Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi

A British woman held under the COFEPOSA Act could meet her lawyer and her five-year-old daughter only under tight rules. She challenged those rules under Article 32. Justice Bhagwati held that the right to life in Article 21 means the right to live with human dignity, and struck down both rules.

Quick Revision

Parties

Francis Coralie Mullin — petitioner; a British national held in Tihar Central Jail as a detenu (a person held under a preventive detention order, which detains without trial to stop future harm) under the COFEPOSA Act. She challenged the interview rules.

The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi — respondent No. 1; the authority that laid down the Conditions of Detention.

The Superintendent of Tihar Central Jail (and others) — respondents; the prison authorities that applied the interview restrictions. The judgment lists counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 only.

Procedural History

1. 23 November 1979: an order under section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA) put the petitioner in Tihar Central Jail.
2. She filed a writ (a court's formal order) petition in the Supreme Court for habeas corpus (a court order to produce a detained person) against her detention.
3. 27 February 1980: the Supreme Court rejected that petition. She stayed in detention.
4. She then filed Writ Petition No. 3042 of 1980 under Article 32. It challenged sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause 3(b) of the Conditions of Detention Order and asked for directions to the Administrator and the Jail Superintendent.
5. At the hearing, the respondents made two concessions (see Arguments Contended). The Court still examined the validity of the sub-clauses.
6. 13 January 1981: the Court (Bhagwati, J., for the Bench with Fazal Ali, J.) allowed the petition.

Facts

1. The petitioner, a British national, was arrested and detained in Central Jail, Tihar, under an order dated 23 November 1979 issued under section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act.
2. Her writ petition for habeas corpus was rejected on 27 February 1980. She remained in Tihar.
3. While in detention, she had real difficulty meeting her lawyer and her family.
4. Her daughter, aged about five years, and her sister, who looked after the daughter, could meet her only once in a month. She could not meet her very young daughter more often.
5. A criminal proceeding was pending against her for attempting to smuggle hashish out of the country. She needed to consult her lawyer for her defence in it.
6. To arrange an interview, her lawyer had to get prior appointment from the District Magistrate, Delhi. The interview could take place only in the presence of a Customs Officer nominated by the Collector of Customs.
7. This caused considerable hardship. On some occasions the lawyer got the appointment but no nominated Customs Officer was present, so there was no interview.
8. The petitioner was therefore effectively denied interviews with her lawyer. Her daughter could meet her only once a month.
9. The prison authorities imposed these limits under clause 3(b), sub-clauses (i) and (ii), of the Conditions of Detention laid down by the Delhi Administration. The Order is dated 23 August 1975 and was made under section 5 of the COFEPOSA Act.
10. Sub-clause (i): an interview with a legal adviser on the defence of a detenu in a criminal case, or on writ petitions and the like, could be allowed by prior appointment. It had to be in the presence of an officer of Customs, Central Excise or Enforcement nominated by the local Collector of Customs or Central Excise, or the Deputy Director of Enforcement who sponsored the detention.
11. Sub-clause (ii): a monthly interview could be permitted for family members, meaning wife, children or parents of the detenu. The District Magistrate, Delhi, granted permission for interviews.
12. The judgment records that the facts were few and undisputed.

Issues Raised

The judgment does not number the questions. It frames them as follows.

1. Do sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause 3(b) of the Conditions of Detention Order violate Articles 14 and 21 because they are arbitrary and unreasonable?
2. Does a person held in preventive detention keep any fundamental rights that a court can enforce?
3. What is the true scope and ambit of the right to life guaranteed by Article 21?
4. Does a detenu have a right to interviews with members of his family and friends, and how often?
5. Does a detenu have a right to consult a legal adviser of his choice, and can the prior appointment with the District Magistrate and the presence of a Customs or Excise officer be required?

Arguments Contended

The judgment records the arguments only in general terms. It names no authorities relied on by either side in the arguments.

For the petitioner

• Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause 3(b) violate Articles 14 and 21 because they are arbitrary and unreasonable.
• Allowing family interviews only once a month is discriminatory and unreasonable. Under-trial prisoners get interviews with relatives and friends twice a week under Rule 559A. Convicted prisoners get them once a week under Rule 550 of the Punjab Jail Manual.
• A detenu is entitled under Article 22 to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. She was therefore entitled to meet a lawyer she wanted to consult or have appear for her in a legal proceeding.
• The requirement of prior appointment, and of the presence of a Customs or Excise officer, is arbitrary and unreasonable. It violates Articles 14 and 21.
• She asked for directions to the Administrator and the Jail Superintendent to allow interviews with her lawyer and family without the sub-clause restrictions.

For the respondents

• Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) do not violate Articles 14 and 21, because the restrictions are reasonable, fair and just.
• Concession 1: the respondents had no objection if the petitioner met her daughter and sister twice a week, as under-trial prisoners do, instead of monthly.
• Concession 2: for interviews with her lawyer, they would not insist on a Customs or Excise officer being present.

The Court noted that the validity of the sub-clauses still had to be decided. Many detenus are held under the COFEPOSA Act. The conditions of their interviews must be settled finally by this Court.

Court's Reasoning

The judgment is a single opinion by Bhagwati, J. for the Court. Its paragraphs are not numbered, so no paragraph numbers are given. The steps follow the order of the judgment.

Opinion of the Court (Bhagwati, J.)

1. Noted: the Court said it must examine the validity of the sub-clauses in the context of its constitutional values, even though the respondents made concessions.
2. Noted: the Court said it must keep in mind the vital distinction between preventive detention and punitive detention when testing conditions of detention.
3. Noted: preventive detention is not punishment. It aims to pre-empt a person from conduct injurious to society.
4. Noted: punitive detention punishes a person found by the judicial process to have committed an offence.
5. Noted: the power of preventive detention is a necessary evil, tolerated in a free society for the security of the State and public order (the peace of the community). It is a drastic power to detain without trial. Many countries allow it only in war or aggression.
6. Noted: the Constitution recognises the power but hedges it with safeguards in Articles 21 and 22. Clauses (4) to (7) of Article 22 deal with preventive detention. A law or action that does not conform to them is invalid.
7. Noted: Article 21 also limits the power. Before Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, Article 21 had a narrow meaning. It guarded only against executive action unsupported by law.
8. Noted: in Maneka Gandhi the Court opened a new dimension. Article 21 also restricts law making. The procedure the law prescribes must be reasonable, fair and just, or the law is void.
9. Noted: Maneka Gandhi became the springboard for M.O. Hoscot, Hussainara Khatoon and the two Sunil Batra cases.
10. Held: under Article 21 as interpreted in Maneka Gandhi, no one may be deprived of life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law. The procedure must be reasonable, fair and just, not arbitrary, whimsical or fanciful. The Court decides this in judicial review (a court's check on the validity of State action).
11. Held: a law of preventive detention must pass the test of Article 22 and also of Article 21.
12. Noted: the power is frightful and awesome. It must be used with the greatest care, and courts must be ever vigilant against its abuse.
13. Noted: a person under punitive detention has the fullest opportunity to defend himself at trial. A preventive detenu is held on suspicion, and his chance to contest the Executive's action is very limited.
14. Noted: because of this, Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir laid down that restrictions on a preventively detained person must be minimal, consistently with the effectiveness of detention.
15. Noted: the Court asked whether a preventive detenu has any rights he can enforce in court. It said the answer is no longer res integra (res integra: a point not yet decided).
16. Noted: the two Sunil Batra cases held that "fundamental rights do not flee the person as he enters the prison although they may suffer shrinkage necessitated by incarceration."
17. Noted: State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Sanzgiri had impliedly accepted this earlier position.
18. Noted: Chandrachud, J. in D.B. Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh stated it clearly. A convict is not stripped of all fundamental rights by conviction. A convict loses freedoms such as free movement across India and the right to practise a profession.
19. Noted: in D.B. Patnaik, Chandrachud, J. added that a convict keeps other rights, such as the right to hold property. A convict also keeps the Article 21 right not to be deprived of life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law.
20. Noted: a five-Judge Bench affirmed this statement in the first Sunil Batra case. Krishna Iyer, J. affirmed it for the Court in the second Sunil Batra case.
21. Noted: Krishna Iyer, J. said the reach of this Court's writ over prison caprice and cruelty is incontestable. A prisoner wears the armour of basic freedom behind bars.
22. Noted: Krishna Iyer, J. added that the law responds to a prisoner's distress signals through writ aid. The Indian human has a constant companion, the Court armed with the Constitution.
23. Noted: the Supreme Court of the United States took the same view. In Eve Pall's case, Douglas, J. said prisoners remain persons entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberty is curtailed by procedures that meet all requirements of due process.
24. Noted: in Charles Wolff's case, White, J. said a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections. He said "There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country."
25. Noted: Douglas, J. repeated that a prisoner's liberty is limited by confinement, but his interest in the limited liberty left is the more substantial. Conviction does not make him a non-person. Serious punishment needs procedural safeguards.
26. Noted: Marshall, J. said a prisoner does not shed basic constitutional rights at the prison gate. He supported due process protection for freedom from serious discipline.
27. Held: what these Judges said applies equally under our constitutional system. A prisoner or detenu is not stripped of fundamental or other legal rights, except those inconsistent with incarceration.
28. Held: if any of those rights is violated, the Court will immediately spring into action and run to his rescue. The Court used Krishna Iyer, J.'s words for the Court as an activist institution.
29. Noted: the Court said it must now ask whether any fundamental right of the detenu is violated by sub-clauses (i) and (ii). It first took up Article 21, which after Maneka Gandhi has a highly activist magnitude.
30. Noted: Article 21 provides that no one is deprived of life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law. That procedure must be reasonable, fair and just.
31. Held: a constitutional provision enacting a fundamental right must be read so as to expand its reach and ambit, not attenuate its meaning and content.
32. Noted: the Court used Weems v. U.S. as the guide to interpretation. The general language of a constitution is not confined to the evil that gave it birth. Constitutions are not ephemeral enactments. A narrow reading would make their rights lose reality.
33. Held: a constitutional provision must be read widely and liberally, so that it does not become atrophied or fossilized. This applies with greater force to a fundamental right.
34. Held: the right to life is the most precious human right and the ark of all other rights. It must be read broadly so as to enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person.
35. Held: the right to life in Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal existence. It means much more than physical survival.
36. Noted: in Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Subba Rao, J. quoted Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois. The passage says something more is meant than mere animal existence. It said the ban on deprivation of life covers all limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. It also bars mutilation of the body and destruction of any organ through which the soul communicates with the outer world.
37. Noted: the Constitution Bench in the first Sunil Batra case accepted this passage as correct law.
38. Held: every limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed is protected by Article 21. A fortiori (all the more so), this includes the faculties of thinking and feeling.
39. Held: deprivation under Article 21 may be total or partial. It may be permanent or temporary. It is a continuing act, and so long as it lasts it must follow procedure established by law.
40. Held: any act that damages, injures or interferes with the use of any limb or faculty, even temporarily, falls within Article 21.
41. Held: the right to life does go further. The Court said "the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it".
42. Held: this covers the bare necessaries of life: adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter. It also covers facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, moving about freely, and mixing with fellow human beings.
43. Noted: the magnitude and content of these components depend on the economic development of the country. The right must include the basic necessities of life and the right to carry on functions that make up the bare minimum expression of the human self.
44. Held: every act that offends or impairs human dignity is a deprivation pro tanto (to that extent) of the right to live. It must follow reasonable, fair and just procedure established by law, which also stands the test of other fundamental rights.
45. Held: any torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment offends human dignity. Article 21 prohibits it unless procedure prescribed by law allows it. But no law or procedure leading to such treatment can ever meet the test of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. Such a law would be unconstitutional and void under Articles 14 and 21.
46. Noted: so Article 21 carries an implicit right against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states this right. Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees it.
47. Held: the right to live can be abridged by procedure established by law. When a person is lawfully imprisoned, the right shrinks to the extent that it cannot be enjoyed in incarceration.
48. Noted: a prisoner or detenu cannot move about freely outside the prison walls. He cannot socialise at his free will with persons outside the jail.
49. Held: as part of the right to live with human dignity, a detenu is entitled to interviews with members of his family and friends. A prison regulation on such interviews is valid under Articles 14 and 21 only if it is reasonable, fair and just.
50. Held: the same result follows from the right to personal liberty in Article 21. The right to interviews with family and friends is clearly part of personal liberty.
51. Noted: Maneka Gandhi gave personal liberty the widest amplitude. It covers many rights, including rights raised to distinct fundamental rights with added protection under Article 19.
52. Held: personal liberty includes the right to socialise with family and friends, subject to valid prison regulations. Under Articles 14 and 21, those regulations must be reasonable and non-arbitrary. An arbitrary or unreasonable one can be struck down.
53. Held: sub-clause (ii) of clause 3(b) is violative of Articles 14 and 21 in so far as it permits only one interview a month to a detenu. The Court said it unhesitatingly held so.
54. Why: an under-trial prisoner gets interviews twice a week under Rule 559A. A convicted prisoner gets them once a week under Rule 550. The Court found it hard to see how one a month for a detenu could be reasonable.
55. Why: a detenu stands on a higher pedestal than an under-trial prisoner or a convict. Sampath Prakash held that restrictions on a detenu must be minimal, consistently with the effectiveness of detention.
56. Held: a detenu must be allowed at least two interviews a week with relatives and friends.
57. Held: a relative or friend must be able to interview the detenu at any reasonable hour, after getting permission from the Superintendent of the Jail. Permission from the District Magistrate, Delhi, is not needed.
58. Why: the District Magistrate procedure is cumbrous and unnecessary from the point of view of security, and so unreasonable.
59. Noted: the Court went further. Even without Rules 550 and 559A, the present norm of two interviews a week for prisoners is a criterion of what is reasonable and non-arbitrary.
60. Held: the same reasoning invalidates sub-clause (i) of clause 3(b), which required prior permission of the District Magistrate and the presence of a nominated officer.
61. Held: a detenu has the right to consult a legal adviser of his choice. The purpose need not be defence in a criminal proceeding. It may be to secure release from preventive detention, to file a writ petition, or to pursue any civil or criminal claim.
62. Held: that right is included in the right to live with human dignity and is part of personal liberty. The detenu cannot be deprived of it, except by "reasonable, fair and just procedure established by a valid law".
63. Held: a prison regulation may regulate legal interviews in a reasonable, fair and just manner. It cannot prescribe an arbitrary or unreasonable procedure. If it does, it violates Articles 14 and 21.
64. Noted: prior appointment through the District Magistrate, Delhi, causes great hardship. The lawyer must apply well in advance. The time fixed may not suit a busy practitioner. From a practical view, the right to consult a legal adviser would be illusory.
65. Noted: the presence of a nominated officer is also an unreasonable requirement. The District Magistrate would have to fix the time in consultation with the Collector of Customs or Central Excise, or the Deputy Director of Enforcement. It may be hard to match the lawyer's time with the officer's.
66. Noted: if the nominated officer does not attend, as seems to have happened on quite a few occasions in the petitioner's case, no interview can be held. The lawyer must go back, and the whole appointment procedure must start again.
67. Noted: the respondents gave no satisfactory explanation of the reason for requiring the officer's presence.
68. Held: sub-clause (i) of clause 3(b), which regulates the detenu's right to meet a legal adviser of his choice, violates Articles 14 and 21. It is unconstitutional and void.
69. Held: it would be quite reasonable if a detenu could meet his legal adviser at any reasonable hour of the day after taking an appointment from the Superintendent of the Jail. The Superintendent must give the appointment without any avoidable delay.
70. Held: the interview need not take place in the presence of a nominated officer of Customs, Central Excise or Enforcement. If such an officer can conveniently be present without postponing the interview, he may watch it. If not, any other Jail official may watch it, if thought necessary.
71. Held: the watching officer must not be within hearing distance of the detenu and the legal adviser.
72. Held: the writ petition is allowed, and relief is granted to the extent indicated.

Authorities

• Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1979] 1 SCC 248 — followed and applied. Article 21 restricts law making, and the procedure must be reasonable, fair and just. Personal liberty has the widest amplitude.
• M.O. Hoscot v. State of Maharashtra, [1979] 1 SCR 192 — named as part of the line of decisions that grew from Maneka Gandhi.
• Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, [1980] 1 SCC 81 — named in the same line of decisions.
• Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Administration, [1979] 1 SCR 392 — followed. A five-Judge Bench held that fundamental rights do not flee the person at the prison gate. It also accepted the Munn v. Illinois passage on life.
• Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, [1980] 2 SCR 557 — followed and applied. Krishna Iyer, J. said a prisoner wears the armour of basic freedom behind bars.
• Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, [1969] 3 SCR 574 — followed. Restrictions on a person preventively detained must, consistently with the effectiveness of detention, be minimal.
• State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Sanzgiri, [1966] 1 SCR 702 — cited as having impliedly accepted that prisoners keep fundamental rights.
• D.B. Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [1975] 2 SCR 24 — followed. A convict keeps the fundamental rights that incarceration does not take away, including Article 21.
• Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1964] 1 SCR 232 — referred to. Subba Rao, J. quoted Munn v. Illinois to show that life means more than animal existence.
• Munn v. Illinois, [1877] 94 US 133 — referred to. Field, J. said life means more than mere animal existence, and bars deprivation of the limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed.
• Eve Pall's case, 417 US 817: 41 Lawyers Edition 2nd 495 — quoted with approval. Douglas, J.: prisoners remain persons with constitutional rights.
• Charles Wolff's case, 41 Lawyers Edition 2nd 935 — quoted with approval. White, J.: no iron curtain between the Constitution and the prisons.
• Weems v. U.S., 54 Lawyers Edition 801 — quoted with approval as the guide to reading a constitutional provision widely.

Also cited in footnotes: the judgment text has no footnotes.

Provisions mentioned

• Article 14 — equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. The Court held both sub-clauses violate it.
• Article 19 — named only as a source of rights that personal liberty includes, as held in Maneka Gandhi.
• Article 21 — no one is deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The procedure must be reasonable, fair and just.
• Article 22, clauses (4) to (7) — safeguards against preventive detention. The petitioner also relied on Article 22 for the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of choice.
• Article 32 — the right to move the Supreme Court. The petition was filed under it.
• COFEPOSA Act, section 3 — the detention order of 23 November 1979 was issued under it.
• COFEPOSA Act, section 5 — the Delhi Administration made the Conditions of Detention Order of 23 August 1975 under it.
• Section 3(b)(i) and (ii), that is clause 3(b)(i) and (ii) of the Conditions of Detention — rules on interviews with a legal adviser and with family members. Both were held invalid.
• Rule 559A and Rule 550, Punjab Manual for the Superintendence and Management of Jails — twice-weekly interviews for under-trial prisoners and weekly interviews for convicts.
• Article 5, Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 7, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights — the right against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, which the Court said is implicit in Article 21.

Judgement

The Court allowed the writ petition and granted relief to the extent indicated in the judgment. The directions are:

1. Sub-clause (ii) of clause 3(b) of the Conditions of Detention Order is violative of Articles 14 and 21 in so far as it permits only one interview in a month to a detenu.
2. A detenu must be permitted at least two interviews in a week with relatives and friends.
3. A relative or friend must be able to have an interview with the detenu at any reasonable hour on obtaining permission from the Superintendent of the Jail. Permission of the District Magistrate, Delhi, is not necessary.
4. Sub-clause (i) of clause 3(b), which regulates a detenu's interview with a legal adviser of his choice, is violative of Articles 14 and 21. It is unconstitutional and void.
5. A detenu may have an interview with his legal adviser at any reasonable hour of the day after taking an appointment from the Superintendent of the Jail. The Superintendent must give the appointment without any avoidable delay.
6. The interview need not take place in the presence of a nominated officer of Customs, Central Excise or Enforcement.
7. If such an officer can conveniently be present without postponing the interview, he may watch it. If not, any other Jail official may watch it, if thought necessary. The watcher must not be within hearing distance of the detenu and the legal adviser.

The judgment states no order on costs. It records the respondents' two concessions (twice-weekly family interviews and no insistence on a Customs or Excise officer) without making them part of the order.

Legal Principle / Ratio

The right to life in Article 21 includes the right to live with human dignity. A detenu keeps every right except those that cannot be enjoyed in incarceration. Prison rules on interviews with family and lawyers must be reasonable, fair and just, or they violate Articles 14 and 21.

Key holding: "the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it".

Subsequent Treatment

A.K. Roy v. Union of India — 1982 AIR 710; 1982 SCR (2) 272; 1982 (1) SCC 27 (Supreme Court of India, decided 28 December 1981).

Bench as printed: Y.V. Chandrachud, P.N. Bhagwati, A.C. Gupta, V.D. Tulzapurkar and D.A. Desai. The text has no numbered paragraphs, so none is cited.

• Counsel for the petitioners relied on Francis Coralie Mullin, with Hoskot and Hussainara Khatoon. He argued that a detenu may appear through a lawyer before the Advisory Board.
• The Court summarised Francis Coralie Mullin. A detenu wanted to interview her lawyer, and clause 3(b)(i) of the Conditions of Detention made this almost impossible. The Court held the clause void under Articles 14 and 21.
• The Court also noted the directions. The interview was to be at any reasonable hour after appointment from the Jail Superintendent. A Customs or Central Excise officer's presence was not needed. An officer could watch but not stay within hearing distance.
• The Court held that the decision had no bearing on the point before it. Francis Coralie Mullin asked only whether the procedure for interviews with a legal adviser was reasonable.
• A.K. Roy therefore did not treat the case as deciding a detenu's right to be represented by a lawyer before the Advisory Board.

Other later cases (not summarized)

• Devji Vallabhbhai Tandel v. Administrator of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR 1982 SC 1029 — text not fetched.
• Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1618 — text not fetched.

Critical Analysis

Analysis based on the judgment text.

• The Court did not decide whether Article 22 itself gives the right to a lawyer in detention. It rested the lawyer's interview on Article 21 and held it part of dignity and personal liberty.
• The Court said the content of the right to live with dignity depends on the economic development of the country. The judgment does not say how a court should measure that limit.
• The Court said any torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is barred by Article 21. It did not apply that statement to the facts, which concerned interviews only.
• The Court set two interviews a week as a reasonable norm. It also said the norm is reasonable independently of Rules 550 and 559A. The judgment gives no further guidance on other conditions of detention.
• The respondents' concessions did not end the case. The Court said the conditions must be finally settled because many COFEPOSA detenus are affected.
• The judgment gives no reason why the Customs officer's presence was needed. It records only that the respondents offered no satisfactory explanation.

Significance

• The Court built directly on Maneka Gandhi. It described that case as the springboard for the later development of Article 21.
• It gave a wider meaning to life than mere animal existence. It listed nutrition, clothing, shelter, reading, writing and human contact as parts of the right to live with dignity.
• It confirmed that prisoners and detenus keep their fundamental rights, apart from those inconsistent with incarceration.
• It set practical standards for interviews: two a week with family and friends, and lawyer interviews at any reasonable hour.

Exam-Important Points

• Rule: the right to life under Article 21 is the right to live with human dignity, not mere animal existence. The trap: do not limit it to protection of limbs and faculties.
• Rule: a detenu keeps all fundamental rights except those that cannot be enjoyed in incarceration. The trap: fundamental rights do not end at the prison gate.
• Rule: restrictions on a preventive detenu must, consistently with the effectiveness of detention, be minimal (Sampat Prakash).
• Holding on family: a detenu needs at least two interviews a week. One a month was held unreasonable and arbitrary.
• Holding on lawyer: interview at any reasonable hour on appointment from the Jail Superintendent, not the District Magistrate. A nominated officer need not be present.
• Prison officials may still watch a lawyer interview if thought necessary. The trap: they must stay out of hearing distance.
• Articles 14 and 21 together tested the rules. Article 22 was argued but the Court rested its reasoning on Article 21.

Prepared from the full text of the judgment. The judgment text has no numbered paragraphs, so no paragraph numbers are cited.