Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. (P) Ltd.

A company manager drove a car off the road into a tree and a passenger died. No one saw the driving. The Supreme Court used res ipsa loquitur (the accident speaks for itself) to find negligence and held the company liable for its manager.

Quick Revision

The AIR, SCR and SCC citations are printed in the judgment's own header. The appeal number is stated in the judgment.

Parties

Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi and others — appellants. The first claimant is the wife and claimants 2 to 8 are the children of the deceased Purshottam Tulsidas Udeshi.

Purshottam Tulsidas Udeshi — the deceased. He was 58 years old and travelled in the car as a passenger.

Ranjit Ginning & Pressing Co. (P) Ltd. — respondent No. 1 and first opponent before the Tribunal. It owned the car and employed the driver.

Madhavjibhai Mathuradas Ved — the Manager of the company, who drove the car. He is not a party to this appeal.

Union Fire Accident and General Insurance Co. Ltd. — respondent No. 2 and second opponent. It insured the car. It was later nationalised, so the Court gave notice to the nationalised insurance company, which appeared through counsel.

Procedural History

1. The claimants filed a claim for Rs. 1 lakh under section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act before the Claims Tribunal (the body that hears motor accident claims), Jabalpur.
2. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur found that the Manager drove negligently. It held the company liable for its employee's negligence.
3. The Tribunal fixed Rs. 31,209.15 as general damages (compensation for loss that cannot be itemised) and Rs. 2,000 as special damages (compensation for specific proved expenses) for funeral and post-funeral expenses. It directed the insurance company to indemnify the owner up to Rs. 15,000.
4. The owner appealed to the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. First Appeal No. 104/66. The claimants and the insurer were respondents.
5. By judgment and order dated 20-4-1967, the High Court allowed the owner's appeal. It did not decide whether the driving was rash and negligent or what the compensation should be.
6. The High Court held that the Manager's act of taking Purshottam as a passenger was neither in the course of his employment nor under any authority. It found no evidence that the owners knew of it.
7. The High Court held that Purshottam was no better than a trespasser as against the owners.
8. On the claimants' application, the High Court granted a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. This is Civil Appeal No. 2071 of 1968.

Facts

1. On 18 December 1960 Purshottam Tulsidas Udeshi died in a motor car accident near a village called Chincholivad, 16 miles from Saoner.
2. He was travelling in a Hindustan Ambassador Saloon car, driven by Madhavjibhai Mathuradas Ved, the Manager of Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Private Ltd.
3. The car was insured with the Union Fire Accident and General Insurance Co. Ltd.
4. The deceased was 58 years old. The claimants said he earned about Rs. 9,000 a year.
5. The car was going from Nagpur to Pandhurna. The Manager's purpose, admitted in the owner's written statement, was to deliver Rs. 20,000 to the Ginning and Pressing factory at Pandhurna.
6. The claimants led no direct evidence of how the accident happened, and no eyewitness was examined.
7. P.W. 1, the deceased's younger brother, went to the spot soon after the accident with a relative and an employee of his brother's employer.
8. He saw that the car had dashed against a tree. The tree stood on the right-hand side of the road, four feet away from the main metalled road.
9. The road was a straight metalled road, 15 feet wide, with fields at a lower level on either side. Vehicles are expected to keep to the left side.
10. The tree was uprooted about 9 to 10 inches from the ground. The front of the car was broken.
11. The impact pushed the machine of the car back about a foot. The steering wheel and engine receded on the driver's side, the occupants died and the front seat also moved back.
12. A photograph taken at the time was filed.
13. The witness was not cross-examined on the state of the car and the tree. It was not suggested to him that the car was not driven rashly and negligently.
14. The Tribunal recorded that the mishap was on the right side of the road, beyond the pavement, and killed the car's three occupants.
15. The Tribunal noted that the respondents pleaded inevitable accident but led no evidence for it.
16. The respondents admitted that the vehicle was proceeding from Nagpur to Pandhurna for the stated purpose.
17. The respondents denied rash and negligent driving and pleaded that the vehicle was in perfectly sound condition.
18. They said the husband of claimant No. 1 travelled on his own responsibility, for his own purpose and absolutely free of charge. They said he did not travel on behalf of, or at the instance of, the company or the driver.
19. They pleaded that the accident was inevitable and opposed the claim as highly exaggerated.
20. The Tribunal accepted the claimants' income documents and fixed the deceased's income at Rs. 9,316.83 a year.
21. The Tribunal excluded the bonus of Rs. 1,875, leaving Rs. 7,441.83 a year. For 5 years this came to Rs. 37,209.15.
22. After deducting Rs. 6,000 that the deceased might have spent on himself, the Tribunal reached Rs. 31,209.15.
23. Item No. 27 on the record showed that the deceased's pay was only Rs. 425 a month. The Tribunal had included dearness allowance, conveyance allowance and other items.

Issues Raised

1. Did the claimants establish that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of Madhavjibhai Mathuradas Ved, the Manager of the company?
2. Can negligence be inferred from the facts proved when there is no eyewitness, by applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur?
3. Did the incident take place during the course of the Manager's employment, so that the company is vicariously liable (answerable for another's tort)?
4. If the claimants succeed on these two points, what compensation are they entitled to?
5. Is the insurance company liable for more than Rs. 15,000 for injury to a passenger? This depends on section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act and on the policy.

Arguments Contended

For the appellants (claimants)

• The accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the Manager of respondent No. 1.
• The accident took place during the course of the driver's employment.
• The High Court wrongly held that the incident did not take place in the course of employment or under the company's authority.
• The appellants accepted before the Court that the deceased's monthly pay was Rs. 425 (counsel for the appellants).
• Authorities: the judgment does not list the authorities counsel for the appellants cited. The Court itself found that Lockhart supports the appellants.

For respondent No. 1 (the company)

• The vehicle was in sound condition and the driving was not rash or negligent.
• The accident was inevitable. The Court recorded that this plea was not raised before it.
• The road was a very narrow one, about 15 feet wide, with fields on either side. Stray cattle might have suddenly come on the road and caused the accident.
• The deceased travelled at his own risk, free of charge and for his own purpose, not for the company or its driver.
• If the High Court did not decide the negligence point, it should be sent back to the High Court.
• The owner's counsel pointed to item No. 27 and said the income should be taken as only Rs. 425 a month, without allowances.
• The owner's counsel argued that the insurance cover under the Act extends to injury to passengers. He relied on section 95(1)(b)(i).
• Authorities: counsel relied on Houghton v. Pilkington and Twine v. Bean's Express, Limited. The High Court had relied on Sitaram Motilal Kalal, Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Lockhart and Conway v. George Wimpey. The Court noted that counsel produced no authority for the company's non-liability on the facts found.

For respondent No. 2 (the insurance company)

• Counsel Mr. Naunit Lal submitted that the statutory insurance does not cover injury to passengers.
• The owner had specifically insured the risk to passengers up to Rs. 15,000 only. So the insurer's liability should be limited to Rs. 15,000.
• The insurer was ready to pay Rs. 15,000 under the policy endorsement.

Court's Reasoning

The judgment has no numbered paragraphs. It was delivered by Kailasam, J. for the Bench of Kailasam and Beg, JJ. The steps below follow the judgment's order.

Kailasam, J. (for the Court)

A. Scope of the appeal

1. Noted: the appeal is by certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The two questions are whether the claimants proved rash and negligent driving, and whether the incident happened in the course of the driver's employment. If they succeed on both, compensation must then be fixed.
2. Noted: the High Court relied on Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt, Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Lockhart and Conway v. George Wimpey & Co. Ltd. to hold the Manager's driving was not in the course of employment. The respondents' counsel relied on other decisions, referred to later.
3. Held: the Court decides negligence first, as the High Court did not decide it. If the claimants fail to prove a rash and negligent act, no other question arises.

B. Negligence and res ipsa loquitur

4. Noted: the claimants led no direct evidence and no eyewitness was examined. The evidence was P.W. 1's account of the car and the tree, which stood unchallenged.
5. Noted: the Tribunal found that the car hit a tree beyond the pavement so violently that three occupants died. It applied the maxim res ipsa loquitur, citing Ellor v. Selfridge.
6. Noted: the Tribunal held the respondents had to establish inevitable accident and had led no evidence. The Court agreed that the burden rests on the opposite party to prove inevitable accident.
7. Noted: to succeed, the opposite party must show that the cause of the accident could not have been avoided by ordinary care and caution.
8. Noted: the Court quoted Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Ed., Vol. 28, p. 81). The defendant must show what caused the accident and that the result was inevitable. Otherwise, he must show all possible causes and that the result could not have been avoided for each.
9. Held: no such attempt was made, and the plea of inevitable accident was not raised before the Court.
10. Noted: the normal rule is that the plaintiff proves negligence. In some cases the true cause is solely within the defendant's knowledge, which causes the plaintiff hardship. The plaintiff can prove the accident but not how it happened.
11. Noted: the principle of res ipsa loquitur avoids this hardship. The accident speaks for itself or tells its own story. It is then enough for the plaintiff to prove the accident, and the defendant must show it happened from some cause other than his negligence.
12. Noted: Salmond on the Law of Torts (15th Ed., p. 306) says the maxim applies whenever such an accident is so improbable without the defendant's negligence that a reasonable jury could find it was so caused without further evidence.
13. Noted: Halsbury (3rd Ed., Vol. 28, p. 77) states an exception to the general rule on burden of proof. The exception applies where the facts established give a natural inference of the defendant's negligence, or where the event tells its own story clearly and unambiguously.
14. Noted: where the maxim applies, the burden is on the defendant. He must show that he was not negligent, or that the accident more probably happened in a manner that did not connote negligence.
15. Noted: two things must be shown for the principle to apply. The car must be under the defendant's management, and the accident must be one that does not ordinarily happen if proper care is used.
16. Held: there is no dispute that the car was under the Manager's management. On P.W. 1's facts, with proper care the car could not have gone to the right extreme of the road, dashed against a tree and moved it.
17. Noted: the respondents argued that stray cattle might have entered the road. The Court rejected this.
18. Why: on a country road about 15 feet wide with fields on both sides, "ordinary care requires that the car should be driven at a speed in which it could be controlled". The Court held this plea unacceptable.
19. Held: the car went to the right extremity of the road, the wrong side, and struck the tree. It uprooted the tree about 9 inches from the ground. The engine moved a foot back and the steering wheel and engine receded on the driver's side.
20. Held: "The car could not have gone to the right extremity and dashed with such violence on the tree" if the driver had used reasonable care and caution.
21. Held: the doctrine applies on the facts made out. It was for the opponents to prove that the incident did not happen through their negligence, and they did not even attempt to do so. The Tribunal was justified in applying the doctrine.
22. Held: the Court declined the request to send the point back to the High Court. The evidence on record is convincing to prove rash and negligent driving.

C. Course of employment

23. Noted: the second contention is that the High Court erred in holding the incident was not in the course of employment or under the company's authority.
24. Noted: the High Court found that no evidence showed the owner knew Purshottam was carried as a passenger, so the owner could not be liable for the servant's tortious act.
25. Noted: the High Court itself found the car was going from Nagpur to Pandhurna on the company's business. It also found the Manager may have been going on the owner's business and may have had implied authority to drive.
26. Noted: the High Court nonetheless held there were no pleadings or material to show that Purshottam travelled on the owner's business or under any ostensible authority (authority a servant appears to have) given to the Manager to take him.
27. Held: it is admitted in the written statement that Madhavjibhai was the Manager of respondent No. 1. It is also admitted that the car was proceeding from Nagpur to Pandhurna to deliver Rs. 20,000 to the factory there.
28. Noted: the Tribunal found on the pleadings that the Manager was the company's employee and negligently caused the death while driving in the course of employment. The High Court confirmed that the Manager was going on the owner's business.
29. Held: this finding is not disputed. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the servant's negligence caused the accident in the course of his employment. The master is liable. The law on these facts is very clear. Because the question was argued at length, the Court reviewed the law.
30. Noted: "the master's liability is based on the ground that the act is done in the scope or course of his employment or authority". The Court said this is now firmly established.

D. Young v. Edward Box and Co. Ltd.

31. Noted: Lord Justice Denning stated the position in Young v. Edward Box and Co. Ltd. The plaintiff and fellow workmen were given a lift on a defendant's lorry with the consent of the foreman and driver. The plaintiff was injured on a Sunday evening by the driver's negligence.
32. Noted: the defence was that the plaintiff was a trespasser. The traffic manager said he had never instructed the foreman to arrange Sunday lifts and that the foreman had no authority to consent.
33. Noted: two learned Judges held that the foreman's right to give leave was within his ostensible authority and the plaintiff was a licensee. Lord Denning held that the plaintiff was a trespasser as against the defendants. Even so, the driver was acting in the course of his employment in giving the lift, which was enough to make the defendants liable.
34. Noted: Lord Denning's two questions. The first is whether the servant is liable. If yes, the second is whether the employer must shoulder the servant's liability. The employer must also be responsible for the servant's conduct in giving a lift, not only for his driving.
35. Noted: if the servant is forbidden or unauthorised to give lifts, the passenger is no doubt a trespasser as against the owners. That is not by itself an answer to the claim.
36. Noted: an owner may send a servant on a journey, putting him in a position to drive and to give lifts. The owner is then answerable for how the servant conducts himself on the journey, provided the servant acts in the course of his employment.
37. Held: applying this test, the Manager had ostensible authority to give Purshottam leave to ride. The Manager also acted in the course of his employment in giving the lift. The respondents would be liable under both tests.

E. The three cases relied on by the High Court

38. Noted: in Sitaram Motilal Kalal, an owner entrusted a taxi to A. A trained B, who cleaned the taxi, to drive it. While B took the licence test, he injured the respondent, and A was not in the vehicle. The majority held the owner not liable.
39. Noted: this Court there held it unproved that A was authorised to coach the cleaner. The owner's plea of no authority was accepted. The act was not shown to be impliedly authorised or to fall within the extensions of the doctrine of scope of employment.
40. Noted: the test in Sitaram is whether the act was done on the owner's business or impliedly authorised by him. At page 537 the Court stated that the master is vicariously liable for acts of servants in the course of employment. The act must be a wrongful act authorised by the master, or a wrongful and unauthorised mode of doing an authorised act.
41. Noted: Sitaram also accepted Lord Denning's statement in Ormrod v. Crosville Motor Services Ltd. The owner is liable if the driver is, with the owner's consent, driving on the owner's business or for the owner's purposes. This extends the doctrine of scope of employment.
42. Held: since the accident here happened in the course of employment, Sitaram is of no help to the respondents.
43. Noted: in Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Lockhart, a carpenter employed by the railway used his own car, uninsured, on the way to repair work. The railway had warned servants against using uninsured private cars. An accident happened through his negligence.
44. Noted: the Privy Council held his transport was incidental to the work he was employed to do. The prohibition concerned using an uninsured car, not acting as a driver. It limited the way of doing the work, and breach did not free the master from liability to a third party.
45. Held: the case does not help the respondents. It supports the appellants' contention that the Manager driving for the company's purposes was in the course of his employment.
46. Noted: in Conway v. George Wimpey & Co. Ltd., contractors provided lorries to carry their own employees. A notice in each cab and clear oral instructions forbade the driver from carrying others.
47. Noted: the plaintiff, a labourer of another firm, was allowed by the driver to ride on the way to work and was injured while dismounting. It was held that taking him was not a wrongful mode of performing an authorised act. It was an act of a class the driver was not employed to perform at all.
48. Held: the facts are entirely different. There the driver was under strict orders not to carry passengers, but here a responsible officer, the Manager, permitted Purshottam to ride.
49. Held: "it is reasonable to presume, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the Manager had authority to carry Purshottam". The Manager, as the company's high-ranking officer, was acting in the course of his employment. The Court saw no support for the High Court's contrary conclusion.

F. Cases cited by the respondents

50. Noted: in Houghton v. Pilkington, the plaintiff got into the defendant's cart at a servant's request to help an unconscious servant. He fell out and was hurt through the servant's negligence in starting the horse. It was held that the emergency gave the servant no implied authority to invite the plaintiff, so the defendant was not liable.
51. Noted: Bankes, J. agreed with Bray, J. He was first inclined to accept that the emergency gave implied authority. But Cox v. Midland Counties Ry. Co. governed the case, so he could not consistently hold that the driver had implied authority.
52. Held: Houghton has entirely different facts. It was decided on the ground that an emergency did not give the driver authority to invite the plaintiff into the cart.
53. Noted: in Twine v. Bean's Express, Limited, defendants supplied a van and driver to a bank. The driver remained their servant. The defendants accepted no responsibility for injury to people riding who were not their employees.
54. Noted: two notices on the van said no unauthorised person was allowed on the vehicle and the driver had instructions not to allow unauthorised travellers. T, not authorised to ride, got a lift with the driver's consent and was killed through his negligence.
55. Noted: the claim that the driver was on a duly authorised journey failed. The defendants owed T no duty of care. The appeal confirmed that the driver was not acting within the scope of his employment in giving the lift.
56. Held: the facts are totally different. Counsel produced no authority supporting the company's non-liability on the facts found.

G. The recent trend in the law

57. Noted: "the recent trend in law is to make the master liable for acts which do not strictly fall within the term" in the course of employment, as ordinarily understood.
58. Noted: in Sitaram this Court accepted Lord Denning's view in Ormrod. The owner is liable also when the driver, with the owner's consent, drives on the owner's business or purposes. The Court said this extension has been accepted by this Court.
59. Noted: Lord Denning's two-question approach in Young v. Edward Box has been uniformly accepted. It appears in Salmond on the Law of Torts (15th Ed., p. 606) and in the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947. The House of Lords approved it in Staveley Iron & Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Jones and I.C.I. Ltd. v. Shatwell.
60. Noted: the scope of course of employment was extended in Navarro v. Moregrand Ltd. The plaintiff wanted a flat tenancy and applied to the second defendant, who had ostensible authority to let the flat for the landlord. He demanded £225 as a premium and the plaintiff paid.
61. Noted: the plaintiff sued the landlord under the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act, 1949. The Court of Appeal held that the illegal request did not give the plaintiff notice that the second defendant was exceeding his authority.
62. Noted: the Court of Appeal held that he was not acting within actual or ostensible authority in asking for the premium. But the landlord had entrusted him with the letting. He did the wrong in the very course of conducting that business, so he acted in the course of employment.
63. Noted: Lord Denning took the view that the second defendant acted illegally and had no authority for an illegal act. Still, he was plainly acting in the course of his employment. This extended the scope to cover an unauthorised illegal act of asking for and receiving a premium.
64. Held (reserved): the Court did not feel called upon to decide whether this extended meaning should be accepted by this Court.
65. Noted: Lord Goddard, Chief Justice, went further in Barker v. Levinson and said the master is responsible for a criminal act of the servant if done within the general scope of the employment. Lord Denning did not go that far. He was relieved to find that the passage was struck out in the authorised Law Reports (1951) 1 K.B. 342.
66. Held: the Court respectfully agreed with Lord Denning that the passage attributed to Lord Chief Justice Goddard went a bit too far.
67. Held: the Court confirmed the law laid down in Sitaram Motilal Kalal and found the driver acted in the course of his employment, so the owner is liable. It set aside the High Court's finding that the act was not committed in the course of employment or under the master's authority, and allowed the appeal.

H. Quantum of compensation

68. Noted: the High Court did not go into quantum. The Tribunal fixed compensation at Rs. 33,209.15 with costs. It directed the insurance company to indemnify the owner to the extent of Rs. 15,000.
69. Noted: the Tribunal fixed special damages for funeral and post-funeral expenses, including transport, at Rs. 2,000. This item was not disputed.
70. Noted: the second item was Rs. 31,209.15, as the deceased's likely earnings for 5 years. The Tribunal fixed his income at Rs. 9,316.83 a year, rightly excluded the bonus of Rs. 1,875, and fixed net earnings at Rs. 7,441.83 a year. It reached Rs. 37,209.15 for 5 years and deducted Rs. 6,000.
71. Noted: respondents' counsel said the deceased's pay was only Rs. 425 a month and the Tribunal erred in including dearness allowance, conveyance allowance and other items. Appellants' counsel accepted this figure.
72. Held: at Rs. 425 a month the annual income is Rs. 5,100 and for 5 years Rs. 25,500. Adding Rs. 2,000 as special damages, the total is Rs. 27,500. The Court accepted this calculation and restored the Tribunal's award, restricted to Rs. 27,500.

I. Liability of the insurance company

73. Noted: the Union Fire Accident & General Insurance Co. Ltd., Paris, carrying on business at Nagpur, was nationalised. The Court directed notice to the nationalised company so that it could be heard. It appeared through Mr. Naunit Lal and added nothing except on the limit of its liability for passenger injury.
74. Noted: the insurer said the statutory insurance does not cover passenger injury and the owner had specifically insured the risk only up to Rs. 15,000. The owner said the cover under the Act extends to passengers and relied on section 95(1)(b)(i).
75. Noted: section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as amended by Act 56 of 1969, is based on the English Act. The Court therefore looked at the English Road Traffic Act, 1960, and the 1930 Act. Neither required insurance for death or bodily injury to passengers in the vehicle, except passengers carried for hire or reward or under a contract of employment.
76. Noted: sub-section 203(4) of the 1960 Act said a policy need not cover death or bodily injury to persons carried in, or entering or leaving, the vehicle at the time of the event. The English provisions were introduced into the Indian section 95 by amendment.
77. Noted: Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Ed., Vol. 22, p. 368, item 755) states the general exclusion of passengers, subject to certain exceptions.
78. Noted: the Court found it unnecessary to trace later English law, since the later changes were not adopted in the Indian statute. It added that the Motor Vehicle (Passenger Insurance) Act, 1971 made passenger cover compulsory. The Road Traffic Act, 1972 repealed that Act. Section 145 of the 1972 Act delayed the coming into force until 1 December 1972 (Bingham's Motor Claims Cases, 7th Ed., p. 704).
79. Held: section 95(a) and 95(b)(i) adopted the English Road Traffic Act, 1960 and excluded the insurance company's liability for risk to passengers.
80. Held: the words third party are not wide enough to cover all persons except the insured and the insurer. The Court rejected that plea because the proviso to the sub-section makes clear that cover is not available to passengers. Proviso (ii) says a policy is not required to cover death or bodily injury to persons carried in or upon, or entering, mounting or alighting from the vehicle. The exception is a vehicle carrying passengers for hire or reward or under a contract of employment.
81. Held: it is not required that a policy cover risk to passengers not carried for hire or reward. The insurer's plea is accepted and the insurance company is not liable under the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act.
82. Noted: an insurer can always take policies covering risks outside section 95. Here, an endorsement for an additional premium undertook to pay compensation on a stated scale for bodily injury to any passenger. The scale fixed Rs. 15,000.
83. Noted: the insurer was willing to pay Rs. 15,000. The insured's counsel argued the liability for passengers was unlimited and relied on Clause 1 of Section II (Liability to Third Parties) of the policy.
84. Noted: counsel said clause 1 is wide enough to cover all risks, including injury to passengers. The insurer would indemnify all sums that the insured becomes legally liable to pay.
85. Held: the clause is not very clearly worded. But the exception for what is necessary to meet the requirements of Section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 shows that liability is limited to what section 95 requires.
86. Held: the second part of clause 1(a) excludes liability for injury arising in the course of the person's employment by the insured. Its meaning becomes clear from the policy's other clauses. The policy insures risks outside section 95 only against an extra premium. So clause 1 and 1(a) cover only the risk section 95 requires.
87. Held: on construction of the policy, the Court accepted the insurer's plea that the owner was insured only up to Rs. 15,000 for passenger injury. The insurer's liability is restricted to Rs. 15,000.

Authorities

• Young v. Edward Box and Co. Ltd., (1951) 1 T.L.R. 789 at 793. Approved. Lord Denning's two questions and his view that the driver acting in the course of employment makes the employer liable, even to a trespasser.
• Sitaram Motilal Kalal v. Santanuprasad Jaishankar Bhatt, [1966] 3 S.C.R. 527. Relied on by the High Court. The Court confirmed its law and distinguished it as no help on the facts.
• Ormrod and Another v. Crosville Motor Services Ltd., (1953) 2 All E.R. 753. Referred to. The owner is liable if the driver drives on the owner's business or purposes with consent.
• Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Lockhart, (1942) A.C. 591 (A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 63); named Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Leonard Lockhall in the footnote. Relied on by the High Court. The Court said it supports the appellants, not the respondents.
• Conway v. George Wimpey & Co. Ltd., [1951] 1 A.E.R. 363 (Court of Appeal, 62 T.L.R. 458). Relied on by the High Court. Distinguished on its facts of strict orders against carrying passengers.
• Ellor v. Selfridge, [1930] 46 T.L.R. 236. Cited by the Tribunal for res ipsa loquitur. The judgment's headnote spells the name Eller v. Selfridge.
• Houghton v. Pilkington, (1912) 3 K.B. 308. Cited by the respondents. Distinguished on its facts of emergency and no implied authority. The headnote spells the name Honghton v. Pilkington.
• Cox v. Midland Counties Ry. Co., 3 Ex. 268. Mentioned as the case governing Houghton. Distinguished.
• Twine v. Bean's Express, Limited, 62 T.L.R. 155 (1945-46). Cited by the respondents. Distinguished as totally different on its facts.
• Staveley Iron & Chemical Co. Ltd. v. Jones, (1956) A.C. 627. Noted as House of Lords approval of Lord Denning's two questions.
• I.C.I. Ltd. v. Shatwell, (1965) A.C. 656. Noted as House of Lords approval of the same approach.
• Navarro v. Moregrand Ltd. and Another, (1951) 2 T.L.R. 674. Noted. The Court did not decide whether to accept its extended meaning.
• Barker v. Levinson, 66 The Times L.R. (Pt. 2) 717. Noted. The Court agreed that the passage attributed to Goddard, C.J. went a bit too far.
• Textbooks and statutes cited: Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Ed.), Vol. 28 (pp. 77, 81) and Vol. 22 (p. 368, item 755); Salmond on the Law of Torts (15th Ed.), pp. 306 and 606; Bingham's Motor Claims Cases (7th Ed.), p. 704; the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947.
• Also cited in footnotes: the law report (1951) 1 K.B. 342, where the Barker v. Levinson passage was struck out.

Provisions

• Article 133(1)(a), Constitution of India: the High Court granted the certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court.
• Section 110, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939: claims for compensation for motor accidents go to the Claims Tribunal.
• Section 95(1)(b)(i), Motor Vehicles Act: the policy must insure the owner's liability for death or bodily injury to any person. It must also cover damage to a third party's property. The harm must arise from use of the vehicle in a public place.
• Proviso (ii) to section 95(b): a policy need not cover death or injury to persons carried in or on the vehicle. The exception is a vehicle carrying passengers for hire or reward or under a contract of employment.
• Section 95 as amended by Act 56 of 1969: based on the English Road Traffic Act, 1960 and the 1930 Act.
• Section 203(4), Road Traffic Act, 1960 (England): a policy need not cover death or injury to persons carried in, or getting on or off, the vehicle.
• Motor Vehicle (Passenger Insurance) Act, 1971 and Road Traffic Act, 1972, section 145: English later law, mentioned only in passing.
• Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act, 1949: the Act under which the plaintiff in Navarro sued.

Judgement

1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The High Court's finding that the act was not committed in the course of employment or under the master's authority is set aside.
3. The Court held that the driving was rash and negligent and that the Manager acted in the course of his employment, so the owner is liable.
4. There shall be a decree in favour of the appellants for Rs. 27,500 against the respondents.
5. Of that amount, the liability of the insurance company is restricted to Rs. 15,000.
6. The appeal is allowed with the costs of the appellants, to be paid by the respondents in equal share.

Legal Principle / Ratio

Where the facts proved show an accident that does not happen without negligence, and the car was in the defendant's management, the defendant must disprove negligence. A master is liable for a servant's tort done in the scope or course of employment, including a lift given by a manager who drives on the master's business.

Key holding: "it is reasonable to presume, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the Manager had authority to carry Purshottam".

Not decided: whether the wider Navarro extension should be accepted in India. The Court also disagreed with the criminal-act passage attributed to Goddard, C.J.

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

• The Court's own calculation takes five years of earnings at Rs. 25,500 and adds Rs. 2,000. It does not repeat the Tribunal's Rs. 6,000 deduction for the deceased's personal spending. The judgment gives no reason.
• The Court says it restores the Tribunal's award, but the final figure of Rs. 27,500 is lower than the Tribunal's Rs. 33,209.15.
• The Court explains two routes to liability under the Young v. Edward Box test: ostensible authority, and acting in the course of employment. It does not choose between them, because the respondents would be liable under both.
• The Court left open whether the extended meaning in Navarro should be accepted in India.
• The insurance ruling depends on the policy wording, which the Court itself calls not very clearly worded.

Significance

• The case applies res ipsa loquitur to a road accident with no eyewitness and shifts the burden onto the driver's employer.
• It confirms the Supreme Court's acceptance of Lord Denning's two-question approach to vicarious liability.
• It shows that a gratuitous passenger's status as a trespasser as against the owner is not the test. The test is whether the servant acted in the course of employment.
• It records that section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act does not require insurance for passengers carried free of charge.

Exam-Important Points

• Facts in one line: a company manager drove a car into a tree near Chincholivad and a gratuitous passenger died. No eyewitness saw the driving.
• Rule: res ipsa loquitur applies where the car was under the defendant's management and such an accident does not ordinarily happen with proper care. Trap: the plea of inevitable accident puts the burden on the defendant.
• Rule: a master is liable if the servant's act is in the scope or course of employment or authority. Trap: a trespasser passenger can still recover in these circumstances.
• Lord Denning's two questions: first, is the servant liable? Second, must the employer shoulder that liability?
• Distinguish: Conway and Twine had notices or orders against carrying passengers. Houghton turned on an emergency.
• Compensation: Rs. 425 a month, Rs. 5,100 a year, Rs. 25,500 for 5 years, plus Rs. 2,000 special damages, giving Rs. 27,500. The allowances were not counted.
• Insurance: under section 95, passengers not carried for hire or reward need not be insured. The insurer owed only Rs. 15,000 under the policy endorsement.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. The judgment has no numbered paragraphs, so no paragraph numbers are cited.