| Court | Queen's Bench Division |
|---|---|
| Bench | Nield, J. |
| Year | 1969 |
| Cited in | Negligence (Notes) |
A doctor who never even examined a dying man was, on paper, plainly negligent — turning away a patient without so much as a look is about as careless as medicine gets. He still won. The poison had already made death certain hours before the doctor was ever asked to help.
Barnett (widow of the deceased) — plaintiff.
Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee — defendant; managed the hospital whose casualty department turned the deceased away.
At around 5:00 a.m. on 1 January 1966, three night watchmen drank tea that had, unknown to them, been laced with arsenic. By around 8:00 a.m., all three arrived at the casualty department of a hospital managed by the defendant, complaining of severe stomach pain and vomiting.
The casualty department's medical officer, Dr Banerjee, was not present at the hospital at the time. When a nurse telephoned him about the men, he did not come to examine them himself; instead, he advised, by telephone, that they should go home and see their own doctors. None of the three men were examined by any doctor at the hospital. One of them, the deceased Mr Barnett, subsequently died; a post-mortem revealed that he had died of arsenic poisoning.
His widow sued the hospital management committee, alleging that the casualty department had been negligent in failing to examine and treat her husband when he presented with his symptoms.
On behalf of Barnett (Plaintiff): It was argued that a hospital casualty department owes a clear duty of care to a patient who presents himself with symptoms requiring medical attention, and that refusing even to examine a patient complaining of severe symptoms, instead sending him away by telephone advice alone, was a plain breach of that duty. Given this admitted or clearly established negligence, the hospital should be held liable for the death that followed.
On behalf of the Hospital Management Committee (Defendant): While not seriously disputing that the casualty officer's conduct fell below the standard expected — refusing to see a patient at all was difficult to defend as reasonable care — the defence rested on causation: even accepting that the hospital had been negligent in failing to examine and treat the deceased, the medical evidence showed that by the time he presented at the hospital, the arsenic poisoning was already so far advanced that no available antidote could have been administered in time to save his life. The negligence, even if real, made no actual difference to the outcome.
Nield, J. was prepared to find, on the facts, that the casualty officer had indeed been negligent in failing to see and examine the deceased when he presented with his symptoms — a doctor who turns away a patient reporting severe symptoms, without any examination at all, plainly falls short of the standard of reasonable care expected of a hospital casualty department.
However, the judge held that establishing a breach of duty was not, by itself, enough; the plaintiff also had to prove that this breach actually caused the death — applying what has become known as the "but for" test of factual causation: would the harm have occurred but for the defendant's negligence? On the medical evidence before the court, even if the deceased had been properly examined and admitted, there was no effective antidote that could realistically have been administered in time, given how far the arsenic poisoning had already progressed by the time he reached the hospital, to prevent his death. In other words, the deceased would probably have died from the poisoning regardless of whether the casualty officer had examined him or not.
Since the plaintiff could not show that the hospital's admitted failure to examine and treat the deceased had actually made any difference to the outcome, causation was not established, and the claim in negligence failed on that ground, despite the clear breach of duty.
Nield, J. held that although the hospital had been negligent in failing to examine and treat the deceased, this negligence had not caused his death, since he would have died from the arsenic poisoning in any event, even with proper treatment. The claim against the hospital was accordingly dismissed.
Establishing that a defendant breached a duty of care is not, by itself, sufficient to found liability in negligence; the claimant must also prove factual causation — that the breach actually caused the harm suffered, applying the "but for" test: would the claimant's injury have occurred but for the defendant's negligence? Where the evidence shows that the harm would have occurred regardless of the defendant's negligence, the claim fails on causation even though a clear breach of duty is established.
Barnett v. Chelsea & Kensington Hospital Management Committee is the standard illustration, taught in virtually every tort law course, of the "but for" test of factual causation, and of the important distinction between breach of duty and causation as separate elements a claimant must independently establish. It demonstrates that even a serious, clearly established breach of duty — here, a doctor refusing to examine a dying patient at all — does not automatically result in liability if the claimant cannot show that the breach made a real difference to the outcome. The case remains a frequently cited caution against assuming that negligence and liability are the same thing.
Facts, bench and citation verified against Wikipedia's and independent case-law summaries' accounts of the judgment.