Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh

Landlords in the Gwalior area said their tenants had lost their rights by not paying land revenue. They removed the tenants from the land without going to court. The Supreme Court held that this was not allowed, whatever the state of the tenants' rights.

Quick Revision

Parties

• Lallu Yeshwant Singh — appellant in the Supreme Court. The judgment names him as the son of Nahar Singh, now deceased, represented by Babu Singh. He was one of the plaintiffs below.
• Yeshwant Singh and other sons of Lallu Nahar Singh — the plaintiffs in the suit. They said they were gairdakhilkar cultivators.
• Rao Jagdish Singh — defendant No. 1 in the suit and respondent in the appeal. He was said to have forcibly stopped the plaintiffs from cultivating.
• Four other defendants — Rao Jagdish Singh was sued with 4 others. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 cultivated the land after the plaintiffs were stopped. Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 appeared in the appeal.
• Sikri J. — delivered the judgment of the Court. J.C. Shah J. was the other member of the bench.

Procedural History

1. The plaintiffs sued in the Court of the Tehsildar, Pargana Pichhore, District Gwalior, as Revenue Case No. 24 of 2000 S.Y. They sought possession of agricultural land under section 326 of the Qanoon Mal.
2. The Tehsildar decreed the suit. A decree is the court's formal order on the claim.
3. The Collector upheld the order on appeal.
4. The Commissioner upheld it on further appeal.
5. The Board of Revenue agreed with the Commissioner and dismissed the revision. It held that the tenant's possession does not end automatically when his right is extinguished. He must be legally dispossessed. It added that action should have been taken under section 137 of the Qanoon Ryotwari.
6. Rao Jagdish Singh and others filed Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 91 of 1955, read with Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 92 of 1955, in the High Court of Madhya Bharat under Article 227 of the Constitution.
7. The High Court accepted the applications. It quashed the decision of the Board of Revenue and dismissed the claim. The judgment and order are dated 24 September 1956.
8. The High Court held that the landlord did not have to file a suit under section 137. It held that nothing in the general law of lessor and lessee required the lessor to obtain a court order before ejecting the lessee. It read section 163 as requiring an enquiry into whether possession was wrongful.
9. The appellant came to the Supreme Court by special leave (the Court's permission to appeal) in Civil Appeal No. 145 of 1965.

Facts

1. The land in dispute is agricultural land. The suit was filed in the Tehsildar's Court, Pargana Pichhore, District Gwalior. The defendants said the village is a Ryotwari village.
2. The plaintiffs said they were gairdakhilkar cultivators of the land.
3. The plaintiffs said Rao Jagdish Singh, defendant No. 1, forcibly stopped them from cultivating. They said he got the land cultivated by defendants Nos. 2 and 3. They said he thus interfered with their possession.
4. The plaintiffs sued all the defendants for a decree for possession under section 326 of the Qanoon Mal.
5. The defendants said no suit could be brought against Jagirdars under section 326, since the village is a Ryotwari village.
6. The defendants said the plaintiffs had failed to pay revenue. They said the plaintiffs' rights were extinguished under section 82 of the Qanoon Ryotwari.
7. The judgment does not state the date of the dispossession.

Issues Raised

The judgment does not frame issues in so many words. The questions below follow the two contentions of the appellant and the points the Court decided.

1. Does non-payment of land revenue by a khatedar extinguish his right automatically under section 82(3) of the Qanoon Ryotwari?
2. Can a landlord forcibly enter and drive out a tenant whose tenancy is alleged to be extinguished, or must he take action under section 137 or go to court?
3. Do the words disturbed unlawfully in section 326 of the Qanoon Mal mean disturbed not in due course of law?
4. Does the word trespass in section 326 include forcible entry and dispossession by a landlord?
5. In a suit under section 326 read with section 163 of the Qanoon Ryotwari, is the question of title relevant?
6. Did the High Court err in quashing the decision of the Board of Revenue?

Arguments Contended

For the appellant (N.S. Bindra, P.W. Sahasrabudde and A.G. Ratnaparkhi appeared)

1. In a suit under section 326 of the Qanoon Mal, read with section 163 of the Qanoon Ryotwari, a plaintiff can recover possession. This applies if he was dispossessed from prior juridical possession within six months of the suit.
2. The question of title is irrelevant in such a suit.
3. A landlord cannot forcibly enter and drive out a tenant whose tenancy is alleged to be extinguished.

For the respondents (Rameshwar Nath and Mahinder Narain appeared for respondents Nos. 1 to 3)

1. At trial the respondents said the village is Ryotwari and no suit could be brought against Jagirdars under section 326.
2. They said the plaintiffs failed to pay revenue, so their rights were extinguished under section 82 of the Qanoon Ryotwari.
3. Counsel stressed the words in case of proof of trespass in section 326. He said a landlord does not commit trespass when he forcibly enters land held by a tenant whose tenancy has expired.
4. The respondents invited the Court's attention to State of West Bengal v. Birendra Nath Basunia (A.I.R. 1955 Cal. 601). The Calcutta High Court there refused an order under Article 226 stopping the Government from forcibly taking possession of land it had validly resumed.
5. The respondents relied on Hillaya Subbaya Hegde v. Narayanappa Timmaya ((1911) 13 B.L.R. 1200). It was cited for the true owner's right to retain possession even if obtained from a trespasser by force or other unlawful means.
6. Reference was also made to a number of English authorities. The judgment does not name them or say which side cited them.

Court's Reasoning

The report has no numbered paragraphs, so no paragraph numbers are cited. Sikri J. delivered one judgment for the Court (Sikri and Shah JJ.). There is no concurring or dissenting opinion. The steps follow the order of the judgment.

Sikri J. — judgment of the Court

1. Noted: the appeal by special leave was against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Bharat in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 91 of 1955, read with No. 92 of 1955. Those applications were filed under Article 227 by Rao Jagdish Singh and others.
2. Noted: by that judgment the High Court accepted the applications. It quashed the decision of the Board of Revenue. It dismissed the claim of Lallu Yeshwant Singh, son of Nahar Singh, now deceased, represented by Babu Singh.
3. Noted: the plaintiffs were Yeshwant Singh and other sons of Lallu Nahar Singh. They sued Rao Jagdish Singh and 4 others in the Tehsildar's Court for possession under section 326 of the Qanoon Mal. This was Revenue Case No. 24 of 2000 S.Y.
4. Noted: the plaintiffs' case was that they were gairdakhilkar cultivators. Rao Jagdish Singh had forcibly stopped them from cultivating and got the land cultivated by defendants Nos. 2 and 3.
5. Noted: the defendants said the village was a Ryotwari village and no suit lay against Jagirdars under section 326. They also said the plaintiffs' rights were extinguished under section 82 of the Qanoon Ryotwari for non-payment of revenue.
6. Noted: the Tehsildar decreed the suit. The Collector and the Commissioner upheld the order. The Board of Revenue dismissed the revision.
7. Noted: the appellant contended first that a plaintiff can recover possession if dispossessed from prior juridical possession within six months, and that title is irrelevant. He contended second that a landlord cannot forcibly enter and drive out a tenant whose tenancy is alleged to be extinguished.
8. Noted: the Court set out the statutory provisions. Section 82(3) of the Qanoon Ryotwari says the right of a khatedar is extinguished when he keeps the land revenue of his khata in arrears. The exception is where collection of land revenue is ordered to be postponed.
9. Noted: section 137 lists six steps against a khatedar who has not paid the year's land revenue one week before the last instalment. The proviso lets the Collector accept instalments up to three years from a good payer (khush-dehanda) whose default was for reasons beyond his control.
10. Noted: section 163 says suits of trespass and obstruction between khatedars, and between khatedars and others, go to the Sega (Department) court, with the limitation described in section 326 of the Qanoon Mal. Sections 326, 327, 328, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334 and 335 of the Qanoon Mal apply so far as applicable.
11. Noted: section 325 of the Qanoon Mal lets a person not in possession file a regular suit within three years of dispossession. Section 326 provides for summary suits within six months for return of possession disturbed unlawfully or for prevention of obstruction. Suits beyond that time are heard under section 325.
12. Noted: the Board of Revenue thought the tenant's right is extinguished by arrears of land revenue. It held that his possession does not end automatically and he must be legally dispossessed.
13. Noted: the Board said no act can be done by the strength of one's own hands. The law's help must be taken and the prescribed procedure followed. The Board added that action should have been taken under section 137.
14. Noted: the High Court held that the landlord was not bound to file a suit under section 137. It held that the proviso to section 137 did not stand in the way of that view.
15. Noted: the High Court held that the general law of lessor and lessee did not require a lessor to obtain a court order before ejecting a lessee. It read section 163 as requiring an enquiry into whether the possession is wrongful.
16. Held: on a true interpretation of the provisions, the Board of Revenue came to the correct conclusion.
17. Held: under section 82(3) a khatedar's right is extinguished if he keeps the revenue of his khata in arrears. But there is no automatic extinguishment.
18. Why: section 137 lets the Collector accept arrears from a good payer who has special reasons beyond his control.
19. Held: the proviso helps the tenant, not the landlord. If the High Court's reasoning were right, the proviso would become a dead letter.
20. Why: in every case of arrears the landlord could take possession forcibly without trying to recover the revenue under section 137.
21. Held: section 163 clearly provides for suits of the kind described in section 326.
22. Held: section 326 is very similar to section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The words disturbed unlawfully in section 326 mean "disturbed not in due course of law".
23. Why: otherwise there is no reason why section 326 gives a shorter limitation period and a summary procedure, while section 325 gives three years for a suit for possession.
24. Noted: counsel for the respondent stressed the words "in case of proof of trespass" in section 326. He said a landlord does not commit trespass when he forcibly enters land held by a tenant whose tenancy has expired.
25. Held: in the context, the word trespass in section 326 includes forcible entry and dispossession by the landlord.
26. Noted: reference was made to a number of English authorities. The Court did not deal with them.
27. Why: the law in India on this subject is different.
28. Noted: under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, it is well settled that the question of title is irrelevant in a suit under that section.
29. Held: section 326 of the Qanoon Mal, read with section 163 of the Qanoon Ryotwari, has a structure similar to section 9. So there is no reason to interpret section 326 differently.
30. Noted: in Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy, the Privy Council observed: "In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court."
31. Noted: in K.K. Verma v. Naraindas C. Malkani, Chagla C.J. said the law in India is essentially different from the law in England.
32. Noted: Chagla C.J. said that under Indian law the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected. He may have no right to continue after the tenancy ends, but "his possession is juridical and that possession is protected by statute".
33. Noted: Chagla C.J. added that under section 9 a former tenant may sue his landlord for possession if the landlord deprives him of it otherwise than in due course of law. A trespasser who has been thrown out cannot sue under section 9 against the true owner.
34. Noted: in Yar Mohammad v. Lakshmi Das, the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court said no question of title of either side can be raised in a section 9 suit. The plaintiff succeeds without proving title, and the defendant fails even if he can establish the best title.
35. Noted: the Full Bench said restoration of possession in such a suit is subject to a regular title suit. The person with the real or better title is not prejudiced and can prove title in a regular suit and recover possession.
36. Noted: the Full Bench also said "Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it". It said the law will not let a person take the law into his own hands or dispossess a person in actual possession without going to court.
37. Noted: the Full Bench said no person can be a judge in his own cause. It quoted Edge C.J. in Wali Ahmad Khan v. Ayodhya Kundu. He said the section aimed to drive a person who wants to eject another into the proper court. It aimed also to stop him from ejecting such persons with a high hand.
38. Noted: the respondent invited attention to State of West Bengal v. Birendra Nath Basunia. There the Calcutta High Court refused an order under Article 226 stopping the Government from forcibly taking possession of land validly resumed.
39. Held: the Court was not concerned with that question. But it did not agree with the conclusion of the Calcutta High Court that a lessor in India may use force to throw out his lessee.
40. Noted: Hillaya Subbaya Hegde v. Narayanappa Timmaya observed that the true owner of property may retain possession even if he obtained it from a trespasser by force or other unlawful means. That passage cited Lillu bin Raghushet v. Annaji Parashram and Bandu v. Naba.
41. Held: the Court could not see how that decision helps the respondent.
42. Why: it was not a suit under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act.
43. Noted: Lillu bin Raghushet v. Annaji Parashram recognised that a breach of the peace in attempting to take possession gives a ground for criminal prosecution. If the attempt succeeds, it also gives a ground for a summary suit for restoration of possession under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. That case cited Dadabhai Narsidas v. The Sub-Collector of Broach.
44. Noted: in Bandu v. Naba, Sargent C.J. said the Indian Legislature has provided for summary removal of anyone who dispossesses another, peaceably or otherwise than by due course of law. He said that, subject to that provision, there is no reason to hold the rightful owner who dispossesses another to be a trespasser. The owner may rely on the title vested in him to support his possession, as he may under English law. He added that West J. appeared to take the same view in Lillu v. Annaji.
45. Held: the law on this point has been correctly stated by the Privy Council, by Chagla C.J. and by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court.
46. Held: the High Court erred in quashing the order of the Board of Revenue.

Provisions

• Qanoon Ryotwari, section 82(3) — the right of a pukhta maurusi, sakitul milkiyat or mamuli maurusi is extinguished when the khatedar keeps the land revenue of his khata in arrears. The exception is where collection is ordered to be postponed.
• Qanoon Ryotwari, section 137 — if the whole year's revenue is not paid one week before the last instalment date, the khatedar may be dealt with by six steps. They are issue of process, arrest, attachment and sale of movables, attachment and sale of immovables, confiscation of the khata with ejectment of the defaulter, and auction of the khata. The proviso lets the Collector accept instalments up to three years from a good payer whose default was beyond his control.
• Qanoon Ryotwari, section 163 — suits of trespass and obstruction go to the Sega (Department) court, with the limitation described in section 326 of the Qanoon Mal. These suits are between khatedars, or between khatedars and others. Sections 326, 327, 328, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334 and 335 of the Qanoon Mal apply so far as applicable.
• Qanoon Mal, section 325 — a cultivator not in possession may file a regular suit in the Tehsil court within three years of dispossession, on stamp paper. For a person in actual physical possession, the Patwari enters his name in the revenue papers.
• Qanoon Mal, section 326(1) — suits between Malguzars and cultivators, or between cultivators, for return of possession disturbed unlawfully (Beja Tot Par) or to prevent obstruction go to the summary jurisdiction of the Pargana revenue Court or Tappa courts. The suits concern agricultural lands, thrashing grounds, roads, forests, pastures, gardens, trees, wells, irrigation and tanks. The time limit is six months. On proof of trespass or obstruction, possession and damages are awarded and bonds may be taken.
• Qanoon Mal, section 326(3) — suits after that time are entertained under section 325 in the regular jurisdiction.
• Specific Relief Act, 1877, section 9 — the Court called section 326 very similar to it. The judgment does not set out the text of section 9. The Court said that under section 9 the question of title is irrelevant. The quoted passages say a person dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law may sue summarily.
• Constitution, Article 227 — the provision under which Rao Jagdish Singh and others applied to the High Court.
• Constitution, Article 226 — mentioned only in Birendra Nath Basunia, where the Calcutta High Court refused an order against the Government.

Authorities

• Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy (51 I.A. 293 at 299) — Privy Council. Quoted for the rule that in India forcible possession is not permitted. The Court held the law correctly stated there.
• K.K. Verma v. Naraindas C. Malkani (I.L.R. [1954] Bom. 950 at 957) — Chagla C.J. Quoted for the protection of a former tenant's juridical possession. The Court held the law correctly stated there.
• Yar Mohammad v. Lakshmi Das (I.L.R. [1958] 2 All. 394) — Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. Quoted on irrelevance of title and respect for possession. The Court held the law correctly stated there.
• Wali Ahmad Khan v. Ayodhya Kundu ([1891] I.L.R. 13 All. 537 at 556) — Edge C.J. Quoted within Yar Mohammad on the object of the section.
• State of West Bengal v. Birendra Nath Basunia (A.I.R. 1955 Cal. 601) — cited by the respondent. The Court did not agree that a lessor in India may use force against his lessee.
• Hillaya Subbaya Hegde v. Narayanappa Timmaya ((1911) 13 B.L.R. 1200) — cited by the respondent. The Court said it was not a section 9 suit and did not help the respondent.
• Lillu bin Raghushet v. Annaji Parashram ([1881] I.L.R. 5 Bom. 387) — cited within Hillaya. The Court noted it recognised a summary suit under section 9 after a successful forcible taking.
• Bandu v. Naba ([1890] I.L.R. 15 Bom. 238) — cited within Hillaya. The Court quoted Sargent C.J. on the Legislature's provision for summary removal.
• Dadabhai Narsidas v. The Sub-Collector of Broach (7 Bom. H.C. Rep. 82 A.C.J.) — cited within Lillu for the summary suit under section 9.
• Lillu v. Annaji — the short name used for the same Bombay decision, where West J. is said to have taken the same view as Sargent C.J.
• English authorities — referred to generally. The Court did not deal with them.
• Also cited in footnotes: none beyond the reports listed above.

Judgement

1. The High Court erred in quashing the order of the Board of Revenue.
2. The appeal was allowed with costs.
3. The judgment of the High Court was set aside.
4. The order of the Board of Revenue was restored.

Legal Principle / Ratio

Non-payment of land revenue does not automatically extinguish a khatedar's right. The words disturbed unlawfully in section 326 of the Qanoon Mal mean disturbed otherwise than in due course of law. In such a suit title is irrelevant, and a landlord may not forcibly dispossess a tenant.

Key holding, from the Privy Council passage the Court approved: "In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court."

Subsequent Treatment

Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao

• Krishna Ram Mahale (Dead), By His Lrs. v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao ((1989) 4 SCC 131; AIR 1989 SC 2097).
• Court and date: Supreme Court of India, 9 August 1989. Bench: K.N. Singh and M.H. Kania. Kania J. wrote the judgment.
• Defendant No. 3 argued that the licence had ended, so the plaintiff had no right to stay on the business and premises (para 8 of that judgment).
• The Court rejected that argument. It said the law is well-settled. A person in settled possession cannot be dispossessed by the owner except by recourse to law. This holds even if he had no right to remain (para 8 of that judgment).
• For this it referred to the Division Bench decision in Lallu Yeshwant Singh. It said that case cited with approval the Privy Council passage in Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy (para 8 of that judgment).
• Counsel pointed out that some of those observations arose in suits under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, or the analogous provisions of the 1877 Act. The Court said this made no difference, since the suit was filed within a few weeks of the dispossession and well before six months (para 9 of that judgment).

Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur

• Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur ((2019) 8 SCC 729; AIR 2019 SC 3827).
• Court and date: Supreme Court of India, 7 August 2019. Bench: M.R. Shah, S. Abdul Nazeer and Arun Mishra. Arun Mishra J. wrote the judgment.
• The question before the Court was whether a person claiming title by adverse possession can sue under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit would seek declaration of title and a permanent injunction or restoration of possession (para 1 of that judgment).
• The Court cited Lallu Yeshwant Singh as holding that taking forcible possession is illegal. It said a landlord has no right to re-enter by showing force or intimidation. He must proceed under the law (para 12 of that judgment).
• It said the Supreme Court affirmed the Privy Council decision in Midnapur Zamindary Company Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy and other decisions. It then set out the passages from Lallu Yeshwant Singh (para 12 of that judgment).
• It added that the Supreme Court has approved the decision of the Privy Council and of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Yar Mohammad v. Laxmi Das (para 12 of that judgment).
• Later in the judgment the Court repeated the rule. In India the law respects possession. Persons are not permitted to take the law into their hands and dispossess a person in possession by force, as observed in Lallu Yeshwant Singh. A suit can be filed only on the possessory title, for appropriate relief under the Specific Relief Act, by a person in possession (para 51 of that judgment).

Comparative Analysis

• This case and Krishna Ram Mahale both protect a person who was put out of possession without going to court. Here the dispute was between landlords and tenant-cultivators under Gwalior revenue law. In Krishna Ram Mahale it concerned a restaurant business and its premises held under an agreement the defendant said had expired (paras 4 and 8 of that judgment).
• In this case the Court relied on the structure of section 326 of the Qanoon Mal, which it compared with section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. In Krishna Ram Mahale the Court said it made no difference that some observations arose in section 6 suits. The suit there was filed within six months (para 9 of that judgment).
• Ravinder Kaur Grewal cites this case in paras 12 and 51 of that judgment. It also discusses Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander and Somnath Berman v. Dr. S.P. Raju on possessory suits and adverse possession (paras 11 and 13 of that judgment).

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

• The judgment records no finding that the plaintiffs were khatedars, whether arrears existed or who held the better title. It decided that force could not be used.
• The judgment records the defence that no suit lies against Jagirdars under section 326. It does not say how the Court answered that defence.
• The judgment does not state the date of the dispossession. It does not show how the six-month period in section 326 was checked.
• The Court did not deal with the English authorities. It said the law in India is different.
• The Court did not decide the Article 226 question raised in Birendra Nath Basunia. It disagreed only with the view that a lessor may use force.
• The report does not state the amount of costs.

Significance

• The case holds that a landlord cannot forcibly eject a defaulting tenant. He must follow the process of law.
• It treats the tenant's non-payment of revenue as not automatically ending his right. The Collector's power to accept arrears is part of the scheme.
• It reads a summary possession remedy in the Gwalior revenue law in the same way as section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877.
• Krishna Ram Mahale (1989) used it as authority for the rule on settled possession. Ravinder Kaur Grewal (2019) cited it for the rule that forcible possession is illegal.

Exam-Important Points

• Rule: a landlord cannot forcibly dispossess a tenant, even where he says the tenancy is extinguished. Trap: the Court did not decide who had the better title.
• Rule: non-payment of land revenue under section 82(3) does not extinguish the right automatically. Trap: the proviso to section 137 and the Collector's power to accept arrears were central.
• Rule: the words disturbed unlawfully in section 326 mean disturbed not in due course of law.
• Rule: the word trespass in section 326 includes forcible entry and dispossession by the landlord.
• Rule: title is irrelevant in a suit of this kind, as under section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. A regular title suit stays open to the person with the better title.
• Rule: English authorities were not needed, since the law in India is different.
• Fact: the High Court had acted under Article 227. The Supreme Court restored the Board of Revenue's order and awarded costs.
• Cases to link: Midnapur Zamindary Company (Privy Council), K.K. Verma, Yar Mohammad, and later Krishna Ram Mahale and Ravinder Kaur Grewal.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. The report has no numbered paragraphs, so no paragraph numbers are cited for this judgment. Paragraph numbers in Subsequent Treatment are those of the later judgments.