Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar

Four appeals asked whether the sedition (inciting disaffection against the Government) offence in Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 505 survive the free-speech guarantee in Article 19(1)(a). A Constitution Bench upheld both sections. It limited Section 124A to acts that involve incitement (urging others) to violence or an intention or tendency to create disorder.

Quick Revision

Parties

Kedar Nath Singh — appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 1957. A Begusarai (Bihar) speaker convicted under Sections 124A and 505(b) IPC.

State of Bihar — respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 1957. Its counsel, Mr. R.C. Prasad, adopted the submissions of Mr. C.B. Agarwala.

State of Uttar Pradesh — appellant in Criminal Appeals Nos. 124 to 126 of 1958. It challenged the Allahabad High Court's acquittals and the writ order.

Mohd. Ishaq Ihahi — respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 124 of 1958. He had been convicted under Section 124A for a speech at Aligarh.

Rama Nand — respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 1958. He had been convicted under Section 124A for a speech at Hanumanganj.

Parasnath Tripathi — respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 126 of 1958. He had applied for a writ of habeas corpus (a court order to produce a detained person) in the Allahabad High Court.

Attorney General of India — notice was issued to the Attorney General under Order 41, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, and his counsel argued on Article 374(2).

Procedural History

1. Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 1957: the First Class Magistrate at Begusarai (Monghyr, Bihar) framed two charges. After substantial oral evidence he convicted Kedar Nath Singh under Section 124A and Section 505(b) IPC. He sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year. No separate sentence was passed for Section 505(b).
2. Mr. Justice Naqui Imam of the Patna High Court, sitting singly, upheld the convictions and sentence on 9 April 1956 in Criminal Appeal No. 445 of 1955. He called the speech an abuse of the Government, full of incitements to revolution and certainly seditious. The constitutional validity of the sections was not argued before him.
3. Kedar Nath Singh obtained special leave (permission from the Supreme Court) to appeal. His petition took the ground that Sections 124A and 505 are inconsistent with Article 19(1)(a).
4. A Division Bench heard the appeal on 5 May 1959. It directed hearing by a Constitution Bench. On 4 November 1960 a Constitution Bench directed notice to the Attorney General. On 9 February 1961 the matter was adjourned for two months. This let the State Governments decide whether to press the prosecutions, and the Law Commission was considering amendment of the law of sedition. The States instructed counsel to press the appeals.
5. Criminal Appeal No. 124 of 1958: the Magistrate committed Mohd. Ishaq Ihahi to the Sessions Court after sanction. The Sessions Judge acquitted him under Section 153A on 8 January 1955. He convicted him under Section 124A and gave rigorous imprisonment for one year. In his appeal, the High Court heard the challenge to Section 124A.
6. Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 1958: Rama Nand was committed for trial and convicted under Section 124A. He got rigorous imprisonment for three years. The Sessions Judge held that he incited the audience to open violent rebellion with arms. He appealed to the Allahabad High Court.
7. Criminal Appeal No. 126 of 1958: Parasnath Tripathi, on trial under Section 124A, asked the Allahabad High Court for a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that Section 124A was void under Article 19(1)(a).
8. A Full Bench of Desai, Gurtu and Beg, JJ. (reported as Ram Nandan v. State) decided the three matters together. In separate but concurring judgments, they held Section 124A ultra vires (beyond legal power) Article 19(1)(a). They acquitted the accused in Appeals 124 and 125 and granted the writ in Appeal 126. The High Court gave certificates of fitness for appeal. The Supreme Court judgment was delivered on 20 January 1962.

Facts

1. On 26 May 1953, at village Barauni (Police Station Taghra, Monghyr), Kedar Nath Singh made a public speech. The Magistrate framed one charge under Section 124A and one charge under Section 505(b), both based on the same words.
2. The speech said that dogs of the C.I.D. were loitering and that the people had elected Congress goondas to the gaddi by mistake. It said official dogs would be liquidated along with the Congress goondas. It said the people who drove out the British would turn these Congress rulers out too.
3. It said the Congress rulers relied on American dollars and imposed taxes, and that they sucked the blood of mazdoors and kisans. It said zamindars and capitalists would also be brought before the people's court.
4. It said the Forward Communist Party would expose the black deeds of the Congress rulers, who were like the British with only the colour changed. It said they had set up a rule of lathis and bullets. It said the British had aeroplanes, guns, bombs and other weapons yet had to go.
5. It said the Forward Communist Party did not believe in votes but in revolution. In the flames of that revolution the capitalists, zamindars and Congress leaders, who had made it their profession to loot the country, would be reduced to ashes. A Government of the poor would be established on those ashes.
6. It said nothing could be expected from the Congress rulers, and that they set up Vinoba Bhave to divert attention. It called him an agent of the Congress Government and warned him not to become a puppet. The accused told the audience that the Congress Government would do them no good.
7. It ended with a message to the Congress tyrants. They were accused of entangling the people in bribery, black-marketing and corruption, while the children of the poor were hungry.
8. The Section 505(b) charge said the statement was made with intent to cause, or likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public, which might induce commission of an offence against the State and against public tranquillity.
9. Mohd. Ishaq Ihahi spoke at Aligarh on 30 October 1953 as Chairman of the Reception Committee of the All India Muslim Convention. The speech was thought to be seditious.
10. On 29 May 1954 the Bolshevik Party held a meeting at village Hanumanganj, District Basti. Rama Nand was found to have advocated violence to overthrow the Government established by law.
11. On 26 September 1955 Parasnath Tripathi spoke at village Mansapur (Police Station Akbarpur, District Faizabad). He is alleged to have urged the audience to raise a volunteer army and resist the Government and its servants by violence. He is also alleged to have created feelings of hatred and enmity against the Government.

Issues Raised

1. Are Sections 124A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code void because they violate Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution?
2. Does clause (2) of Article 19, as amended in 1951, save these sections? They would need to be restrictions in the interests of the security of the State or public order (peace and order in society).
3. Should Section 124A be read as the Federal Court read it in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar, or as the Privy Council read it in Bhalerao? The Federal Court needed disorder or its tendency. Was disaffection alone enough, as the Privy Council held?
4. If the section can be read both ways, may the Court choose the narrower reading to avoid unconstitutionality?
5. Is Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code constitutionally valid?

Arguments Contended

For the appellants challenging the sections (Kedar Nath Singh; the Uttar Pradesh respondents)

Mr. Janardan Sharma, for Kedar Nath Singh in Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 1957

1. Sections 124A and 505 are ultra vires because they contravene Article 19(1)(a).
2. A speech may or may not disturb public order, but Section 124A punishes both kinds. It hits permissible and impermissible speech together.
3. The Explanations to Section 124A do not affect the interpretation of the main section.
4. In a democracy, a citizen may criticise the Government with a view to change it.
5. Two questions arise: whether Section 124A enacts a law in the interest of public order, and whether it imposes reasonable restrictions in that interest.
6. The Allahabad decision (I.L.R. (1958) 2 All. 84) declaring Section 124A ultra vires states the law correctly.

Mr. R.C. Prasad, for the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 1957

1. He referred to Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P. [1957] S.C.R. 860. He said he would adopt the submissions of Mr. C.B. Agarwala.

Mr. Gopal Behari, for the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 124 of 1958

1. The High Court accepted the Privy Council's reading of Section 124A. Even in English law, sedition does not necessarily include an intention to disturb public order (79 C.L.R. 101).
2. Explanations 2 and 3 would be redundant if Section 124A incorporated the English view of sedition.
3. The Allahabad High Court and other High Courts gave the same reading as the Privy Council. He cited 1941 All. 156, 1930 Lah. 309, 56 Cal. 1085 and 10 Luck. 712.
4. Lohia's case [1960] 2 S.C.R. 821 governs this case. Section 124A punishes speech with no tendency to disturb public order, so it contravenes Article 19(1)(a). Article 19(2) does not save it.
5. The Court cannot rewrite the section to confine it to speeches that tend to disturb public order. The whole section must fail, as it cannot be dissected.
6. Before the Court, he relied entirely on the Allahabad Full Bench decision. Mr. Sharma also relied on it.

For the State (Uttar Pradesh and the State of Bihar side)

Mr. C.B. Agarwala, for the State of Uttar Pradesh in Criminal Appeals Nos. 124 to 126 of 1958

1. The Allahabad Full Bench was wrong to hold that Section 124A is not in the interest of public order. The section comes within the saving clause (2) of Article 19.
2. The correct meaning of Section 124A is that given by the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar, 1942 F.C.R. 38, not the Privy Council's meaning in Bhalerao, 74 I.A. 89.
3. Courts' reading of statutory words changes as society changes. Section 124A is in a chapter on offences against the State, so it is not a libel on an officer but an offence against the State.
4. English law uses the same words. He cited Stephen's Commentaries, Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd edition), Jowitt's Dictionary and Stephen's History of Criminal Law. Under English law a tendency to create tumult or disorder is an essential element. He cited Russell on Crimes, R. v. Collins and R. v. Sullivan.
5. Section 124A was taken from English law (22 Bom. 152), so it must be read as sedition is read in England.
6. Articles 133 and 133A of the Canadian Criminal Code (sedition) were given the same reading (1951 Canadian S.C.R. 265).
7. The view in Tilak's case (22 Bom. 112), Bhalerao and Wallace Johnson that incitement to violence or tendency to disorder is not necessary is wrong. Devi Saran's case (32 Pat. 1124) takes the Federal Court view.
8. The Court should accept the Federal Court's reading, which makes the section constitutional.
9. Even on the Privy Council's reading, Section 124A is valid. It plainly covers speech likely to disturb public order. The fact that some cases without likely disorder are also covered cannot invalidate it. He relied on Ramji Lal Modi and Virendra's case [1958] S.C.R. 308.
10. Lohia's case does not apply. There the link between the provision and public disorder was too remote.
11. Even on the Privy Council view, the two classes of cases are severable. He cited [1957] S.C.R. 930, [1941] F.C. 72, [1951] S.C.R. 682, [1953] 1059 and 65 L. Ed. 1139.
12. In reply: English law needs a tendency to cause tumult or disorder. He cited R. v. Aldred, 22 Cox C.C. 1, R. v. Burdott and R. v. O'Brien, 6 St. Tr. (N.S.) 571. The Privy Council said only that actual incitement to violence is not necessary. It did not say that a tendency to disturb public order is unnecessary.
13. Even if public order is not an ingredient, speeches that bring or attempt to bring the Government into hatred or contempt, or excite dissatisfaction, are covered.

Mr. P. Verma, for the Attorney General

1. Under Article 374(2) of the Constitution, a decision of the Federal Court is to be deemed a decision of the Supreme Court. Niharendu Dutt Majumdar (1942 F.C.R. 38) should be held binding.
2. A tendency to disturb public order is inherent in Section 124A itself.

Court's Reasoning

Opinion of B.P. Sinha, C.J. (for the Constitution Bench)

1. Noted: The main question is whether Sections 124A and 505 have become void under Article 19(1)(a). The challenge to Section 124A is common to all appeals.
2. Noted: In Appeal 169 of 1957 the charges were framed in full to bring out the gravamen of the charge. The speech passages, the conviction, and the High Court observations are recorded in Facts and Procedural History.
3. Noted: The High Court had not considered constitutionality. The question reached the Supreme Court through special leave, the Division Bench reference and the Constitution Bench hearings. The States were told to press their appeals.
4. Noted: Mr. Agarwala said the Allahabad Full Bench was wrong. He said Section 124A fell within the saving clause 2 of Article 19. He relied on Niharendu Dutt Majumdar, Stephen's Commentaries (21st edition, Volume IV, page 141) and Halsbury's Laws. Mr. Gopal Behari and Mr. Sharma relied on the Allahabad decision.
5. Noted (history): The section began as section 113 of Macaulay's Draft Penal Code of 1837-39. It was left out of the Penal Code as enacted in 1860, for a reason that is not clear. It was added in 1870 by Act XXVII of 1870. The 1870 text punished exciting feelings of disaffection to the Government in British India, with one Explanation on fair disapprobation.
6. Noted: In Queen-Empress v. Jogender Bose (the Bangobasi case), Chief Justice Petheram told the jury that disaffection means feeling contrary to affection. He said words calculated to create a disposition not to obey lawful authority were enough, even if no disturbance followed.
7. Noted: In Queen-Empress v. Balgangadhar Tilak, Strachey, J. told the jury that disaffection means the absence of affection, including hatred, enmity, dislike, hostility, contempt and every form of ill-will. The amount of disaffection is immaterial except for punishment. It is immaterial whether any feeling was excited, because an attempt is punished equally. The offence is not inciting mutiny or rebellion. He rejected the view that incitement to rebellion is needed.
8. Noted: The Court quoted the Tilak charge at length because it drew much comment later. It omitted the part on the Explanation, which has since become three Explanations. The jury found Tilak guilty by six to three.
9. Noted: The Bombay Full Bench (Farran C.J., Candy and Strachey JJ.) refused leave to appeal to the Privy Council. At that stage Tilak argued that the Government sanction was not sufficient in law, because it did not set out the offending articles. He also argued that the judge misdirected the jury on disaffection. The Bench dealt with the second point. It said the argument that a direct incitement to disorder or rebellion is needed goes well beyond the words of the section. It held that absence of affection, read in context, meant an active sentiment on the other side. It added that no miscarriage of justice was alleged.
10. Noted: Before the Privy Council, Mr. Asquith Q.C. argued that the direction was too wide. The Lord Chancellor refused special leave. Taking the whole summing up, they saw no reason to dissent from it (Gangadhar Tilak v. Queen Empress).
11. Noted: The Allahabad Full Bench (Edge C.J.) in Queen Empress v. Amba Prasad generally adopted Calcutta and Bombay. It said a man may be guilty although his article urges obedience. It noted that Bombay's Satara case held disaffection to mean political alienation, discontent or disloyalty. Ranade J. read it as a positive feeling of aversion akin to ill will. The accused pleaded guilty there, so the implications were not examined in detail.
12. Noted: The Indian Penal Code Amendment Act IV of 1898 replaced the single Explanation by three. Adaptation orders of 1937, 1948 and 1950 followed the Government of India Act 1935, the Independence Act 1947 and the Constitution.
13. Noted (the present section): Section 124A now punishes words, spoken or written, signs or visible representation that bring or attempt to bring into hatred or contempt, or excite or attempt to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law in India. Punishment is transportation for life or a shorter term, imprisonment up to three years, with fine, or fine alone.
14. Noted (Explanations): Explanation 1 says disaffection includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. Explanation 2 says comments disapproving the Government's measures, to get them changed by lawful means, without exciting hatred, contempt or disaffection, are not an offence. Explanation 3 says the same for comments on administrative or other action.
15. Noted: Sedition appears in the IPC chapter headed Of offences against the State. The judgment calls it Chapter IV in one place and Chapter VI in another. It was not invented by the British Government in India and has been known in England for centuries. Every State must be able to punish those who jeopardise its safety and stability or spread disloyalty that tends to disruption or public disorder.
16. Noted: Stephen's Commentaries say the law must reconcile the right of private criticism with the safety of the State. Sedition is conduct whose object or natural consequence is unlawful display of dissatisfaction with the Government. It lists five heads of sedition. Criticism on political matters is not itself seditious. The law interferes when discussion passes the bounds of fair criticism, especially when public disorder is a natural consequence.
17. Noted: This statement is derived from Fitzgerald J.'s charge in Reg v. Alexander Martin Sullivan. He described sedition as practices calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the State. Its tendency is to incite insurrection and rebellion. In Rex v. Aldred, Coleridge J. said sedition denotes tumult, insurrection or uproar and implies violence or lawlessness in some form.
18. Noted: In Niharendu Dutt Majumdar, Gwyer C.J. (Federal Court) said the duty of every Government is to preserve order. He said sedition answers those who seek to disturb the State's tranquillity. He said words constitute sedition if they have the intention or tendency to create disturbance or disorder. Section 124A was taken from English law. He ended that "Public disorder, or the reasonable anticipation or likelihood of public disorder, is thus the gist of the offence."
19. Noted: The Privy Council in King-Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao did not approve this. It said England has no statutory definition of sedition, but the Code does. It held that excite disaffection does not include excite disorder. It approved Tilak and Annie Basant. It said the Federal Court's decision rested on a wrong construction of Section 124A and of Rule 34(6)(e) of the Defence of India Rules.
20. Noted: The Privy Council in Wallace Johnson v. The King (Gold Coast Criminal Code section 326) had also held that incitement to violence is not a necessary ingredient of sedition.
21. Noted (conflict of authority): There is a direct conflict between the Federal Court and the Privy Council. Either view can be taken for good reasons. The Federal Court followed the pre-existing English Common Law. It does not appear that the Privy Council rulings were brought to its notice.
22. Noted: This Court had not decided the question directly. Observations on free speech and seditious writing were made in 1950 in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras and Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi. Both were heard by Kania C.J. and five other judges and decided on 26 May 1950.
23. Noted: In Romesh Thappar, the majority struck down section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act as beyond Article 19(2). In Brij Bhushan, the same majority struck down section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act as extended to Delhi.
24. Noted: Patanjali Sastri J. in Romesh Thappar observed that sedition was deleted from draft Article 13(2). He said criticism exciting disaffection is not a ground for restricting speech unless it undermines the security of the State or tends to overthrow it. He noted that the Irish formula undermining the public order or the authority of the State was not adopted. He quoted Madison on leaving a few noxious branches to grow rather than harm the yield (quoted in Near v. Minnesotta).
25. Noted: This Court said those observations brought out the difference between security of the State and public order. Public order was not in Article 19(2) as it stood originally, so the section was struck down.
26. Noted: Fazl Ali J. dissented in both cases. In Romesh Thappar he asked whether disorders menacing the peace and tranquillity of the Province, and public safety, undermine the security of the State. He said the answer must be yes. He could not understand the argument that a seditious document may be barred but one disturbing public tranquillity may not. He said sedition owes its gravity to its tendency to create disorder. Sir James Stephen classed it as an offence against public tranquillity.
27. Noted: In Brij Bhushan he said the framers faced a dilemma over the word sedition. They used wider words that cover sedition and everything that makes it serious. Sedition undermines the State's security usually through public disorder.
28. Noted: Parliament then amended Article 19(2) by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, section 3, with retrospective effect. This accepted Fazl Ali J.'s view that the security of the State is allied to public order.
29. Noted: In Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., the validity of section 295A IPC was challenged. The Court said "in the interests of" is wider than for the maintenance of. A law may be in the interests of public order though not designed to maintain it directly. It cited Debi Saran v. State of Bihar. This does not bear directly on the present point but shows the legislature's wide power.
30. Noted: Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression. Clause (2), after amendment, allows reasonable restrictions in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. Everyone agreed the right is not absolute.
31. Noted: The Government established by law is the visible symbol of the State. If it is subverted, the State is in jeopardy. This is why sedition is placed among offences against the State.
32. Noted: The "Government established by law" must be distinguished from the persons carrying on the administration for the time being.
33. Held: Acts under Section 124A that subvert the Government by bringing it into contempt or hatred are within the penal section. Why: disloyalty or enmity towards the Government implies a tendency to public disorder by violence or incitement to violence. The section covers words implying subversion by violent means, called revolution.
34. Held: The section makes clear that strong words expressing disapprobation of measures, to improve or alter them by lawful means, are outside it. Comments, however strongly worded, that do not excite feelings generating public disorder by violence are not penal. Disloyalty is not the same as commenting in strong terms on the Government.
35. Held: No one argued that a speech inciting violence or tending to disorder falls outside sedition. The argument was that very strong speech or vigorous criticism of Government measures or officials might also be caught. In the Court's opinion, such words are outside the section.
36. Noted: The Court is the custodian of fundamental rights. It must strike down a law that unduly restricts free speech. Freedom of speech is the sine qua non (essential condition) of a democracy. Yet it must not become a licence for vilification of the Government in words that incite violence or tend to create public disorder. "A citizen has a right to say or write whatever he likes about the Government, or its measures" so long as he does not incite violence against the Government or intend to create public disorder.
37. Noted: If the Federal Court view is accepted, the gist of sedition is incitement to violence or the tendency or intention to create public disorder. That brings the law into line with the English law of sedition, as the 1870 legislators intended, and the law will be within clause 2. If instead a literal meaning is taken, divorced from this background as the Privy Council did, the section is not only within but also very much beyond clause 2.
38. Noted: Apart from clause 2, Sections 124A and 505 clearly violate Article 19(1)(a). The question is how far clause 2 saves them. The words in the interest of ... public order are of great amplitude (Virendra v. State of Punjab).
39. Held (first route in the opinion, the Federal Court reading): If disaffection or enmity alone, without any tendency to disorder, completed the offence, the sections would be unconstitutional. A provision capable of two readings, one valid and one invalid, must be read in the valid way. The section read as a whole with the Explanations aims at penalising only acts intended or tending to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence.
40. Held: Criticism of public measures or comment on Government action, however strongly worded, is within reasonable limits. The law steps in only when words have the harmful tendency or intention of creating public disorder. So construed, the section strikes the correct balance between individual rights and public order.
41. Held: A court should look at the antecedent history, the purpose and the mischief of legislation (The Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India). The Court had no hesitation in reading the sections to limit them to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder, disturbance of law and order, or incitement to violence (see Ratio for the wording).
42. Held (alternative route, if the literal reading is possible): Even if Section 124A can be read literally as the Privy Council read it, the Court may limit its application to avoid unconstitutionality. In Chamarbaugwalla, the Court chose the narrower meaning of prize competitions, limited to those of a gambling character. It upheld the Prize Competitions Act (XLII of 1955), including sections 4 and 5 and Rules 11 and 12.
43. Held: That ratio applies here. Section 124A is limited to activities involving incitement to violence or intention or tendency to create public disorder or disturb public peace. The Court did not need to discuss the authorities at pages 940 to 952 of that report in detail.
44. Held: The impugned sections impose restrictions on free speech. These restrictions are in the interest of public order and within the permissible legislative interference.
45. Held (Section 505): Each of its three clauses concerns making, publishing or circulating a statement, rumour or report. Clause (a) concerns causing mutiny or disregard of duty in the Army, Navy or Air Force. Each clause covers a statement, rumour or report made with intent, or likely, to cause the stated result. Clause (b) concerns causing fear or alarm to the public which may induce an offence against the State or public tranquillity. Clause (c) concerns inciting one class or community to commit an offence against another. Each element has reference to, and a direct effect on, the security of the State or public order. So Section 505 is within reasonable restrictions and Article 19(2) saves it.
46. Noted: The appellant in 169 of 1957 and the respondents in 124 to 126 of 1958 did not argue that their words fell outside sedition as interpreted. No such argument was advanced on the interpretation given.

Authorities

• Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. King Emperor, (1942) F.C.R. 38 (also cited as Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King Emperor) — followed. The Court preferred its reading that disorder, or its tendency, is the gist of sedition.
• King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, (1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 89 (also cited as King Emperor v. Sada Shiv Narayan; King-Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao) — not followed. The Privy Council held that excite disaffection does not include excite disorder.
• Wallace Johnson v. The King, [1940] A.C. 231 — not followed. The Privy Council held that incitement to violence is not needed for sedition under the Gold Coast Code.
• Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 594 (headnote spelling Romesh Thapar) — referred to. Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Act was struck down, and the deletion of sedition from Article 13(2) was noted.
• Brij Bhushan v. The State of Delhi, (1950) S.C.R. 605 (also cited as Brij Bhushan v. The State) — referred to. Section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act was struck down. Fazl Ali J.'s dissent was set out.
• Ramji Lal Modi v. The State of U.P., (1957) S.C.R. 860 (also cited as Ramji Lal Modi v. The State U.P.; Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U. P.) — referred to for the width of in the interests of.
• Debi Saran v. The State of Bihar (also cited as Devi Saran; Debi Saron) — cited within Ramji Lal Modi on in the interests of. Counsel cited it as 32 Pat. 1124.
• Virendra v. The State of Punjab, [1958] S.C.R. 308 — relied on for the amplitude of in the interest of ... public order.
• The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 603 — applied. A court looks at the antecedent history, purpose and mischief.
• R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. The Union of India, [1957] S.C.R. 930 — applied. A court limits a law to the reading that keeps it constitutional.
• Queen-Empress v. Jogender Bose (the case is also named Queen-Empress v. Jagendra Chunder Bose) — the Bangobasi case; Petheram C.J.'s charge on disaffection.
• Queen-Empress v. Balqanqaddhar Tilak (Balgangadhar Tilak) and Gangadhar Tilak v. Queen Empress (no citation given in the judgment) — Strachey J.'s charge; the Bombay Full Bench refused leave; the Privy Council refused special leave. Approved in Bhalerao.
• Stephen, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 21st edition, Volume IV, pages 141-142 — quoted for the definition and five heads of sedition. Halsbury, 3rd edition, Volume 10 — relied on by counsel.
• Queen Empress v. Amba Prasad — the Allahabad Full Bench, which generally adopted Calcutta and Bombay.
• The Satara case (Bombay Full Bench) — noted for its meaning of disaffection.
• Reg v. Alexander Martin Sullivan — Fitzgerald J.'s charge on sedition, the source of Stephen's statement.
• Rex v. Aldred — Coleridge J.'s statement that sedition implies violence or lawlessness.
• Annie Basant v. Advocate General of Madras — approved by the Privy Council in Bhalerao. It was a case under section 4 of the Indian Press Act, 1910.
• Near v. Minnesotta — cited within Romesh Thappar for Madison's remark on noxious branches.
• Ram Nandan v. State (Allahabad Full Bench, Desai, Gurtu and Beg JJ.) — the decision under appeal. It held Section 124A void.

Also cited in footnotes: none recorded. Cases in counsel's arguments (Lohia's case [1960] 2 S.C.R. 821, Devi Saran, R. v. Collins, R. v. Sullivan, R. v. Aldred, R. v. Burdott, R. v. O'Brien and the High Court reports) are listed under Arguments Contended.

Statutes and constitutional provisions mentioned

• Section 124A IPC — sedition (text above).
• Section 505 IPC — statements conducing to public mischief; clause (b) was charged.
• Section 153A IPC — the charge of which Mohd. Ishaq Ihahi was acquitted.
• Section 295A IPC — considered in Ramji Lal Modi.
• Article 19(1)(a) — freedom of speech and expression. Article 19(2) — reasonable restrictions, as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.
• Article 374(2) — Federal Court decisions deemed Supreme Court decisions (argued by the Attorney General's counsel).
• Article 13(2) of the Draft Constitution — sedition was deleted before it became Article 19(2).
• Articles 133 and 133A of the Canadian Criminal Code — sedition provisions cited by counsel.
• Order 41 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules — notice to the Attorney General.
• Letters Patent clause 41 — Tilak's leave application.
• Defence of India Act (XXXV of 1939), Rule 34(6)(e).
• Indian Press Act (I of 1910), section 4.
• Prize Competitions Act (XLII of 1955).
• Acts XXVII of 1870 and IV of 1898; section 326 of the Gold Coast Criminal Code.

Judgement

1. Criminal Appeal No. 169 of 1957 (Kedar Nath Singh) is dismissed.
2. Criminal Appeals Nos. 124 to 126 of 1958 (State of Uttar Pradesh) are allowed. They are sent back to the High Court to pass such order as it thinks fit and proper in light of the interpretation given.
3. Section 124A IPC is valid when limited to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder, or disturbance of law and order, or incitement to violence.
4. Section 505 IPC is valid. Article 19(2) saves it.
5. Costs: the judgment records no order on costs.

Legal Principle / Ratio

Section 124A is constitutional only because it is read down (reading down: narrowing a provision to keep it valid). It punishes only acts with intention or tendency to create disorder, or incitement to violence. Section 505 is valid because each of its elements has a direct effect on the security of the State or public order.

Key holding: "limit their application to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder, or disturbance of law and order, or incitement to violence".

Alternative route (arguably obiter): the Court also said the same result would follow even if Section 124A could be read literally as the Privy Council did. It could still be read down under the Chamarbaugwalla approach.

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

• The Court said either reading of Section 124A can be taken and supported on good reasons. It chose the one that kept the law valid, rather than testing the section as written.
• The Court said the sections, as written, are clearly violative of Article 19(1)(a) apart from clause (2). It saved them by limiting them to a narrower meaning than the words literally carry.
• The judgment reads the Explanations and the offence as already limited to violence-linked acts, yet it also says the Privy Council's literal reading is possible. The two routes are presented as alternatives.
• No argument was advanced that the appellant's own words fell outside the narrowed definition. The judgment therefore did not apply its test to the facts of the speeches.

Significance

• It is the leading Supreme Court judgment on sedition. It fixes incitement to violence or tendency to disorder as the test.
• It shows the court's duty to draw a line between a citizen's right under Article 19(1)(a) and the legislature's power under Article 19(2).
• It prefers the Federal Court reading over the Privy Council reading, which is a notable break from Privy Council authority after the Constitution.

Exam-Important Points

• Rule: Section 124A IPC is valid but covers only incitement to violence or an intention or tendency to create disorder. Trap: the Court did not strike it down.
• Conflict resolved: Niharendu Dutt Majumdar (Federal Court) is preferred to Bhalerao and Wallace Johnson (Privy Council).
• Technique: Where a law can be read two ways, the Court prefers the reading that keeps it constitutional (reading down).
• Article 19(2) wording: in the interests of public order is wider than for the maintenance of (Virendra; Ramji Lal Modi).
• Section 505 IPC: held valid, because its elements bear directly on State security or public order.
• Procedural trap: Appeal 169 of 1957 was dismissed. Appeals 124 to 126 of 1958 were allowed and remanded.
• Article 19(2) history: Public order was added by the First Amendment, 1951, after Romesh Thappar and Brij Bhushan.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. The judgment text has no numbered paragraphs, so no paragraph numbers are cited. The AIR and SCR citation is printed in the judgment text.