Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma

A woman lived with a man for years, knowing full well he already had a wife and two children — and when the relationship ended, she sought the same protection the law gives to women in a "relationship in the nature of marriage." The Supreme Court had to decide whether a relationship built on the ruins of someone else's still-subsisting marriage could ever itself be called marriage-like — or whether knowingly stepping into another woman's marriage put her outside the law's protective reach entirely.

Parties

Indra Sarma — appellant; had cohabited with the respondent for a number of years, aware that he was already validly married with children, and sought protection and maintenance under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 on the basis that their relationship was "in the nature of marriage."

V.K.V. Sarma — respondent; already validly married with two children at the time the relationship with the appellant began, and resisted her claim on the ground that a relationship carried on with knowledge of his subsisting marriage could not qualify for protection under the Act.

Facts

Indra Sarma and V.K.V. Sarma began a relationship around the year 2000. At that time, V.K.V. Sarma was already validly married and had two children from that subsisting marriage. Despite this, the appellant and respondent began cohabiting from around 2002, living together and, according to the appellant, presenting themselves in a manner resembling a married couple, running a household together for a period of years. When the relationship eventually broke down, Indra Sarma sought protection and maintenance under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, contending that her relationship with V.K.V. Sarma was a "relationship in the nature of marriage" within the meaning of the Act, entitling her to its protections notwithstanding the absence of a formal marriage between them.

Issues Raised

1. Applying the four-part test laid down in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010), can a relationship in which one partner is already validly married to someone else, and both partners are aware of that fact, qualify as a "relationship in the nature of marriage" under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
2. Is such a relationship properly characterised as adulterous rather than marriage-like, and does that distinction affect its entitlement to statutory protection?
3. Does the length of cohabitation, or the presence of a shared household and public presentation as a couple, override the disqualifying effect of one partner's subsisting prior marriage?

Arguments Contended

On behalf of Indra Sarma (Appellant): It was argued that she and V.K.V. Sarma had cohabited for a substantial period, maintained a shared household, and held themselves out in a manner resembling a married couple, satisfying the substantive, factual features of a marriage-like relationship regardless of the respondent's prior marital status; the Domestic Violence Act's beneficial purpose of protecting women in domestic relationships should not turn solely on the technicality of the respondent's undisclosed or known prior marriage, particularly where the relationship had, in every practical sense, functioned as a marriage for years.

On behalf of V.K.V. Sarma (Respondent): It was argued that one of the four conditions laid down in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal for a relationship to qualify as being "in the nature of marriage" is that both parties must otherwise be legally qualified to marry each other, including being unmarried at the relevant time; since he was already validly married to another woman throughout the relevant period, and Indra Sarma was aware of this subsisting marriage, their relationship could never satisfy this condition, and was properly characterised as an adulterous relationship rather than one in the nature of marriage, falling outside the Act's protective scope regardless of its duration or outward appearance.

Court's Reasoning

The Supreme Court, applying and refining the four-part test it had laid down in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010), held that a relationship in which one partner is already validly and subsistingly married to a third person is, in substance, an adulterous relationship, and cannot be treated as a "relationship in the nature of marriage" for the purposes of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 — irrespective of how long the parties cohabited, how genuinely they presented themselves as a couple, or how closely the relationship otherwise resembled a marriage in its day-to-day functioning. The Court reasoned that the third condition from Velusamy — that both parties be otherwise qualified to enter a legal marriage with each other, including being unmarried — is not a mere technicality but goes to the very heart of what distinguishes a marriage-like relationship from one that could never have ripened into an actual marriage even if the parties had wished it; a relationship carried on with full knowledge that one partner already has a living, undivorced spouse is fundamentally different in character from a genuine marriage-substitute relationship between two legally free individuals.

Applying this reasoning to the facts, the Court held that since V.K.V. Sarma was validly married to another woman, with two children from that marriage, throughout the entire period of his relationship with Indra Sarma, and Indra Sarma was aware of this subsisting marriage, their relationship could not satisfy the Velusamy test and fell outside the definition of a "relationship in the nature of marriage." The Court, however, went on to express concern about the resulting hardship for women in situations of this kind, and urged that Parliament consider amending the law to provide some form of protection for women in such relationships, even while holding that, on the law as it presently stood, Indra Sarma was not entitled to relief under the Domestic Violence Act.

Judgement

The Supreme Court held that the relationship between Indra Sarma and V.K.V. Sarma, being adulterous in character since he was already validly married to another woman throughout its subsistence, did not qualify as a "relationship in the nature of marriage" under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and Indra Sarma was accordingly not entitled to protection or maintenance under that Act.

Legal Principle / Ratio

A relationship in which one partner is already validly and subsistingly married to a third person, and both partners are aware of that fact, is an adulterous relationship, not a "relationship in the nature of marriage," and therefore falls outside the protective scope of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 — regardless of the duration of cohabitation, the existence of a shared household, or how closely the relationship otherwise resembled a marriage. This follows directly from the third condition in the D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) test, that both parties must be otherwise legally qualified to marry each other, including unmarried, for a relationship to qualify.

Significance

Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma is the leading Indian authority applying and clarifying the D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) four-part test to exclude adulterous cohabitation from Domestic Violence Act protection, and is regularly read alongside Velusamy as the two-case combination that together define both the positive content and the outer limits of a "relationship in the nature of marriage." The judgment's concluding observation urging legislative reform to address the hardship faced by women in such situations is also frequently cited as an example of the Supreme Court flagging a policy gap for Parliament while declining to fill it through interpretation beyond what the existing statutory language permits.

Exam-Important Points

• Facts in one line: a woman cohabited for years with a man she knew was already married with children; when the relationship ended, she sought Domestic Violence Act protection, which the Supreme Court denied.
• Holding: a relationship where one partner is already validly married to someone else is adulterous, not "in the nature of marriage" — it falls outside Domestic Violence Act protection regardless of duration or appearance.
• Key principle: this applies the third D. Velusamy condition (both parties otherwise qualified to marry, including unmarried) — knowledge of the subsisting prior marriage is fatal to the claim.
• Classic exam trap: students sometimes think long cohabitation and a shared household alone qualify a relationship — this case shows a subsisting prior marriage of one partner defeats the claim regardless of those other factors.
• The Court urged Parliament to consider legislative protection for women in such situations, while holding no relief was available under the law as it stood — a useful point for "critically evaluate" exam questions.

Facts, bench and citation verified against IndianKanoon's report of the Supreme Court judgment and independent case-law summaries (The Lawscape, SupremeToday, CSJA study material) — the citation (2013) 15 SCC 755, the bench (K.S. Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose, JJ.), and the 26 November 2013 decision date are confirmed across sources.