offends the clause (para 54). Aiyar, J. cited it through Willoughby (para 87).
• Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India, [1950] SCR 869. Sastri, C.J. cited it on classification (para 8). Fazl Ali, J. cited it (para 25). Mukherjea, J. cited it (para 45). Das, J. followed its principles (para 58). Aiyar, J. cited it for the seven principles (paras 76, 78).
• Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96. Sastri, C.J. used it on classification and Yick Wo (paras 8, 10, 12).
• Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540. Sastri, C.J. quoted McKenna J.'s dissent (para 8) and noted it no longer controls (para 10).
• Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141. Sastri, C.J. cited it as the later view (paras 8, 10).
• Gulf Colorado etc. Company v. Ellis, cited as 165 U.S. 666 by Sastri, C.J., 165 U.S. 150 by Mukherjea, J. and 166 U.S. 150 by Mahajan, J. Sastri, C.J. noted it (para 10). Mahajan, J. used it for arbitrary classification (para 39). Mukherjea, J. used it for the mere rope of sand point (para 53). Das, J. used it for the same point (para 59).
• Kotch v. Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 552. Sastri, C.J. noted it as the farthest swing towards State power (para 10).
• Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312. Sastri, C.J. distinguished it (paras 12, 20).
• Morgan Proprietary Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for New South Wales, [1940] AC 838, 858. Sastri, C.J. used it for colourable legislative expedient (para 13).
• Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128. Sastri, C.J. cited it for discretion in licensing (para 14).
• New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552. Sastri, C.J. cited it for discretionary licensing (paras 15, 16).
• Romesh Thapar v. The State of Madras, [1950] SCR 594. Harries, C.J. relied on it as the Crossroads case (Sastri, C.J., para 5). Sastri, C.J. distinguished it (paras 18, 19).
• Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1950] SCR 759. Sastri, C.J. distinguished it (paras 18, 19).
• Dr. Khare's case (Dr. N. B. Khare v. State of Delhi), [1950] SCR 519, 526. Sastri, C.J. followed Kania C.J.'s view that validity does not depend on a fear of abuse (paras 17, 19).
• Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22. Sastri, C.J. cited it as a comparison (para 20).
• Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. May. Sastri, C.J. quoted Holmes J. that legislatures are ultimate guardians of liberties (para 20).
• Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1. Sastri, C.J. used it for the need for intentional discrimination (para 21).
• Special Reference No. 1 of 1951, In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912, [1951] SCR 747. Fazl Ali, J. said it may meet the delegation criticism (para 32).
• State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara, [1951] SCR 682. Fazl Ali, J. (para 25), Das, J. (para 58) and Aiyar, J. (para 76) relied on it for Article 14 principles.
• Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corporation, 299 U.S. 183. Mukherjea, J. cited it for the principle that similarly placed persons be treated alike (para 45).
• Skinner v. Oklahoma, cited as 316 U.S. 535 and 316 U.S. 555 by Mukherjea, J., and 216 U.S. 535 by Das, J. Mukherjea, J. used it for degrees of evil and arbitrary exclusion (paras 45, 55). Das, J. used it for arbitrary classification (para 67).
• Southern Railway Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 412. Mukherjea, J. used it for the need for a real and substantial distinction (para 45).
• A.K. Gopalan v. The State of Madras, [1950] SCR 88. Mukherjea, J. used it for the meaning of law in Article 21 (para 47).
• Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68. Mukherjea, J. distinguished it (para 47).
• Brown v. The State of New Jersey, 175 U.S. 171. Mukherjea, J. distinguished it (para 47).
• Sunday Lake Iron Company v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350. Mukherjea, J. used it on officer's mala fides (paras 48, 54). Aiyar, J. cited it through Weaver (para 85).
• Middleton v. Texas Power and Light Co., 249 U.S. 152. Mukherjea, J. cited it for the presumption of adequate grounds (para 53).
• Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86. Mukherjea, J. cited it for the view that the clause secures against arbitrary discrimination (para 54).
• Jeffrey Manufacturing Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571. Das, J. explained it as a classification case (para 60).
• Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501. Aiyar, J. quoted Holmes J. on a little play in its joints (para 76).
• Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 532. Aiyar, J. distinguished it (para 84).
• Rogers v. Alabama and Concordia Fire Insurance Co. v. Illinois. Aiyar, J. cited them through Weaver (para 85).
• Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519. Aiyar, J. cited it through Willoughby (para 87).
• Bowman's case, [1917] AC 406. Bose, J. cited it on changing meaning over time (para 102).
• Niharendu Dutt Majumder's case, [1942] FCR 32. Bose, J. cited it (para 102).
• Bhagwati Charan Shukla's case, ILR 1946 Nag 865. Bose, J. cited it (para 102).
• Texts quoted:
  • Craies on Statute Law (Mukherjea, J., para 53).
  • Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (Das, J., para 60).
  • Willis, Weaver and Willoughby on Constitutional Law (Aiyar, J., paras 77, 83, 85, 87; Weaver also Mukherjea, J., para 47; Willis also Mukherjea, J., para 55).
  • Dowling (Mukherjea, J., para 45).
  • Dicey (Bose, J., para 95).
  • Dean Pound (Bose, J., para 100).
• Also cited in footnotes: none. The report has no footnotes.

Provisions mentioned

• Article 14: the State shall not deny equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within India.
• Article 13(2) and Article 13: a law that takes away or cuts down a Part III right is void. Law includes an order or notification.
• Article 12: defines the State to include legislatures and governments (and local authorities, per Aiyar, J., para 86).
• Article 21: no person is deprived of life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law.
• Article 226: High Courts may issue writs such as certiorari.
• Articles 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 22: mentioned in Fazl Ali, J. (para 35) and Aiyar, J. (para 72). Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) are mentioned in Sastri, C.J. (paras 18-19) in discussing Romesh Thapar.
• Preamble to the Constitution: equality of status and opportunity (Aiyar, J., para 71; Fazl Ali, J., para 35).
• Sections 3, 4, 5(1), 5(2), 6, 7, 8, 13, 15 and 16 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950: Special Courts, Special Judges, the power to direct trials, and the special procedure (paras 3-4, 42, 62).
• Section 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935: the Governor's power to promulgate the Ordinance (Mukherjea, J., para 42).
• Code of Criminal Procedure, sections 236, 238, 269, 350 and 491: charge, minor offences, jury orders, re-hearing on transfer, and habeas corpus power (paras 50, 62).
• Indian Penal Code, sections 378, 380 and 381: theft, theft in a dwelling house and theft by a servant (Das, J., para 67). The Indian Arms Act and the High Explosives Act are named in Chakravartti, J.'s account (Sastri, C.J., para 21).

Judgement

1. The appeals were dismissed (para 107).
2. Sastri, C.J. would have allowed Appeal No. 297 of 1951 and Appeal No. 298 of 1951 (Sastri, C.J., para 23).
3. Fazl Ali, J. held Section 5, or at least the part in issue, void under Article 14 (para 35).
4. Mahajan, J. agreed with Mukherjea, J. and held Section 5 hit by Article 14 (paras 36-37, 41).
5. Mukherjea, J. held Section 5(1) discriminatory on its terms and held the appeals bound to fail even on the limited ground adopted by the High Court (paras 54-55).
6. Das, J. held Section 5(1) invalid only so far as it empowers the State to direct cases. The Special Court had no jurisdiction (para 69).
7. Aiyar, J. held that Section 5 is void as it makes no reasonable classification (paras 82, 88).
8. Bose, J. held the whole Act bad under Article 14 (para 106).
9. The High Court's order quashing Anwar Ali Sarkar's conviction therefore stands. In Gajen Mali's case, the High Court's order prohibiting further proceedings stands (Das, J., para 69).
10. The judgment records no order on costs.

Legal Principle / Ratio

A law that lets the executive send chosen cases to a harsher procedure without a rule or reasonable classification denies equal protection under Article 14. The need for speedier trial alone cannot supply the classification. The opinions differ on whether the whole of Section 5, only the word cases, or the whole Act falls.

Key holding (Mukherjea, J., para 53): "This is not a reasonable classification at all but an arbitrary selection."

• Test stated by Das, J. (para 58): the classification must be "founded on an intelligible differentia" with a rational relation to the Act's object.
• Dissent: Sastri, C.J. said unguided discretion does not invalidate a law and only its abuse can be challenged (para 17). Bose, J. gave a broader test of whether the law offends the social conscience of a democratic republic (paras 100-106).

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

• The seven judges gave seven opinions. There is no single opinion of the Court.
• The judgment disagrees on the scope of invalidity. Fazl Ali, Mahajan, Mukherjea and Aiyar JJ. struck down Section 5. Das, J. struck down only the power over cases. Bose, J. struck down the whole Act.
• Sastri, C.J. says Article 14 should be read with the American trend toward State power (paras 10-11). Bose, J. rejects tests like classification as a full answer (paras 91-93). The judgment leaves this tension open.
• Fazl Ali, J. says the Constitution has not adopted American due process (para 34). Bose, J. nevertheless reads Article 14 as a standard of fair treatment (paras 100-106).
• Whether proof of intention is needed is answered differently. Sastri, C.J. relies on Snowden v. Hughes (para 21). Fazl Ali, Mukherjea and Aiyar JJ. say no hostile intent is needed when the law itself discriminates (paras 33, 48, 75).

Significance

• It shows that a statement of the Act's aim does not by itself supply a reasonable classification (Das, J., para 66; Aiyar, J., para 80).
• It holds that Article 14 applies to procedural law (Mukherjea, J., para 47; Das, J., para 61; Aiyar, J., para 74).
• It shows Article 14 can be breached by the statute and not just by officials who administer it (Mukherjea, J., para 54; Aiyar, J., para 85).

Exam-Important Points

• Rule: Article 14 forbids a law that gives the executive unguided power to choose who faces a harsher procedure.
• Trap: the appeals were dismissed, with Sastri, C.J. dissenting. The judgment records no single majority opinion. State the result judge by judge.
• Scope: Das, J. held only the power over cases invalid. Bose, J. held the whole Act invalid. Others held Section 5 invalid.
• Test (Das, J.): an intelligible differentia plus a rational relation to the object of the Act.
• Preamble: the preamble cannot cut down clear words in Section 5(1) (Mukherjea, J., para 53; Aiyar, J., para 82).
• Intention: no proof of hostile intention is needed when the discrimination arises from the terms of the law (Mukherjea, J., para 48).
• Procedural law: Article 14 covers procedural law (Mukherjea, J., para 47).
• Section 5(1): read the four categories carefully: offences, classes of offences, cases and classes of cases.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. Paragraph numbers follow the official Supreme Court judgment text and run continuously across the seven opinions. Law reports may number the same paragraph differently. The citation is taken from the judgment's own header.