| Court | Supreme Court of India (largest-ever Constitution Bench) |
|---|---|
| Bench | S.M. Sikri, C.J., J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Grover, A.N. Ray, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, D.G. Palekar, H.R. Khanna, K.K. Mathew, M.H. Beg, S.N. Dwivedi, A.K. Mukherjea and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ. (13 judges, 7:6) |
| Year | 1973 (decided 24 April 1973) |
| Cited in | Nature and Salient Features of the Indian Constitution (Notes) |
A Hindu religious head's challenge to Kerala's land reforms grew into the largest bench the Supreme Court has ever assembled, and produced, by the narrowest possible margin, the single most important sentence in Indian constitutional law: Parliament can amend anything in the Constitution — except the Constitution itself.
His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru, head of the Edneer Mutt — petitioner; challenging Kerala land reform legislation affecting the mutt's property.
State of Kerala and others — respondents; defending the land reform legislation and the constitutional amendments protecting it.
Kesavananda Bharati, the head (Swamiji) of a religious mutt in Kerala, challenged the Kerala Land Reforms Act, which imposed restrictions on the management of the mutt's properties, as violating his Fundamental Rights. The case was filed against the backdrop of a much larger constitutional confrontation: Parliament, seeking to insulate land reform and other social-welfare legislation from Fundamental Rights challenges, had passed a series of constitutional amendments — including the 24th, 25th and 29th Amendments — that expanded Parliament's power to amend Part III and inserted laws into the Ninth Schedule to shield them from judicial review altogether.
This followed directly from I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967), where the Supreme Court had held that Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights at all, since a constitutional amendment was itself "law" for the purposes of Article 13, and any amendment abridging Part III was void. Golak Nath had created a serious practical deadlock: Parliament needed to amend Fundamental Rights to pursue land reform and other Directive Principle-driven legislation, but the Court had held it lacked the power to do so at all. Kesavananda Bharati's petition became the vehicle through which the Supreme Court, sitting in its largest-ever bench of thirteen judges, revisited this entire question afresh.
On behalf of Kesavananda Bharati (Petitioner): It was argued that Parliament's amending power under Article 368, however broadly worded, could not be read as an unlimited power to rewrite the Constitution's fundamental character or identity — a power to "amend" presupposes the continued existence of the thing being amended, and cannot logically include a power to destroy or replace it entirely; certain core features of the Constitution — its democratic and republican character, the separation of powers, the supremacy of the Constitution itself, and the protection of at least the essence of Fundamental Rights — were beyond the reach of the amending power, whatever the correct outer limit of that protection might be.
On behalf of the State of Kerala and the Union of India (Respondents): It was argued that Article 368 conferred an unqualified power on Parliament, as the body directly representing the sovereign will of the people, to amend any part of the Constitution, including Part III, without any implied limitation reading words into the text that were not there; Golak Nath's blanket prohibition on amending Fundamental Rights had proved unworkable and needed to be overruled to allow the elected legislature the flexibility necessary to pursue social and economic transformation through land reform and similar measures.
By the narrowest possible majority — 7 judges to 6 — the Court overruled Golak Nath's absolute prohibition, holding that Parliament does have the power under Article 368 to amend any part of the Constitution, including the Fundamental Rights in Part III. However, the majority held that this amending power, however wide, is not unlimited: it does not include the power to amend the Constitution in a way that damages or destroys its "basic structure" or essential identity. The majority reasoned that the word "amend" itself implies change within the framework of the existing Constitution, not its abrogation or replacement with a fundamentally different one; a constituent power to alter the Constitution's text could not, without express and unambiguous words to that effect, be read as extending to a power to destroy the document's foundational character.
While the thirteen judges did not agree on a single, closed list of what constitutes the "basic structure," the elements identified across the various opinions — and confirmed in subsequent cases — came to include the supremacy of the Constitution, the republican and democratic form of government, the secular character of the Constitution, the separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary, the federal character of the Constitution, and the power of judicial review. On the specific amendments under challenge, the Court largely upheld the 24th and 25th Amendments (subject to this basic structure limitation), while striking down the portion of the 25th Amendment that sought to exclude judicial review of whether a law genuinely gave effect to Article 39(b)/(c).
By a 7:6 majority, the Supreme Court held that Parliament's power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 is wide and extends to Fundamental Rights, overruling Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, but held that this power does not extend to amending the Constitution in a manner that damages or destroys its "basic structure."
Parliament's power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 is plenary and extends to every part of the Constitution, including the Fundamental Rights in Part III, but it does not include the power to abrogate or destroy the "basic structure" or essential identity of the Constitution — including, among other elements, its supremacy, its republican and democratic character, its secular character, the separation of powers, its federal character, and the power of judicial review. An amendment that damages the basic structure is unconstitutional even if passed through the full procedure prescribed by Article 368.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala is the single most important judgment in Indian constitutional law, having originated the basic structure doctrine that has since protected the Constitution's core identity through decades of political change, most dramatically during the vindication that followed in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) and the invalidation of the 1975 Emergency-era excesses. Decided by the largest bench the Supreme Court has ever convened, by the narrowest possible margin, it remains the foundational authority cited in nearly every subsequent case testing the validity of a constitutional amendment, and its basic structure doctrine has itself been described by scholars and courts as an unamendable feature of the Constitution — the ultimate safeguard against any future attempt, by any majority however large, to subvert India's constitutional democracy through the formally valid process of amendment.
Facts, bench and citation verified against IndianKanoon's report of the judgment and independent case-law summaries.