| Court | Rolls Court (Court of Chancery) |
|---|---|
| Bench | Lord Langdale, M.R. |
| Year | 1840 (decided 8 December 1840) |
| Cited in | Offer and Acceptance — Meaning, Definition and Essential Rules (Notes) |
A farmer offered his land for £1,000, calling it his final word on the price. The buyer tried to haggle him down to £950 — and when that was refused, tried to fall back on the original £1,000 as if nothing had happened. The Rolls Court's answer became the rule every first-year contract student learns before any other: a counter-offer doesn't sit beside the original offer, it kills it.
Hyde — plaintiff; the prospective buyer, who first counter-offered a lower price and then tried to accept the original offer.
Wrench — defendant; the seller of the farm, who had made the original £1,000 offer and later refused to sell.
Wrench, who owned a farm at Luddenham in Kent, first offered to sell it to Hyde for £1,200; Hyde declined. On 6 June 1840, Wrench wrote to Hyde's agent offering to sell the farm for £1,000, stating that this was his final offer and that he would not alter it. On or before 8 June, Hyde wrote back offering £950 for the farm. Wrench considered this and, on 27 June, informed Hyde that he would not accept £950. Two days later, on 29 June, Hyde wrote again, this time agreeing to pay the original price of £1,000. Wrench did not respond to this and subsequently refused to sell the farm to Hyde at all. Hyde sued for specific performance of the alleged contract at £1,000.
On behalf of Hyde (Plaintiff): It was argued that Wrench's letter of 6 June, offering the farm for £1,000, remained a standing offer that Hyde was entitled to accept at any time before it was withdrawn; Hyde's intervening offer of £950 was merely an attempt to negotiate a better price and did not amount to an outright rejection of the £1,000 offer, so that when Hyde wrote on 29 June agreeing to pay £1,000, a valid and binding contract was concluded on Wrench's original terms.
On behalf of Wrench (Defendant): It was argued that his letter of 6 June was a definite, final offer of £1,000, and that Hyde's reply proposing £950 was not a mere request for a better price but a counter-offer that necessarily rejected and superseded the original £1,000 offer; once rejected in this way, the original offer was no longer capable of being accepted, since an offer cannot be revived by the very person who had already turned it down, and Wrench was free to refuse to sell on any terms thereafter.
Lord Langdale, M.R. held that when Hyde replied to Wrench's offer of £1,000 by offering only £950, he was not simply making an inquiry or seeking a concession within the framework of the original offer — he was rejecting that offer and substituting a new proposal of his own on different terms. An offer and a counter-offer cannot logically coexist on the same subject-matter at the same time, because a counter-offer is, in substance, both a rejection of what was offered and a fresh offer of different terms; once Wrench rejected Hyde's counter-offer of £950, there was no longer any outstanding offer from Wrench that Hyde could accept, since Hyde's own counter-offer had already extinguished it.
The Court held that Hyde could not revive the original £1,000 offer merely by purporting to accept it after his own counter-offer had failed; the offer having been destroyed by the counter-offer, Hyde's later letter of 29 June was not an acceptance of anything — at most, it was itself a fresh offer to buy at £1,000, which Wrench was free to accept or reject, and which Wrench in fact never accepted. On these facts, the Court found no concluded contract existed between the parties, and specific performance could not be granted.
The Rolls Court held that no binding contract existed between Hyde and Wrench, since Hyde's counter-offer of £950 operated as a rejection of Wrench's original £1,000 offer, destroying it; Hyde's later purported acceptance of the £1,000 offer was consequently ineffective, being at most a new offer that Wrench never accepted. Hyde's claim for specific performance was dismissed.
A counter-offer operates in law as a rejection of the original offer and simultaneously as a new offer on the counter-offeror's own terms; it destroys the original offer, which ceases to be capable of acceptance thereafter. An offeree who has made a counter-offer cannot subsequently accept the original offer as though the counter-offer had never been made — the original offer must be freshly revived or re-made by the original offeror before it can again be accepted.
Hyde v. Wrench is the originating authority for the counter-offer rule across the common-law world, including India, where it directly underlies Section 7(1) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872's requirement that acceptance be "absolute and unqualified." The case supplies the standard test examiners use to distinguish a genuine acceptance from a counter-offer masquerading as one, and is regularly read alongside cases like Harvey v. Facey to separate the different ways a response to an offer can fail to conclude a contract — either because it varies the terms (Hyde v. Wrench) or because it was never really an offer to begin with (Harvey v. Facey). Indian courts continue to apply the rule without modification in commercial negotiation disputes, particularly in cases of counter-proposals during price negotiations for the sale of property or goods.
Facts, bench and citation verified against BAILII's report of the Rolls Court judgment ([1840] EWHC Ch J90) and independent case-law summaries (Wikipedia, LawTeacher, IPSA Loquitur) — the bench (Lord Langdale, M.R.) and the 8 December 1840 decision date are confirmed across sources.