Gurupad Khandappa Magdum v. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum

A widow sued for her share in her husband's joint family property after his death in 1960. The Supreme Court held that her share is worked out in two steps: what she would have got on a partition in his lifetime, plus her share of his interest on his death. The judgment has no numbered paragraphs.

Quick Revision

Parties

• Gurupad Khandappa Magdum — appellant and defendant 1. He is a son of the deceased Khandappa. He alone contested the suit.
• Hirabai Khandappa Magdum — respondent and plaintiff. She is the widow of Khandappa. She sued for partition and separate possession of 7/24th share.
• Shivapad — respondent and defendant 2. He is the second son. He admitted the plaintiff's claim.
• Biyawwa, Bhagirathibai and Dhundubai — respondents and defendants 3, 4 and 5. They are the three daughters. They admitted the plaintiff's claim.
• Khandappa Sangappa Magdum — the deceased. He died on 27 June 1960. His property is the subject of the suit.

Procedural History

1. On 6 November 1962 Hirabai filed special civil suit No. 26 of 1963 in the court of the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangli.
2. The trial court gave its judgment on 13 July 1965. It rejected Gurupad's case that the properties were Khandappa's self-acquisitions and that he had partitioned them in his lifetime.
3. The trial court still limited the plaintiff's share to 1/24th. It followed Shiramabai Bhimgonda v. Kalgonda and refused to add 1/4th and 1/24th together.
4. Gurupad filed first appeal No. 524 of 1966 in the Bombay High Court. Hirabai filed cross-objections.
5. On 19 March 1975 a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed Gurupad's appeal and allowed the cross-objections. It held that the properties belonged to the joint family, that there was no prior partition, and that the plaintiff was entitled to 7/24th.
6. Gurupad appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave (permission granted by the Supreme Court to appeal).
7. Another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Rangubai Lalji v. Laxman Lalji had already reconsidered Shiramabai and dissented from it. Patel J. wrote both judgments.
8. Patel J. felt that Shiramabai was not fully argued and was incorrectly decided. On a true view, the widow's share is the notional-partition share added to her share in her husband's interest on his death.
9. The High Court in the judgment under appeal relied on Rangubai Lalji. That indirectly endorsed the view that Shiramabai was incorrectly decided.
10. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with costs on 27 April 1978.

Facts

1. Khandappa Sangappa Magdum died on 27 June 1960.
2. He left his wife Hirabai (the plaintiff), two sons (Gurupad and Shivapad, defendants 1 and 2) and three daughters (defendants 3 to 5).
3. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force on 17 June 1956. Khandappa died after that date.
4. On 6 November 1962 Hirabai filed a suit for partition and separate possession of a 7/24th share. The properties were two houses, a land, two shops and movables.
5. She said the properties belonged to the joint family. The family consisted of her husband, herself and their two sons.
6. Her case was that on a partition in Khandappa's lifetime between himself and his two sons, she would have got a 1/4th share. The other three would also have got 1/4th each.
7. She said Khandappa's 1/4th share would devolve on his death on six sharers. These were she and her five children. Each would have a 1/24th share in it.
8. She added 1/4th and 1/24th to claim 7/24th of the joint family properties.
9. Defendants 2 to 5 admitted her claim. Only defendant 1, Gurupad, contested the suit.
10. Gurupad said the suit properties were not joint family properties. He said they were Khandappa's self-acquisitions. He said there was no joint family in existence on the date of Khandappa's death in 1960.
11. He said Khandappa had partitioned the suit properties between himself and his two sons in December 1952 and December 1954.
12. He said that by a family arrangement dated 31 March 1955 Khandappa had given directions for the share he reserved for himself in the earlier partitions. So there was no question of a fresh partition.
13. The trial court and the High Court rejected Gurupad's case on these facts (see Procedural History). The Supreme Court found the High Court's view well founded and not seriously disputed.

Issues Raised

1. How is Explanation 1 to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to be interpreted?
2. Is the plaintiff's share in the coparcenary property only 1/24th, or is it 1/4th plus 1/24th, that is 7/24th?
3. Must the fiction of a partition immediately before the death be carried through to ascertain the heirs' shares, or does it only fix the deceased's share?

Arguments Contended

The judgment does not set out counsel's arguments in separate form. It records the parties' cases in the pleadings and the contentions on Explanation 1 as below.

For the appellant (Gurupad, defendant 1)

1. The suit properties did not belong to the joint family. They were Khandappa's self-acquisitions.
2. On the date of Khandappa's death in 1960 there was no joint family in existence.
3. Khandappa partitioned the properties between himself and his two sons in December 1952 and December 1954.
4. By a family arrangement dated 31 March 1955 he gave directions for the share he reserved for himself. So no fresh partition was possible.
5. On Explanation 1, the appellant suggested a restricted operation of the fiction. The Court records this when it rejects the restriction suggested by the appellant. The judgment gives no further detail of the argument.
6. Authorities: the judgment records none relied on by the appellant.

For the respondent (Hirabai, plaintiff)

1. The properties belonged to the joint family of her husband, herself and their two sons.
2. On a partition in Khandappa's lifetime, she would have got a 1/4th share, and the other three would have got 1/4th each.
3. Khandappa's 1/4th share would devolve on six sharers. Each, including she, takes 1/24th of it.
4. Adding 1/4th and 1/24th, she claims 7/24th.
5. Authorities: the judgment records the High Court's reliance on Rangubai Lalji v. Laxman Lalji for her position. It records no separate authorities cited for her by counsel.

Defendants 2 to 5 admitted the plaintiff's claim.

Court's Reasoning

The judgment was delivered by Chandrachud, C.J. for the Bench of Chandrachud C.J., Shingal and Tulzapurkar JJ. It is a single opinion with no numbered paragraphs. No separate concurring or dissenting opinion is recorded.

Chandrachud, C.J. (for the Court)

The pedigree and the starting point

1. Noted: A pedigree helps understand the point. Khandappa Sangappa Magdum is at the top. Below him are Hirabai (plaintiff), Gurupad (defendant 1), Biyawwa (defendant 3), Bhagirathibai (defendant 4), Dhundubai (defendant 5) and Shivapad (defendant 2).
2. Noted: The Court gives the facts. It records that the plaintiff claims 7/24th by adding 1/4th and 1/24th. It also records the trial court's reliance on Shiramabai.
3. Noted: Rangubai Lalji dissented from Shiramabai. Patel J. wrote both. He felt Shiramabai was not fully argued and was incorrectly decided. The High Court's judgment under appeal rests on Rangubai Lalji.
4. Noted: The view that the properties belonged to the joint family and that there was no prior partition is well founded. It is not seriously disputed.
5. Held: The appeal therefore rests on the interpretation of Explanation 1 to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Section 6 and how it applies

6. Noted: Section 6 says that when a male Hindu dies after the Act commenced, with an interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest devolves by survivorship upon the surviving members. It does not devolve under the Act.
7. Noted: The proviso has a condition. The deceased may leave a female relative in class I of the Schedule, or a male relative in that class claiming through her. Then his interest devolves by testamentary or intestate succession under the Act. It does not devolve by survivorship.
8. Noted: Explanation 1 says the interest of a Mitakshara coparcener is deemed to be the share that would have been allotted to him if a partition had taken place immediately before his death. This holds whether or not he could claim partition.
9. Noted: Explanation 2 says the proviso does not let a person who separated from the coparcenary before the death, or any of his heirs, claim a share on intestacy.
10. Held: The Act came into force on 17 June 1956. Khandappa died in 1960 with an interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property. The pre-conditions of Section 6 are satisfied and the section is squarely attracted.
11. Held: By the normal rule, his interest would devolve by survivorship on the surviving members. The widow and daughter are female relatives in class I of the Schedule. He died leaving a widow and daughters. So the proviso applies and the normal rule is excluded.
12. Held: His interest therefore devolves by intestate succession under the Act. It does not devolve by survivorship.
13. Noted: Testamentary succession is out of the question because he made no will. Under the Explanation to Section 30, a male Hindu's interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property can be disposed of by will.
14. Held: It is undisputed that the normal rule does not apply and the proviso is attracted. The appeal turns on the meaning of Explanation 1. That meaning is the subject of acute controversy between the parties.

What Section 6 deals with, and the two things to find out

14. Noted: Section 6 deals with devolution of the interest a male Hindu has in Mitakshara coparcenary property at the time of his death. Explanation 1 is explanatory of the section. So what it provides must be correlated to the subject matter of the section.
15. Noted: The plaintiff's suit is essentially a claim to a share in the interest her husband had at his death. Two things must be found. First, her share in her husband's share. Second, her husband's own share in the coparcenary property.
16. Held: The proviso gives the formula for fixing the share of the claimant. Explanation 1 gives the formula for deducing the share of the deceased.

Step 1: the plaintiff's share in the deceased's share is 1/6th

17. Held: The plaintiff's share under the proviso follows the deceased's will, if any. There is none. So it follows the rules of intestate succession in Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Act.
18. Noted: Khandappa left two sons, three daughters and a widow. Son, daughter and widow are class I heirs in the Schedule.
19. Held: Under Section 8(a) read with the first clause of Section 9, they take simultaneously and to the exclusion of other heirs. Among them the two sons, three daughters and widow take equally. Each has one share under Section 10 read with Rules 1 and 2.
20. Held: There are six sharers with equal shares. Whatever the deceased's share, the plaintiff's share in it is 1/6th.

Step 2: the deceased's share in the coparcenary property is 1/4th

21. Noted: The next step is equally important but not equally easy. It is to find out the share the deceased had in the coparcenary property, because she has 1/6th of that share.
22. Noted: Explanation 1 creates a fiction. The deceased's interest is deemed to be the share allotted to him if a partition had taken place immediately before his death. One must imagine that a little before Khandappa's death, the property was partitioned between him and the other coparceners.
23. Noted: The plaintiff was not a coparcener. She could not demand partition. Yet if a partition took place between her husband and his two sons, she would receive a share equal to a son's. The Court cites Mulla's Hindu Law, Fourteenth Edition, page 403, paragraph 315.
24. Held: In a partition between Khandappa and his two sons there would be four sharers. The fourth is Khandappa's wife. So Khandappa would have got 1/4th of the coparcenary property on that hypothesis.
25. Held: Two things are clear. In a partition Khandappa would have got 1/4th. The plaintiff's share in that 1/4th is 1/6th, that is 1/24th. So far there is no difficulty.
26. Noted: The difficult question is whether her share in the coparcenary property is only 1/24th, or 1/4th plus 1/24th, that is 7/24th. The trial judge accepted the former, relying on Shiramabai, which was later overruled by the Bombay High Court. The High Court accepted the latter.

The Court's decision on the two views

27. Held: There is no justification for limiting the plaintiff's share to 1/24th. That would ignore the 1/4th she would have got on a partition in her husband's lifetime between him and his two sons.
28. Why: In overlooking that 1/4th, one lets one's imagination boggle under the weight of the reality that there was in fact no partition between the husband and his sons.
29. Held: Whether a partition had actually taken place between the husband and his sons is beside the point for Explanation 1. The Explanation compels the assumption of a fiction that a partition of the property had taken place. The point of time is immediately before the death of the person in whose property the heirs claim a share.

The fiction must be given its full effect

30. Held: The fiction created by Explanation 1 has to be given its due and full effect.
31. Noted: The Court cites Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi v. S. Teja Singh. There the fiction in Section 18A(9)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 was given full effect. Failure to send an estimate of tax on income under Section 18A(3) is deemed a failure to send a return.
32. Noted: Teja Singh held that this necessarily involves the fiction that a notice was issued under Section 22 and that the assessee failed to comply with it.
33. Noted: In Teja Singh a missing step had to be supplied. Section 18A(9)(b) stopped at the deemed failure to furnish a return. It did not provide that a Section 22 notice is deemed issued and not complied with. These assumptions had to be made to give due and full effect to the fiction.
34. Held: In an important aspect, the present case is stronger. It is not necessary to assume or supply a missing link to work out the fiction.
35. Noted: This is what Lord Asquith meant in his passage in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council. If you are told to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must also imagine as real the consequences and incidents that would inevitably have flowed from it.
36. Noted: A statute may say you must imagine a certain state of affairs. It does not then allow your imagination to "boggle" at the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.

The assumption of partition is irrevocable

37. Held: To find the share of heirs in a deceased coparcener's property, the very first step is to find the deceased's share in the coparcenary property. Only then can the claimant's share be known.
38. Held: Explanation 1 uses a simple but fictional expedient. What must be assumed is that a partition had in fact taken place between the deceased and his coparceners immediately before his death.
39. Held: "That assumption, once made, is irrevocable." One cannot make it once to find the deceased's share and then go back on it to find the heirs' shares.
40. Held: The assumption must permeate the whole process of finding the heirs' ultimate share, through all its stages.
41. Held: To make the assumption at the first stage for the limited purpose of finding the deceased's share, and then ignore it in calculating the heirs' share, is "truly to permit one's imagination to boggle".
42. Held: All the consequences of a real partition must be worked out logically. The heirs' shares must be found on the basis that they had separated from one another and received a share in a partition during the deceased's lifetime.
43. Held: The allotment of this share is not a processual step (a mere working step) devised only to reach some other conclusion. It must be treated as a concrete reality. It cannot be recalled, just as a share allotted to a coparcener in an actual partition cannot generally be recalled.
44. Held: The inevitable corollary is that the heir gets his or her share in the interest the deceased had at the time of his death. The heir gets this in addition to the share received, or deemed received, in the notional partition.

Legislative intent and the history of women's rights

45. Held: This interpretation of Section 6, its proviso and Explanation 1 furthers the legislative intent. That intent is to enlarge the share of female heirs, in quality and in quantity.
46. Noted: The Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 gave heirship rights to the son's daughter, daughter's daughter and sister in all areas where Mitakshara law prevailed.
47. Noted: Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, broadly speaking, gave the Hindu widow a right to a share in the joint family property. It also gave her a right to demand partition like any male member.
48. Noted: Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 says property possessed by a female Hindu, acquired before or after the Act, is held by her as full owner and not as a limited owner.
49. Held: Restricting the fiction in the manner suggested by the appellant would be a "retrograde step, putting back as it were the clock of social reform". That reform has enabled the Hindu woman to acquire equal status with males in matters of property.
50. Held: Even if two interpretations of Explanation 1 are reasonably possible, "we must prefer that interpretation which will further the intention of the legislature". That interpretation also remedies the injustice Hindu women have suffered over the years.

Agreement with the High Courts

51. Noted: The Court is happy that the Bombay High Court took the same view in Rangubai Lalji v. Laxman Lalji. There Patel J. fairly pronounced his own earlier judgment in Shiramabai Bhimgonda v. Kalgonda as incorrect.
52. Noted: A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sushilabai Ramachandra Kulkarni v. Narayanrao Gopalrao Deshpande, the Gujarat High Court in Vidyaben v. Jagdishchandra N. Bhatt and the Orissa High Court in Ananda v. Haribandhu took the same view.
53. Held: The Court endorses the analysis in the judgment of Kantawala C.J. for the Full Bench in Sushilabai. That Bench considered exhaustively the decisions on the point.
54. Held: For these reasons the Court confirms the High Court's judgment and dismisses the appeal with costs.

Authorities

• Shiramabai Bhimgonda v. Kalgonda, (1963) 66 Bom. L.R. 351 — Bombay High Court Division Bench. Followed by the trial court to limit the share to 1/24th. Its author Patel J. later held it incorrectly decided. Overruled in the Bombay High Court (Facts and opening of the judgment; last part of the judgment).
• Rangubai Lalji v. Laxman Lalji, 68 Bom. L.R. 74 (spelt Rangubhai in the headnote) — Bombay High Court. Reconsidered and dissented from Shiramabai. Approved by the Court. The High Court relied on it in the judgment under appeal.
• Sushilabai Ramachandra Kulkarni v. Narayanrao Gopalrao Deshpande, A.I.R. 1975 Bom. 257 — Full Bench of the Bombay High Court. Considered the decisions exhaustively. The Court approved it and endorsed Kantawala C.J.'s analysis.
• Vidyaben v. Jagdishchandra N. Bhatt, A.I.R. 1974 Guj. 23 — Gujarat High Court. Took the same view. Approved.
• Ananda v. Haribandhu, A.I.R. 1967 Orissa 194 — Orissa High Court. Took the same view. Approved.
• Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi v. S. Teja Singh, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 394 — Supreme Court. Applied to show that a statutory fiction must be given due and full effect, with the missing steps supplied.
• East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 A.C. 109, 132 — House of Lords. Lord Asquith's passage on imagining a statutory state of affairs and its consequences. Quoted with approval.
• Mulla's Hindu Law, Fourteenth Edition, page 403, paragraph 315 — textbook. Cited for the widow's right to a son's share on a partition between husband and sons.

Also cited in footnotes: none beyond those listed.

Provisions mentioned

• Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act 30 of 1956), Section 6 — a male Hindu's interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property goes by survivorship. The proviso applies where he leaves a class I female relative or a male relative claiming through her. Then the interest goes by testamentary or intestate succession.
• Section 6, Explanation 1 — the coparcener's interest is the share that would have been allotted to him on a partition immediately before his death, whether or not he could claim partition.
• Section 6, Explanation 2 — the proviso does not let a person who separated before the death, or any of his heirs, claim a share on intestacy.
• Section 8(a) — class I heirs take simultaneously and to the exclusion of other heirs.
• Section 9 (first clause) — class I heirs take simultaneously and exclude others.
• Section 10 (Rules 1 and 2) — class I heirs take one share each.
• Section 14(1) — a female Hindu holds property possessed by her as full owner, not limited owner.
• Section 30 (Explanation) — a male Hindu's interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property can be disposed of by will.
• Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, Section 18A(9)(b) and Section 18A(3) — failure to send an estimate of tax is deemed failure to send a return. Section 22 — notice to furnish a return.
• Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 — heirship rights to the son's daughter, daughter's daughter and sister.
• Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, Section 3 — the widow's right to a share and to demand partition.

Judgement

1. The Court confirmed the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 19 March 1975.
2. The appeal by Gurupad Khandappa Magdum was dismissed.
3. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
4. The effect is that Hirabai is entitled to a 7/24th share in the joint family properties, as the High Court held.

Legal Principle / Ratio

When a coparcener dies leaving a female class I relative, Explanation 1 to Section 6 requires a partition to be assumed immediately before his death. That assumption is irrevocable and runs through every step of finding the heirs' shares. A widow therefore gets the share she would have got on that partition, plus her share in the deceased's interest on his death.

Key holding: the heir gets the share "in addition to the share which he or she received or must be deemed to have received in the notional partition".

Obiter and observations

• Even if two interpretations of Explanation 1 are reasonably possible, the Court must prefer the one that furthers the legislature's intention and remedies the injustice Hindu women have suffered.
• Testamentary succession would have been possible under the Explanation to Section 30. It was out of question here because there was no will.

Subsequent Treatment

Prakash v. Phulavati

• AIR 2016 SC 769 (Supreme Court, Adarsh Kumar Goel and Anil R. Dave JJ., decided 16 October 2015). Paragraph 26.1 lists this case with Shyama Devi v. Manju Shukla and Anar Devi v. Parmeshwari Devi. It says the Court interpreted Explanation 1 to Section 6 (before the 2005 Amendment) in these cases. The deeming provision about partition immediately before the death was given due and full effect under the settled rule on deeming fictions. The footnote cites this case at paragraphs 6, 11 and 13.

Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma

• [2020] 10 S.C.R. (Supreme Court, Arun Mishra, S. Abdul Nazeer and M.R. Shah JJ., decided 11 August 2020). Paragraph 96 describes this case as dealing with the widow's interest under Explanation 1. It says the widow's share is found by adding her notional-partition share to the share she would get in her husband's interest on his death. It then quotes this case's passage on the irrevocable assumption.
• Paragraph 96 of Vineeta Sharma adds a limit. This case did not involve any change in the coparcenary body. Everything remained static. The deceased's share is worked out on the statutory fiction. Where the coparcenary changes by law or otherwise, rights are recognised as at the final decree. Only the deceased coparcener's share and his heirs' shares are found under the Explanation, not those of other coparceners.
• Paragraph 97 of Vineeta Sharma notes that Anar Devi v. Parmeshwari Devi considered this case. Anar Devi held that a coparcener's undivided interest goes to his heirs by intestate succession when he leaves a class I female relative, and not by survivorship. Paragraph 97 says Anar Devi did not involve an enlargement of rights or change in a coparcener's share. It says that decision cannot support a disruption of the coparcenary by statutory fiction.
• Paragraph 74 of Vineeta Sharma quotes Prakash v. Phulavati paragraph 27.2, which repeats the paragraph 26.1 summary of this case.

Other later cases (not summarized)

• Shyama Devi v. Manju Shukla, (1994) 6 SCC 342 — named in Prakash paragraph 26.1 and Vineeta Sharma paragraph 74 as following this case.
• Anar Devi v. Parmeshwari Devi, (2006) 8 SCC 656 — considered this case; the text could not be fetched.

Comparative Analysis

• This case: the assumption of a partition must run through the whole calculation of the heirs' shares. Vineeta Sharma paragraph 96 accepts that the deceased's share is worked out on the statutory fiction. It limits the fiction to the deceased's share and his heirs' shares.
• This case dealt with a static coparcenary. Vineeta Sharma says that where the body of coparceners changes by law or otherwise, rights are recognised as they exist at the final decree.
• Prakash paragraph 26.1 states this case's point only in general terms: the deeming provision is given due and full effect. Vineeta Sharma paragraph 96 gives the widow's two-part share and quotes the key passage.

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

• The judgment does not set out counsel's arguments in separate form. The appellant's contention on Explanation 1 is known only from the Court's reference to the restriction he suggested.
• The headnote and the judgment differ on the suit details. The headnote gives 6 November 1952 and suit No. 26/53. The judgment body gives 6 November 1962 and suit No. 26 of 1963. This page follows the judgment body.
• The Court decides the widow's share where the coparcenary body is fixed. Vineeta Sharma paragraph 96 says the case did not involve any change in the coparcenary body. The judgment itself does not address that situation.

Significance

• It settled that the notional partition under Explanation 1 to Section 6 is carried to its full logical end. The widow takes both her notional-partition share and her share in the deceased's interest.
• It approved the Bombay, Gujarat and Orissa High Court view.
• The Court presented the result as part of a line of reforms improving Hindu women's property rights.

Exam-Important Points

• Arithmetic: 1/4th (her share on the notional partition) plus 1/24th (her 1/6th share of the deceased's 1/4th) is 7/24th.
• Rule: the assumption of partition immediately before death is irrevocable and applies at every stage.
• Two steps: the proviso with Sections 8, 9 and 10 fixes the claimant's share (1/6th). Explanation 1 fixes the deceased's share (1/4th).
• Why the proviso applies: the deceased left a widow and daughters, who are class I female relatives. So the interest goes by intestate succession, not survivorship.
• Trap: the widow is not a coparcener. She still gets a son's share on a notional partition between her husband and his sons.
• Trap: whether a real partition took place between husband and sons is beside the point for Explanation 1.
• Link: Shiramabai (1/24th only) was held incorrect by the Court. Rangubai Lalji and the Full Bench in Sushilabai are approved.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. The judgment has no numbered paragraphs, so no paragraph numbers are cited for it. The citation (1978) 3 SCC 383; AIR 1978 SC 1239 is as printed in the judgment header. Paragraph numbers for the later cases follow their own texts.